OUTLINE OF GREAT BOOKS

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

Annan

Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) ranks with Samuel Johnson as one of the dominating figures in English literature. A profound scholar, steeped in German philosophy, he absorbed the Teuton spirit, and all his work is coloured by the idealism of Fichte and the romantic individualism of Jean Paul Richter. In his isolated and unrestful soul there was a singular blend of the Hindu seer and the Hebrew prophet. On the one hand he was filled with a sense of the illusion of things, the only certain fact in the ever-shifting mirage being the unvarying moral law of cause and effect, the retributive law of justice. On the other hand he had an exaggerated sense of his individual personality which drove him into tremendous denunciation and gave his forthright utterances the dynamic vehemence of a major prophet. By his savage denunciation of shams, his insistence upon justification by work, and his unshakable belief in the justice of the 'great soul of the world' he profoundly influenced the finer minds of his age. Our portrait is from the famous painting by J. McNeill Whistler in the Glasgow Art Galleries.

Frontispiece

OUTLINE
OF
GREAT BOOKS

Edited by

SIR J. A. HAMMERTON

Comprising Two Hundred and Fifty of the World's
Most Famous Works of History Philosophy Science
Religion Poetry Biography Travel and Criticism
Outlined in their Authors' Own Words

With a Portrait Gallery
of the Authors

IN THREE VOLUMES

★

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WILLIAM H. WISE & COMPANY
1934

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Thucydides

ANABASIS
Xenophon

THE HISTORY OF GREECE
George Grote

CATILINE
Sallust

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THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION
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G. W. F. Hegel

SARTOR RESARTUS
Thomas Carlyle

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
ON LIBERTY
John Stuart Mill

Editor's Introduction

In preparing this choice of great books from ancient and modern literature an effort has been made to present the selection in a way that might help the reader to remember the order of their appearance and so to acquire a lasting mental impression of their sequence in time.

Choosing the section of Philosophy as an example, it is instructive to note the order in which the books were first given to the world from about 400 B.C. to A.D. 1903. And in some degree, less or greater, the same applies to the other divisions, excepting perhaps Poetry and Miscellaneous, where the order of dates is of minor consequence. A different arrangement, however, was demanded for the presentation of the works of History. Instead of their order being determined by the dates of their original publication, it has been based upon the historical periods of which they treat. The reason for this exception will be obvious.

The distinguishing feature of the work is that it offers the pith and marrow of some two hundred and fifty famous books in *condensed versions*. It is not a collection of "specimen passages." Let anyone without previous knowledge of Locke's Human Understanding or Karl Marx's Capital—taking two examples at random—spend the twenty minutes necessary to the careful reading of each of our abridgements, and he will acquire a knowledge of these works beyond all comparison with that of anyone who has read merely an equivalent amount of "illustrative extracts." And the same applies to all the other outlines appearing in this volume.

The work has a three-fold appeal, and this, briefly stated, may help the reader to determine in what measure it meets his particular case.

(1) *Young Students of Literature* will find it a pleasant and profitable introduction to a very wide range of booklore. Books that may still be but names to them will become so vital when read in our condensed versions that many readers will seek closer acquaintance with the originals, confident of being interested.

(2) *For Busy Men and Women* deficient in book knowledge, the Outline supplies an actual "short cut" to acquaintance with many books that otherwise might exist for them in vain.

(3) *To the Bookman and Scholar* who may have read the originals of most of these two hundred and fifty books, the Outline will prove invaluable as an aid to memory. Though one might read more than five hundred books in the course of five years, it is improbable that one could ever recall two hundred and fifty of these with any measure of clearness. With the help of our abridgements that becomes easy of achievement.

Our Outline is based upon a rational theory of reading. No matter how acute the mind of a reader may be, nor how retentive his memory, immediately after he has read a work so monumental as Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, or Boswell's Life of Johnson, he will not have retained in his memory a greater proportion of the whole than is represented by our printed summaries of those masterpieces. Ten, twenty, or thirty years after it is improbable that his memory will hold so much. What an advantage, then, for him to know that at so slight an effort on his part our pages can either restore his memory of a book read many years ago or provide him with a mental impression almost as vivid as though he had formed it himself after several evenings' close study of the original!

I have just mentioned the abridgement of Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. This is one of the few exceptions to the standard length of our condensed versions, as it occupies the space of the summaries of at least six books of ordinary length, and all who are familiar with the original work will agree that anything less than that would have been quite inadequate. Gibbon's immortal work, possibly the greatest prose work ever written in any language, a masterpiece of erudition, patience and creative literary energy, demanded special treatment, and the version of it appearing in our section of History is in itself a masterpiece of compression, more remarkable because in a space so relatively small the rhythm of Gibbon's characteristic style has not been lost and so much historical information has been compressed without the feeling of mere epitomising.

Perhaps it is also worth adding that the outlines of all classics from Greek and Latin, as also those from the modern tongues, have been made direct from the originals by scholars who are expert in the literatures of the different languages.

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WALTER BAGEHOT

'The History' of Herodotus

HERODOTUS

WHEN Cicero called Herodotus the Father of History he meant that the Greek was the first to conceive an historical work in an artistic and dramatically unified form. In subordination to this *motif* he worked up a vast mass of antiquarian and ethnological lore. His History takes us down to 478 B.C. Its dramatic crisis is the destruction of the power of Persia by a handful of Greeks at Thermopylae, Salamis and Mycale; its lesson, that of the Nemesis falling on those who, drunk with pride of power, forget the restrictions of mortality.

I—THE WESTWARD THRUST OF PERSIAN POWER

I WILL not dispute whether those ancient tales be true, of Io and Helen and the like, which one or another have called the sources of the war between the Hellenes and the barbarians of Asia; but I will begin with those wrongs whereof I myself have knowledge. In the days of Sadyattes, king of Lydia, and his son Alyattes, there was war between Lydia and Miletus. And Croesus made himself master of the lands bounded by the Halys, and he waxed in power and wealth, so that there was none like him. To him came Solon, the Athenian, but would not hail him as the happiest of all men, saying that none may be called happy until his life's end.

Thereafter trouble fell upon Croesus by the slaying of his son when he was hunting. Then Cyrus the Persian rose up and made himself master of the Medes and Persians, and Croesus, fearing his power, was fain to go up against him, being deceived by an oracle; but first he sought to make alliance with the chief of the states of Hellas. In those days, Pisistratus was despot of Athens; but Sparta was mighty, by the laws of Lycurgus. Therefore Croesus sent envoys to the Spartans to make alliance with them, which was done very willingly. But when Croesus went up against Cyrus, his army was put to flight, and Cyrus besieged him in the city of Sardis, and took it, and made himself lord of Lydia. He would have slain Croesus, but, finding him wise and pious, he made him his counsellor.

Now this Cyrus had before overthrown the Median king, Astyages, whose daughter was his own mother. For her father, fearing a dream, wedded her to a Persian, and when she bore a child, he gave order for its slaying. But the babe was taken away and brought up by a herdsman of the hill-folk. But in course of time the truth became known to Astyages, and to Harpagus, the officer who had been bidden to slay the babe, and to Cyrus himself. Then Harpagus, fearing the wrath of Astyages, bade Cyrus gather together the Persians—who in those days were a hardy people of the mountains—and make himself king over the Medians; which things Cyrus did, overthrowing his grandfather Astyages. And it was in this wise that the dominion of the Persians began.

The Ionian cities of Asia were zealous to make alliance with Cyrus when he had overthrown Croesus. But he held them of little account, and threatened them, and the Lacedaemonians also, who sent him messengers warning him to let the Ionians alone. And he sent Harpagus against the cities of the Ionians, of whom certain Phocaeans and Teians sailed away to Rhegium and Abdera rather than become the slaves of the barbarians; but the rest, though they fought valiantly enough, were brought to submission by Harpagus.

WHILE Harpagus was completing the subjugation of the West, Cyrus was making conquest of Upper Asia, and overthrew the kingdom of Assyria, of which the chief city was Babylon, a very wonderful city, wherein there had ruled two famous queens, Semiramis and Nitocris. Now, this queen had made the city wondrous strong by the craft of engineers, yet Cyrus took it by a shrewd device, drawing off the water of the river so as to gain a passage. Thus Babylon also fell under the sway of the Persian. But when Cyrus would have made war upon Tomyris, the queen of the Massagetae, who dwelt to the eastward, there was a great battle, and Cyrus himself was slain and the most part of his host. And Cambyses, his son, reigned in his stead.

II—CAMBYSES CARRIES THE CONQUEST INTO EGYPT

CAMBYSES set out to conquer Egypt, taking in his army certain of the Greeks. But of what I shall tell about that land, the most was told to me by the priests whom I myself visited at Memphis and Thebes and Heliopolis. The Egyptians account themselves the most ancient of peoples. If the Ionians are right, who reckon that Egypt is only the Nile Delta, this could not be. But I reckon that the whole Egyptian territory is Egypt, from the Cataracts and Elephantine down to the sea, parted into the Asiatic part and the Libyan part by the Nile.

For the causes of the rising and falling of the Nile, the reasons that men give are of no account. And of the sources whence the river springs are strange stories told, of which I say not whether they be true or false; but the course of it is known for four months' journey by land and water, and in my opinion it is a river comparable to the Ister.

The priests tell that the first ruler of Egypt was Menes, and after him were three hundred and thirty kings, counting one queen, who was called Nitocris. After them came Sesostris, who carried his conquest as far as the Thracians and Scythians; and later was Rhampsinitus, who married his daughter to the clever thief that

robbed his treasure-house; and after him Cheops, who built the pyramid, drawing the stones from the Arabian mountain down to the Nile. Chephren also, and Mycerinus built pyramids, and the Greeks have a story—which is not true—that another was built by Rhodopis. And in the reign of Sethon, Egypt was invaded by Sennacherib the Assyrian, whose army's bowstrings were eaten by field-mice.

A thing more wonderful than the pyramids is the labyrinth near Lake Moeris, and still more wonderful is Lake Moeris itself, all which were made by the twelve kings who ruled at once after Sethon. And after them, Psammitichus made himself the monarch; and after him his great-grandson Apries prospered greatly, till he was overthrown by Amasis. And Amasis also prospered, and showed favour to the Greeks. But for whatever reason, in his day Cambyses made his expedition against Egypt, invading it just when Amasis had died, and his son Psammenitus was reigning.

CAMBYSES put the Egyptian army to rout in a great battle and conquered the country, making Psammenitus prisoner. Yet he would have set him up as governor of the province, according to the Persian custom, but that Psammenitus was stirred up to revolt and, being discovered, was put to death. Thereafter Cambyses would have made war upon Carthage, but that the Phoenicians would not aid him; and against the Ethiopians, who are called 'long-lived,' but his army could get no food; and against the Ammonians, but the troops that went were seen no more.

Now, madness came upon Cambyses, and he died, having committed many crimes, among which was the slaying of his brother Smerdis. And there rose up one among the Magi who pretended to be Smerdis, and was proclaimed king. But this false Smerdis was one whose ears had been cut off, and he was thus found out by one of his wives, the daughter of a Persian nobleman, Otanes. Then seven nobles conspired together, since they would not be ruled over by one of the Magi; and having determined that it was best to have one man for ruler, rather than the rule of the people or of the nobles, they slew Smerdis and made Darius, the son of Hystaspes, their king.

Then Darius divided the Persian empire into twenty satrapies, whereof each one paid its own tribute, save Persia itself, and he was lord of all Asia, and Egypt also.

In the days of Cambyses, Polycrates was despot of Samos, being the first who ever thought to make himself a ruler of the seas. And he had prospered marvellously. But Oroetes, the satrap of Sardis, compassed his death by foul treachery, and wrought many other crimes; whom Darius in turn put to death by guile, fearing to make open war upon him. And not long afterwards, he sent Otanes to make conquest of Samos. And during the same days there was a revolt of the Babylonians; and Darius went up against Babylon, yet for twenty months he could not take it.

Howbeit, Babylon was taken by the act of Zopyrus, who, having mutilated himself, went to the Babylonians and told them that Darius had thus evilly entreated him, and so, winning their trust, he made easy entry for the Persian army, and so Babylon was taken for the second time.

III—DARIUS AND HIS ARMY CROSS THE DANUBE

NOW, Darius was minded to make conquest of the Scythians—concerning which people, and the lands beyond those which they inhabit, there are many marvels told, as of a bald-headed folk called Argippaei; and the Arimaspians or one-eyed people; and the Hyperborean land where the air is full of feathers. Of these lands are legends only; nothing is known. But concerning the earth's surface, this much is known, that Libya is surrounded by water, certain Phoenicians having sailed round it. And of the unknown regions of Asia much was searched out by order of Darius.

The Scythians themselves have no cities; but there are great rivers in Scythia, whereof the Ister is the greatest of all known streams, being greater even than the Nile, if we reckon its tributaries. The great god of the Scythians is Ares; and their war customs are savage exceedingly, and all their ways barbarous. Against this folk Darius resolved to march.

His plan was to convey his army across the Bosporus on a bridge of boats, while the Ionian fleet should sail up to the Ister and bridge that and await him. So he crossed the Bosporus and marched through Thrace, subduing on his way the Getae, who believe that there is no true death.

But when he passed the Ister, he would have taken the Ionians along with him; but by counsel of Coes of Mitylene, he resolved to leave them in charge of the bridge, giving order that, after sixty days, they might depart home, but no sooner.

THEN the Scythians, fearing that they could not match the great king's army, summoned the other barbaric peoples to their aid; among whom were the Sauromatians, who are fabled to be the offspring of the Amazons. And some were willing, but others not. Therefore the Scythians retired before Darius, first towards those peoples who would not come to their help; and so enticed him into desert regions, yet would in no wise come to battle with him.

Now, at length, Darius found himself in so evil a plight that he began to march back to the Ister. And certain Scythians came to the Ionians and counselled them to destroy the bridge, the sixty days being passed. And this Miltiades, the Athenian despot of the Chersonese, would have had them do, so that Darius might perish with all his army; but Histiaeus of Miletus dissuaded them, because the rule of the despots was upheld by Darius. And thus the Persian army was saved, Megabazus being left in Europe to subdue the Hellespontines. When Megabazus had subdued many of the Thracian peoples, who, indeed, lack only union with each other to make them the mightiest of all nations, he sent an embassy to Amyntas, the king of Macedon, to demand earth and water. But because those envoys insulted the ladies of the court, Alexander, the son of Amyntas, slew them all, and of them or all their train naught was heard more.

Now Darius, with fair words, bade Histiaeus of Miletus abide with him at the royal town of Susa. Then Aristagoras, the brother of Histiaeus, having failed in an attempt to subdue Naxos, and fearing both Artaphernes, the satrap of Sardis, and the Persian general Megabazus, with whom he had quarrelled, sought to stir up a revolt of the Ionian cities; being incited thereto by secret messages from Histiaeus.

To this end he sought alliance with the Lacedaemonians; but they would have nothing to do with him, deeming the venture too remote. Then he went to Athens, whence the sons of Pisistratus had been driven forth just before. For Hipparchus had been slain by Harmodius and Aristogiton, and afterwards Hippias would hardly have been expelled but that his enemies captured his children and so could make with him what terms they chose. But the Pisistratidae having been expelled, the city grew in might, and changes were made in the government of it by Clisthenes the Alcmaeonid. But the party that was against Clisthenes got aid from Cleomenes of Sparta; yet the party of Clisthenes won.

Then, since they reckoned that there would be war with Sparta, the Athenians had sought friendship with Artaphernes at Sardis; but since he demanded earth and water they broke off. But because Athens was waxing in strength, the Spartans bethought them of restoring the despotism of the Pisistratidae. But Sosicles, the Corinthian, dissuaded the allies of Sparta from taking part in so evil a deed. Then Hippias sought to stir up against the Athenians the ill-will of Artaphernes, who bade them take back the Pisistratidae, which they would not do.

Therefore, when Aristagoras came thither, the Athenians were readily persuaded to promise him aid. And he, having gathered the troops of the Ionians, who were at one with him, marched with them and the Athenians against Sardis and took the city, which by a chance was set on fire. But after that the Athenians refused further help to the Ionians, who were worsted by the Persians. But the ruin of the Ionians was at the sea-fight of Lade, where the men of Chios fought stoutly; but, they of Samos and Lesbos deserting, there was a great rout.

IV—THE KNELL OF PERSIA'S HOPE AT MARATHON AND THERMOPYLAE

Thereafter King Darius, being very wroth with the Athenians for their share in the burning of Sardis, sent a great army across the Hellespont to march through Thrace against Athens, under his young kinsman Mardonius. But disaster befell these at the hands of the Thracians, and the fleet that was to aid them was shattered in a storm; so that they returned to Asia without honour. Then Darius sent envoys to demand earth and water from the Greek states; and of the islands the most gave them, and some also of the cities on the mainland; and among these were the Aeginetans, which were at feud with Athens.

But of those who would not give the earth and water were the Eretrians of Euboea. So Darius sent a great armament by sea against Eretria and Athens, led by Datis and Artaphernes, which sailed first against Eretria. The Athenians, indeed, sent aid; but when they found that the counsels of the Eretrians were divided, so that no firm stand might be made, they withdrew. Nevertheless, the Eretrians fought valiantly behind their walls, till they were betrayed on the seventh day. But the Persians, counselled by Hippias, sailed to the bay of Marathon.

Then the Athenians sent the strong runner Pheidippides to call upon the Spartans for aid; who promised it, yet for sacred reasons would not move until the full moon. So the Athenian host had none to aid them save the loyal Plataeans, valiant though few. Yet in the council of their generals the word of Miltiades was given for battle, whereto the rest consented. Then the Athenians and Plataeans, being drawn up in a long line, charged across the plain nigh a mile, running upon the masses of the Persians; and, breaking them upon the wings, turned and routed the centre also after long fighting, and drove them down to the ships, slaying as they went; and of the ships they took seven. And of the barbarians there fell 6,400 men, and of the Athenians, 192. But as for the story that the Alcmaeonidae hoisted a friendly signal to the Persians, I credit it not at all.

Now, Darius was very wroth with the Greeks when he heard of these things, and made preparation for a mighty armament to overthrow the Greeks, and also the Egyptians, who revolted soon afterwards. But he died before he was ready, and Xerxes, his son, reigned in his stead. Then, having first crushed the Egyptians, he, being ruled by Mardonius, gathered a council and declared his intent of marching against the Hellenes; which resolution was commended by Mardonius, but Artabanus, the king's uncle, spoke wise words of warning. Then Xerxes would have changed his mind, but for a dream which came to him twice, and to Artabanus also, threatening disaster if he ceased from his project; so that Artabanus was won over.

Then Xerxes made vast provision for his invasion—for the building of a bridge over the Hellespont, and the cutting of a canal through the peninsula of Athos, where the fleet of Mardonius had been shattered. And from all parts of his huge empire he mustered his hosts first in Cappadocia, and marched thence by way of Sardis to the Hellespont. And because, when the bridge was a-building, a great storm wrecked it, he bade flog the naughty waves of the sea. Then, the bridge being finished, he passed over with his host, which took seven days to accomplish.

And when they were come to Doriscus he numbered them, and found them to be 1,700,000 men, besides his fleets. And in the fleet were 1,207 great ships, manned chiefly by the Phoenicians and the Greeks of Asia, having also Persian and Scythian fighting men on board. But when Demaratus, an exiled king of Sparta, warned Xerxes of the valour of all the Greeks, but chiefly of the Spartans, who would give battle, however few they might be, against any foe, however many, his words seemed to Xerxes a jest, seeing how huge his own army was.

Now, Xerxes had sent to many of the Greek states heralds to demand earth and water, which many had given; but to Athens and Sparta he had not sent, because there the heralds of his father Darius had been evilly entreated. And if it had not been for the resolution of the Athenians at this time, all Hellas would have been forced to submit to the Great King; for they, in despite of threatening oracles, held fast to their defiance, being urged thereto by Themistocles, who showed them how those oracles must mean that, although they would suffer evil things, they would be victorious by means of wooden bulwarks, which is to say, ships; and thus they were encouraged to rely upon building and manning a mighty fleet. And all the other cities of Greece resolved to stand by them, except the Argives, who would not submit to the leadership of the Spartans. Nor were the men of Thessaly willing to join, since the other Greeks could not help them to guard Thessaly itself.

Therefore, the Greeks resolved to make their stand at Thermopylae on land, and at the strait of Artemisium by sea. But at the strong pass of Thermopylae only a small force was gathered to hold the barbarians in check, there being of the Spartans themselves only 300, commanded by the king Leonidas. And when the Persians had come thither and sought to storm the pass, they were beaten back with ease, until a track was found by which they might take the defenders in the rear. Then Leonidas bade the rest of the army depart except his Spartans. But the Thespians also would not go; and then those Spartans and Thespians went out into the open and died gloriously.

V—FINAL DESTRUCTION OF THE PERSIAN HOSTS

During these same days the Greek fleet at Artemisium fought three several engagements with the Persian fleet, in which neither side had much the better. And thereafter the Greek fleet withdrew, but was persuaded to remain undispersed in the bay of Salamis. The Peloponnesians were no longer minded to attempt the defence of Attica, but to fortify their isthmus, so that the Athenians had no choice but either to submit or to evacuate Athens, removing their families and their goods to Troezen or Aegina or Salamis. In the fleet, their contingent was by far the largest and best, but the commanding admiral was the Spartan Eurybiades. Then the Persians, passing through Boeotia, but, being dispersed before Delphi by thunderbolts and other portents, took possession of Athens, after a fierce fight with the garrison in the Acropolis.

Then the rest of the Greek fleet was fain to withdraw from Salamis, and look to the safety of the Peloponnese only. But Themistocles warned them that if they did so, the Athenians would leave them and sail to new lands and make themselves a new Athens; and thus the fleet was persuaded to hold together at Salamis. Yet he did not trust only to their goodwill, but sent a messenger to the Persian fleet that the way of retreat might be intercepted. For the Persian fleet had gathered at Phalerum, and now looked to overwhelm the Grecian fleet altogether, despite the adverse counsel of Queen Artemisia of Halicarnassus. When Aristides, called the Just, the great rival of Themistocles, told the Greeks that their retreat by sea was cut off, then they were no longer divided, but resolved to fight it out.

In the battle, the Aeginetans and the Athenians did the best of all the Greeks, and Themistocles best among the commanders; nor was ever any fleet more utterly put to rout than that of the Persians, among whom Queen Artemisia won praise unmerited. As for King Xerxes, panic seized him when he saw the disaster to his fleet, and he made haste to flee. He consented, however, to leave Mardonius behind with 300,000 troops in Thessaly, he being still assured that he could crush the Greeks.

When the winter and spring were passed, Mardonius marched from Thessaly and again occupied Athens, which the Athenians had again evacuated, the Spartans having failed to send succour. But when at length the Lacedaemonians, fearing to lose the Athenian fleet, sent forth an army, the Persians fell back to Boeotia. So the Greek hosts gathered near Plataea to the number of 108,000 men, but the troops of Mardonius were about 350,000. Yet, by reason of doubtful auguries, both armies held back, till Mardonius resolved to attack, whereof warning was brought to the Athenians by Alexander of Macedon.

But when the Spartan Pausanias, the general of the Greeks, heard of this, he did what caused no little wonder, for he proposed that the Athenians instead of the Lacedaemonians should face the picked troops of the Persians, as having fought them at Marathon. But Mardonius, seeing them move, moved also. Then he sent some light horse against the Greeks by a fountain whence flowed the army's water; which, becoming choked, it was needful to move to a new position. The move being at night, most of the allies withdrew into the town. But the Spartans and Tegeans and Athenians, perceiving this, held each their ground till dawn.

Now, in the morning the picked Persian troops fell on the Spartans, and their Grecian allies attacked the Athenians. But, Mardonius being slain, the Persians fled to their camp, which was stormed by the Spartans and Tegeans, and the Athenians, who also had routed their foes; and there the barbarians were slaughtered, so that of 300,000 men not 3,000 were left alive. But Artabanus, who, before the battle, had withdrawn with 40,000 men, escaped hurriedly to the Hellespont.

And on the same day was fought another fight by sea at Mycale in Ionia, where also the barbarians were utterly routed, for the fleet had sailed thither. And thence the Greeks sailed to Sestos, attacked and captured the place, and so went home.

History of the Peloponnesian War

THUCYDIDES

AT the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. Thucydides began to write a history of the conflict. His History in eight books gives an account of the hostilities to 411 B.C., but the war, a twenty-seven years' struggle between Athens and Sparta for the hegemony of the Greek world, did not end until the surrender of Athens to Lysander in 404. The work is remarkable chiefly for its analysis of the causes that underlay the events recorded. In this respect Thucydides was the first and remains the greatest of philosophical historians. His History contains some fine descriptive passages, and in the substantially authentic summaries of speeches attributed to various prominent men on both sides, some magnificent declamations.

I—THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

I HAVE written the account of the war between Athens and Sparta, since it is the greatest and most calamitous of all wars hitherto to the Greeks. For the contest with the Medes was decided in four battles; but this war was protracted over many years, and wrought infinite injury and bloodshed.

Of the immediate causes of the war the first is to be found in the affairs of Epidamnus, Corcyra and Corinth, of which Corcyra was a colony. Of the Greek states, the most were joined to either the Athenian or the Peloponnesian league, but Corcyra had joined neither. But having a quarrel with Corinth about Epidamnus, she now formed an alliance with Athens, which enraged the Corinthians.

They then helped Potidaea, a Corinthian colony but an Athenian tributary, to revolt from Athens. Corinth next appealed to Sparta, as the head of Hellas, to intervene ere it should be too late and check the Athenian aggression, which threatened to make her the tyrant of all Greece. At Sparta, the war party prevailed, although Archidamus urged that sufficient pressure could be brought to bear without hostilities.

The great prosperity and development of Athens since the Persian war had filled other states with fear and jealousy. She had rebuilt her city walls and refortified the port of Piraeus after the Persian occupation; Sparta had virtually allowed her to take the lead in the subsequent stages of the war, as having the most effective naval force at command. Hence she had founded the Delian league of the maritime states, to hold the seas against Persia. At first these states provided fixed contingents of ships and mariners; but Athens was willing to accept treasure in substitution, so that she might herself supply ships and men.

Thus the provision of forces by each state to act against Persia was changed in effect into a tribute for the expansion of the Athenian fleet. The continuous development of the power of Athens had been checked only momentarily by her disastrous Egyptian expedition. Her nominal allies found themselves actually her tributary dependencies, and various attempts to break free from her yoke had made it only more secure and burdensome.

Hence the warlike decision of Sparta was welcomed by others beside Corinth. But diplomatic demands preceded hostilities. Sparta and Athens sent to each other summons for the 'expulsion of the curse,' that is of all persons connected with certain families which lay under the curse of the gods.

In the case of Athens, this amounted to requiring the banishment of her greatest citizen and statesman, Pericles. To this the Spartans added the demand that the Athenians should 'restore the freedom of Hellas,' and should specifically remove certain trading disabilities imposed on the people of Megara.

At this crisis Pericles laid down the rules of policy on which Athens ought to act—rules which required her to decline absolutely to submit to any form of dictation from Sparta. When a principle was at stake, it made no difference whether the occasion was trivial or serious. Athens could face war with confidence. Her available wealth was far greater—a matter of vital importance in a prolonged struggle. Her counsels were not divided by the conflicting interests of allies all claiming to direct military movements and policy. Her fleet gave her command of the sea, and enabled her to strike when and where she chose. If Peloponnesian invaders ravaged Attica, still no permanent injury would be done comparable to that which the Athenians could inflict upon them. The one necessity was to concentrate on the war, and attempt no extension of dominion while it was in progress.

War was not yet formally declared when the Thebans attempted to seize Plataea, a town of Boeotia, which had long been closely allied to Athens. The attempt failed, and the Thebans were put to death; but the Plataeans appealed to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbour, and when the Athenian garrison was sent to them this was treated as a *casus belli*.

PREPARATIONS were urged on on both sides; Sparta summoned her allies to muster their contingents on the Isthmus for the invasion of Attica, nearly all the mainland states joining the Peloponnesian league. The islanders and the cities in Asia Minor, on the other hand, were nearly all either actually subject to Athens or in alliance with her.

As Pericles advised, the Athenians left the country open to the ravages of the invading forces, and themselves retired within the city. In spite of the resentment of those who saw their property being laid waste, Pericles maintained his ascendancy, and persuaded the people to devote their energies to sending out an irresistible fleet and to establishing a great reserve both of ships and treasure, which were to be an annual charge and brought into active use only in the case of dire emergency. The fleet sailed round the Peloponnese, and the



HERODOTUS was born at Halicarnassus about 484 B.C., and he lived probably to the age of 60. Practically his whole life was spent in travelling and in making investigations in those classic lands whose story forms the theme of his great work. The above bust is in the National Museum at Naples.

JULIUS CAESAR was a many-sided genius. Apart from his successes as a soldier he was a very able statesman, for his conceptions of administration, which he himself did not live to carry out, were in the main the principles upon which his nephew Augustus founded the solid fabric of the Roman Empire. As a historian and man of letters he stands in the highest rank. The only works that have come down to us are his famous Commentaries on the Gallic War and on the Civil War, which are models of simple and clear writing.



THUCYDIDES (*c.* 464-404 B.C.) came of good Athenian stock. In the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War he was in command of an Athenian fleet detailed to protect the coast of Thrace, where he owned gold mines. His failure to prevent Amphipolis from falling into the hands of the Spartans was attributed to interested motives and punished by banishment. The date of his death is uncertain.

GAIUS JULIUS CAESAR (102-44 B.C.)
From the classic bust in the British Museum



XENOPHON was born at Athens about 430 B.C., and died about 355. The turning-point in his life was his decision to join Cyrus's Greek army. His subsequent appointment as a general brought out all his qualities as a notable captain of *condottieri*. Though an Athenian he joined the Spartans on his return to Greece, and even fought against his native city-state. He lived some time at Scillus, where he indulged his tastes for literature and sport. His best works are the Anabasis, Memorabilia and Cyropedia.



FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, historian, politician and soldier, was born in A.D. 37 and died in about A.D. 100. He was of high birth and a Pharisee, but never allowed his genius to be circumscribed by the prevalent Hebrew insularity. Mainly because of his scholarly achievements, he was sent to Rome in 63 as a delegate to Nero; and shortly afterwards, on the outbreak of a rebellion against the Roman power in Judea, he became governor of Galilee. He defended Iopata against the Roman armies, but was captured and imprisoned. On his release, he went to Rome, and there remained, the intimate friend of the Emperor Vespasian and other great men, until he died.

CORNELIUS TACITUS was born about A.D. 55. He married the daughter of Agricola, adopted a public career and passed through the usual offices of state. Information about his life is sparse apart from allusions in his own works. Tacitus died about A.D. 117.



JEAN FROISSART was born about 1338 and died about 1404. His well-known Chronicles trace the history of the main events in England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Flanders and Spain, as well as happenings at the papal courts at Rome and Avignon, between 1325 and 1400, and form one of the greatest of medieval historical works. They give a vivid picture of the age of chivalry.



EDWARD HYDE, EARL OF CLARENDON
From the painting after Gerard Goest in the National Portrait Gallery

CLARENDON was born at Dinton, in Wiltshire, on February 18, 1608. In 1640 he was returned to parliament and, almost at the beginning of his political career, was appointed to serve on many important committees. Immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War, he strongly supported Charles I and the 'known laws of England' against the House of Commons; and during the struggle was the king's wisest and most efficient councillor. He served Charles II for seven years as first minister. He offended the king, however, by 'saucy and overbold expressions,' and made many enemies by his administration. He was impeached in 1667, and went to France, where he died in 1674. Clarendon's History of the Great Rebellion is one of the world's most famous books; it is particularly notable for its graphic pen portraits.

ravages it was able to inflict, with the alarm it created, caused the withdrawal of the forces in Attica.

In that winter Pericles delivered a great funeral oration, or panegryic, in memory of the Athenians who had so far fallen gloriously in defence of their country, in which he painted the characteristic virtues of the Athenian people in such a fashion as to rouse to the highest pitch the patriotic pride of his countrymen, and their confidence in themselves and in their future.

II—EARLY SUCCESSES OF ATHENS

In the second year of the war, Athens suffered from a fearful visitation of the plague, which, however, made no way in the Peloponnese. It broke out also among the reinforcements dispatched to Potidaea; and it required all the skill of Pericles to reconcile the Athenians to the continuation of the war, after seeing their territories over-run for the second time for six weeks. By dint of dwelling on the supreme importance of their decisive command of the sea, and on the vast financial resources which secured their staying power, he maintained his ascendancy until his death in the following year, though he had to submit to a fine.

The events which followed his death only confirmed the profundity of his political judgement, and the accuracy with which he had gauged the capacities of the state. In that winter Potidaea was forced to capitulate to the Athenians.

In the summer of the third year, the Lacedaemonians called on the Plataeans to desert the Athenian alliance. On their refusal, Plataea was besieged by the allied forces of the Peloponnesians. With splendid resolution, the Plataeans defeated the attempt of the allies to force an entry till they were able to complete and withdraw behind a second and more easily tenable line of defence, when the Peloponnesians settled down to a regular investment. The same year was marked by the brilliant operations of the Athenian admiral Phormio near Naupactus.

On the other hand, a Peloponnesian squadron threatened the Piraeus, caused some temporary panic and awakened the Athenians to the necessity of maintaining a look-out, but otherwise effected little. The year is further noted for the invasion of Macedonia by the Thracian or Scythian king Sitalces, who was, however, induced to retire.

In the next year, Lesbos revolted against the Athenian supremacy. As a result, an Athenian squadron blockaded Mitylene. The Lacedaemonians were well pleased to accept alliance with a sea power which claimed to have struck against Athens, not as being subject to her, but in anticipation of attempted subjugation. The prompt equipment, however, of another Athenian fleet chilled the naval enthusiasm of Sparta.

During this winter the Plataeans began to feel in straits from shortage of supplies, and it was resolved that a party of them should break through the siege lines and escape to Athens, a feat of arms which was brilliantly and successfully accomplished.

In the next—the fifth—summer, Mitylene capitulated; the fate of the inhabitants was to be referred to Athens. Here Cleon had now become the popular leader, and he persuaded the Athenians to order the whole of the adult males to be put to death. The opposition, however, succeeded in getting this bloodthirsty resolution rescinded. The second dispatch, racing desperately after the first, did not succeed in overtaking it, but was just in time to prevent the order for the massacre from being carried out. Lesbos was divided among Athenian citizens, who left the Lesbians in occupation as before, but drew a large rental from them.

In the same summer the remaining garrison of Plataea surrendered to the Lacedaemonians, on terms to be decided by Lacedaemonian commissioners. Before them the Plataeans justified their resistance, but the commissioners ignored the defence and, on the pretext that the only question was whether they had suffered any 'wrong' at the hands of the Plataeans, and that the answer to that was obvious, put the Plataeans to death and razed the city to the ground.

Meanwhile, at Corcyra, the popular and the oligarchical parties, who favoured the Athenians and Peloponnesians respectively, had reached the stage of murderous hostility to each other. The oligarchs captured the government and were then in turn attacked by the popular party; and there was savage faction fighting. An attempt was made by the commander of the Athenian squadron at Naupactus to act as moderator; the appearance of a Peloponnesian squadron and a confused sea fight, somewhat in favour of the latter, brought the popular party to the verge of a compromise. But the Peloponnesians retired on the reported approach of a fresh Athenian fleet, and a democractic reign of terror followed.

'The father slew the son, and the supplicants were torn from the temples and slain near them.' And thus was initiated the peculiar horror of this war—the desperate civil strife in one city after another, oligarchs hoping to triumph by Lacedaemonian, and democrats by Athenian, support, and either party when uppermost, ruling by terror. It was at this time also that the Ionian and Dorian cities of Sicily, headed by Leontini and Syracuse respectively, went to war with each other, and an Athenian squadron was first induced to participate in the struggle.

Among the operations of the next, or sixth, summer was a campaign which the Athenian commander Demosthenes conducted in Aetolia —successful at the outset, but terminating in disaster, which made the general afraid to return to Athens. He seized a chance, however, of recovering his credit by foiling a Lacedaemonian expedition against Naupactus; and in other ways he successfully established a high military reputation, so that he was no longer afraid to reappear at Athens.

Next year, the Athenians dispatched a larger fleet, with Sicily for its objective. Demosthenes, however, who had a project of his own in view, was given an independent command. He was thus enabled to seize and fortify Pylos, a position on the south-west of Peloponnese, with a harbour sheltered by the isle of Sphacteria. The Spartans, in alarm, withdrew their invading

force from Attica, and attempted to recover Pylos, landing over 400 of their best men on Sphacteria. The locality now became the scene of a desperate struggle, which finally resulted in the Spartans on Sphacteria being completely isolated.

So seriously did the Lacedaemonians regard this blow that they invited the Athenians to make peace virtually on terms of an equal alliance; but the Athenians were now so confident of a triumphant issue that they refused the terms—chiefly at the instigation of Cleon. Some supplies, however, were got into Sphacteria, owing to the high rewards offered by the Lacedaemonians for successful blockade-running.

At this moment, Cleon, the Athenian demagogue, having rashly declared that he could easily capture Sphacteria, was taken at his word and sent to do it. He had the wit, however, to choose Demosthenes for his colleague, and to take precisely the kind of troops Demosthenes wanted; with the result that within twenty days the Spartans found themselves with no other alternatives than annihilation or surrender. Their choice of the latter was an overwhelming blow to Lacedaemonian prestige.

III—VICTORIES OF LACEDAEMON

The capture of the island of Cythera in the next summer gave the Athenians a second strong station from which they could constantly menace the Peloponnese. On the other hand, in this year the Sicilians were awakening to the fact that Athens was not playing a distinterested part on behalf of the Ionian states, but was dreaming of a Sicilian empire. At a sort of peace congress, Hermocrates of Syracuse successfully urged all Sicilians to compose their quarrels on the basis of *uti possidetis*, and thus deprive the Athenians of any excuse for remaining. Thus for the time Athenian aspirations in that quarter were checked.

At Megara this year the dissensions of the oligarchical and popular factions almost resulted in its capture by the Athenians. The Lacedaemonian Brasidas, however—who had distinguished himself at Pylos—effected an entry, so that the oligarchical and Peloponnesian party became permanently established in power.

The most important operations were now in two fields. Brasidas made a dash through Thessaly into Macedonia, in alliance with Perdiccas of Macedon, with the hope of stirring the cities of Chalcidice to throw off the Athenian yoke; and the democrats of Boeotia intrigued with Athens to assist in a general revolution. Owing partly to misunderstandings and partly to treachery, the Boeotian democrats failed to carry out their programme, the Athenians were defeated at Delium, and Delium itself was captured by the Boeotians.

Meanwhile, Brasidas succeeded in persuading Acanthus to revolt, he himself winning the highest of reputations for justice and moderation as well as for military skill. Later in the year he suddenly turned his forces against the Athenian colony of Amphipolis, which he induced to surrender by offering very favourable terms before Thucydides, who was in command at Thasos, arrived to relieve it.

The further successes of Brasidas during this winter made the Athenians ready to treat for peace, and a truce was agreed upon for twelve months. Brasidas however continued to render aid to the subject cities which revolted from Athens—this being now the ninth year of the war—but he failed in an attempt to capture Potidaea.

The period of truce terminating without any definite peace being arrived at, the summer of the tenth year is chiefly notable for the expedition sent under Cleon to recover Amphipolis, and for a recrudescence of the old quarrel in Sicily between Leontini and Syracuse. Before Amphipolis, the incompetent Cleon was routed by the skill of Brasidas; but the victor as well as the vanquished was slain, though he lived long enough to know of the victory. Their deaths removed two of the most zealous opponents of the peace for which both sides were now anxious. Hence at the close of the tenth year peace was concluded.

The Lacedaemonians, however, were almost alone in being fully satisfied by the terms, and the war was really continued by an anti-Laconian confederation of the former Peloponnesian allies, who saw in the peace a means to the excessive preponderance of Athens and Sparta. Argos was brought into the new confederacy in the hope of establishing her nominal equality with Sparta.

For some years from this point the combinations of the states were constantly changing, while Athens and Sparta remained generally on terms of friendliness, the two prominent figures at Athens being the conservative Nicias and the restless and ambitious young intriguer Alcibiades.

In the fourteenth year there were active hostilities between Argos, with which by this time Athens was in alliance, and Lacedaemon, issuing in the great battle of Mantinea, where there was an Athenian contingent with the Argives. This was notable especially as completely restoring the prestige of the Lacedaemonian arms, their victory being decisive. The result was a new treaty between Sparta and Argos, and the dissolution of the Argive-Athenian alliance; but this was once more reversed in the following year, when the Argive oligarchy was attacked successfully by the popular party.

The next year is marked by the high-handed treatment of the island of Melos by the Athenians. This was one of the very few islands, which had not been compelled to submit to Athens, but had endeavoured to remain neutral. Thither the Athenians now sent an expedition, absolutely without excuse, to compel their submission. The Melians, however, refused and gave the Athenians a good deal of trouble before they could be subdued, when the adult male population was put to death, and the women and children enslaved.

At this time the Athenians resolved, under colour of an appeal for assistance from the Sicilian city of Egesta, deliberately to set about the establishment of their empire in Sicily. The aggressive policy was vehemently advocated by Alcibiades, and opposed by Nicias. Nevertheless, he, with Alcibiades and Lamachus, was appointed to command the expedition,

which was prepared on a scale of unparalleled magnificence. It was on the point of starting, when the whole city was stirred to frenzy by the midnight mutilation of the sacred images called Hermae, an act laid at the door of Alcibiades, along with many other charges of profane outrages. Of set purpose, however, the enemies of Alcibiades refused to bring him to trial. The expedition sailed. The Syracusans were deaf to the warnings of Hermocrates until the great fleet had actually arrived at Rhegium.

Nicias was now anxious to find an excuse, in the evident falsity of statements made by the Egestans, for the fleet to content itself with making a demonstration and then returning home. The scheme of Alcibiades, however, was adopted for gaining over the other Sicilian states in order to crush Syracuse. But at this moment dispatches arrived requiring the return of Alcibiades to stand trial. Athens was in a panic over the Hermae affair, which was supposed to portent an attempt to re-establish the despotism which had been ended a hundred years before by the expulsion of the Pisistratidae. Alcibiades, however, made his escape, and for years pursued a life of political intrigue against the Athenian government.

Nicias and Lamachus, left in joint command, drew off the Syracusan forces by a ruse, and were thus enabled to occupy unchecked a strong position before Syracuse. Although, however, they inflicted a defeat on the returned Syracusan forces, they withdrew into winter quarters; the Syracusans were roused by Hermocrates to improve their military organization; and both sides entered on a diplomatic contest for winning over the other states of Sicily.

Alcibiades, now an avowed enemy of Athens, was received by the Lacedaemonians, whom he induced to send an able officer, Gylippus, to Syracuse, and to establish a military post corresponding to that of Pylos on Attic soil at Decelea.

IV—THE DISASTER OF SYRACUSE

In the spring the Athenians succeeded in establishing themselves on the heights called Epipolae, overlooking Syracuse, began raising a wall of circumvallation, and carried by a surprise the counter-stockade which the Syracusans were raising. In one of the skirmishes, while the building of the wall was in progress, Lamachus was killed; otherwise matters went well for the Athenians and ill for the Syracusans, till Gylippus was allowed to land at Himera, force his way into Syracuse, and give new life.

Nicias was guilty of the blunder of allowing Gylippus to land at Himera to aid the defence at the moment when it was on the point of capitulation. A long contest followed, the Athenians endeavouring to complete the investing lines, the Syracusans to pierce them with counterworks. Nicias sent to Athens for reinforcements, while the Syracusans were energetically fitting out a fleet and appealing for aid in the Peloponnese.

Nicias, in fact, was extremely despondent. He dispatched a pitiable letter (which Thucydides probably gives verbatim from some public record) to the home authorities. The arrival of Gylippus, he said, had completely changed the situation. The Syracusans would soon be strongly reinforced. His army were obliged to give up their own works of circumvallation, and had become rather the besieged than the besiegers. Their ships were leaky, their crews daily diminishing—some even deserting. The expedition must either be recalled at once or strongly reinforced. He himself was suffering from illness, and begged to be relieved of his command. The Athenians, however, answered his dispatches by preparing a great reinforcement under the command of Demosthenes, without accepting the resignation of Nicias. The Lacedaemonians, however, also sent some reinforcements; at the same time they formally declared war, and carried out the plan of occupying and fortifying Decelea, which completely commanded the Athenian territory and was the cause of until loss and suffering.

Now, at Syracuse, the besieged took the offensive both by sea and land, and were worsted on the water, but captured some of the Athenian forts commanding the entry to the besiegers' lines—a serious disaster. By the time that Demosthenes with his reinforcements reached Sicily nearly the whole island had come over to the side of Syracuse. Before this, the Syracusans had again challenged an engagement by both sea and land, with results indecisive on the first day but distinctly in their favour on the second. At this juncture, Demosthenes arrived and, seeing the necessity for immediate action, made a night attack on the Syracusan lines; but, his men falling into confusion after a first success, the attempt was disastrously repulsed.

Demosthenes was quick to realize that the whole situation was hopeless; but Nicias lacked nerve to accept the responsibility of retiring, and also had some idea that affairs within Syracuse were favourable. His obstinacy gave Demosthenes and his colleague Eurymedon the impression that he was guided by secret information. And now it became the primary object of Gylippus and the Syracusans to keep the Athenians from retiring. Another naval defeat reduced the Athenians to despair; they resolved that they must cut their way out.

The desperate attempt was made, but by almost hopeless men against an enemy now full of confidence. To the excited, almost agonised, watchers on shore, it seemed for a brief space that the ships might force a passage; the fight was a frenzied scuffle; but presently the terrible truth was realized—the Athenian ships were being driven ashore. The last hope of escape by sea was gone, for, though there were still ships enough, the sailors were too utterly demoralised to make the attempt.

Hermocrates and Gylippus, sure that a retreat by land would not be tried, succeeded by a trick in detaining the Athenians till they had themselves sent out detachments to hold the roads. On the third day the Athenians began their retreat in unspeakable misery, amid the lamentations of the sick and wounded, whom they were forced to leave behind. For three days they struggled on, short of food and perpetually harassed, cut off from all communications. On the third day their passage was barred in a pass, and they found themselves in a trap. On the third night they attempted to

break away by a different route, but the van and the rear lost touch. Overtaken by the Syracusans, Demosthenes attempted to fight a rearguard action, but in vain, and he was forced to surrender at discretion with his whole force.

Next day, Nicias with the van was overtaken and, after a ghastly scene of confusion and slaughter, the remnants of the vanguard were forced to surrender also. Nicias and Demosthenes were put to death; great numbers were seized as private spoil by their captors, the rest of the prisoners—more than 7,000—were confined for weeks under the most noisome conditions in the quarries, and finally the survivors were sold as slaves. So pitiably ended that once magnificent enterprise in the nineteenth year of the war.

The terrific disaster filled every enemy of Athens with confident expectation of her immediate and utter ruin. Lacedaemon anticipated an unqualified supremacy. At Athens there was a stubborn determination to prepare for a desperate stand; but half the islanders were intriguing for Lacedaemonian or Persian aid in breaking free, while Alcibiades became extremely busy.

The first Peloponnesian squadron which attempted to move was promptly driven into Piraeus by an Athenian fleet and blockaded. On the open revolt of some of the states, the Athenians for the first time brought into play their reserve fund and reserve navy—the emergency had arisen. While one after another of the subject cities revolted, the Athenians struck hard at Chios, and especially Miletus, and obtained marked success. Meanwhile, a revolution in Samos had expelled the oligarchy and re-established the democracy, to which the Athenians accorded freedom, thereby securing a useful ally. In Lesbos also they recovered their supremacy.

Phrynicus now came into prominence as a shrewd commander and a crafty politician, while the intricate intrigues of Alcibiades, whose great object was to recover his position at Athens, created perpetual confusion. These events took place in the twentieth year of the war, and to them must be added a Lacedaemonian treaty with Persia.

All the leading men, however, were engaged in playing fast and loose, each of them having his personal ambitions in view. Of this labyrinth of plots and counter-plots, the startling outcome was the sudden abrogation of the constitution at Athens and the capture of the government by a committee of five with a council of four hundred and a supplementary assembly of five thousand—in place of the whole body of citizens as formerly. The Five and the Four Hundred in effect were the government, and they established a reign of terror.

At Athens, the administration thus formed was effective; but the army and fleet at Samos repudiated the revolution and swore loyalty to the democracy, claiming to be the true representatives of the Athenian state. Moreover, they allied themselves with Alcibiades, expecting through him to receive Persian support; and, happily for Athens, he succeeded in restraining the fleet—which was still more than a match for all adversaries—from sailing back to Piraeus to subvert the rule of the Four Hundred.

The more patriotic of the oligarchs saw, in fact, that the best hopes for the state lay in the establishment of a limited democracy; with the result that the extreme oligarchs, who would have joined hands with the enemy, were overthrown, and the rule of the Five Thousand replaced that of the Four Hundred, providing Athens with the best administration it had ever known. A great naval victory was won by the Athenian fleet, under the command of Thrasybulus, over a slightly larger Peloponnesian fleet at Cynossema.

Anabasis or The Going Up of the Ten Thousand

XENOPHON

SOME documentation is needed in introducing Xenophon's history of the 'anabasis,' or up-country march, of the Greek army. Cyrus the Younger of Persia had assisted the Lacedaemonians against the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war, which ended in the victory of the former at Aegos Potami, 404 B.C. This year saw also the death of Cyrus's father and the succession of his brother, Artaxerxes II. Cyrus determined to make a bid for the Persian throne, and in 401 set out into Artaxerxes's territory with an army of 10,000 Greek mercenaries.

Most of the narrative refers to the 'catabasis,' or retreat from Cunaxa to the Euxine.

I—THE GOING UP OF CYRUS AND HIS HOST

CYRUS, the younger brother of Artaxerxes the king, began his preparations for revolt by gradually gathering and equipping an army on the pretext of hostile relations between himself and another of the western satraps, Tissaphernes. Notably, he secretly furnished Clearchus, a Lacedaemonian, with means to equip a Greek force in Thrace; another like force was ready to move from Thessaly under Aristippus; while a Boeotian, Proxenus, and two other friends were commissioned to collect more mercenaries to aid in the war with Tissaphernes.

Next, an excuse for marching up-country, at the head of all these forces, was found in the need of suppressing the Pisidians. He advanced from Sardis into Phrygia, where his musters were completed at Celaenae. A review was held at Tyriaeum, where the Cilician queen, who had supplied funds, was badly frightened by a mock charge of the Greek contingent. When the advance had reached Tarsus, there

was almost a mutiny among the Greeks, who were suspicious of the intentions of Cyrus. But the diplomacy of their chief general, Clearchus, the Lacedaemonian, and promises of increased pay, prevailed, though it had long been obvious that Pisidia was not the objective of the expedition.

Further reinforcements were received at Issus, the eastern seaport of Cilicia; Cyrus then marched through the Syrian gate into Syria. At Myriandrus two Greek commanders, probably through jealousy of Clearchus, deserted. The whole force now struck inland to Thapsacus, on the Euphrates.

At Thapsacus, Cyrus announced his purpose. The Greek soldiers were angry with their generals for having, as they supposed, wilfully misled them, but were mollified by promise of large rewards. One of the commanders, Menon, won the approval of Cyrus by being the first to lead his contingent across the Euphrates on his own initiative. The advance was now conducted through a painfully sterile country. In the course of this, the troops of Clearchus and Menon very nearly came to blows; the intervention of Proxenus only made matters worse; and order was restored by the arrival of Cyrus, who pointed out that the whole expedition must be ruined if the Greeks fell out among themselves.

By this time, Artaxerxes had realised that the repeated warnings of Tissaphernes (who had in the first instance betrayed the intentions of Cyrus to Artaxerxes, his brother) and others were justified; and as the expedition neared Babylonia, signs of the enemy became apparent in the deliberate devastation of the country. Here Orontes, one of the principal Persian officers of Cyrus, was convicted of treason and put to death.

The army was again reviewed, the whole force amounting to some 100,000 barbarians and nearly 14,000 Greeks; the enemy were reputed to number over 1,000,000, though not so many took part in the engagement.

Cyrus now advanced, expecting battle immediately, at an entrenched pass (near Cunaxa); but, finding this unoccupied, he did not maintain battle order; which was hurriedly taken up on news of the approach of the royal forces. The Greeks, under Clearchus, occupied the right wing, Cyrus being in the centre, and Ariaeus on the left. The king's army was so large that even its centre extended far beyond the left of Cyrus.

The Greeks advanced on the royalist left. which broke and fled almost without a blow, Thinking that the Greeks might be intercepted and cut off, Cyrus charged the centre in person with his bodyguard and routed the opposing troops; but dashing forward in the hope of capturing Artaxerxes, was himself pierced by a javelin and fell dead on the field. So ended the career of the most brilliant Persian since Cyrus the Great had established the Persian Empire; brave, accomplished, the mirror of honour, just himself, and the rewarder of justice in others, generous and most loyal to his friends.

The magnanimity of his character may be illustrated by his natural graciousness. Often when he had wine served which was of an, unusually fine flavour, his habit was to send the half-emptied flasks to some of his acquaintances with a message in these or similar words: 'Cyrus has not in many years encountered a more pleasing wine than this; accordingly he sends some in this flask to you. He hopes that you will drink of it to-day with those friends whose acquaintance you cherish.'

The tragic event of his death served as proof not only of his personal merit, but also of his ability in distinguishing such followers as were faithful, friendly and loyal. For when he died all his followers, and those who ate from his table, fell with their swords drawn in his defence, with the exception of one Ariaeus, who commanded the cavalry squadron on the left wing. But upon hearing of the fall of his leader, Ariaeus, with all the forces under his command, took flight from the field. And Artaxerxes and his troops fell upon him and pursued him in his retreat.

II—THE GREAT RETREAT TO THE EUXINE

When Cyrus fell, the left wing, under Ariaeus, broke and fled. The Greeks had meantime poured on in pursuit of the royalist left, while the main body of the royalists were in possession of the rebel camp, though a Greek guard, which had been left there, held the Greek quarter. Artaxerxes, however, had no mind to give battle to the returning Greek column.

It was not till next day that Clearchus learned that Cyrus was slain, and that Ariaeus had fallen back to the last halting place, where he proposed to wait twenty-four hours, and no more, before starting to retreat westward. Clearchus sent word that the Greeks, for their part, had been victorious, and that if Ariaeus would rejoin them they would win the Persian crown for him, since Cyrus was dead.

The next message was from Artaxerxes, inviting the Greeks to give up their arms; to which they replied that he might come and take them if he could, but, if he meant to treat them as friends, they would be no use to him without arms; if as enemies they would keep them for defence.

Though no formal choice was made, the Greeks recognized Clearchus as their leader. They fell back to join Ariaeus, who declined the proposal to win him the Persian throne; and it was agreed to follow a new route in retreat to Ionia, the way of the advance being now impracticable.

Now, however, Artaxerxes began to negotiate through Tissaphernes, the Greeks maintaining a bold and even contemptuous front, warranted by the king's obvious fear of risking an engagement.

Finally, an offer came to conduct the Greeks back to Grecian territory, providing them, at their own cost, with necessaries. Prolonged delays, however, aroused suspicions of treachery among the Greeks, who distrusted Tissaphernes and Ariaeus alike; but Clearchus held it better not to break openly with the Persians. The march at last began along a northerly route towards the Black Sea, the Greeks keeping rigidly apart from the Persian forces which accompanied them, in readiness for an attack.

At the crossing of the Tigris suspicion was particularly active, the conduct of Ariaeus being especially dubious; but still no

overt hostilities were attempted until the river Zabatus was reached, after three weeks of marching.

Here Clearchus endeavoured to end the extremely strained relations between the Greeks and the barbarian commanders by an interview with Tissaphernes. Both men carefully repudiated any idea of hostile intentions, and the Persian invited Clearchus and the Greek officers generally to attend a conference. Not all, but a considerable number—five generals, including Clearchus, Proxenus and Menon, with twenty more officers and nearly two hundred others —attended. At a given signal all were treacherously massacred; but a fugitive reached the Greek camp, where the men sprang to arms. Ariaeus, approaching with an escort, declared that Clearchus had been proved guilty of treason, but was received with fierce indignation, and withdrew.

Of the murdered generals, Clearchus was a man of high military capacity, but a harsh disciplinarian, feared and respected but very unpopular; Proxenus, a particular friend of Xenophon, was an amiable but not a strong man; Menon, the Thessalian commander, was a crafty and hypocritical time-server, of whom no good can be spoken.

The ten thousand Greeks were now in an ugly predicament; they were a thousand miles from home, while between them and the Black Sea lay the mountains of Armenia. They were surrounded by hostile hordes, and were without cavalry. They had no recognized chief, and their most trusted leaders were gone. The whole company seemed paralysed under a universal despondency.

It was at this juncture that Xenophon, an Athenian gentleman-volunteer, was stirred to action by a dream He rose and roused the officers of the contingent of Proxenus, to which he was attached. Heartened by an address, in which he pointed out that, on the one hand they had to depend on their own courage, skill, and resourcefulness, and, on the other, were released from all obligation to the Persians, they unanimously chose him their leader, and at his instigation roused the senior officers of all the other contingents to assemble for deliberation.

The council thus summoned, inspired again by the words of Xenophon, vigorously backed up by other leaders, appointed new generals, among them Xenophon himself, and set about actively to organize a retreat to the sea. The contagion of resolute determination spread through the ranks of the whole force. Chrisophus the Lacedaemonian was given the chief command, the two youngest generals, Xenophon and Timerion, were placed in charge of the rearguard. A troop of slingers was organized; all horses with the army were sequestrated to form a cavalry squadron. The army started on its march through the unknown, formed in a hollow square, which was shortly so organized that the columns could be broadened or narrowed according to the ground without creating confusion.

They soon found themselves able to repulse without difficulty even attacks in force by the troops of Tissaphernes, the enemy being entirely outmatched in hand-to-hand fighting. The slingers and archers, however, proved troublesome, and hostile forces, though keeping out of reach, were never far off. At last Tissaphernes and Ariaeus drew off altogether, and the Greek generals having as alternative courses the march eastwards upon Susa, northwards upon Babylon, and westwards towards Ionia, decided to revert to the course northwards to the Black Sea.

III—THE SEA! THE SEA!

This route led at first through the country of the Carduchi, a very warlike folk who had never been subjugated. Here there was a good deal of hard fighting, the Carduchi being adepts in hill warfare and particularly expert archers. Such was the length and weight of their arrows that the Greeks collected them and used them as javelins. Seven days of this brought the retreating force to the river Centrites, which parts the Carduchian mountains from the province of Armenia.

With a barely fordable river, troops in evidence on the other side, and the Carduchi hanging on their rear, the passage offered great difficulties, solved by the discovery of a much shallower ford. A feint at one point by the rearguard drew off the enemy on the opposite bank, while the main body crossed at the shallows, which the rearguard also managed to pass by a successful ruse which misled the Carduchi on the south bank.

The Persian governor of Western Armenia, Tiribazus, offered safe passage through his province, but scouts brought information that large forces were collecting and would dispute the passage of a defile through which the army must pass. This point, however, was reached by a forced march, and the enemy were routed.

For some days after this, the marching was very severe; the men had to struggle forward on very nearly empty stomachs, through blizzards, suffering terribly from frost-bite and the blinding effect of the snow on their eyes, so that at times nothing short of actual threats from the officers could induce the exhausted men to toil forward; and all the time the enemy's skirmishers were harassing the troops and cutting off stragglers. These, however, were finally dispersed by a sudden onslaught of the rearguard, and after this a more populous district was reached, where food and wine abounded, and the Greeks made some days' halt to recuperate.

Here a guide was obtained for the next stages; but on the third night he deserted, because Chirisophus had lost his temper and struck him. This incident was the only occasion of a serious difference between Xenophon and the elder commander.

On the seventh day after this the river Phasis was crossed; but two days later, on approaching a mountain pass, it was seen to be occupied in force. A council of war was held, at which some jesting passed, Xenophon remarking on the reputation of the Lacedaemonians as adepts in thieving, a jibe which Chirisophus retorted on the Athenians; as the business in hand was to 'steal a march' on the enemy, each encouraged the other to act up to the national reputation. In the night, a detachment of volunteers captured the ridge above the pass;

the enemy beat a hasty retreat when they found their position turned.

Another five days brought the army into the country of the Taochi, where the Greeks had to rush a somewhat dangerous position in order to capture supplies. A space of some twenty yards was open to such a storm of missiles from above that it could only be passed by drawing the enemy's fire and making a dash before fresh missiles were accumulated. When this was accomplished, however, the foe offered no practical resistance, but flung themselves over the cliffs.

Eighteen days later the Greeks reached a town called Gymniae, where they obtained a guide. Their course lay through tribes towards whom the governor was hostile, and the Greeks had no objection to gratifying him by devastating on their way. On the fifth day after leaving Gymniae, a mountain pass was reached.

When the van reached the top of the mountain (Teches), a great shout arose. And when Xenophon heard it, and they of the rearguard, they supposed that other enemies were ranged against them, for the men of the land which had been ravaged were following behind; but when the clamour grew louder and nearer, and the new arrivals doubled forward to where the shouting was, so that it became greater and greater with the added numbers, Xenophon thought this must be something of moment. Therefore, taking Lycias and the horsemen, he rode forward at speed to give aid; and then suddenly they were aware of the soldiers' shout, the word that rang through the lines—'The sea! the sea!'

THEN every man raced, rearguard and all, urging horses and the very baggage-mules to the top of their speed, and when they came to the top, they fell on each other's necks, and the generals, and officers, too, with tears of delight. And in a moment, whoever it was that passed the word, the men were gathering stones, and there they reared a mighty column.

And as for the lucky guide, he betook himself home laden with presents.

Of what befell between this point and the actual arrival of the army on the coast of the Black Sea at the Grecian colony of Trapezus (Trebizond) the most curious incident was that of the soldiers lighting upon great quantities of honey, which not only made them violently ill, but had an intoxicating effect, attributed to the herbs frequented by the bees in that district. This necessitated a halt of some days. The second day's march thence brought them to Trapezus, where they made sacrificial thank-offerings to the gods, and further celebrated the occasion by holding athletic games.

IV—THE WARRIORS' RETURN TO THRACE

BUT Trapezus was not Greece, and the problem of transport was serious. The men, sick of marching, were eager to accomplish the rest of their journey by sea. Chirisophus, the general as being a personal friend of the Lacedaemonian admiral stationed at Byzantium, was commissioned to obtain ships from him to take the Greeks home.

Chirisophus departed. The army, which still numbered over ten thousand persons, was willing enough to maintain its military organization for foraging and for self-defence; also to make such arrangements as were practicable for collecting ships in case Chirisophus should fail them; but the men flatly refused to consider any further movement except by water.

So they stayed where they were, maintaining their supplies by raids on the natives; but time passed, and there were no tidings of Chirisophus. At last, they saw nothing for it but to put the sick and other non-combatants aboard of the vessels which had been secured, send them on by sea, and themselves march by the coast to Cerasus, another Greek colony. Thence they continued their westward progress, in which they met with considerable resistance from the natives, who were barbarians of a primitive type, until they came to Cotyora.

This was another settlement from Sinope; but it received the Greeks very inhospitably, so that the latter continued their practice of ravaging the neighbouring territories. It was now eight months since the expedition had started on its homeward march. Here a deputation arrived from Sinope to protest against their proceedings; but Xenophon pointed out that while they were perfectly willing to buy what they needed and behave as friends, if they were not allowed to buy, self-preservation compelled them to take by force. Ultimately, the deputation promised to send ships to convey them to Sinope.

DURING the time of waiting there was some risk of the force breaking itself up, and some inclination to make attacks on the officers, including Xenophon. The formulation of charges, however, enabled him amply to justify the acts complained of, and order generally was restored. At last, however, a sufficient number of ships was collected to convey the force to Sinope, where also Chirisophus put in his long-delayed appearance.

Chirisophus came practically without ships and with nothing but vague promises from the admiral at Byzantium. At this point it occurred to the army that it would be better to have a single commander for the whole than a committee of generals each in control of his own division. Hence Xenophon was invited to accept the position. On consulting the omens he declined, recommending that since Chirisophus was a Lacedaemonian, it would be the proper thing to offer him the command, which was accordingly done.

The force now sailed from Sinope as far as Heraclea. Here the contingents from Arcadia and Achaea—more than half the force—insisted on requisitioning large supplies of money from Heraclea. Chirisophus, supported by Xenophon, refused assent; the Arcadians and Achaeans consequently refused to serve under their command any more, and appointed captains for themselves. The other half of the army was also parted in two divisions, commanded by Chirisophus and Xenophon respectively.

From Calpe the Arcadians and Achaeans made an expedition into the interior, which fared so ill that Xenophon, hearing by accident of what had happened, was obliged to march to their relief. To his satisfaction, however, it was found that the enemy had already dispersed, and the Greek column was overtaken on the way back to Calpe. The general effect of the

episode was to impress upon the Arcadians and Achaeans that it was common sense for the whole force to remain united.

The usual operations were carried on for obtaining supplies, report having arrived that Cleander, the Lacedaemonian governor of Byzantium, was coming, which he presently did, with a couple of galleys but no transports. From information received, Cleander was inclined to regard the army as little better than a band of brigands; but this idea was successfully dissipated by Xenophon. Cleander went back to Byzantium, and the Greeks marched from Calpe to Chrysopolis, which faces Byzantium.

Here the whole force was at last carried over to the opposite shore, and once more found itself on European soil, having received promises of pay from the admiral Anaxibius. Suspicions of his real intentions were aroused, and Xenophon had difficulty in keeping his men from breaking loose and sacking Byzantium itself.

Ultimately, the greater part of the force took service with the Thracian king Seuthes. Seuthes, however, failed to carry out his promises as to payment and rewards. But now the Lacedaemonians were engaged in a quarrel with the western satraps, Tissaphernes and Artabazus; six thousand veterans so experienced as those who had followed this famous march into the heart of the Persian empire, had fought their way from Cunaxa to Trapezus, and had supported themselves mainly by their military prowess in getting from Trapezus to Europe, were a force by no means to be neglected, and the bulk of the troops were not unwilling to be incorporated in the Spartan armies. So ends the story of the retreat of the ten thousand Greeks.

The History of Greece

GEORGE GROTE

As early as 1822 George Grote conceived the idea of writing a reliable and authoritative history of Greece, and was confirmed in his purpose by the publication of Mitford's history, a work full of anti-democratic fervour. In some respects Grote's work is a defence of the Athenian democracy. It appeared between 1846 and 1856 and covered Greek history from the earliest times till the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander the Great. It still holds the field as the classic work on the subject as a whole, though later research has modified several of Grote's conclusions.

I—EARLY HISTORY

The divine myths constitute the earliest matter of Greek history. These may be divided into those which belong to the gods and to the heroes respectively; but most of them, in point of fact, present gods, heroes and men in juxtaposition. Every community sought to trace its origin to some common divine, or semi-divine, progenitor; the establishment of a pedigree was a necessity; and each pedigree contains at some point figures corresponding to some actual historical character, before whom the pedigree is imaginary, but after whom, in the main, actual. The precise point where the legend fades into the mythical, or consolidates into the historical, is not usually ascertainable.

The legendary period culminates in the tale of Troy, which belongs to a period prior to the Dorian conquest presented in the Herakleid legend; the tale of Troy itself remaining the common heritage of the Greek peoples, and having an actual basis in historical fact. The events, however, are of less importance than the picture of an actual historical, political and social system, corresponding, not to the supposed date of the Trojan war, but to the date of the composition of the Homeric poems.

Later ages regarded the myths themselves with a good deal of scepticism, and were often disposed to rationalise them, or to find for them an allegorical interpretation. The myths of other European peoples have undergone a somewhat similar treatment.

Greece proper, that is, the European territory occupied by the Hellenic peoples, has a very extensive coast-line, covers the islands of the Aegean and is so mountainous on the mainland that communication between one point and another is not easy.

This facilitated the system which isolated communities, compelling each one to develop and perfect its own separate organization; so that Greece became, not a state, but a congeries of single separate city states—small territories centring in the city, although in some cases the village system was not centralised into the city system.

On the other hand, the Hellenes very definitely recognized their common affinity, looked on themselves as a distinct aggregate, and very emphatically differentiated that entire aggregate from the non-Hellenes, whom they designated 'barbarians.'

Of these states, the first to come into view—post-Homerically—is Sparta, the head of the Dorian communities, governed under the laws and discipline attributed to Lycurgus, with its special peculiarity of the dual kingship designed to make a pure despotism impossible. The government lay and remained in the hands of the conquering Spartan race—as for a time with the Normans in England—which formed a close oligarchy, while within the oligarchical body the organization was democratic and communistic. For Sparta, the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. were characterised by the two Messenian wars; and we note that while the Hellenes generally recognized her headship, Argos claimed a titular right to that position.

As a general rule, the primitive monarchical system portrayed in the Homeric poems was displaced in the Greek cities by an oligarchical government, which in turn was overthrown by

an irregular despotism called *tyrannis*, primarily established by a professed popular leader, who maintained his supremacy by mercenary troops. One after another these usurping dynasties were again ejected in favour either of a restored oligarchy or of a democracy. Sparta, where the power of the dual kingship was extremely limited, was the only state where the legitimate kingship survived. Corinth attained her highest power under the despot Periander, son of Cypselus.

Of the Ionian section of Greek states, the supreme type is Athens. Her early history is obscure. The kingship seems to have ended by being, so to speak, placed in commission, the royal functions being discharged by an elected body of Archons. Dissensions among the groups of citizens issued in the democratic Solonian constitution, which remained the basis of Athenian government, except during the despotism of the house of Pisistratus in the latter half of the sixth century B.C.

But outside of Greece proper were the numerous Dorian and Ionian colonies, really independent cities, planted in the coast districts of Asia Minor, at Cyrene and Barka in Mediterranean Africa, in Epirus (Albania), Southern Italy, Sicily and even at Massilia in Gaul and in Thrace beyond the proper Hellenic area. These colonies brought the Greek world in touch with Lydia and its king, Croesus, with the one seagoing Semitic power, the Phoenicians, with the Egyptians and, more remotely, with the wholly Oriental empires of Assyria and Babylon, as well as with the outer barbarians of Scythia.

Between 560 and 510 B.C., Athens was generally under the rule of the despot Pisistratus and his son Hippias. In 510, the Pisistratidae were expelled and Athens became a pure democracy. Meanwhile, the Persian Cyrus had seized the Median monarchy and overthrown every other potentate in Western Asia; Egypt was added to to the vast Persian dominion by his son Cambyses. A new dynasty was established by Darius, the son of Hystaspes, who organized the empire, but failed to extend it by invading European Scythia.

THE revolt of the Ionic cities in Asia Minor against the governments established by the 'great king' brought him in contact with the Athenians, who sent help to Ionia. Demands for 'earth and water,' *i.e.* the formal recognition of Persian sovereignty, sent to the apparently insignificant Greek states were insolently rejected. Darius sent an expedition to punish Athens in particular, and the Athenians drove his army into the sea at the battle of Marathon.

Xerxes, son of Darius, organized an overwhelming force by land and sea to eat up the Greeks. The invaders were met but hardly checked at Thermopylae, where Leonidas and the immortal three hundred fell; all Greece north of the Isthmus of Corinth was in their hands, including Athens. But their fleet was shattered to pieces, chiefly by the Athenians under Themistocles and Aristides at Salamis, and the destruction of their land forces was completed by the united Greeks at Plataea. A further disaster was inflicted on the same day at Mycale.

II—THE STRUGGLE OF ATHENS AND SPARTAN

MEANWHILE, the Sicilian Greeks, led by Gelo of Syracuse, successfully resisted and overthrew the aggression of Carthage, the issue being decided at the battle of Himera. The part played by Athens under the guidance of Themistocles in the repulse of Persia gave her a new position among the Greek states and an indisputable naval leadership. As the maritime head of Hellas she was chief of the naval Delian League, now formed ostensibly to carry on the war against Persia. But the leaguers, who first contributed a quota of ships, soon began to substitute money to provide ships, which in effect swelled the Athenian navy and turned the contributors into tributaries. Thus, almost automatically, the Delian League converted itself into an Athenian empire.

In Athens itself an unparalleled personal ascendancy was acquired by Pericles, who made the form of government and administration more democratic than before. But this growing supremacy of Athens aroused the jealous alarm of other Greek states. Sparta saw her own titular hegemony threatened; the subject cities grew restive under the Athenian yoke. Sparta came forward professedly as champion of the liberties of Hellas; Athens refused to submit to Spartan dictation and accepted the challenge which plunged Greece into the Peloponnesian war.

The Athenians concentrated on the expansion of their naval armament, left the open country undefended and gathered within the city walls, and landed forces at will on the Peloponnese. Plataea, almost their sole ally on land, held out valiantly for some time, but was forced to surrender; and Athens herself suffered frightfully from a visitation of the plague.

AFTER the death of Pericles, Cleon became the most prominent leader of the aggressive and democratic party, Nicias, of the anti-democratic peace party. Over most of Greece in each state the oligarchic faction favoured the Peloponnesian league, the democratic, Athens. The general Demosthenes at Pylos effected the surrender of a Lacedaemonian force, which temporarily shattered Sparta's military prestige, a blow in some degree counteracted by the brilliant operations of Brasidas in the north, where, however, both he and Cleon were killed.

Meanwhile, Athens was awakening to the possibilities of a great sea-empire, in consequence of her intervention having been invited in disputes among the Sicilian states. As the outcome, incited by the brilliant young Alcibiades, she resolved on the fatal Sicilian expedition. The expedition, planned on an unprecedented scale, and placed under the command of Alcibiades and Nicias, was dispatched in spite of the startling mutilation of the Hermae, a sacriligious performance attributed to Alcibiades. It had hardly reached Sicily when he was recalled, but made his escape and spent some years in intriguing against Athens.

The siege of Syracuse was progressing favourably, when the Spartan Gylippus was allowed to enter, and put new life into the defence. Disaster followed on disaster both by sea and land; finally, the whole Athenian force was either cut to pieces or surrendered at discretion,

to become the slaves of the Syracusans, both Nicias and Demosthenes being put to death.

Meanwhile, the truce between Athens and Sparta had been ended and war again declared. Sparta occupied permanently a post on Attic territory, Deceleia, with merciless effect. The Sicilian disaster moved the islanders, notably Chios, to revolt, with Spartan help, against Athens. She, however, renovated her navy with unexpected vigour. But, with her fleets away, Alcibiades inspired oligarchical intrigues in the city; a *coup d'etat* gave the government to the leaders of a group of 400. The navy stood by the democratic constitution, the 400 were overthrown, and an assembly, nominally of 5,000, assumed the government. A great Athenian triumph at Arginusae was followed later by a still more overwhelming disaster at Aegos Potami.

The Spartan commander Lysander blockaded Athens; starvation forced her to surrender. Lysander established the government known as that of the Thirty Tyrants, who were headed by Kritias. Lysander's ascendancy created in Sparta a party in opposition to him; in the outcome, the Spartan king Pausanias helped in the overthrow of the Thirty at Athens by Thrasybulus, and the restoration of the Athenian democracy. Throughout, the conduct of the democratic party contrasted favourably with that of the oligarchical faction.

These eighty years were the great period of Athenian literature and art: of the Parthenon and Pheidias; of Aeschylus, the soldier of Marathon; then of Sophocles and Euripides and Aristophanes; finally, of Socrates, the inspirer of Plato and the founder of ethical science.

III—THE BLOTTING OUT OF HELLAS

THE triumph of Sparta had established her empire among the Greeks; she used her power with a tyranny infinitely more galling than the sway of Athens. The Spartan character had become greatly demoralised. Agesilaus, who succeeded to the kingship, set on foot ambitious projects for a Greek conquest of Asia; but Greece began to revolt against the Spartan dominion. Thebes and other cities rose, and called for help from Athens, their former foe.

In the first stages of the ensuing war, of which the most notable battle was Coronea, Sparta maintained her supremacy within the Peloponnesus, but not beyond. Athens obtained the countenance of Persia, and the counter-diplomacy of Sparta produced the peace known by the name of the Spartan Antalcidas, establishing generally the autonomy of Greek cities. But this in effect meant the restoration of Spartan domination.

In course of time, however, this brought about the defiance of Spartan dictation by Thebes and the tremendous check to her power inflicted at the battle of Leuctra, by Epaminondas the Theban, whose military skill and tactical originality there overthrew the Spartan military prestige. As a consequence, half the Peloponnese itself broke away from Sparta; a force under Epaminondas aided the Arcadians and the Arcadian federation was established.

Hellenic Sicily during these years was having a history of her own of some importance. Syracuse, after her triumph over the Athenian forces, continued the contest with her neighbours, which had been the ostensible cause of the Athenian expedition. But this was closed by the advent of fresh invaders, the Carthaginians, who renewed the attack repulsed at Himera. Owing to the disaster to Athens, her fleets were no longer to be feared by Carthage as a protection to the Hellenic world; and for two centuries to come, her interventions in Sicily were incessant. Now, the presence of a foreign foe in Sicily gave intriguers for power at Syracuse their opportunity, of which the outcome was the subversion of the democracy and the establishment of Dionysius as despot.

His son, Dionysius II, succeeded, and was finally ejected by the Corinthian Timoleon, who, after a brilliant career of victories as Syracusan general against Carthage, acted as general liberator of Sicilian cities from despotisms, laid down his powers and was content with the position, not of despot, but of counsellor, to the great prosperity of Sicily as a whole.

GOING back to the north of Greece, the semi-Hellenic Macedon with a Hellenic dynasty was growing powerful. Philip—father of Alexander the Great—was now king, and was resolved to make himself the head of the Greek world. His great opponent is found in the person of the Athenian orator Demosthenes, who saw that Philip was aiming at ascendancy, but generally failed to persuade the Athenians to recognize the danger in which they stood. Philip gradually achieved his immediate end of being recognized as the captain-general of the Hellenes, and their leader in a new Persian war, when his life was cut short by an assassin, and he was succeeded by his youthful son Alexander.

The Greek states, awakening to their practical subjection, would have thrown off the new yoke, but the young king with swift and overwhelming energy swept down from Thrace upon Thebes, the centre of resistance, and stamped it out. He had already conceived, in part, at least, his vast schemes of Asiatic conquest; while he lived Greece had practically no distinguishable history. She is merely an appendage to Macedon. Everything is absorbed in the Macedonian conqueror. With an army incredibly small for the task before him, he entered Asia Minor and routed the Persian forces on the River Granicus. The Greek Memnon, the one able leader for the Persians, would have organized against him a destructive naval power; but death removed him.

Alexander dispersed the armies of the Persian king Darius at the Issus, captured Tyre after a remarkable siege and took easy possession of Egypt, where he founded Alexandria. Having organized the administration of the conquered territories, he marched to the Euphrates, but did not engage the enormous Persian hosts till he had found and shattered them at the battle of Gaugamela, also called Arbela. Darius fled, and Alexander swept on to Babylon, to Susa, to Persepolis, assuming the functions of the 'Great King.' The fugitive Darius was assassinated.

ALEXANDER henceforth assumed a new and oriental demeanour; but he continued his conquests, crossing the Hindu Kush to Bactria and then bursting into the Punjab. But his ambitions were ended by his death, and their

fulfilment, not at all according to his designs, was left to the 'Diadochi,' the generals among whom the conquered dominions were parted. Athens led the revolt against Macedonian supremacy, but in vain. Demosthenes, condemned by Antipater, took poison. The remainder of the history is that of the blotting out of Hellas and of Hellenism.

Catiline

SALLUST

A vigorous account of the notorious conspiracy of Catiline in 63 B.C. to overthrow the civil power in Rome, Sallust's Catiline is one of the best histories in Latin literature. The narrative is vivid and consistent, and the sketches of character are admirable in their power and conciseness. Although the author obviously hated the democratic party with which Catiline was connected, and had no great admiration for Cato or Cicero, his work is wonderfully impartial. Sallust's conception of history, indeed, as is exemplified also in his Jugurthine War, was very modern. He attempts to bring before his readers not only the incidents of history, but also their causes; further, he invariably seeks to establish the connexion between events that a contemporary would have treated as isolated facts.

I—THE PLOTTING

I ESTEEM the intellectual above the physical qualities of man; and the task of the historian has attracted me because it taxes the writer's abilities to the utmost. Personal ambition had at first drawn me into public life, but the political atmosphere, full of degradation and corruption, was so uncongenial that I resolved to retire and devote myself to the production of a series of historical studies, for which I felt myself to be the better fitted by my freedom from the influences which bias the political partisan. For the first of these studies I have selected the conspiracy of Catiline.

Lucius Catilina [commonly called Catiline] was of high birth, richly endowed both in mind and body, but of extreme depravity; with extraordinary powers of endurance, reckless, crafty and versatile, a master in the arts of deception, at once grasping and lavish, unbridled in his passions, ready of speech, but with little true insight. Of insatiable and inordinate ambitions, he was possessed, after Sulla's supremacy, with a craving to grasp the control of the state, utterly careless of the means so the end were attained. Naturally headstrong, he was urged forward by his want of money, the consciousness of his crimes and the degradation of morals in a society where luxury and greed ruled side by side.

The wildest, the most reckless, the most prodigal, the most criminal, were readily drawn into the circle of Catiline's associates; in such a circle those who were not already utterly depraved very soon became so under the sinister and seductive influence of their leader. This man, who in the pursuit of his vices had done his own son to death, did not hesitate to encourage his pupils in every species of crime; and with such allies, and the aid of the disbanded Sullan soldiery swarming in Italy, he dreamt of subverting the Roman state while her armies, under Gnaeus Pompeius, were far away.

The first step was to secure his own election as consul. One plot of his had already failed, because Catiline himself had attempted to move prematurely; but the conspirators remained scatheless. Those who were now with Catiline included members of the oldest families and of equestrian rank. Crassus himself was suspected of complicity, owing to his rivalry with Pompeius. The assembled conspirators were addressed by Catiline in a speech of the most virulent character. He urged these social outcasts to rise against a bloated plutocracy battening on the ill-gotten wealth to which his audience had just as good a title. He promised the cancellation of all debts, the proscription of the wealthy and the general application of the rule of 'the spoils to the victors.' He had friends at the head of the armies in Spain and Mauritania; if Gaius Antonius were the other successful candidate for the consulship, his co-operation, too, could be secured. Such was the purport of his speech; but I do not credit the popular fiction that the conspirators were solemnly pledged in a bowl of mingled wine and blood.

Rumours of the plot however, began to leak out through a certain Fulvia, mistress of Quintus Curio, a man who had been expelled from the senatorial body on account of his iniquities; and this probably caused many of the nobility to support, for the consulship, Cicero, whom, as a 'new man,' they would otherwise have religiously opposed. The result was that Catiline's candidature failed and Cicero was elected with Gaius Antonius for his colleague.

At length Cicero, seeing that the ferment was everywhere increasing to an extent with which the ordinary law could not cope, obtained from the senate the exceptional powers for dealing with a national emergency which they had constitutional authority to grant. Thus, when news came that a Catilinarian, Gaius Manlius, had risen in Etruria at the head of an armed force, prompt administrative measures were taken to dispatch adequate military forces to various parts of the country. Catiline himself had taken no overt action; he now presented himself in the senate, was openly assailed by Cicero, responded with insults which were interrupted by cries of indignation, and flung from the house with the words, "Since I am beset by enemies and driven out, the fire you have kindled about me shall be crushed out by the ruin of yourselves."

Seeing that delay would be fatal, he started at once for the camp of Manlius, leaving Cethegus and Lentulus to keep up the ferment in Rome. To several persons of position he sent letters

announcing that he was retiring to Marseilles; but, with misplaced confidence, he sent one of a different and extremely compromising tenor to Quintus Catullus, which the recipient read to the senate. It was next reported that he had assumed the consular attributes and joined Manlius; whereupon he was proclaimed a public enemy, a general levy was decreed, and Antonius was appointed to take the field, while Cicero was to remain in the capital.

II—THE DOWNFALL

Meanwhile, Lentulus at Rome, among his various plots, intrigued to obtain the support of the Allobroges, a tribe of Gauls from whom there was at the time an embassy in Rome. The envoys, however, took the advice of Quintus Fabius Sanga, and while he kept Cicero supplied with information, themselves pretended to be in full agreement with the conspirators.

Risings were now taking place all over Italy, though they were ill concerted. At Rome, the plan was that when Catiline's army was at Faesulae, the tribune Lucius Bestia should publicly accuse Cicero of having caused the war; and this was to be the signal for an organized massacre, while the city itself was to be fired at twelve points simultaneously. The insurgents were then to march out and join Catiline at Faesulae.

The Allobroges were now departing, carrying with them letters from Lentulus to Catiline; but, according to a concerted plan, they were arrested. This provided Cicero with evidence which warranted the arrest of Lentulus and other ringleaders in Rome; and its publication created a popular revulsion—the lower classes were not averse from plunder but saw no likelihood of benefit to themselves in a general conflagration of Rome.

A certain Lucius Tarquinius was now captured, who gave information tallying with what was already published, but further incriminated Crassus. Crassus, however, was so wealthy, and had so many of the senate in his power, that even those who privately believed the charge to be true, thought it politic to pronounce it a gross fabrication.

The danger of an attempted rescue of Lentulus brought on a debate as to what should be done with the prisoners. Caesar, from whatever motive, spoke forcibly against any unconstitutional action which, however justified by the enormity of the prisoners' guilt, might become a dangerous precedent. In his opinion, the wise course would be to confiscate their property and place their persons in custody, not in Rome but in provincial towns.

Caesar's humanitarian statesmanship was answered by the grave austerity of Cato. "The question for us is not that of punishing a crime, but of preserving the state—or of what the degenerate Roman of to-day cares for more than the state, our lives and property. To speak of clemency and compassion is an abuse of terms only too common, when vices are habitually dignified with the names of virtues. Let us for once act with vigour and decision, and doom these convicted traitors to the death they deserve." The decree of death was carried to immediate execution. In the meantime, Catiline had raised a force numbering two legions. He remained in the hills refusing to give battle to Antonius.

On hearing the fate of Lentulus and the rest, he attempted to retreat to Gaul, but this movement was anticipated and intercepted by Metellus Celer, who was posted at Picenum with three legions. With Antonius pressing on his rear, Catiline resolved to hazard all on a desperate engagement. In exhorting his troops, he dwelt on the fact that men fighting for life and liberty were more than a match for a foe who had infinitely less at stake.

Thus brought to bay, Catiline's soldiers met the attack of the government troops with furious valour, their leader setting a brilliant example of daring and generalship. But Petreius, on the other side, directed his force against the rebel centre, shattered it and took the wings in flank. Catiline's followers stood and fought till they fell, with their wounds in front; he himself hewed his way through the foe, and was found still breathing at a distance from his own ranks. No quarter was given or taken; and among the rebels there were no survivors. In the triumphant army, all the stoutest soldiers were slain or wounded; mourning and grief mingled with the elation of victory.

Commentaries on the Gallic War

JULIUS CAESAR

Born in Rome, July 12, 102 B.C., of patrician rank, Gaius Julius Caesar furnishes an example of greatness as orator, man of letters, soldier and statesman unexcelled in history. Allying himself with the democratic party he was quaestor in Spain in 68, praetor in 62, and consul in 59 when he formed the first triumvirate. Appointed governor of Gaul, Caesar there developed his genius for war, but his success resulted in the Civil War. After Pharsalus, Caesar attained supreme power, but his activities were cut short by his assassination, March 15, 44 B.C. Of his literary works only his commentaries on the Gallic War and the Civil War have survived, both models of lucid writing.

I—SUBDUING CELTIC GAUL

Gaul is divided into three parts, one of which the Belgae inhabit; the Aquitani another; those who in their own language are called Celts, in ours Gauls, the third. All these differ from each other in language, customs and laws. Among the Gauls the Helvetii surpass the rest in valour, as they constantly contend in battle with the Germans.

When Messala and Piso were consuls, Orgetorix, the most distinguished of the Helvetii, formed a conspiracy among the nobility, persuading them that, since they excelled all in valour, it would be very easy to acquire the supremacy of the whole of Gaul. They made great preparations, but suddenly Orgetorix died, and suspicion was not lacking that he committed suicide.

After his death, the Helvetii nevertheless attempted the exodus from their territories. When it was reported to Caesar that they were attempting to make their route through our province, he gathered as great a force as possible, and by forced marches arrived at Geneva.

The Helvetii now sent ambassadors to Caesar requesting permission to pass through the province, which he refused, inasmuch as he remembered that Lucius Cassius, the consul, had been slain, and his army routed and made to pass under the yoke by the Helvetii. Disappointed in their hope, the Helvetii attempted to force a passage across the Rhône, but, being resisted by the soldiers, desisted.

After the war with the Helvetii was concluded, ambassadors from almost all parts of Gaul assembled to congratulate Caesar, and to declare that his victory had happened no less to the benefit of the land of Gaul than of the Roman people, because the Helvetii had quitted their country with the design of subduing the whole of Gaul.

When the assembly was dismissed, the chiefs of the Aedui and of the Sequani waited upon Caesar to complain that Ariovistus, the king of the Germans, had settled in their territories, had seized a third of their land, which was the best in Gaul, and was now ordering them to depart from another third part.

To ambassadors sent by Caesar, demanding an appointment of some spot for a conference, Ariovistus gave an insolent reply, which was repeated on a second overture. Hearing that the king of the Germans was threatening to seize Vesontio, the capital of the Sequani, Caesar, by a forced march, arrived there and took possession of the city. Apprised of this event, Ariovistus changed his attitude, and sent messengers intimating that he agreed to meet Caesar, as they were now nearer to each other and could meet without danger.

The conference took place, but it led to no successful result, for Ariovistus demanded that the Romans should withdraw from Gaul; and his conduct became afterwards so hostile that it led to war. A battle took place about fifty miles from the Rhine. The Germans were routed and fled to the river, across which many escaped, the rest being slain in pursuit. Caesar, having concluded two very important wars in one campaign, conducted his army into winter quarters.

II—TAMING THE REBELLIOUS BELGAE

While Caesar was in winter quarters in Hither Gaul, frequent reports were brought to him that all the Belgae were entering into a confederacy against the Roman people, because they feared that, after all Celtic Gaul was subdued, our army would be led against them. Caesar, alarmed, levied two new legions in Hither Gaul, and proceeded to the territory of the Belgae. As he arrived there unexpectedly, and sooner than anyone anticipated, the Remi, who are the nearest of the Belgae to Celtic Gaul, sent messages of submission and gave Caesar full information about the other Belgae.

Caesar next learnt that the Nervii, a savage and very brave people, whose territories bordered those just conquered, had upbraided the rest of the Belgae who had surrendered themselves to the Roman people, and had declared that they themselves would neither send ambassadors nor accept any conditions of peace. He was informed concerning them that they allowed no access of any merchants, and that they suffered no wine and other things tending to luxury to be imported, because they thought that by their use the mind is enervated and the courage impaired.

After he had made three days' march into their territory, Caesar discovered that all the Nervii had stationed themselves on the other side of the River Sambre, not more than ten miles from his camp, and that they had persuaded the Atrebates and the Veromandui to join with them, and that the Aduatuci also were expected by them, and were on the march. The Roman army proceeded to encamp in front of the river, on a site sloping towards it. Here they were fiercely attacked by the Nervii, the assault being so sudden that Caesar had to do all things at one time. The standard as the sign to run to arms had to be displayed, the soldiers were to be called from the works on the rampart, the order of battle was to be formed, and a great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness of time and the sudden charge of the enemy.

Time was lacking even for putting on helmets and uncovering shields. In such an unfavourable state of affairs, various events of fortune followed. The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions speedily drove back the Atrebates, who were breathless with running and fatigue. Many of them were slain. In like manner the Veromandui were routed by the eighth and eleventh legions; but as part of the camp was very exposed, the Nervii hastened in a very close body, under Boduagnatus, their leader, to rush against that quarter. Our horsemen and light-armed infantry were routed by the first assault, and the enemy, rushing into our camp in great numbers, pressed hard on the legions. But Caesar, seizing a shield and encouraging the soldiers, many of whose centurions had been slain, ordered them to extend their companies that they might more freely use their swords.

So great a change was soon effected that, though the enemy displayed great courage, the battle was ended so disastrously for them that the Nervii were almost annihilated. Scarcely five hundred were left who could bear arms. Their old men sent ambassadors to Caesar by the consent of all who remained, surrendering themselves. The Aduatuci, who were coming to the help of the Nervii, returned home when they heard of this battle.

All Gaul being now subdued, so high an opinion of this war was spread among the barbarians that ambassadors were sent to Caesar by those nations that dwelt beyond the Rhine, to promise that they would give hostages and execute his commands. He ordered these

embassies to return to him at the beginning of the following summer, because he was hastening into Italy and Illyricum. Having led his legions into winter quarters among the Carnutes, the Andes and the Turones, which states were close to those in which he had waged war, he set out for Italy, and a public thanksgiving of fifteen days was decreed for these achievements, an honour which before that time had been conferred on none.

III—WAR BY LAND AND SEA IN GAUL

When Caesar was setting out for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with the twelfth legion and part of the cavalry against the Nantuates, the Veragri and the Seduni, who extend from the territories of the Allobroges and the Lake of Geneva and the River Rhône to the top of the Alps. The reason for sending him was that he desired that the pass along the Alps, through which the Roman merchants had been accustomed to travel with great danger, should be opened.

Galba fought several successful battles, stormed some of their forts, and concluded a peace. He then determined to winter in a village of the Veragri, which is called Octodurus. But before the winter camp could be completed the tops of the mountains were seen to be crowded with armed men, and soon these rushed down from all parts and discharged stones and darts on the ramparts.

The fierce battle that followed lasted for more than six hours. During the fight more than a third part of the army of 30,000 men of the Seduni and the Veragri was slain, and the rest were put to flight, panic-stricken. Then Galba, unwilling to tempt fortune again, after having burnt all the buildings in that village, hastened to return into the province, urged chiefly by the want of corn and provision. As no enemy opposed his march, he brought his forces safely into the country of the Allobroges and there wintered.

These things being achieved, Caesar, who was visiting Illyricum to gain a knowledge of that country, had every reason to suppose that Gaul was reduced to a state of tranquillity. For the Belgae had been overcome, the Germans had been expelled and the Seduni and the Veragri among the Alps defeated. But a sudden war sprang up in Gaul.

The occasion of that war was this. P. Crassus, a young man, had taken up his winter quarters with the seventh legion among the Andes, who border on the Atlantic Ocean. As corn was scarce, he sent out officers among neighbouring states for the purpose of procuring supplies. The most considerable of these states was the Veneti, who have a very great number of ships with which they have been accustomed to sail into Britain, and thus they excel the rest of these states in nautical affairs. With them arose the beginning of the revolt.

The Veneti detained Silius and Velanius, who had been sent among them, for they thought they would recover by their means the hostages which they had given Crassus. The neighbouring people, the Essui and the Curiosolitae, led on by the influence of the Veneti (as the measures of the Gauls are sudden and hasty) detained other officers for the same motive. All the sea-coast being quickly brought over to the sentiments of these three states, they sent a common embassy to P. Crassus to say " If he wished to receive back his officers, let him send back to them their hostages."

Caesar, being informed of these things, since he was himself so far distant, ordered ships of war to be built on the River Loire ; rowers to be raised from the province ; sailors and pilots to be provided. These matters being quickly executed, he hastened to the army as soon as the season of the year admitted.

Caesar at once ordered his army, divided into several detachments, to attack the towns of the enemy in different districts. Many were stormed, yet much of the warfare was vain and much labour was lost, because the Veneti, having numerous ships specially adapted for such a purpose, their keels being flatter than those of our ships, could easily navigate the shallows and estuaries, and thus their flight hither and thither could not be prevented.

At length, in a naval fight, our fleet, being fully assembled, gained a victory so signal that, by that one battle, the war with the Veneti and the whole sea-coast was finished. Caesar thought that severe punishment should be inflicted, in order that for the future the rights of ambassadors should be respected by barbarians ; he therefore put to death all their senate and sold the rest for slaves.

About the same time P. Crassus arrived in Aquitania, which, as was already said, is, both from its extent and its number of population, a third part of Gaul. Here, a few years before, L. Valerius Praeconius, the lieutenant, had been killed and his army routed, so that Crassus understood no ordinary care must be used. On his arrival being known, the Sotiates assembled great forces, and the battle that followed was long and vigorously contested. The Sotiates being routed, they retired to their principal stronghold, but it was stormed, and they submitted. Crassus then marched into the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusites who raised a great host of men to carry on the war, but suffered total defeat, after which the greater part of Aquitania of its own accord surrendered to the Romans, sending hostages of their own accord from different tribes. A few only—and those remote nations—relying on the time of year, neglected to do this.

IV—THE FIRST LANDING IN BRITAIN

The following winter, this being the year in which Gn. Pompeius and M. Crassus were consuls [this was the year 699 after the building of Rome, 55 before Christ ; it was the fourth year of the Gallic War] the Germans, called the Usipetes and likewise the Tenchtheri, with a great number of men, crossed the Rhine not far from where that river falls into the sea. The motive was to escape from the Suevi, the largest and strongest nation in Germany, by whom they had been for several years harassed and hindered from agricultural pursuits.

The Suevi are said to possess a hundred cantons, from each of which they send forth

for war a thousand armed men yearly, the others remaining at home and going forth in their turn in other years.

Caesar, hearing that various messages had been sent to them by the Gauls (whose fickle disposition he knew) asking them to come forward from the Rhine, and promising them all that they needed, set forward for the army earlier in the year than usual. When he had arrived in the region he discovered that those things which he had suspected would occur had taken place, and that, allured by the hopes held out to them, the Germans were then making excursions to greater distances, and had advanced to the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi, who are under the protection of the Treviri. After summoning the chiefs of Gaul, Caesar thought proper to pretend ignorance of the things which he had discovered and, having conciliated and confirmed their minds and ordered some cavalry to be raised, resolved to make war against the Germans.

When he had advanced some distance, the Germans sent ambassadors, begging him not to advance further, as they had come hither reluctantly, having been expelled from their country. But Caesar, knowing that they wished for delay only to make further secret preparations, refused the overtures. Marshalling his army in three lines, and marching eight miles, he took them by surprise, and the Romans rushed their camp. Many of the enemy were slain, the rest being either scattered or drowned in attempting to escape by crossing the Meuse in the flight.

The conflict with the Germans being finished, Caesar thought it expedient to cross the Rhine. Since the Germans were so easily urged to go into Gaul, he desired they should have fears for their own territories. Therefore, notwithstanding the difficulty of constructing a bridge, owing to the breadth, rapidity and depth of the river, he devised and built one of timber and of great strength, piles being first driven in on which to erect it.

The army was led over into Germany, advanced some distance and burnt some abandoned villages of the hostile Sigambri. Then Caesar, having done enough to strike fear into the Germans and to serve both honour and interest, after a stay of eighteen days across the Rhine, returned into Gaul and cut down the bridge.

During the short part of the summer which remained he resolved to proceed into Britain, because succours had been constantly furnished to the Gauls from that country. Having collected about eighty transport ships, he set sail with two legions in fair weather, and the soldiers were attacked instantly on landing by the cavalry and charioteers of the barbarians. The enemy were vanquished, but could not be pursued, because the Roman horse had not been able to maintain their course at sea and to reach the island. This alone was wanting to Caesar's accustomed success.

V—CAESAR ON THE THAMES

During the winter Caesar ordered as many ships as possible to be constructed, and the old repaired. About six hundred transports and twenty ships of war were built and, after settling some disputes in Gaul among the chiefs, Caesar went to Port Itius with the legions. He took with him several of the leading chiefs of the Gauls, determining to retain them as hostages and to keep them with him during his next expedition to Britain, lest a commotion should arise in Gaul during his absence.

Caesar, having crossed to the shore of Britain and disembarked his army at a convenient spot, advanced about twelve miles and repelled all attacks of the cavalry and charioteers of the enemy. Then he led his forces into the territories of Cassivellaunus to the River Thames, which river can be forded in one place only. Here an engagement took place which resulted in the flight of the Britons. But Cassivellaunus had sent messengers to the four kings who reigned over Kent and the districts by the sea, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximaquilus and Segonax, commanding them to collect all their forces and assail the naval camp.

In the battle which ensued the Romans were victorious, and when Cassivellaunus heard of this disaster he sent ambassadors to Caesar to treat about a surrender. Caesar, since he had resolved to pass the winter on the continent, on account of sudden revolts in Gaul, demanded hostages and prescribed what tribute Britain should pay each year to the Roman people.

Caesar, expecting for many reasons greater commotion in Gaul, levied additional forces. He saw that war was being prepared on all sides, that the Nervii, Aduatuci and Menapii, with the addition of all the Germans on this side of the Rhine, were under arms; that the Senones did not assemble according to his command, and were concerting measures with the Carnutes and the neighbouring states; and that the Germans were importuned by the Treviri in frequent embassies. Therefore he thought that he ought to take prompt and effective measures for the war.

Accordingly, before the winter was ended, he marched with four legions unexpectedly into the territories of the Nervii, captured many men and much cattle, wasted their lands, and forced them to surrender and give hostages. He followed up his success by worsting the Senones, Carnutes and Menapii, while Labienus defeated the Treviri.

Gaul being tranquil, Caesar, as he had determined, set out for Italy to hold the provincial assizes. There he was informed of the decree of the senate that all the youth of Italy should take the military oath, and he determined to hold a levy throughout the entire province. The Gauls, animated by the opportunity afforded through his absence, and indignant that they were reduced beneath the dominion of Rome, began to organize their plans for war openly.

Many of the nations confederated and selected as their commander Vercingetorix, a young Avernian. On hearing what had happened, Caesar set out from Italy for Transalpine Gaul, and began the campaign by marching into the country of the Helvii, although it was the severest time of the year and the country was covered with deep snow.

The armies met, and Vercingetorix sustained a series of losses at Vellaunodunum, Genabum and Noviodunum. The Gauls then

threw a strong garrison into Avaricum, which Caesar besieged, and at length Caesar's soldiers took it by storm. All the Gauls, with few exceptions, joined in the revolt; and the united forces, under Vercingetorix, attacked the Roman army while it was marching into the country of the Sequani, but they suffered complete defeat. After struggling vainly to continue the war, Vercingetorix surrendered and the Gallic chieftains laid down their arms.

Caesar demanded a great number of hostages, sent his lieutenants with various legions to different stations in Gaul, and determined himself to winter at Bibracte. A supplication of twenty days was decreed at Rome by the senate on hearing of these successes.

The Antiquities of the Jews

FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS

AN historical sketch of the Jewish race from the Creation to A.D. 66, The Antiquities of the Jews deals with events of the greatest interest not only from an antiquarian, but also from a religious standpoint. Its author, Flavius Josephus, was himself a Jew who lived in the 1st century A.D. His work is based on Biblical and non-Biblical authorities impartially; sometimes his narrative is merely a paraphrase of parts of the Old Testament; sometimes he gives us valuable information derived from other sources. His frequent inaccuracies are mainly due to his uncritical acceptance of Jewish traditions. A part of the history—that which deals with Christ—is thought to be an interpolation of a later date.

I—FROM ALEXANDER TO ANTIOCHUS

AFTER Philip, king of Macedon, had been treacherously slain by Pausanias, he was succeeded by his son Alexander, who, passing over the Hellespont, overcame the army of Darius, king of Persia, at Granicum. So he marched over Lydia, subdued Ionia, overran Caria and Pamphylia, and again defeated Darius at Issus. The Persian king fled into his own land and his mother, wife and children were captured. Alexander besieged and took first Tyre, and then Gaza, and next marched towards Jerusalem.

At Sapha, in full view of the city, he was met by a procession of the priests in fine linen, and a multitude of the citizens in white, the high-priest, Jaddua, being at their head in his resplendent robes. Graciously responding to the salutations of priests and people, Alexander entered Jerusalem, worshipped and sacrificed in the Temple, and then invited the people to ask what favours they pleased of him; whereupon the high-priest desired that they might enjoy the laws of their forefathers, and pay no tribute on the seventh year. All their requests were granted, and Alexander led his army into the neighbouring cities.

Now, when Alexander was dead and his government had been divided among many, Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, by treachery seized Jerusalem, and took away many captives to Egypt and settled them there. His successor, Ptolemy Philadelphus, restored to freedom 120,000 Jews who had been kept in slavery at the instance of Aristeus, one of his most intimate friends. He also dedicated many gifts to God, and showed great friendship to the Jews in his dominions.

Other kings in Asia followed the example of Philadelphus, conferring honours on Jews who became their auxiliaries and making them citizens with privileges equal to those enjoyed by the Macedonians and Greeks. In the reign of Antiochus the Great the Jews suffered greatly while he was at war with Ptolemy Philopater, and with his son, called Epiphanes. When Antiochus had beaten Ptolemy he seized on Judea, but ultimately he made a league with Ptolemy, gave him his daughter Cleopatra to wife and yielded up to him Celesyria, Samaria, Judea and Phoenicia by way of dowry. Onias, son of Simon the Just, was then high-priest. He greatly provoked the king by neglecting to pay his taxes, so that Ptolemy threatened to settle his soldiers in Jerusalem to live on the citizens.

But Joseph, the nephew of Onias, by his wisdom brought all things right again, and entered into friendship with the king, who lent him soldiers and sent him to force the people in various cities to pay their taxes. Many who refused were slain. Joseph not only thus gathered great wealth for himself, but sent much to the king and to Cleopatra, and to powerful men at the court of Egypt. He had a son named Hyrcanus, who became noted for his ability, and crossed the Jordan with many followers; he made war successfully on the Arabians, built a magnificent stone castle, and ruled over all the region for seven years, even all the time that Seleucus was king of Syria. But when Seleucus was dead, his brother Antiochus Epiphanes took the kingdom, and Hyrcanus, seeing that Antiochus had a great army, feared he should be punished for what he had done to the Arabians. So he took his own life, Antiochus seizing his possessions.

II—TO THE DEATH OF JUDAS MACCABAEUS

ANTIOCHUS, despising the son of Ptolemy as being but weak, and coveting the possession of Egypt, conducted an expedition against that country with a great force; but was compelled to withdraw by a declaration of the Romans. On his way back from Alexandria he took the city of Jerusalem, entering it without fighting in the 143rd year of the kingdom of the Seleucidae. He slew many of the citizens, plundered the city of much money and returned to Antioch.

After two years he again came up against

Jerusalem, and this time left the Temple bare, taking away the golden altar and candlesticks, the table of shewbread, and the altar of burnt offering and all the secret treasures. He slew some of the people, and carried off into captivity about ten thousand, burnt the finest buildings, erected a citadel and therein placed a garrison of Macedonians. Building an idol altar in the Temple, he offered swine on it, and he compelled many of the Jews to raise idol altars in every town and village and to offer swine on them every day. But many disregarded him, and these underwent bitter punishment. They were tortured or scourged or crucified.

Now, at this time there dwelt at Modin a priest named Mattathias, a citizen of Jerusalem. He had five sons, one of whom, Judas, was called Maccabaeus. Mattathias and his sons not only refused to sacrifice as Antiochus commanded, but, with his sons, attacked and slew an apostate Jewish worshipper and Apelles, the king's general, and a few of his soldiers. Then the priest and his five sons overthrew the idol altar and fled into the desert, followed by many of their followers with their wives and children. About a thousand of these who had hidden in caves were overtaken and destroyed; but many who escaped joined themselves to Mattathias and appointed him to be the ruler, who taught them to fight, even on the Sabbath. Gathering a great army, he overthrew the idol altars and slew those who broke the laws. But after ruling one year, he fell into a distemper, and committed to his sons the conduct of affairs. He was buried at Modin, all the people making great lamentation.

His son Judas took upon himself the administration of affairs in the 146th year, and with the help of his brothers and others cast their enemies out of the country and purified the land of its pollutions. Judas celebrated in the Temple at Jerusalem the festival of the restoration of the sacrifices for eight days. From that time we call the yearly celebration the Feast of Lights. Judas also rebuilt the wall and reared towers of great height.

When these things were over he made excursions against adversaries on every side, he and his brothers Simon and Jonathan subduing in turn Idumaea, Gilead, Jazer, Tyre and Ashdod.

Antiochus died of a distemper which overtook him as he was fleeing from Elymais, from which he was driven during an attack upon its gates. Before he died he called his friends about him, and confessed that his calamities had come upon him for the miseries he had brought upon the Jewish nation.

Antiochus was succeeded by his son, Antiochus Eupator, a boy of tender age, whose guardians were Philip and Lysias. He reigned but two years, being put to death, together with Lysias, by order of the usurper Demetrius, the son of Seleucus, who fled from Rome and, landing in Syria, gathered an army and was joyfully received by the people. Against Jerusalem, Demetrius sent an expedition commanded by his general, Bacchides. Judas Maccabaeus, fighting with great courage, but having with him only 800 men, fell in the battle. His brothers Simon and Jonathan, receiving his body by treaty from the enemy, carried it to the village of Modin and there buried him. He left behind him a glorious reputation, by gaining freedom for his nation and delivering them from slavery under the Macedonians. He died after filling the office of high-priest for three years.

III—TO THE ROMAN DOMINION

JONATHAN and his brother Simon continued the war against Bacchides. They were assisted by Alexander, the son of Antiochus Epiphanes, who, in the 160th year, came up into Syria against Demetrius and defeated and slew him in a great battle near Ptolemais. But the son of Demetrius, named after his father, in the 165th year, after Alexander had seated himself on the throne and had gained in marriage Cleopatra, daughter of Ptolemy Philometor, came from Crete with a great number of mercenary soldiers. Jonathan and Simon, brothers of Judas Maccabaeus, entering into league with Demetrius, who offered them very great advantages, defeated at Ashdod the army sent by Alexander under Apollonius.

A breach took place between Alexander and Ptolemy through the treachery of Ammonius, a friend of the former, and the Egyptian king took away his daughter Cleopatra from her husband, and immediately sent to Demetrius, offering to make a league of mutual assistance and friendship with him, to give him his daughter in marriage, and to restore him to the principality of his fathers. These overtures were joyfully accepted, and Ptolemy came to Antioch and persuaded the people to receive Demetrius. Alexander was beaten in a battle by the two allies and fled into Arabia, where, however, his head was speedily cut off by Zabdiel, a prince of the country, and sent to Ptolemy. But that king, through falling from his horse, died a few days afterwards.

Demetrius, being secure in power, disbanded a great part of his army, but this action greatly irritated the soldiers. Furthermore, he was hated, as his father had been, by the people of Syria. A revolt was raised by an Apanemian named Trypho, who overcame Demetrius in a fight, and took from him both his elephants and the city of Antioch. Demetrius on this defeat retired into Cilicia, and Trypho delivered the kingdom to Anchiochus, the youthful son of Alexander, who quickly sent ambassadors to Jonathan and made him his confederate and friend, confirming him in the high-priesthood and yielding up to him four prefectures which had been added to Judea. Accordingly, Jonathan promptly joined him in a war against Demetrius, who was again defeated.

Soon after Demetrius had been carried into captivity Trypho deserted Antiochus, who had now reigned four years. He usurped power, which he basely abused; and Antiochus Soter, brother of Demetrius, raised a force against him and drove him away to Apamea, where he was put to death, his term of power having lasted only three years. Antiochus Soter then attacked Simon, who successfully resisted, established peace and ruled in all for eight years. His death also was the result of treachery, his son-in-law Ptolemy playing him false. His son Hyrcanus became high-priest, and speedily ejected the forces of Ptolemy from the land. Subduing all factions, he ruled justly for thirty-one years, leaving five sons.

The eldest, Aristobulus, purposed to change the government into a kingdom, and placed a diadem on his own head; but his mother, to whom the supremacy had been entrusted, disputed his authority. He cast her into prison, where she was starved to death; and next he compassed the death of his brother Antigonus, but was soon attacked by a painful disease. He reigned only one year. His widow, Alexandra, let his brothers out of prison and made Alexander Janneus king.

His reign was one of war and disorder. With savage cruelty he repressed rebellion, condemning hundreds of Jews to crucifixion. While these were yet living, their wives and children were slain before their eyes. His life was ended by a sickness which lasted three years, and after his death civil war broke out between his two sons, Aristobulus and Hyrcanus, in which great barbarities were committed. The conflict was terminated by the intervention of the Romans under Scarus. The two brothers appealed to Pompey after he came to Damascus; but that Roman general marched against Jerusalem and took it by force. We lost our liberty as a nation and became subject to the Romans.

IV—THE JEWS AND THE ROMANS

Crassus next came with Roman troops into Judea and pillaged the Temple, and then marched into Parthia, where both he and his army perished. Then Cassius obtained Syria, and checked the Parthians. He passed on to Judea, fell on Tarichaea, and took it, and carried away 3,000 Jewish captives.

A wealthy Idumean named Antipater, who had been a great friend of Hyrcanus, and had helped him against Aristobulus, was a very active and seditious man. He had married Cypros, a lady of his own Idumean race, by whom he had four sons, Phaselus and Herod, who afterwards became king, and Joseph and Pheroras; and a daughter, Salome. He cultivated friendship with other potentates, especially with the king of Arabia, to whom he committed the care of his children while he fought against Aristobulus. But when Caesar had taken Rome, and after Pompey and the senate had fled beyond the Ionian Sea, Aristobulus was set free from the bonds in which he had been laid.

Caesar resolved to send him with two legions into Syria to set matters right; but Aristobulus had no enjoyment of this trust, for he was poisoned by Pompey's party. But Scipio, sent by Pompey to slay Alexander, son of Aristobulus, cut off his head at Antioch. And Ptolemy, son of Menneus, ruler of Chalcis, took Alexander's brethren to him, and sent his son Philippion to Askelon to Aristobulus's wife, and desired her to send back with him her son Antigonus and her daughters; the one of whom, Alexandra, Philippion fell in love with and married her; though afterwards his father, Ptolemy, slew him and married Alexandra.

Now, after Pompey was dead, and after the victory Caesar had gained over him, Antipater, who had managed the Jewish affairs, became very useful to Caesar when he made war against Egypt, and that by the order of Hyrcanus. He brought over to the side of Caesar the principal men of the Arabians, and also Jamblicus, the ruler of the Syrians, and Ptolemy, his son, and Tholomy, the son of Sohemus, who dwelt at Mount Libanus, and almost all the cities, and with 3,000 armed Jews he joined Mithradates of Pergamus, who was marching with his auxiliaries to aid Caesar.

Antipater and Mithradates together won a pitched battle against the Egyptians, and Caesar not only then commended Antipater, but used him throughout that war in the most hazardous undertakings and finally, at the end of that campaign, made him procurator of Judea, at the same time appointing Hyrcanus high-priest. Antipater, seeing that Hyrcanus was of a slow and slothful temper, made his eldest son, Phaselus, governor of Jerusalem; but committed Galilee to his next son, Herod, who was only fifteen, but was a youth of great mind, and soon proved his courage, and won the love of the Syrians by freeing their country of a nest of robbers and slaying the captain of these, one Hezekias.

Thus Herod became known to Sextus Caesar, a relation of the great Caesar, who was now president of Syria. Now, the growing reputation of Antipater and his sons excited the envy of the principal men among the Jews, especially as they saw that Herod was violent and bold, and was capable of acting tyrannically. So they accused him before Hyrcanus of encroaching on the government, and of transgressing the laws by putting men to death without their condemnation by the sanhedrin. Protecting Herod, whom he loved as his own son, from the sanhedrin when they would have sentenced him to death, Hyrcanus aided him to flee to Damascus, where he took refuge with Sextus Caesar. When Herod received the kingdom, he slew all the members of that sanhedrin excepting Sameas, whom he respected because he persuaded the people to admit Herod into the city, and he even slew Hyrcanus also.

Now, when Caesar was come to Rome, and was ready to sail into Africa to fight against Scipio and Cato, Hyrcanus sent ambassadors to him, desiring the ratification of the league of friendship between them. Not only Caesar but the senate heaped honours on the ambassadors, and confirmed the understanding that subsisted. But during the disorders that arose after the death of Caesar, Cassius came into Syria and disturbed Judea by exacting great sums of money. Antipater sought to gather the great tax demanded from Judea, and was foully slain by a collector named Malichus, on whom Herod quickly took vengeance for the murder of his father. By his energy in obtaining the required tax, Herod gained new favour with Cassius.

V—THE HERODIAN ERA

In order to secure his position, Herod made an obscure priest from Babylon, named Ananelus, high-priest in place of Hyrcanus. This offended Alexandra, daughter of Hyrcanus and wife of Alexander, son of Aristobulus the king. She had ten children, among whom were Mariamne, the beautiful wife of Heros, and Aristobulus. She sent an appeal to Cleopatra,

queen of Egypt, in order by her intercession to gain from Antony the high-priesthood for this son. At the instance of Antony, Herod took the office from Ananelus, and gave it to Aristobulus, but took care that the youth should soon be murdered. Then, from causeless jealousy, he put to death his uncle Joseph and threw Mariamne into prison. Victory in a war with Arabia enhanced his power. Cruelly slaying Hyrcanus, he hasted away to Octavian, who had beaten Antony at Actium, and obtained also from him, the new Caesar Augustus, the kingdom, thus being confirmed in his position.

Women of the palace who hated Mariamne for her beauty, her high birth and her pride, falsely accused her to Herod of gross unfaithfulness. He loved her passionately, but, giving ear to these traducers, ordered her to be tried. She was condemned to death, and showed great fortitude as she went to the place of execution, even though her own mother, Alexandra, in order to make herself safe from the wrath of the king, basely and publicly and violently upbraided her, while the people, pitying her, mourned at her fate. Herod was also attacked, by a tormenting distemper. He ordered the execution of Alexandra and of several of his most intimate friends.

By his persistent introduction of foreign customs, which corrupted the constitution of the country, Herod incurred the deep hatred of very many eminent citizens. He erected servile trophies to Caesar, and prepared costly games in which men were condemned to fight with wild beasts. Ten men who conspired against him were betrayed, and were tortured horribly and then slain. But the people seized the spy who had informed against them, tore him limb from limb and flung the body in pieces to the dogs. By constant and relentless severity Herod still strengthened his rule.

But now fearful disturbances arose in his family His sister Salome and his brother Pheroras displayed virulent hatred against Alexander and Aristobulus, sons of the murdered Mariamne, and, on their part, the two young men were incensed at the partiality shown by Herod to his eldest son, Antipater. This prince was continually using cunning strategy against his brethren, while feigning affection for them. He so worked on the mind of the king by false accusations against Alexander that many of the friends of this youth were tortured to death in the attempts made to force disclosures from them.

A traitor named Eurycles fanned the flame by additional accusations, all utterly groundless, so that Herod wrote letters to Rome concerning the treacherous designs of his sons against him, and asking permission of Caesar to bring them to trial. This was granted, and they were condemned by an assembly of judges at Berytus. By their father's command they were starved to death.

Herod by this time had nine wives and many children and grandchildren. The latter he brought up with much care. Antipater was sent on a mission to Rome, and during his absence his plots were discovered, and on his return, Herod, amazed at his wickedness, condemned him to death. The king now altered his testament, dividing the territory among several of his sons. He died on the fifth day after the execution of Antipater, having reigned thirty-four years after procuring the death of Antigonus.

Archelaus, his son, was appointed by Caesar, in confirmation of Herod's will, governor of one-half of the country; but accusation of enemies led to his banishment to Lyons, in Gaul. Cyrenaicus, a Roman senator and magistrate, was sent by Caesar to make taxation in Syria and Judea, and Caponius was made procurator of Judea. Philip, a son of Herod, built cities in honour of Tiberius Caesar. When Pontius Pilate became procurator he removed the army from Caesarea to Jerusalem, abolished Jewish laws, and (in the night) introduced Caesar's effigies on the ensigns.

About this time Jesus, a wise man, a doer of wonderful works, drew over to him many Jews and Gentiles. He was Christ; and when Pilate, at the suggestion of the principal men among us, had condemned him to the cross, those that loved him did not forsake him, for he appeared to them again alive at the third day, as the prophets had foretold; and the tribe of Christians, so named from him, are not extinct at this day. John, who was called the Baptist, was slain by Herod the tetrarch at his castle at Machaerus, by the Dead Sea. The destruction of his army by Aretas, king of Arabia, was ascribed by the Jews to God's anger for this crime.

Agrippa, grandson of Herod the Great, became the most famous of his descendants. On him Claudius Caesar bestowed all the dominions of his grandfather with the title of king. But pride overcame him. Seated on a throne at a great festival at Caesarea, arrayed in a magnificent robe, he was stricken by a disease, and died.

He was succeeded by his son Agrippa, during whose time Felix and Festus were procurators in Judea, while Nero was Roman emperor. This Agrippa finished the Temple by the work of 18,000 men. The war of the Jews and Romans began through the oppression by Gessius Florus, who secured the procuratorship by the friendship of his wife Cleopatra with Poppea, wife of Nero. Florus filled Judea with intolerable cruelties, and the war began in the second year of his rule and the twelfth of the reign of Nero. What happened will be known by those who peruse the books I have written about the Jewish war.

The Annals

CORNELIUS TACITUS

A MAN of strong prepossessions and prejudices, Tacitus allowed them to colour his narratives; but he cannot be charged with dishonesty. His portraits are singularly powerful; his narrative is picturesque, vivid, dramatic; but the condensed character of his style and the pregnancy of his phrases make his work occasionally obscure. His Germania is a valuable record of the early institutions of the Teutonic peoples. His Histories of the Empire from Galba to Domitian are valuable as dealing with events of which he was an eye-witness. His Annals, covering practically the reigns from Tiberius to Nero, open only some forty years before his own birth.

I—EMPEROR AND NEPHEW

TIBERIUS, adopted son and actual stepson of Augustus, was summoned from Illyria by his mother Livia to the bedside of the dying emperor at Nola. Augustus left a granddaughter, Agrippina, who was married to Germanicus, the nephew of Tiberius; and a grandson, Agrippa Postumus, a youth of evil reputation. The succession of Tiberius was not in doubt; but his first act was to have Agrippa Postumus put to death—according to his own statement, by the order of Augustus.

At Rome, consuls, senators and knights hurried to embrace their servitude. The nobler the name that each man bore, the more zealous was he in his hypocrisy. The grave pretence of Tiberius that he laid no claim to imperial honours was met by the grave pretence that the needs of the state forbade his refusal of them. His mother, Livia Augusta, was the object of a like sycophancy. But the world was not deceived by the solemn farce.

The death of Augustus, however, was the signal for mutinous outbreaks among the legions on the European frontiers of the empire. In Pannonia the ostensible motive was jealousy of the higher pay and easier terms of service of the Praetorian guard. So violent were the men, and so completely did the officers lose control, that Drusus, the son of Tiberius, was sent to make terms with the mutineers, and only owed his success to the reaction caused by the superstitious alarm of the soldiery at an eclipse of the moon. Germanicus, who was in command in Germany, was absent in Gaul. Here the mutiny of the Lower Army, under Caecina, was very serious, because it was clearly organized, the men working systematically and not haphazard

NEWS of the outbreak brought their popular general, Germanicus, to the spot. The mutineers at once offered to make him emperor, a proposal which he indignantly repudiated. The position, in a hostile country, made some concession necessary; but fresh disturbances broke out when it was suspected that the arrival of a commission from the senate meant that the concessions would be cancelled. Here the reaction which broke down the mutiny was caused by the shame of the soldiers themselves when Germanicus sent his wife and child away from a camp where their lives were in danger. Of their own accord, the best of the soldiers turned on their former ringleaders and slew them. And the legions under Caecina took similar steps to recover their lost credit. Germanicus, however, saw that the true remedy for the disaffection would be found in an active campaign. The desired effect was attained by an expedition against the Marsi, conducted with a success which Tiberius, at Rome, regarded with mixed feelings.

The German tribe named the Cherusci favoured Arminius, the determined enemy of Rome, in preference to Segestes, who was conspicuous for 'loyalty' to Rome. Germanicus advanced to support the latter, and Arminius was enraged by the news that his wife, the daughter of Segestes, was a prisoner. His call to arms, his declamations in the name of liberty, roused the Cherusci, the people who had annihilated the legions of Varus a few years before. A column commanded by Caecina was enticed by Arminius into a swampy position, where it was in extreme danger, and a severe engagement took place. The scheme of Arminius was to attack the Romans on the march; fortunately, the rasher counsels of his uncle, Inguiomerus, prevailed; an attempt was made to storm the camp and the Romans were thus enabled to inflict a decisive defeat on the foe.

IT was at this time that the disastrous practice was instituted of informers bringing charges of treason against prominent citizens on grounds which Tiberius himself condemned as frivolous. The emperor began to make a practice of attending trials, which indeed prevented corrupt awards, but ruined freedom.

Now arose disturbances in the east. The Parthians expelled their king, Vonones, a former favourite of Augustus. Armenia became involved, and these things were the source of serious complications later. Tiberius was already meditating the transfer of Germanicus to these regions. That general, however, was planning a fresh German campaign from the North Sea coast. A great fleet carried the army to the mouth of the Ems; thence Germanicus marched to the Weser and crossed it. Germanicus was gratified to find that his troops were eager for the impending fray. A tremendous defeat was inflicted on the Cherusci, with little loss to the Romans. Arminius, who had headed a charge which all but broke the Roman line, escaped only with the utmost difficulty.

Nevertheless, the Germans rallied their forces and a second furious engagement took place, in which the foe fought again with desperate valour, and were routed mainly through the superiority of the Roman armour and discipline. The triumph was marred only by a disaster which befel the legions which were withdrawn by sea. A terrific storm wrecked almost the entire fleet, and it was with great difficulty that

the few survivors were rescued. The consequent revival of German hopes made it necessary for two large armies to advance against the Marsi and the Catti respectively, complete success again attending the Roman arms.

Jealousy of his nephew's popularity and success now caused Tiberius to insist on his recall. At this time informers charged with treason a young man of distinguished family, Libo Drusus, mainly on the ground of his foolish consultation of astrologers, with the result that Drusus committed suicide. This story will serve as one among many which exemplify the prevalent demoralisation. In the same year occurred the audacious insurrection of a slave who impersonated the dead Agrippa Postumus; and also the deposition of the king of Cappadocia whose kingdom was annexed as a province of the empire.

A contest took place between the Suevi and the Cherusci, in which Rome declined to intervene. Maroboduus, of the Suevi, was disliked because he took the title of king, which was alien to the German ideas, being in this respect contrasted with Arminius. The Cherusci had the better of the encounter.

II—THE DEVELOPMENT OF DESPOTISM

GERMANICUS on his recall was in danger, while in Rome, of being made the head of a faction in antagonism to Drusus, the son of Tiberius. He was dispatched, however, with extraordinary powers, to take control of the East, where Piso, the governor of Syria, believed that he held his own appointment precisely to be a thorn in the side of Germanicus. The latter made a progress through Greece, settled affairs in Armenia and Parthis, and continued his journey to Egypt.

Piso's machinations, encouraged by the reports which reached him of the emperor's displeasure at the conduct of Germanicus, caused the gravest friction. Finally, on the return from Egypt through Syria, Germanicus became desperately ill. He declared his own belief that Piso and his wife had poisoned him; and, on his death, the rumour met general credence, though it was unsupported by evidence. Agrippina returned to Rome, bent on vengeance, and the object of universal sympathy. Piso attempted to make himself master of Syria, but failed to win over the legions, and then resolved to return to Rome and defy his accusers.

About this time Arminius was killed in attempting to make himself king. Shortly before, Tiberius had rejected with becoming dignity a rival chief's offer to poison the national hero of German independence.

On the arrival in Italy of Agrippina with the ashes of Germanicus, the popular and official expressions of grief and sympathy were almost unprecedented. This public display was not at all encouraged by Tiberius himself. Drusus was instructed to emphasise the fact that Piso must not be held either guilty or innocent till the case had been sifted. Tiberius insisted that not he, but the senate, must be the judge; the case must be decided on its merits, not out of consideration for his own outraged feelings.

Piso was charged with having corrupted the soldiery, levied war on the province of Syria and poisoned Germanicus. All except the last charge was proved up to the hilt; for that alone there was no evidence. Piso, therefore, despaired, fearing less the ebullitions of popular wrath than the emotionless implacability of the emperor. He was found dead in his room; but whether by his own act or that of Tiberius, was generally doubted. The penalties imposed on his wife and son were mitigated by the emperor himself.

A number of notorious scandals at this period emphasise the degradation of morals and the disregard for the sanctity of the marriage tie in a society where children were regarded as a burden, in spite of official encouragement of the birth-rate. There was an instructive debate on a proposal that magistrates appointed to provinces should not take wives with them.

Risings in Gaul of the Treveri and Aedui created much alarm in Rome; the composure of Tiberius was justified by their decisive suppression.

In Africa, Blaesus successfully suppressed, though he did not finally curb, the brigand chief Tacfarinas, who had been building up a nomad empire of his own. It was under Dolabella, the successor of Blaesus, that Tacfarinas was completely overthrown and slain.

Hitherto the rule of Tiberius had been, on the whole, prosperous. But the ninth year marks the establishment of the ascendancy of Aelius Sejanus over the mind of the emperor, whereby his sway was transformed into a foul tyranny. Not of noble birth, Sejanus had neglected no means, however base, to secure favour with Tiberius and with the Praetorian Guard, of which he held the command.

He was now determined to get rid of Drusus, the son of Tiberius, as the most dangerous obstacle to his ambitions. He accomplished his purpose by administering a poison, of which the operation was unsuspected till the facts were revealed many years later by an accomplice. Then the young sons of Germanicus became the accepted representatives of the imperial line, for the infant sons of Drusus died very shortly afterwards. Accordingly, Sejanus now directed his attacks against the more powerful persons who might be regarded as partisans of the house of Germanicus.

Despite the multiplication of prosecutions, it is to be noted that it was still possible for a shrewd and tactful person, as exemplified by the career of Marcus Lepidus, to uphold the principles of justice and liberty without losing the favour of the emperor. Among other prosecutions, that of Cremutius, whose crime was that of praising the memory of Brutus and Cassius, demands attention, as the first of the kind.

THE ambitions of Sejanus received a check when he had the presumption to request Tiberius to grant him the hand of the widow of Drusus in marriage. In order the more surely to bring disgrace on the house of Germanicus, he now implanted in the mind of Agrippina a conviction that Tiberius intended to poison her. That such suspicions were commonplaces of that terrible time is illustrated by the story. The persistent gloom of her face and voice, and her refusal of proffered dishes as she sat near Tiberius at dinner, attracted his attention; to

test her, he personally commended and pressed on her some apples; this only intensified her suspicions, and she gave them to the attendants untasted. Tiberius made no open comment, but observed to his mother that it would hardly be surprising should he contemplate harsh measures towards one who obviously took him for a poisoner.

III—MORBID TYRANT AND DOTARD

It was at this time that Tiberius withdrew himself from the capital and took up his residence at a country seat where hardly anyone had access to him except Sejanus; whether at the favourite's suggestion or not is uncertain. The retreat finally selected was the island of Caprae.

The monstrous lengths to which men of the highest rank were now prepared to go to curry favour with Tiberius and Sejanus was exemplified in the ruin of Sabinus, a loyal friend of the house of Germanicus. The unfortunate man was tricked into speaking bitterly of Sejanus and Tiberius. Three senators were actually hidden above the ceiling of the room where he was entrapped into uttering his unguarded phrases, and on this evidence he was condemned.

The death of the aged Livia Augusta removed the last check on the influence of Sejanus.

[The account of his two years of unqualified supremacy, and of his sudden and utter overthrow has been lost, two books of the Annals being missing here.]

From this time, the life of Tiberius at Caprae was one of morbid and nameless debauchery. The condition of his mind may be inferred from the opening words of one of his letters to the senate. "If I know what to write, how to write it, what not to write, may the gods and goddesses destroy me with a worse misery than the death I feel myself dying daily." The end came when Marco, the prefect of the Praetorians, to save his own life and secure the succession of Gaius Caesar (Caligula), the surviving son of Germanicus, caused the old emperor to be smothered.

[The record of the next ten years is lost. When the story is taken up again, the wife of Claudius, the infamous Messalina, was at the zenith of her evil career.]

Messalina paraded with utter shamelessness her last and fatal passion for Silius, and went so far as publicly to marry her paramour. It was the freed man Narcissus who made the outrageous truth known to Claudius, and practically terrorised him into striking. Half measures were impossible; a swarm of Messalina's accomplices in vice were put to death. To her, Claudius showed signs of relenting; but Narcissus gave the orders for her death without his knowledge. When they told Claudius that she was dead, he displayed no emotion, but went on with his dinner, and apparently forgot the whole matter.

A new wife had to be provided; Agrippina, the daughter of Germanicus, niece of Claudius himself, and mother of the boy Domitius, who was to become the emperor Nero, was the choice of the freed-man Pallas, and proved the successful candidate.

Meanwhile, there had been a great revolt in Britain, against the propraetor Ostorius. First the Iceni took up arms, then the Brigantes; then—a still more serious matter—the Silures, led by the most brilliant of British warriors, Caractacus. Even his skill and courage, however, were of no avail against the superior armament of the Roman legions; his forces were broken up and he himself, escaping to the Brigantes, was by them betrayed to the Romans. The famous warrior was carried to Rome, where by his dignified demeanour he won pardon and liberty.

In the Far East, Mithridates was overthrown by his nephew Rhadamistus, and Parthia and Armenia remained in wild confusion. The reign of Claudius was brought to an end by poison—the notorious Locusta was employed by Agrippina for the purpose—and he was succeeded by Nero, to the exclusion of Britannicus.

IV—THE INFAMIES OF NERO

At the outset the young emperor was guided by Seneca and Burrus; his first speech—put into his mouth by Seneca, for he was no orator—was full of promise. But he was encouraged in a passion for Acte, a freed-woman, by way of counterpoise to the influence of his mother, Agrippina. The latter, enraged at the dismissal of Pallas, threatened her son with the legitimate claims of Britannicus, son of Claudius; Nero had the boy poisoned. Nero's private excesses and debaucheries developed, while the horrible system of delation flourished and prosecutions for treason abounded.

About this time the emperor's passion for Poppaea Sabina, the wife of Otho, became the source of later disaster. Beautiful, brilliant, utterly immoral, but complete mistress of her passions, she had married Nero's boon companion. Otho was dispatched to Lusitania and Poppaea remained at Rome.

Poppaea was bent on the imperial crown for herself, and urged Nero against his mother. A mock reconciliation took place, but it was only the preliminary to a treacherous plot for murdering the former empress. The plot failed; her barge was sunk, but she escaped to shore Nero, however, dispatched assassins to carry out the work, and Agrippina was slaughtered.

The emperor forthwith plunged into wild extravagances, on which his mother's life had been some check. He took cover for his passion for chariot-driving and singing by inducing men of noble birth to exhibit themselves in the arena; high-born ladies acted in disreputable plays; the emperor himself posed as a mime, and pretended to be a patron of poetry and philosophy. The wildest licence prevailed.

About this time the Roman Governor in Britain, Suetonius, crossed the Menai Straits and conquered the island of Anglesea. But outrages committed against Boadicea, queen of the Iceni, stirred that tribe to fierce revolt. Being joined by the Trinobantes, they fell upon the Romans at Camulodunum and massacred them. Suetonius, returning hastily from the west, found the Roman population in panic. The troops, however, inspired by the general's resolution, won a decisive victory, in which it is said that no fewer than 80,000 Britons, men and women, were slaughtered.

Not long after, Burrus died and Tigellinus became Nero's favourite and confidant. Nero then capped his matricide by suborning the same scoundrel who had murdered Agrippina to bring foul and false charges against his innocent wife, Octavia: who was thus done to death when not yet twenty, that her husband might be free to marry Poppaea. As a matter of course, the crime was duly celebrated by a public thanksgiving.

The dispatch of an incompetent general into Asia resulted in a most inglorious Parthian campaign. It was well that Corbulo, marching from Syria, restored the Roman prestige in the Far East.

These events were followed by the famous fire which devastated Rome; whether or no it was actually Nero's own work, rumour declared that he appeared on a private stage while the conflagration was raging and chanted appropriately of the fall of Troy. He planned rebuilding on a magnificent scale, and sought popularity by throwing the blame of the fire—and putting to exquisite tortures—a class called Christians, from their first leader, Christus, who had suffered death under Pontius Pilate, procurator of Judea, in the reign of Tiberius.

A widespread conspiracy was now formed against Nero, in favour of one Gaius Calpurnius Piso. The plot, however, was betrayed by a freedman of one of the conspirators.

The Wars of the Jews

FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS

THIS, the oldest of the extant works of Josephus, was written towards the end of Vespasian's reign (A.D. 69-79). The Aramaic original has not been preserved, but the Greek version was prepared by Josephus himself, who, on account of his beautiful Greek style, was called the Greek Livy. The work displays Josephus's literary genius to the full. It covers the period from about 170 B.C. to the Fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, the latter portion describing events which came within Josephus's own knowledge. An outline of his later work, The Antiquities of the Jews, appears in page 22.

1—BEGINNING OF THE GREAT CONFLICT

WHEREAS the war which the Jews made against the Romans hath been the greatest of all times, while some men who were not concerned themselves have written vain and contradictory stories by hearsay, and while those that were there have given false accounts, I, Joseph, the son of Matthias, by birth a Hebrew, and a priest also, and who at first fought against the Romans myself, and was forced to be present at what was done afterwards, am the author of this book.

Now, the affairs of the Romans were in great disorder after the death of Nero. At the decease of Herod, Agrippa, his son, who bore the same name, was seventeen years old. He was considered too young to bear the burden of royalty, and Judea relapsed into a Roman province. Cuspius Fadus was sent as governor and administered his office with firmness, but found civil war disturbing the district beyond Jordan. He cleared the country of the robber bands; and his successor, Tiberius Alexander, during a brief rule, put down disturbances which broke out in Judea. The province was at peace till he was superseded by Cumanus, during whose government the people and the Roman soldiery began to show mutual animosity. In a terrible riot, 20,000 people perished, and Jerusalem was given up to wailing and lamentation.

It was in Caesarea that the events took place which led to the final war. This magnificent city was inhabited by two races—the Syrian Greeks, who were heathens, and the Jews. The two parties violently contended for the pre-eminence. The Jews were the more wealthy; but the Roman soldiery, levied chiefly in Syria, took part with their countrymen. Tumults and bloodshed disturbed the streets. At this time a procurator named Gessius Florus was appointed, and he, by his barbarities, forced the Jews to begin the war in the twelfth year of the reign of Nero and the seventeenth of the reign of Agrippa.

But the occasion of the war was by no means proportioned to those heavy calamities that it brought upon us. The fatal flame finally broke out from the old feud at Caesarea. The decree of Nero had assigned the magistracy of that city to the Greeks. It happened that the Jews had a synagogue, the ground around which belonged to a Greek. For this spot the Jews offered a much higher price than it was worth. It was refused, and, to annoy them as much as possible, the owner set up some mean buildings and shops upon it, and so made the approach to the synagogue as narrow and difficult as possible. The more impetuous of the Jewish youth interrupted the workmen. Then the men of greater wealth and influence, and among them John, a publican, collected the large sum of eight talents and sent it as a bribe to Florus, that he might stop the building. He received the money, made great promises, and at once departed for Sebaste from Caesarea. His object was to leave full scope for the riot.

On the following day, while the Jews were crowding to the synagogue, a citizen of Caesarea outraged them by oversetting an earthen vessel in the way, over which he sacrificed birds, as done by the law in cleansing lepers, and thus he implied that the Jews were a leprous people. The more violent Jews, furious at the insult, attacked the Greeks, who were already in arms. The Jews were worsted, took up the books of the law, and fled to Narbata, about seven miles distant.

John, the publican, and twelve men of eminence went to Samaria to Florus, implored his aid and reminded him of the eight talents

he had received. He threw them into prison and demanded seventeen talents from the sacred treasury under pretence of Caesar's necessities. This injustice and oppression caused violent excitement in Jerusalem when the news reached that city. The people assembled around the Temple with the loudest outcries; but it was the purpose of Florus to drive the people to insurrection, and he gave his soldiers orders to plunder the upper market. Of men, women and children there fell that day 3,600.

When Agrippa attempted to persuade the people to obey Florus till Caesar should send someone to succeed him, the more seditious cast reproaches on him and got the king excluded from the city; nay, some had the impudence to fling stones at him. At the same time they excited the people to go to war, and some laid siege to the Roman garrison in the Antonia; others made an assault on a certain fortress called Masada. They took it by treachery and slew the Romans. One, Menahem, a Galilean, became leader of the sedition and went to Masada and broke open Herod's armoury, and gave arms not only to his own people, but to other robbers, also. These he made use of for a bodyguard, and returned in state to Jerusalem and gave orders to continue the siege of the Antonia.

The tower was undermined and fell, and many soldiers were slain. Next day the high priest, Ananias, and his brother Hezekiah, were slain by the robbers. By these successes Menahem was puffed up and became barbarously cruel; but he was slain, as were also the captains under him, in an attack led by Eleazar, a bold youth who was governor of the Temple.

II—THE GATHERING OF GREAT STORMS

And now great calamities and slaughters came on the Jews. On the very same day two dreadful massacres happened. In Jerusalem the Jews fell on Netilius and the band of Roman soldiers whom he commanded after they had made terms and had surrendered, and all were killed except the commander himself, who supplicated for mercy and even agreed to submit to circumcision. On that very day and hour, as though Providence had ordained it, the Greeks in Caesarea rose, and slew over 20,000 Jews, and so the city was emptied of its Jewish inhabitants. For Florus caught those who escaped, and sent them to the galleys.

By this tragedy the whole nation was driven to madness. The Jews rose and laid waste the villages all around many cites in Syria, and they descended on Gadara, Hippo and Gaulonitus and burnt and destroyed many places. Sebaste and Askelon they seized without resistance, and they razed Anthedon and Gaza to the ground.

When thus the disorder in all Syria had become terrible, Cestius Gallus, the Roman commander at Antioch, marched with an army to Ptolemais and overran all Galilee and invested Jerusalem, expecting that it would be surrendered by means of a powerful party within the walls.

But the plot was discovered, and the conspirators were flung headlong from the walls, and an attack by Cestius on the north side of the Temple was repulsed with great loss. Seeing the whole country around in arms, and the Jews swarming on all the heights, Cestius withdrew his army by night, leaving 400 of his bravest men to mount guard in the camp and to display their ensigns, that the Jews might be deceived.

But at break of day it was discovered that the camp was deserted by the army, and the Jews rushed to the assault and slew all the Roman band.

III—JUDEA IN REBELLION AGAINST ROME

Nero was at this time in Achaia. To him, Cestius, in order to lay the blame on Florus, sent as ambassadors Costobar and Saul, two brothers of the Herodian family, who, with Philip, the son of Jacimus, the general of Agrippa, had escaped from Jerusalem. Meantime, a great massacre of the Jews took place at Damascus. Then those in Jerusalem who had pursued after Cestius called a general assembly in the Temple, and elected their governors and commanders. Their choice fell on Joseph, the son of Gorion, and Ananius, the chief priest, who were invested with absolute authority in the city; but Eleazar was passed over, for he was suspected of aiming at kingly power, as he went about attended by a bodyguard of zealots. But as commanding within the Temple he had made himself master of the public treasures, and in a short time the need of money and his extreme subtlety won over the multitude, and all real authority fell into his hands. To the other districts they sent the men most to be trusted for courage and fidelity.

Josephus was appointed to the command of Galilee, with particular charge of the strong city of Gamala. He raised in that province in the north an army of more than a hundred thousand young men, whom he armed and exercised after the Roman manner; and he formed a council of seventy, and appointed seven judges in each city. He sought to unite the people and to win their good will. But great trouble arose from the treachery of his enemy, John of Gischala, who surpassed all men in craft and deceit. He gathered a force of 4,000 robbers and wasted Galilee, while he inflamed the dissensions in the cities, and sent messengers to Jerusalem accusing Josephus of tyranny. Tiberias and several cities revolted, but Josephus suppressed the rising, severely punishing many of the leaders. John retired to the robbers at Masada, and took to plundering Idumea.

IV—VESPASIAN AND JOSEPHUS

Nero, on learning from the messengers the state of affairs, at first regarded the revolt lightly; but presently grew alarmed, and appointed to the command of the armies in Syria and the task of subduing the Jews Vespasian, who had pacified the West when it was disordered by the Germans, and had also recovered Britain for the Romans. He came to Antioch in the early spring, and was there joined by Agrippa and all his forces. He

marched to Ptolemais, where he was met by his son Titus, who had, with expedition unusual in the winter season, sailed from Achaia to Alexandria. So the Roman army now numbered 60,000 horsemen and footmen, besides large numbers of camp followers who were also accustomed to military service and could fight on occasion.

The war was now opened. Josephus attempted no resistance in the open field, and the people had been directed to fly to the fortified cities. The strongest of all these was Jotapata, and here Josephus commanded in person.

Being very desirous of demolishing it, Vespasian besieged it with his whole army. It was defended with the greatest vigour, but after fierce conflicts, was taken in the thirteenth year of the reign of Nero, on the first day of the month Panemus (July). During this dreadful siege, and at the capture, 40,000 men fell. The Romans sought in vain for the body of Josephus, their stubborn enemy. He had leaped down the shaft of a dry well leading to a long cavern. A woman betrayed the hiding-place, and Josephus was taken and brought before the conqueror, of whom he had demanded from his captors a private conference. To Vespasian he announced that he and his son would speedily attain the imperial dignity. Vespasian was conciliated by the speech of his prisoner, whom he treated with kindness; for though he did not release him from his bonds, he bestowed on him suits of clothes and other precious gifts.

Joppa, Tiberias, Taricheae and Gamala were taken, both Romans and Jews perishing in the conflicts; and, by the capture of Gischala, all Galilee was subdued, John of Gischala fleeing to Jerusalem.

V—THE PRELUDE TO THE GREAT SIEGE

While the cities of Galilee thus arrested the course of the Roman eagles, Jotapata and Gamala setting the example of daring resistance, the leaders of the nation in Jerusalem, instead of sending out armies to the relief of the besieged cities, were engaged in the most dreadful civil conflicts.

The fame of John of Gischala had gone before him to Jerusalem, and the multitude poured forth to do him honour. He falsely represented the Roman forces as being very greatly weakened, and declared that their engines had been worn out in the sieges in Galilee. He was a man of enticing eloquence, to whom the young men eagerly gave heed. So the city now began to be divided into hostile factions, and the whole of Judea had before set to the people of Jerusalem the fatal example of discord. For every city was torn to pieces by civil animosities. Not only the public councils, but even numerous families were distracted by the peace and war dispute. Through all Judea the youth were ardent for war, while the elders vainly endeavoured to allay the frenzy. Bands of desperate men began to spread over the land, plundering houses, while the Roman garrisons in the towns, rather rejoicing in their hatred to the race than wishing to protect the sufferers, afforded little help.

Large numbers of these evil men stole into the city and grew into a daring faction, who robbed houses openly, and many of the most eminent citizens were murdered by these Zealots, as they were called, from their pretence that they had discovered a conspiracy to betray the city to the Romans. They dismissed many of the sanhedrin from office, and appointed men of the lowest degree, who would support them in their violence, till the leaders of the people became slaves to their will.

At length resistance was provoked, led by Ananus, oldest of the chief priests, a man of great wisdom, and the robber Zealots took refuge in the Temple and fortified it more strongly than before. They appointed as high priest one Phanias, a coarse and clownish rustic, utterly ignorant of the sacerdotal duties, who when decked in the robes of office caused great derision. This sport and pastime for the Zealots caused the more religious people to shed tears of grief and shame; and the citizens, unable to endure such insolence, rose in great numbers to avenge the outrage on the sacred rites. Thus a fierce civil war broke out in which very many were slain.

Then John of Gischala with great treachery, outwardly siding with Ananus and secretly aiding the Zealots, sent messengers inviting the Idumeans to come to his help, of whom 20,000 broke into the city during a stormy night and slew 85,000 people.

VI—THE SIEGE AND FALL OF JERUSALEM

Nero died after having reigned thirteen years and eight days, and Vespasian, being informed of the event, waited for a whole year, holding his army together instead of proceeding against Jerusalem. Galba was made emperor, and slain, as was also Otho, his successor; and then, after the defeat and death of the emperor Vitellius, Vespasian was proclaimed by the East. He had preferred to leave the Jews to waste their strength by their internal feuds while he sent his lieutenants with forces to reduce various surrounding districts instead of attacking Jerusalem. When he became emperor, he released Josephus from his bonds, honouring him for his integrity. Hastening his journey to Rome, Vespasian commanded Titus to subdue Judea.

At Jerusalem were now three factions raging furiously. Eleazar, son of Simon, who was the first cause of the war, by persuading the people to reject the offerings of the emperors to the Temple, and had led the Zealots and seized the Temple, pretended to cherish righteous wrath against John of Gischala for the bloodshed he had occasioned. But he deserted the Zealots and seized the inner court of the Temple, so that there was war between him and Simon, son of Gioras. Thus Eleazar, John and Simon each led a band in constant fightings, and the Temple was everywhere defiled by murders.

Now, as Titus was on his march he chose out 600 select horsemen, and went to take a view of the city, when suddenly an immense multitude burst forth from the gate over against the monuments of Queen Helena and intercepted him and a few others. He had on neither helmet

nor breastplate, yet though many darts were hurled at him, all missed him, as if by some purpose of Providence and, charging through the midst of his foes, he escaped unhurt. Part of the army now advanced to Scopos, within a mile of the city, while another occupied a station at the foot of the Mount of Olives.

SEEING this gathering of the Roman forces, the factions within Jerusalem for the first time felt the necessity for concord, as Eleazar from the summit of the Temple, John from the porticoes of the outer court, and Simon from the heights of Sion watched the Roman camps forming thus so near the walls. Making terms with each other, they agreed to make an attack at the same moment. Their followers, rushing suddenly forth along the valley of Jehoshaphat, fell on the 10th legion, encamped at the foot of the Mount of Olives, and working there unarmed at the entrenchments. The soldiers fell back, many being killed. Witnessing their peril, Titus, with picked troops, fell on the flank of the Jews and drove them into the city with great loss.

The Roman commander now carefully pushed forward his approaches, and the army took up a position all along the northern and the western walls, the footmen being drawn up in seven lines, with the horsemen in three lines behind, and the archers between.

Jerusalem was fortified by three walls. These were not one within the other, for each defended one of the quarters into which the city was divided. The first, or outermost, encompassed Bezetha, the next protected the citadel of the Antonia and the northern front of the Temple, and the third, or old, and innermost wall was that of Sion. Many towers, 35 feet high and 35 feet broad, each surmounted with lofty chambers and with great tanks for rain water, guarded the whole circuit of the walls, 90 being in the first wall, 14 in the second, and 60 in the third. The whole circuit of the city was about 33 stadia (four miles). From their pent-houses of wicker the Romans, with great toil day and night, discharged arrows and stones, which slew many of the citizens.

AT three different places the battering rams began their thundering work, and at length a corner tower came down, yet the walls stood firm, for there was no breach. Suddenly the besieged sallied forth and set fire to the engines. Titus came up with his horsemen and slew twelve Jews with his own hands.

The Jews now retreated to the second wall, abandoning the defence of Bezetha, which the Romans entered. Titus instantly ordered the second wall to be attacked, and for five days the conflict raged more fiercely than ever. The Jews were entirely reckless of their own lives, sacrificing themselves readily if they could kill their foes. On the fifth day they retreated from the second wall, and Titus entered that part of the lower city which was within it with 1,000 picked men.

But, being desirous of winning the people, he ordered that no houses should be set on fire and no massacres should be committed. The seditious, however, slew everyone who spoke of peace, and furiously assailed the Romans. Some fought from the walls, others from the houses, and such confusion prevailed that the Romans retired; then the Jews, elated, manned the breach, making a wall of their own bodies.

THUS the fight continued for three days, till Titus a second time entered the wall. He threw down all the northern part and strongly garrisoned the towers of the south. The strong heights of Sion, the citadel of the Antonia, and the fortified Temple still held out. Titus, eager to save so magnificent a place, resolved to refrain for a few days from the attack, in order that the minds of the besieged might be affected by their woes, and that the slow results of famine might operate. He reviewed his army in full armour, and they received their pay in view of the city, the battlements being thronged by spectators during this splendid defiling, who looked on in terror and dismay.

The famine increased, and the misery of the weaker was aggravated by seeing the stronger obtaining food. All natural affection was extinguished, husbands and wives, parents and children snatching the last morsel from each other. Many wretched men were caught by the Romans prowling in the ravines by night to pick up food and these were scourged, tortured and crucified. This was done to terrify the rest, and it went on till there was not wood enough for crosses.

Terrible crimes were committed in the city. The aged high-priest, Matthias, was accused of holding communication with the enemy. Three of his sons were killed in his presence, and he was executed in sight of the Romans, together with sixteen other members of the sanhedrin. The famine grew so woeful that a woman devoured the body of her own child. At length, after fierce fighting, the Antonia was scaled, and Titus ordered its demolition.

TITUS now promised that the Temple should be spared if the defenders would come forth and fight in any other place, but John and the Zealots refused to surrender it. For several days the outer cloisters and outer court were attacked with rams, but the immense and compact stones resisted the blows. As many soldiers were slain in seeking to storm the cloisters, Titus ordered the gates to be set on fire. Through that night and the next day the flames raged through the cloisters. Then, in order to save the Temple itself, he ordered the fire to be quenched. On the tenth of August, the same day of the year on which Nebuchadnezzar destroyed the Temple built by Solomon, the cry was heard that the Temple was on fire. The Jews, with cries of grief and rage, grasped their swords and rushed to take revenge on their enemies or perish in the ruins.

The slaughter was continued while the fire raged. Soon no part was left but a small portion of the outer cloisters, where 6,000 people had taken refuge, led by a false prophet who had there promised that God would deliver His people in His Temple. The soldiers set the building on fire and all perished. Titus next spent eighteen days in preparations for the attack on the upper city, which was then speedily captured. And now the Romans were not disposed to display any mercy, night alone putting an end to the carnage. During the whole of this siege of Jerusalem, 1,100,000 were slain, and the prisoners numbered 97,000.

History of European Morals

W. E. H. LECKY

IN 1861, after he had abandoned divinity for historical research, Lecky published Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland, which gave promise of competent work to follow. His History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne was first published in 1869 and at once became a success. Lecky clearly displayed his genius for collecting a great number of social phenomena to a focus and putting a distinct meaning on what he thus brought together, connecting these generalised appearances one with another. His book occupied a field which no one in England had yet attempted, and his dominating position still cannot be gainsaid.

I—NATURAL HISTORY OF MORALS

SOME enquiry into the nature and foundation of morals is a necessary preliminary to any examination of the moral progress of Europe. But on this head views fundamentally antagonistic and irreconcilable are held by the two philosophical schools whose opposition may be traced from the earliest days of ethical thought—the stoical or intuitive, and the epicurean or inductive; of which latter the Utilitarians are the modern representatives. Rejecting as I do the doctrines of this school, I must subject them to a brief investigation.

In this view, virtuous action is the action which produces happiness, and the one and only motive to action in the individual is the attainment of his own personal happiness as he conceives it. The virtuous man is he who sees his own happiness in seeking the happiness of the greatest number; virtue is no more than enlightened self-interest. The sole reason for forming a virtuous habit or performing a virtuous action is that we anticipate therefrom the greater sum of happiness for ourselves. To this source every moral principle can be traced, whether by the method of Thomas Hobbes in its unqualified nakedness, or through Hartley's doctrine of the association of ideas.

To this theory, however, the critic must reply: that in the first place it deprives the unvirtuous man of any motive to act virtuously, in the second it deprives virtuous action of any merit, and in the third it fails to account for the idea of obligation and duty. Moreover, it is the negation of the feeling common to mankind that the highest acts of virtue are acts of self-sacrifice.

On the other side stands the doctrine that man has, as part of his endowment, an intuitive perception of fundamental moral principles as laying him under positive obligations quite irrespective of his own interests, however he may regard them as probably tending ultimately to his personal benefit. Those principles are basic and eternal, unchanging.

That, however, is not to say that there is no moral progress. The perception of every principle is always potentially present, but in varying stages, from the very rudimentary to the very highly developed, one or another being emphasised or depressed according to the conditions of the society which is our environment; with the general result that those heroic virtues which are called into play in a comparatively primitive society are less active and less valued under an elaborate civilization, while the amiable virtues so necessary to the latter condition are held at a very low estimate in the more primitive community. The variation, however, is not in the principles but in the standards.

II—THE PAGAN EMPIRE

THE ancient Roman character was not the product of the Roman religion. It was based not on the worship of the gods but on the intense sentiment of patriotism; enthusiasm attached not to the gods but to the aspects of patriotism which they embodied, involving the supreme idea of unhesitating self-sacrifice on behalf of the state, which permeated the free population.

The expansion of the Imperial Republic de-nationalised the religion by contact with others and identification of Roman with foreign deities. The spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice was atrophied when the Roman was no longer waging his wars against aggressive rivals. The population, which in the old times developed the military and agricultural virtues in a high degree, lost the incentive not only to the former but to the latter also, when the old yeomanry were displaced by the huge estates cultivated by slave labour, and the free population was maintained by the free distribution of corn imported from the provinces and was kept amused by constant public entertainments of an increasingly demoralising character. The disappearance of the religious sanction left the inculcation of moral teaching and moral ideals to the philosophers and the small section to whom philosophy appeals.

It is therefore the Stoics to whom we must turn as the upholders of the lamp of moral ideals. Epicureanism, recognizing self-interest as the sole motive to morality, cannot excite moral enthusiasm. Stoicism assumes that virtue is itself the end for which man exists, not a means to some other end. Duty is supreme. Self-control, control over the passions which lead us astray and perturb our vision, is essential. Death has no terrors, though it is debatable whether it be the entrance to a new life or a simple ceasing to be, or whether circumstances may warrant us in seeking it voluntarily.

Duty, however, is not a state of passive acquiescence; it calls for the active promotion

of the welfare of society and for the benevolent virtues; though the austerity of the Stoical creed is more obviously associated with the heroic types of virtue, its disciples were distinguished by their humanity; and alike in doctrine and practice, Stoicism attains its culmination in the slave Epictetus and the emperor and master of the civilized world, Marcus Aurelius. In a society which was corrupt examples abound of both men and women of the noblest and purest among the followers of Stoicism.

The Stoic suppression of emotion tended to a certain hardness appropriate to the traditional Roman character, softened to more lovableness when touched with the gentler Greek spirit as in Plutarch. But other influences were coming into play in the second century. The popular need for a concrete religion was growing insistent. Oriental creeds imbued with supernaturalism were finding common acceptance, and the Neo-Platonism of the Alexandrian schools was penetrated with mysticism though the intellectual world at least was unconscious or wholly contemptuous of that strange faith which, despised and ostracised as yet, was about to achieve an overwhelming supremacy.

III—THE CONVERSION OF ROME

THE sudden transformation of an obscure and persecuted sect into a dominant power diverting the course of moral development into entirely new channels is a phenomenon so remarkable in its effects that much needless ingenuity has been expended in seeking to explain what was in fact an almost inevitable development.

Three lines have been followed. It has been maintained that the pagan philosophies had already been so much modified by the incorporation of Christian doctrines that acceptance of Christianity became easy; that the world was convinced by the overwhelming evidence of the miraculous origin of the new religion; and that nothing short of Divine interposition can account for an event so marvellous. Every one of these three contentions must be rejected.

First: There is not so much as a hint in any pagan writer or philosopher that he was influenced by or even acquainted with the doctrines of a religion which is mentioned, if at all, only with scorn. Moreover, so far as characteristically Christian morals find a place in the pagan teaching, they are to be found there at a period antecedent to the birth of Christianity.

Secondly: While the miracles of Christianity won easy credence, it was not upon that ground that the creed was accepted. Miracles were the common property of all religions. The Fathers of the Church never thought of challenging the authenticity of pagan thaumaturgists' miracles or the utterances of pagan prophets and Sibyls. Miracles were accepted as a matter of course, with no more searching examination of evidence than the most ordinary phenomena.

Thirdly: The triumph of Christianity is quite simply explicable without resort to any supernatural agency. Religion, philosophy and morals were all in a state of disintegration, in need of a new co-ordination which was provided by the new religion in a most convincing and attractive form, and with a sanction of an unprecedented and most impressive order—that of exclusive salvation. It emphasised the amiable virtues most readily appreciated in a society which had wholly lost its original military character, while its votaries had presented innumerable examples, under persecution, of the highest heroism.

The Christian Society had moreover attained such a degree of disciplined organization that its annihilation was at the beginning of the fourth century the only alternative to its final complete domination; and the result was decisively assured by the failure of the great persecutions under Decius, Diocletian and Galerius.

THAT Christianity survived the persecutions is evidence of the intense vitality of the faith, but the fact calls for no supernatural explanation. The Roman empire tolerated all religions, subject to the due performance of rites demanded by the state religion. That proviso was resisted only by the Jews and the Christians, who were regarded as a Jewish sect. The Jews, an exclusive and not at all a proselytising body, were officially released from the otherwise universal obligation; the Christians, essentially a missionary body, were not. To the state authorities the Christians appeared to form a secret society possibly treasonable and immoral, and as such they were also the objects of popular suspicion and dislike.

But it was only at intervals that the imperial authority took active measures for their suppression, though local authorities were frequently incited to enforce the penal laws against them by popular hostility. There were only two general persecutions, brief but terrible, in the first century under Nero and Domitian; for the next century and a half the persecutions were only sporadic.

Thus, by the time of Decius, who opened the era of terrific suppressions, the sect had become so extended, so powerful and so highly organized, that its extirpation was the only alternative to its decisive domination.

IV—FROM CONSTANTINE TO CHARLEMAGNE

THE recognition of Christianity as a lawful religion by Constantine ensured ite ascendancy. It differed from all others becauss in it alone religion and morals were inseparably bound together, whereas the ethics of the pagan world, based on custom by the many and derived from the philosophers by the few, were practically dissociated from the worship of the gods. But the Christian, to whom this world was no abiding city, held that an eternity of torment was in store for unbelievers and unrepentant sinners. Hell was such a deterrent from sin as the pagan world had not known. It was a creed for the multitude, since the portals of heaven were open to the poorest and meanest no less than to the rich and the wise. The virtues it especially stressed were those of the weak, humble and helpless, to whom it brought healing and consolation.

Specifically it gave a new sanctity to human

life. Abortion and infanticide had been condemned before, but only as venial offences; they assumed a new aspect when the death of the unbaptised meant their condemnation to endless agony. Philosophers might denounce gladiatorial shows as degrading; it was Christianity that condemned them as the deadly sin of murder, though nearly a century passed before their final abolition.

Christianity moreover recognized no distinctions of race or social position; if it enjoined obedience and submission in the slave it enjoined also humanity in the master who received the Sacrament side by side with the slave. It sanctioned the institution of slavery, but under its influence the slave gradually ceased to be a legal chattel. Above all, it insisted on the claims of charity, of alms-giving, of relieving distress; though by undiscriminating methods which had a deleterious side.

Most of all it softened the characters of men by accustoming the imagination to dwell upon images of tenderness and pathos, the winning, almost feminine beauty of the Christian Founder, the Virgin Mother, the agonies of Gethsemane or of Calvary. The high conception that has been formed of the sanctity of human life, the protection of infancy, the elevation and final emancipation of the slave classes, the suppression of barbarous games, the creation of a vast and multifarious organization of charity, and the education of the imagination by the Christian type, constitute together a great movement of philanthropy which has at no time been paralleled or approached in the pagan world.

A movement, however, which profoundly affected the whole scheme of medieval Christian morals had already been initiated in the days of the Decian persecution: the ascetic movement which in its first stage led great numbers of devotees to flee into the desert and become anchorites, and later developed into monachism. It was not without Oriental and pagan precedent, and rested on the doctrine that the flesh is the enemy of the soul, that all carnal appetites and affections ought to be ruthlessly crushed, and that the safest way to salvation is through separation from the world and its temptations, by living either the solitary or the cenobitic life—especially by the exclusion of female allurements.

To such a life in the most repulsively exaggerated forms the highest sanctity attached. It belittled those virtues which belong to a vigorous physical development and denounced those tender family affections which are at the root of the domestic virtues; while it directly repressed, if it did not positively condemn, the civic virtues which had been the moral glory of ancient Rome. By its denunciation of all social intercourse it was destructive of all the social virtues and tended to intensify the general corruption.

The transition however from the eremitic to the monastic life involved a change not only of circumstances but also of character. The habit of obedience and the virtue of humility assumed a position which they had never previously held; and went far to preserve the spirit of charity so seriously threatened by the spiritual pride of the anchorite. Even here, however, the doctrine of obedience, carried to excess, crushed the spirit of intellectual criticism and political freedom; and the corruption of humility into servility is more dangerous to moral progress than the pride which may become an invaluable moral agent.

Most disastrous was the subversion of intellectual honesty involved. The Church, assumed the truth of its dogmas as axiomatic denounced inquiry or doubt as heretical, penalised criticism and did not hesitate to forge evidence in order to make the dogmas acceptable—on the hypothesis that their acceptance was necessary to salvation. Forbidding the pursuit of truth for its own sake, it placed impenetrable barriers in the path of knowledge and undermined the foundations of veracity. The search for secular knowledge or for classical learning being positively discouraged, intellectual advance was virtually prohibited, and literature unassociated with theology almost ceased to exist.

When the fiercest denunciations uttered by the ecclesiastical authorities were directed not against wickedness but against heresy, and the most portentous crimes escaped reproof if the perpetrators were enthusiastically orthodox, it is not surprising that the superstition and the vice of the period between the dissolution of the empire and the reign of Charlemagne can hardly be exaggerated.

Yet in the chaos we can detect the elements of the new society which ultimately issued in the crusades, the feudal system and chivalry. It consisted in two parts, the fusion of Christianity with the military spirit, and an increasing reverence for secular rank.

Early Christianity had been vigorously antagonistic to the military spirit; but the general conviction that the intervention of the Lord of Hosts was particularly conspicuous in war, associating military success with orthodoxy, gave a new sanction to the militarism of the barbarian champions of Catholicism; and the process was furthered when Christianity found itself embattled against the armed hosts of militant Mahomedanism. And the idea of the divine right of kings was inaugurated with the accession of Pepin to the throne of the Franks and the coronation of Charlemagne as Emperor by the Pope.

V—THE POSITION OF WOMEN

The examination of the position of women, necessary to any account of moral progress, compels us to extend our inquiry over a wider field—to go back in fact to the beginning.

In the savage stage, woman is looked upon as the slave of man and the minister of his passions; but the institution of marriage exists and the value of chastity is in some degree recognized. The two steps which first raise woman are the abandonment of purchase and the institution of monogamy.

In the Heroic age of Greece we find women holding a very honourable position, as exemplified by Andromache, Penelope or Nausicaa. In the properly historic ages they are of little account except such as have enrolled themselves among the emancipated *hetaerae* whose beauty and talent might place them in a position commanding if irregular.

In Rome there was not only a far higher standard of conjugal fidelity; the legends of Lucrece and of Coriolanus, such characters as

Cornelia and Porcia, show the honourable estimation in which women were held. But in the early empire if there were noble women worthy of their noble husbands, the general standard had fallen with the general corruption.

Christianity, while it introduced that special form of reverence for women which is inseparable from the cult of the Virgin, was on its moral side so closely bound up with the ascetic doctrines that, while it held virginity in the highest honour and denounced unequivocally every form of unchastity, it treated marriage as a weakness necessary to the life of the race, and the married state as inferior to that of virginity, women being for the most part the seductive means to sin.

Nevertheless the barbaric conquest tended to raise them because the standard of female virtue among barbarians was high. And at the same time Christianity emphasised the sanctity of the marriage bond by its mystical conception of the Church as the Bride of Christ. Finally from the interplay of all these arose that strange amalgam of religious, licentious and military feeling which was formed around women in the age of chivalry, and which no succeeding change of habit or belief has wholly destroyed.

History of the Norman Conquest

EDWARD AUGUSTUS FREEMAN

IN 1846, while at Oxford, Freeman wrote an essay on the effects of the Norman Conquest, and its failure to win a prize led him to study the period more seriously. The results were given to the world in his History of the Norman Conquest of England: its Causes and its Results, published between 1867 and 1879. It is on this work that Freeman's reputation as a historian chiefly rests, and it remains the chief authority for the period. Freeman's thoroughness, accuracy and critical ability are unsurpassed, and his power of entering into the past enabled him to produce some passages of remarkable life and vigour. The work is published by the Oxford University Press, by whose permission this outline appears.

I—THE MEN AND CAUSES OF THE CONQUEST

THE Norman Conquest is important, not as the beginning of English history but as its chief turning point. Its whole importance is that which belongs to a turning point. This conquest is an event which stands by itself in the history of Europe. It took place at a transitional period in the world's development. A kingdom which had hitherto been only Teutonic was brought within the sphere of the laws, manners and speech of the Romance nations.

At the very moment when Pope and Caesar held each other in the death-grasp a church which had hitherto maintained a sort of insular and barbaric independence was brought into a far more intimate connexion with the Roman See. The conquest of England by William wrought less immediate change than when the first English conquerors slew, expelled, or enslaved the whole nation of the vanquished Britons, or when Africa was subdued by Genseric. But it wrought a greater immediate change than the conquest of Sicily by Charles of Anjou. It brought with it not only a new dynasty, but a new nobility. It did not expel or transplant the English nation or any part of it; but it gradually deprived the leading men and families of England of their land and offices, and thrust them down into a secondary position under the alien intruders.

It must not be forgotten that the old English constitution survived the Norman Conquest. What the constitution had been under the Saxon Edgar, that it remained under William. The laws, with a few changes in detail, and also the language of the public documents, remained the same. The powers vested in King William and his Witan remained constitutionally the same as those which had been vested in King Edgar and his Witan a hundred years before.

I cannot too often repeat, for the saying is the very summing up of the whole history, that the Norman Conquest was not the wiping out of the constitution, the laws, the language, the national life of Englishmen. The English kingship gradually changed from the old Teutonic to the later medieval type; but the change began before the Norman Conquest.

Certain events indicate the remoter causes of the Norman Conquest. The accession of Edward at once brings us among the events that led immediately to that conquest; or, rather, we may look on the accession of this Saxon king as the first stage of the conquest itself. Sweyn and Canute, the Danes, had shown that it was possible for a foreign power to overcome England by force of arms.

The misgovernment of the sons of Canute hindered the formation of a lasting Danish dynasty in England. The throne of Cerdic was again filled by a son of Woden; but there can be no doubt that the shock given to the country by the Danish conquest, especially the way in which the ancient nobility was cut off in the long struggle with Sweyn and Canute, directly opened the way for the coming of the Norman. Edward did his best, wittingly or unwittingly, to make his path still easier. This he did by accustoming Englishmen to the sight of strangers—not national kinsmen like Canute's Danes, but Frenchmen, men of utterly alien speech and manners—enjoying every available place of honour or profit in the country.

The great national reaction under Godwin and Harold made England once more England for a few years. But this change, happy as it was, could not altogether do away with the effects of the French predilections of Edward. With Edward, then, the Norman Conquest really begins.

EDWARD is on the throne of England; Godwin, Leofric and Siward divide among them the administration of the realm. The next genera-

tion, the warriors of Stamford Bridge and Senlac, of York and Ely, are fast growing into maturity. Harold Haardraade is already pursuing his wild career of knight-errantry in distant lands, and is astonishing the world by his exploits in Russia and Sicily, at Constantinople and at Jerusalem.

The younger warriors of the Conquest, Edwin and Morcerí and Waltheof and Hereward, were probably born, but they must still have been in their cradles or in their mothers' arms. But, among the leaders of Church and state, Eldred, who lived to place the crown on the head both of Harold and of William, is already a great prelate, abbot of Tewkesbury, soon to succeed Lyfing in the chair of Worcester.

Tostig must have been on the verge of manhood; Sweyn and Harold were already men, bold and vigorous, ready to march at their father's bidding, and before long to affect the destiny of their country for evil and for good. Beyond the sea, William, still a boy in years but a man in conduct and counsel, is holding his own among the storms of a troubled minority, and learning those arts of the statesman and the warrior which fitted him to become the wisest ruler of Normandy, the last and greatest conqueror of England.

The struggle between Normans and Englishmen began with the accession of Edward in 1042, although the actual subjugation of England by force of arms was still twenty-four years distant. The thought of another Danish king was now hateful. "All folk chose Edward to King." As the son of Ethelred and Emma, the brother of the murdered and half-canonised Alfred, he had long been familiar to English imaginations. Edward, and Edward alone, stood forth as the heir of English royalty, the representative of English nationality. In his behalf the popular voice spoke out at once, and unmistakably. His popular election took place in June, immediately on the death of Hardicanute, and even before his burial. Edward, then, was king, and he reigned as every English king before him had reigned, by that union of popular election and royal descent which formed the essence of all ancient Teutonic kingship.

He was crowned at Winchester, April 3, 1043. But by virtue of his peculiar character, his natural place was not on the throne of England, but at the head of a Norman abbey, for all his best qualities were those of a monk. Like his father, he was constantly under the dominion of favourities.

It was to the evil choice of his favourities during the early part of his reign that most of the misfortunes of his time were owing, and that a still more direct path was opened for the ambition of his Norman kinsman. In the latter part of his reign, either happy accident or returning good sense led him to a better choice. Without a guide he could reign but could not rule, but the good fortune of his later years gave him, in Harold, the wisest and noblest of all guides.

II—THE GREAT PROTAGONISTS

We have now reached the first appearance of the illustrious man round whom the main interest of this history will henceforth centre. The second son of Godwin lived to be the last of our kings, the hero and martyr of our native freedom. The few recorded actions of Harold, Earl of the East Angles, could hardly have enabled men to look forward to the glorious career of Harold, Earl of the West Saxons, King of the English.

Tall in stature, beautiful in countenance, of a bodily strength whose memory still lives in the rude pictorial art of his time, he was foremost alike, in a warrior's age, in the active courage and in the passive endurance of the warrior.

Great as Harold was in war, his character as a civil ruler is still more remarkable, still more worthy of admiration. The most prominent feature in his character is his singular gentleness and mercy. Never, either in warfare or in civil strife, do we find Harold bearing hardly upon an enemy. From the time of his advancement to the practical government of the kingdom there is not a harsh or cruel action with which he can be charged.

Such was the man who, seemingly in the fourth year of Edward, in the twenty-fourth of his own age, was invested with the rule of one of the great divisions of England; who, seven years later, became the virtual ruler of the kingdom; who, at last, twenty-one years from his first elevation, received, alone among English kings, the crown of England as the free gift of her people and, alone among English kings, died axe in hand on her soil in the defence of England against foreign invaders.

William of Normandy bears a name which must for ever stand forth among the foremost of mankind. No man that ever trod this earth was endowed with greater natural gifts; to no man was it ever granted to accomplish greater things. No man ever did his work more effectually at the moment; no man ever left his work behind him as more truly an abiding possession for all time. In his character one feature stands out pre-eminently above all others. Throughout the whole of his career we admire in him the embodiment in the highest degree that human nature will allow of the fixed purpose and the unbending will.

We are too apt to look upon William as simply the conqueror of England. But so to do is to look at him only in his most splendid, but at the same time his least honourable, aspect. William learnt to become the conqueror of England only by first becoming the conqueror of Normandy and the conqueror of France. He found means to conquer Normandy by the help of France, and to conquer France by the help of Normandy.

In 1052, William paid his memorable visit to England. At that time both Normandy and England were at rest, enjoying peace. Visits of mere friendship and courtesy among sovereign princes were rare in those days. Such visits as those which William and Eustace of Boulogne paid at this time to this country were altogether novelties, and unlikely to be acceptable to the English mind. We may be sure that every patriotic Englishman looked with an evil eye on any French-speaking prince who made his way to the English court.

William came with a great following; he tarried awhile in his cousin's company; he went away loaded with gifts and honours. And we can hardly doubt that he went away encouraged by some kind of promise of succeeding to the kingdom which he now visited as a stranger. Direct heirs were lacking to the royal house, and William was Edward's kinsman. The

moment was in every way favourable for suggesting to William on the one hand, to Edward on the other, the idea of an arrangement by which William should succeed to the English crown on Edward's death. The Norman writers are full of Edward's promise to William, and also of some kind of oath that Harold swore to him. Had either the promise or the oath been a pure Norman invention William could never have paraded both in the way that he did in the eyes of Europe.

I admit, then, some promise of Edward, some oath of Harold. But when the time came for Edward the Confessor to make his final recommendation of a successor, he certainly changed his purpose ; for his last will, so far as such an expression can be used, was undoubtedly in favour of Harold.

III—THE GROWTH OF NORMAN INFLUENCE

It was in the year 1051 that the influence of strangers reached its height. During the first nine years of Edward's reign we find no signs of any open warfare between the national and the Normanising parties. The course of events shows that Godwin's power was being practically undermined, but the great earl was still outwardly in the enjoyment of royal favour, and his vast possessions were still being added to by royal grants. But soon England began to feel how great is the evil when a king and those immediately around him are estranged from the mass of his people in feeling.

To the French favourites who gradually crowded the court of Edward the name, the speech and the laws of England were things on which their ignorant pride looked with utter contempt.

Count Eustace of Boulogne, now brother-in-law of the King of the English, presently came, like the rest of the world, to the English court. The king was spending the autumn at Gloucester. Thither came Count Eustace, and after his satisfactory interview with the king he turned his face homewards. When a few miles from Dover he felt himself, in a region specially devoted to Godwin, to be still more thoroughly in an enemy's country than in other parts of England, and he and all his company took the precaution of putting on their coats of mail.

The proud Frenchmen expected to find free quarters at Dover, and they attempted to lodge themselves at their pleasure in the houses of the burghers. One Englishman resisted, and was struck dead on the spot. The count's party then rode through the town, cutting and slaying at pleasure. In a skirmish which quickly ensued twenty Englishmen and nineteen Frenchmen were slain.

Count Eustace and the remnant of the party hastened back to Gloucester, and told the story after their own fashion. On the mere accusation of a stranger, the English King condemned his own subjects without a hearing. He sent for Godwin, as earl of the district in which lay the offending town, and commanded him to inflict chastisement on Dover. The English champion was then in the midst of a domestic rejoicing. He, like the king, had been strengthening himself by a foreign alliance, and had just connected his house with that of a foreign prince. Tostig, his third son, had married Judith, the daughter of Baldwin of Flanders.

Godwin bidden, without the least legal proof of offence, to visit Dover with all the horrors of fire and sword, was not long in choosing his course.

But there were influences about Edward which cut off all hope of a peaceful settlement of the matter. Eustace probably still lingered about the king, and there was another voice ever at the royal ear, ever ready to poison the royal mind against the people of England and their leader. It was the voice of a foreign monk, Archbishop Robert. Godwin and three other earls summoned their followers and demanded the surrender of Eustace, but the frightened king sent for the northern earls Siward, Leofric and Ralph, bidding them bring a force strong enough to keep Godwin in check. Thus the northern and southern sections were arrayed against each other.

There were, however, on the king's side men who were not willing to see the country involved in civil war. Leofric, the good Earl of Mercia, stood forth as the champion of compromise and peace, and it was agreed that hostilities should be avoided and that the Witanagemot should assemble at Michaelmas in London.

Of this truce King Edward and his foreign advisers took advantage to collect an army, at the head of which they appeared in London. Godwin and his son Harold were summoned to the gemot, but refused to appear without a security for a safe-conduct. The hostages and safe-conduct were refused.

The refusal was announced by Bishop Stigand to the earl as he sat at his evening meal. The bishop wept ; the earl sprang to his feet, overthrew the table, leaped on his horse and, with his sons, rode for his life all that night. In the morning the king held his Witanagemot, and Godwin and his sons were declared outlaws, but five days were allowed them to get out of the land. Godwin, Sweyn, Tostig and Gyrth, with Gytha and Judith, the newly-married wife of Tostig, set sail for Bruges in a ship laden with as much treasure as it would hold.

Two of Godwin's sons, however, sought another refuge. Harold and his younger brother Leofwine determined on resistance, and resolved to seek shelter among the Danish settlers in Ireland, where they were cordially received by King Diarmid. For a moment the overthrow of the patriotic leaders in England was complete, and the dominion of foreigners over the feeble mind of the king was complete.

Stirring events followed in quick succession. General regret was felt among all patriotic Englishmen at the absence of Godwin. The common voice of England soon began to call for the return of the banished earl, who was looked to by all men as the father of his country. England now knew that in his fall a fatal blow had been dealt to her own welfare and freedom. And Godwin, after sending many petitions to the king, vainly petitioning for a reconciliation, determined to return by force, satisfied that the great majority of Englishmen would be less likely to resist him than to join his banners.

Harold sailed from Ireland to meet his father by way of the English Channel. Godwin sailed up the Thames, and London declared for him. Panic reigned among the favourites of King Edward. The foreigners took to flight, among the fugitives being Archbishop Robert and Bishop Ulf. The gemot decreed the restoration of the



Voltaire (1694–1778), the assumed name by which François Marie Arouet was known to the world, stands out prominently among the many geniuses of literature in 18th century France, both by reason of the vastness of his output and also for the variety of the forms in which he expressed himself. His dramatic works number between fifty and sixty pieces, and plays such as Zaire and Mérope entitle him to eminent rank in a century of peculiar brilliance in the theatre. If his poetic work was unequal, it abounds with wit and high command of metrical forms, notably in the Pucelle. It was, however, in the prose romance that this master of satire excelled, and the many tales written with the purpose of attack on orthodoxy in philosophy, religion or politics show the characteristic, ironical, but unexaggerated style of the author most unmistakably. Allegations of superficiality apart, he was a literary craftsman who has no superior and but few rivals. This portrait, by Christopher Curtius, was executed from sittings given a few weeks before Voltaire's death.

Edward Gibbon son of a Hampshire gentleman, was born at Putney, April 27, 1737. While at Oxford, a whim to enter the Roman Church led to his banishment to Lausanne where he lived under the care of a Calvinist minister. He returned to Lausanne in 1764 and proceeded thence to Rome where the idea of The Decline and Fall was conceived. The colossal task was completed in 1787. Criticism of his great work is unanimous. In accuracy, lucidity and comprehensiveness his history is unsurpassable; and in its pages the author's nature is clearly mirrored. His career in letters, labouring 'without haste and without pause' at this great task, may well exemplify his moral as well as his intellectual qualities; it was compact of patience, calmness and unswerving industry. Gibbon died January 16, 1794. This portrait, by Henry Walton, hangs in the National Portrait Gallery.

earl and the outlawry of many Normans. The king yielded, and accorded to Godwin the kiss of peace, and a revolution was accomplished of which England may well be proud.

But a tragedy soon followed, in the death of the most renowned Englishman of that generation. During a meal at the Easter festival Godwin fell from his seat, and died after lying insensible for three days. Great was the grief of the nation.

IV—THE MOMENT OF THE STRUGGLE

HAROLD, in the years that followed the death of Godwin, became so increasingly popular that he was virtually chief ruler of England, even before the death of Edward, which happened on January 5, 1066. His burial was followed by the coronation of Harold. But the moment of struggle was now come. The English throne had become vacant, and the Norman duke knew how to represent himself as its lawful heir and to brand the king of the nation's choice as a usurper.

William found one Englishman willing to help him in all his schemes, in the person of Tostig, Harold's brother, who had been outlawed at the demand of the nation, owing to his unfitness to rule his province as earl of Northumberland. He had sunk from bad to worse, Harold had done all he could for his fallen brother, but to restore him was impossible. Tostig was at the Norman court, urging William to the invasion of England. At his own risk, he was allowed to make an incursion on the English coast. Entering the Humber, he burnt several towns and slew many men. But after these ravages Tostig repaired to ask help of Harold Haardraade, whom he induced to prepare a great expedition.

Harold Haardraade and Tostig landed and marched towards York. A battle was fought between the Mercians and Norwegians at Fulford, in which the former were worsted, but Harold was marching northward. In the fearful battle of Stamford Bridge both Harold Haardraade and Tostig were slain, and the Viking host was shattered. The victorious English king was banqueting in celebration of the great victory, when a messenger appeared who had come from the distant coast of Sussex.

One blow had been warded off, but another still more terrible had fallen. Three days after the fight at Stamford Bridge, William, duke of the Normans, once the peaceful guest of Edward, had again, but in quite another guise, made good his landing on the shores of England. It was in August 1066 that the Norman fleet had set sail on its great enterprise. For several weeks a south wind had been waited for at the mouth of the River Dive, prayers and sacred rites of every kind being employed to move Heaven to send the propitious breeze. On September 28 the landing was effected at Pevensey, the ancient Anderida. There were neither ships nor men to resist the landing.

The first armed man who set foot on English ground was Duke William himself, whose foot slipped, so that he fell with both hands on the ground. A loud cry of grief was raised at the evil omen. But the ready wit of William failed him not. "By the splendour of God," he cried, "I have taken seizin of my kingdom; the earth of England is in my hands." The whole army landed in order, but only one day was spent at Pevensey. On the next day the army marched on eastward to Hastings, which was fixed on as the centre of the operations of the whole campaign.

It was a hard lot for the English king to be compelled to hasten southward to dislodge the new enemy, after scarcely a moment's rest from the toils and glories of Stamford Bridge. But the heart of Harold failed him not, and the heart of England beat in unison with the heart of her king. As soon as the news came, King Harold held a council of the leaders of Stamford Bridge, or perhaps an armed gemot. He told them of the landing of the enemy; he set before them the horrors which would come upon the land if the invader succeeded in his enterprise. A loud shout of assent rose from the whole assembly. Every man pledged his faith rather to die in arms than to acknowledge any king but Harold.

The king thanked his loyal followers, and at once ordered an immediate march to the south, and an immediate muster of the forces of his kingdom. London was the trysting-place. He himself pressed on at once with his immediate following. And throughout the land awoke a spirit in every English heart which has never died out to this day. The men from various shires flocked eagerly to the standard of their glorious king. Harold seems to have reached London on October 5, about ten days after the fight at Stamford Bridge, and a week after the Norman landing at Pevensey. Though his royal home was now at Westminster, he went, in order to seek divine help and succour, to pray at Waltham, the home of his earlier days, devoting one day to a pilgrimage to the Holy Cross which gave England her war-cry.

HAROLD and William were now both eager for the battle. The king set out from London on October 12. His consummate generalship is nowhere more plainly shown than in this memorable campaign.

William constrained Harold to fight, but Harold, in his turn, constrained William to fight on ground of Harold's own choosing. The latter halted at a point distant about seven miles from the headquarters of the invaders, and pitched his camp upon the ever-memorable heights of Senlac. It was his policy not to attack. He occupied and fortified a post of great natural strength, which he speedily made into what is distinctly spoken of as a castle.

The hill of Senlac, now occupied by the town of Battle, commemorates in its later name the great event of which it was the scene.

V—OCTOBER 14, 1066

THE morning of the decisive day, Saturday, October 14, at last had come. The duke of the Normans heard mass, and drew forth his troops for their march against the English post. Then in full armour, and seated on his Spanish war-horse, William led his host forth in three divisions. The Normans from the hill of Telham first caught sight of the English encamped on the opposite height of Senlac.

First in each of the three Norman divisions

marched the archers, slingers and cross-bow men, then the more heavily armed infantry, lastly the horsemen. The reason of this arrangement is clear. The light-armed were to do what they could with their missiles to annoy the English; the heavy infantry were to strive to break down the palisades of the English camp, and so to make ready the way for the charge of the horse.

Like the Normans, the English had risen early. The king, after exhorting his troops to stand firm, rode to the royal post; he there dismounted, took his place on foot, and prayed to God for help. The battle began at nine in the morning. The trumpet sounded and a flight of arrows from all three Norman divisions was the prelude to the onslaught of the heavy-armed foot. The French infantry had to toil up the hill, and to break down the palisade while a shower of stones and javelins disordered their approach, and while club, sword and axe greeted all who came within the reach of hand-strokes.

Both sides fought with unyielding valour. The war-cries rose on either side. The Normans shouted 'God help us!' The English called on the 'Holy Cross.' The Norman infantry had soon done its best, but that best had been in vain. The choicest chivalry of Europe now pressed on to the attack. The knights of Normandy and of all lands from which men had flocked to William's standard now pressed on, striving to make what impression they could with the whole strength of themselves and their horses on the impenetrable fortress of timber-shields and living warriors.

But all was in vain. The English had thus far stood their ground well and wisely, and the tactics of Harold had so far completely answered. Not only had every attack failed, but the great mass of the French army altogether lost heart. The Britons and the other auxiliaries on the left were the first to give way. The whole of William's left wing was thrown into utter confusion.

The strong heart of William, however, failed him not, and by his single prowess and presence of mind he recalled the fleeing troops. Order was soon restored, and the Norman host pressed on to a second and more terrible attack. The duke himself, his relics round his neck, sought out Harold. A few moments more, and the two might have come face to face, but Gyrth, the noble brother of the English king, hurled a spear at William. The missile narrowly missed the duke, but slew the Spanish steed. But William could fight on foot as well as on horseback. He rose to his feet, pressed straight to seek the man who had so nearly slain him, and the earl fell, crushed beneath the blow of William's mace.

The second attack, however, failed, for the English lines were as unyielding as ever. Direct attack was unavailing. In the Norman character fox and lion were equally blended, as William now showed. He ventured on the daring stratagem of ordering a pretended flight, and the unwary English rushed down the slope, pursuing the fugitives with shouts of delight.

The error was fatal to England. The tide was turned; the duke's object was now gained. The English were no longer entrenched and the battle fell into a series of single combats. As twilight was coming on an arrow, falling like a bolt from heaven, pierced Harold's right eye, and he sank in agony at the foot of the standard. Round that standard the fight still raged, till the highest nobility, the most valiant soldiery of England were slaughtered to a man.

Had Harold lived, had another like him been ready to take his place, we may well doubt whether, even after Senlac, England would have been conquered at all. As it was, from this moment her complete conquest was only a matter of time. From that day forward the Normans began to work the will of God upon the folk of England, till there were left in England no chiefs of the land of English blood, till all were brought down to bondage and sorrow, till it was a shame to be called an Englishman, and the men of England were no more a people.

Chronicle of England

JEAN FROISSART

BORN about 1338, Jean Froissart was only twenty when he began his famous Chronicle of England, France, Spain and the Adjoining Lands. Throughout his life he was dominated by the passion for inquiry. The Chronicle forms a vivid and graphic history of events in France, Britain and the other countries of Western Europe during the period from 1326 to 1400. It is not always reliable as historical fact, yet from the point of view of colour, spirit and living human interest the Chronicle is worth more than many a dry though accurate record of fact. As a picture of the life and manners of the later feudal period it is unrivalled.

I—THE BATTLE OF CRECY

THAT the honourable enterprises, noble adventures and deeds of arms performed in the wars between England and France may be properly related and held in perpetual remembrance, to the end that brave men, taking example from them, may be encouraged in their well-doing, I sit down to record a history deserving great praise: but before I begin, I request of the Saviour of the world, Who from nothing created all things, that He will have the goodness to inspire me with sense and sound understanding to persevere in such manner that all those who shall read may derive pleasure and instruction from my work.

The true reason of my undertaking this book was for my amusement, to which I have ever been inclined, and for which I have frequented the company of many noblemen and gentlemen, as well in France as in England and Scotland, and in other countries, from whose acquaintance I have always requested accounts of battles and adventures, especially

since the mighty battle of Poictiers, where the noble King John of France was taken prisoner, but before that time I was young in years and understanding; however, on quitting school, I boldly undertook to write and relate the wars abovementioned, which compilation, such as it was, I carried to England and presented to my lady Phillippa of Hainault, Queen of England, who most graciously received it from me, to my great profit.

And perhaps as this book is neither so exactly nor so well written as such feats of arms require, I have undertaken this present work, at the prayer and request of my dear lord and master, Sir Robert de Namur, knight, Lord of Beaufort, to whom I owe all love and obedience, and God give me grace to do always according to his pleasure.

THE King of England was encamped, on Friday, near Creçy, in Ponthieu. He, who had been informed that the King of France was following him in order to give him battle, said to his people: "Let us post ourselves here, for we will not go farther before we have seen our enemies. I have good reason to wait on them on this spot, as I am now upon the lawful inheritance of my lady mother, which was given to her as her marriage portion, and I am resolved to defend it against my adversary, Philippe de Valois."

That evening the army set about furbishing and repairing their armour; and the king gave a supper to the earls and barons of his army, where they made good cheer. On their taking leave, the king remained alone with the lords of his bed-chamber; he retired into his oratory and, falling on his knees before the altar, prayed to God that, if he should combat his enemies on the morrow, he might come off with honour. About midnight he went to his bed, and, rising early the next day, he and the Prince of Wales heard mass and communicated. The greater part of his army did the same, confessed and made proper preparations.

The king ordered that his army should be divided into three battalions. In the first he placed the young Prince of Wales, with many lords, knights and squires whom I cannot name. In the second battalion were the Earl of Northampton, the Earl of Arundel and many others; and the third battalion was commanded by the king.

The king then mounted a small palfrey, having a white wand in his hand, and attended by his two marshals on each side of him; he rode at a foot's pace through all the ranks, encouraging and entreating the army that they would guard his honour and defend his right. He spoke this so sweetly, and with such a cheerful countenance, that all who had been dispirited were directly comforted by seeing and hearing him.

When he had thus visited all the battalions, it was near ten o'clock; he retired to his own division and ordered them all to eat heartily and to drink a glass after. They ate and drank at their ease, and then seated themselves upon the ground, placing their helmets and bows before them, that they might be the fresher when their enemies should arrive.

This, when the lords whom the King of France had sent to reconnoitre saw, they counselled that the battle should be delayed until the morrow, for, said they, 'before we can fight to-night your men will be tired and in disorder, while the enemy is fresh and proper arrayed.'

The king commanded that the army should be halted there, and the two marshals rode, the one to the front and the other to the rear, crying out: 'Halt, banners, in the name of God and St. Denis!'

Those that were in front halted, but those behind said they would not halt until they were as forward as the front. As soon as the foremost rank saw them advancing, they fell back in great disorder, which alarmed those behind, who thought they had been fighting.

The English, on seeing their enemies advance, rose undauntedly up and fell into their ranks. You must know that these kings, earls, barons and lords of France did not advance in any regular order, but one after the other, or any way most pleasing to themselves. As soon as the King of France came in sight of the English he cried out to his marshals, 'Order the Genoese forward, and begin the battle, in the name of God and St. Denis!'

There were about fifteen thousand Genoese cross-bowmen, but they were quite fatigued, having marched that day six leagues, completely armed, and with their cross-bows. They told the constable they were not in a condition to do any great things that day in battle. The Earl of Alençon, hearing this, said, 'This is what one gets by employing such scoundrels, who fall off when there is any need for them.'

As the Genoese advanced, they set up three times a loud shout in order to frighten the English; but they remained quite still, and did not seem to attend to it. Then, advancing with their cross-bows presented, they began to shoot. The English archers then advanced one step forward, and shot their arrows with such force and quickness that it seemed as if it snowed. When the Genoese felt these arrows, which pierced their arms, heads and through their armour, they all turned about and retreated quite discomfited.

The King of France, seeing them thus fall back, cried out: 'Kill me those scoundrels, for they stop up our road without any reason!' You would then have seen the men-at-arms lay about them, killing all they could of these runaways.

As for the prince's battalion, early in the day some French, Germans and Savoyards had broken through the archers and had engaged with the men-at-arms. The first division, seeing the danger they were in, sent a knight in great haste to the King of England, who was posted upon a hill near a windmill.

ON the knight's approach, he said: "Sir, those who are about your son are hard pressed by the French, and they entreat that you would come to their assistance with your battalion, for if they should come in greater number they fear he will have too much to do."

The king replied: "Is my son dead, unhorsed or so badly wounded that he cannot support himself?"

"Nay, thank God," answered the knight, "but he is in so hot an engagement that he has great need of your help."

The king replied: "Now, Sir Thomas, go back to those that sent you, and tell them from me not to send again for me this day, nor expect that I shall come, let what will happen, as long as my son has life; and say that I command them to let the boy win

his spurs, for I am determined, if it please God, that all the glory and honour of this day shall be given to him, and to those into whose care I have entrusted him."

The knight returned to his lords and related the king's answer, which mightily encouraged them. The battle, in the main, went hard against the French, and more and more. It was ended at the hour of vespers, and when it was over King Edward came down from his post and with his whole battalion advanced to the Prince of Wales, whom he embraced in his arms and kissed, and said, "Sweet son, God give you good perseverance. You are my son, for most loyally have you acquitted yourself this day. You are worthy to be a sovereign."

The prince bowed down very low and humbled himself, giving all honour to the king his father. The English, during the night, made thanksgivings to the Lord for the happy issue of the day, and without rioting; for the king had forbidden all riot.

II—FROISSART VISITS THE COUNT DE FOIX

It fell on a day that I considered in myself that grand deeds of arms would not fall out for a long space of time in the marches of Picardy and the country of Flanders, since there was peace in those parts. Moreover, I knew that such valiant men as were desirous of advancing themselves, whether in Castile, Portugal, Gascony, Rouergue, Quercy, or in Bigorre, did not remain idle, but employed themselves underhand against each other, in the wish to perform deeds of arms that might surprise and conquer towns and fortresses.

And for this reason, and because it was very tiresome to me to be idle; for I well know that when the time shall come then I shall be dead and rotten, this grand and noble history will be much in fashion, and all noble and valiant persons will take pleasure in it, and gain from it augmentation of profit; and, moreover, since I had, God be thanked, sense and memory, and since I was of age and constitution of body well fit to encounter difficulties, I determined not to delay pursuing my subject.

And in order to know the truth of distant transactions, I took an opportunity of visiting that high and redoubted Prince Gaston Phoebus, Count de Foix and de Bearn; for I well knew that if I were so fortunate as to be admitted into his household, and to remain there in quiet, I could not choose a situation more proper to learn the truth of every event, as numbers of foreign knights and squires assembled there from all countries, attracted by his high birth and gentility.

It fell out, most happily, that on my journey thither, at the city of Pamiers, I met a knight attached to the Count de Foix, called Sir Espaign du Lyon. He was a prudent and valiant knight, handsome in person, and about fifty years of age. I introduced myself to his company, as he had a great desire to know what was doing in France. We were six days on the road travelling to Orthez.

As we journeyed, the knight, after saying his orisons, conversed the greater part of the day with me, asking for news; and when I put any questions to him, he very willingly answered them. Moreover, as we passed castles and towns, he related to me the feats of arms that he knew had been the means of their capture by one lord from another, or by the French from the English, and again how the English had had the better hap.

Indeed, all the histories of Sir Espaign du Lyon gave me such satisfaction and delight I thought the road was much too short. And each night, as soon as we dismounted at our inns, I wrote all down, whether it was late or early, that posterity might have the advantage of it, for there is nothing like writing for the preservation of events. So, therefore, often riding at our leisure so that we might the better entertain ourselves with talk, we came at last to Orthez.

The knight informed the Count de Foix of my arrival, and I was instantly sent for; for he is a lord above all others who delights to see strangers in order to hear news. On my entering he received me handsomely, and retained me of his household, where I staid upwards of twelve weeks well entertained, as were my horses.

Our acquaintance was strengthened by my having brought with me a book which I had made at the desire of Wenceslaus of Bohemia, Duke of Luxembourg and Brabant. In this book, called Le Meliador, are contained all the songs, ballads, roundelays and virelays which that gentle duke had composed, and of them I had made this collection. Every night after supper I read out to him parts, during which time neither he nor anyone else spoke, for he was desirous I should be well heard, and took much delight in it.

I shall relate to you several things respecting him and his household, for I tarried there as long as I could gain any information. Count Gaston Phoebus de Foix, of whom I am now speaking, was at that time fifty-nine years old; and I must say that, though I have seen very many knights, kings, princes and others, I have never seen any so handsome, either in the form of his limbs or in countenance.

He was so perfectly formed one could not praise him too much. He loved earnestly the things he ought to love, and hated those which it was becoming him so to hate. He was a prudent knight, full of enterprise and wisdom. He had never any men of abandoned character with him, reigned prudently, and was constant in his devotions. He had every day distributed as alms, at his gate, five florins in small coin to all comers. He was liberal and courteous in his gifts; and well knew how to take when it was proper and to give back where he had confidence. He was easy of access to all, and entered very freely into discourse, though laconic in his advice and in his answers.

In such manner did the Count de Foix live. When he quitted his chamber at midnight for supper, twelve servants bore each a large lighted torch before him, which were placed near his table and gave a brilliant light to the apartment. The hall was full of knights and squires, and there were plenty of tables laid out for any person who chose to sup.

In short, everything considered, though I had been in several courts, I was never at one which pleased me more, nor was I ever more delighted with feats of arms than at

this of the Count de Foix. There were knights and squires to be seen in every chamber, hall and court, going backwards and forwards, and conversing on arms and amours. Everything honourable was there to be found. All intelligence from distant countries was there to be learnt, for the gallantry of the count had brought visitors from all parts.

It was there I was informed of the greater part of those events which had happened in Spain, Portugal, Arragon, Navarre, England, Scotland and on the borders of Languedoc; for I saw, during my residence, knights and squires arrive from every nation. I therefore made inquiries from them, or from the count himself, who cheerfully conversed with me. Thus to my great pleasure, and mightily to the profit of this history, I abode there a while.

III—FROISSART AT THE ENGLISH COURT

In truth I, Sir John Froissart, treasurer and canon of Chimay, had now a great desire to go and see the kingdom of England: more especially since a truce had been concluded for four years, on sea and land, between France, England and their allies.

Several reasons urged me to make this journey, but principally because in my youth I had been educated at the court of King Edward, of happy memory, and that good lady, Phillippa, his queen, with their children, and others of the barons of those times, and was treated by them with all honour, courtesy and liberality. I was anxious, therefore, to visit that country, for it ran in my imagination that if I once saw it again, I should live the longer.

I had taken care to form a collection of all the poetry on love and morality that I had composed during the last twenty-four years, which I had caused to be fairly written and illuminated.

And being desirous to pay my respects to King Richard of England and his uncles, I had provided myself with my book of poesy, finely ornamented, bound in velvet, and decorated with silver-gilt clasps and studs, as a present for the king.

Thus, in the year of grace 1395, I crossed into England. There I found friends who, after a time, were able to introduce me to the king, and I presented the book to him in his chamber. He opened and looked into it with much pleasure. He then asked me what the book treated of; I replied, "Of love!" He was pleased with the answer, and dipped into several places, reading parts aloud, for he read and spoke French perfectly well, and then gave me many acknowledgments for it.

It happened this same Sunday, after the king had received my book so handsomely, that an English squire, called Henry Castide, a man of prudence and character, made acquaintance with me, having learnt that I was a historian. He asked me if I had chanced to hear an account of the late expedition to Ireland; and since I had not, was willing to tell it me, that I might insert it in my history.

Henry Castide thus began.

"It is not in the memory of man that any king of England ever led so large an armament of men-at-arms and archers, to make war on the Irish, as the present king. He remained upwards of nine months in Ireland, at great expense, which, however, was cheerfully defrayed by his kingdom; for his subjects thought it was well laid out when they saw their king return home with honour.

"To tell you the truth, Ireland is one of the worst countries to make war in, or to conquer; for there are such impenetrable and extensive forests, lakes and bogs, there is no knowing how to carry on war advantageously. The Irish are a very hardy race, of great subtlety, and of various tempers, paying no attention to any gentleman, although their country is governed by kings, but desires to remain in the savage state they have been brought up in.

"True it is that four of the most potent kings have submitted to the King of England, but more through love and good humour than by battle or force. This was considered by everyone as a great acquisition, and the object of the armament accomplished; for during the whole of King Edward's reign, of happy memory, he never had such success as King Richard. The honour is great, but the advantage little, for with such savages nothing can be done."

He further related to me matters concerning Ireland, so that I was moved to speak thus.

"Sir Henry, I readily believe you. But I should like to ask you one thing, which has much surprised me: I should like to know how these four Irish kings have so readily submitted to King Richard. You have said it was brought about by a treaty and the grace of God: the grace of God is good, and of infinite value to those who can obtain it; but we see few lords nowadays augment their territories otherwise than by force."

To this he answered: "In truth, I cannot more fully explain how it was brought about, but it is generally believed that the Irish were greatly frightened at the large force the king landed in Ireland, being much greater than any force that King Edward had ever sent there, because his armies were ever engaged in other wars. Moreover, the Irish had great reverence for Saint Edward, King of England and lord of Ireland and of Aquitaine; and when our king went thither, he bore the arms of Saint Edward on his banners. This, we heard, was very pleasing to the Irish, and inclined them more to submission, for their ancestors had done homage to Saint Edward.

"Thus I have related to you how our king accomplished the object of his expedition to Ireland, so that when you have returned home you may insert it in your chronicle."

"Henry," said I, "you have well spoken, and it shall be done."

All these things, therefore, I retained in my memory, and put on paper, so that they are now written in my history, which, I know well, shall be read by posterity.

History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire

EDWARD GIBBON

FOR its vastness of scope, general accuracy of facts, freedom from bias and sustained dignity of literary style, Gibbon's great work is entitled to be regarded as the supreme historical masterpiece. The author starts with the Empire under Augustus and brings his narrative to an end with the taking of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453. Of the many editions undoubtedly the finest is that of Professor J. B. Bury published by Methuen.

I—ROME, MISTRESS OF THE WORLD

IN the second century of the Christian era, the Empire of Rome comprehended the fairest part of the earth, and the most civilized portion of mankind. On the death of Augustus, that emperor bequeathed, as a valuable legacy to his successors, the advice of confining the empire within those limits which nature seemed to have placed as its permanent bulwarks and boundaries—on the west, the Atlantic Ocean, the Rhine and Danube; on the north, the Euphrates; on the east and towards the south, the sandy deserts of Arabia and Africa. The subsequent settlement of Great Britain and Dacia supplied the two exceptions to the precepts of Augustus, if we omit the transient conquests of Trajan in the east, which were renounced by Hadrian.

By maintaining the dignity of the empire, without attempting to enlarge its limits, the early emperors caused the Roman name to be revered among the most remote nations of the earth. The terror of their arms added weight and dignity to their moderation. They preserved peace by a constant preparation for war.

The soldiers, though drawn from the meanest, and very frequently from the most profligate, of mankind, and no longer, as in the days of the ancient republic, recruited from Rome herself, were preserved in their allegiance to the emperor and their invincibility before the enemy by the influences of superstition, inflexible discipline and hope of reward.

The peace establishment of the Roman army numbered some 375,000 men, divided into thirty legions, who were confined, not within the walls of fortified cities, which the Romans considered as the refuge of pusillanimity, but upon the confines of the empire; while 20,000 chosen soldiers, distinguished by the titles of City Cohorts and Praetorian Guards, watched over the safety of the monarch and the capitol.

As the authors of almost every revolution that distracted the empire, the Praetorians will demand attention; but, in their arms and institutions, we cannot find any circumstance that discriminated them from the legions, save a more splendid appearance and a less rigid discipline.

The navy maintained by the emperors might seem inadequate to their greatness, but it was fully sufficient for every useful purpose of the government. The ambition of the Romans was confined to the land; nor was that warlike people ever actuated by the enterprising spirit which had prompted the navigators of Tyre, of Carthage, and even of Marseilles, to enlarge the bounds of the world and to explore the most remote coasts of the ocean. To the Romans the ocean remained an object of terror rather than of curiosity; the whole extent of the Mediterranean, after the destruction of Carthage and the extirpation of the pirates, was included within their provinces. The policy of the emperors was directed only to preserve the peaceful dominion of that sea and to protect the commerce of their subjects. With these moderate views, Augustus stationed two permanent fleets in the most convenient ports of Italy, the one at Ravenna, on the Adriatic, the other at Misenum, in the Bay of Naples.

'Wheresoever the Roman conquers he inhabits,' was a very just observation of Seneca. Colonies, composed for the most part of veteran soldiers, were settled throughout the empire. Rich and prosperous cities, adorned with magnificent temples and baths and other public buildings, demonstrated at once the magnificence and majesty of the Roman system. In Britain, York was the seat of government. London was already enriched by commerce and Bath was celebrated for the salutary effects of its medicinal waters.

All the great cities were connected with each other, and with the capital, by the public highway, which, issuing from the Forum of Rome, traversed Italy, pervaded the provinces and was terminated only by the frontiers of the empire. This great chain of communications ran in a direct line from city to city, and in its construction the Roman engineers showed little respect for the obstacles either of nature or of private properry. Mountains were perforated and bold arches thrown over the broadest streams.

The middle part of the road, raised into a terrace which commanded the adjacent country, consisted of several strata of sand, gravel and cement, and was paved with granite or large stones. Distances were accurately computed by milestones, and the establishment of post-houses, at a distance of five or six miles, enabled a citizen to travel with ease a hundred miles a day along the Roman roads.

These roads united the subjects of the most distant provinces by an easy and familiar intercourse; but their primary object had been to facilitate the marches of the legions, nor was any country considered as subdued till it was pervious to the arms and authority of the conqueror.

This freedom of intercourse, which was established throughout the Roman world, while it extended the vices, diffused likewise the

improvements of social life. Rude barbarians of Gaul laid aside their arms for the more peaceful pursuits of agriculture. The cultivation of the earth produced abundance in every portion of the empire, and accidental scarcity in any single province was immediately relieved by the plentifulness of its more fortunate neighbours.

Since the productions of nature are the materials of art, this flourishing condition of agriculture laid the foundation of manufactures, which provided the luxurious Roman with those refinements of conveniency, of elegance and of splendour which his tastes demanded. Commerce flourished, and the products of Egypt and the East were poured into the lap of Rome.

THOUGH there still existed within the body of the Roman Empire an unhappy condition of men who endured the weight, without sharing the benefits, of society, the position of a slave was greatly improved in the progress of Roman development. The power of life and death was taken from his master's hands and vested in the magistrate, to whom he had a right to appeal against intolerable treatment. These magistrates exercised the authority of the emperor and the senate in every quarter of the empire, inflexibly maintaining in their administration, as in the case of military government, the use of the Latin tongue. Greek was the natural idiom of science, Latin that of government.

II—THE SEEDS OF DISSOLUTION

BUT while Roman society persisted in a state of peaceful security, it already contained within itself the seeds of dissolution. The long peace and uniform government of the Romans introduced a slow and secret poison into the vitals of the empire. The minds of men were gradually reduced to the same level, the fire of genius was extinguished and even the military spirit evaporated. The citizens received laws and covenants from the will of the sovereign, and trusted for defence to mercenaries. Of their ancient freedom nothing remained except the name, and that Augustus, sensible that mankind is governed by names, was careful to preserve.

It was by the will of the senate the emperor ruled. It was from the senate that he received the ancient titles of the republic; of consul, tribune, pontiff and censor. Even his title of *imperator* was decreed him, according to the custom of the republic, only for a period of ten years. But this specious pretence, which was preserved until the last days of the empire, did not mask the real autocratic authority of the emperor. The fact that he nominated citizens to the senate was proof that the independence of that body was destroyed; for the principles of a free constitution are irrecoverably lost when the legislative power is nominated by the executive.

Moreover, the dependence of the emperor on the legions completely subverted the civil authority. To keep the military power, which had given him his position, from undermining it, Augustus had summoned to his aid whatever remained in the fierce minds of his soldiers of Roman prejudices, and in interposing the majesty of the senate between the emperor and the army, boldly claimed their allegiance as the first magistrate of the republic. During a period of 220 years, the dangers inherent in a military government were in a great measure suspended by this artful system. The soldiers were seldom roused to that fatal sense of their own strength and of the weakness of the civil authority which afterwards was productive of such terrible calamities.

The emperors Caligula and Domitian were assassinated in their palace by their own domestics. The Roman world, it is true, was shaken by the events that followed the death of Nero, when, in the space of eighteen months, four princes perished by the sword. But, excepting this violent eruption of military licence, the two centuries from Augustus to Commodus passed away unstained with civil blood and undisturbed by revolution.

The Roman citizens might groan under the tyranny, from which they could not hope to escape, of the unrelenting Tiberius, the furious Caligula, the profligate and cruel Nero, the beastly Vitellius and the timid, inhuman Domitian; but order was maintained, and it was not until Commodus, the son of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the philosopher, succeeded to the authority that his father had exercised for the benefit of the Roman Empire that the army fully realized and exercised the power it had always possessed.

During the first three years of his reign the vices of Commodus affected the emperor rather than the state. While the young prince revelled in licentious pleasures, the management of affairs remained in the hands of his father's faithful councillors; but, in the year 183, the attempt of his sister Lucilla to assassinate him produced fatal results. The assassin, in attempting the deed, exclaimed, 'The senate sends you this!' and though the blow never reached the body of the emperor, the words of his sister sank deep into his heart.

He turned upon the senate with relentless cruelty. The possession of either wealth or virtue excited the tyrant's fury. Suspicion was equivalent to proof, trial to condemnation, and the noblest blood of the senate was poured out like water. His ministers, Perennis and Cleander, were sacrificed in turn, the first to assuage the anger of the legions of Britain, who sent a deputation of 1,500 select men to lodge formally their complaint; the second to appease a sedition of the people, during a corn famine, which threatened the throne.

Every sentiment of virtue and humanity was extinct in the mind of Commodus. He degraded himself not only by his immoralities, which exceed the decency of modern language, but by performing in public as a gladiator, a profession which the laws and manners of the Romans had branded with a just note of infamy. Seven hundred and thirty-five times the master of the world appeared in the amphitheatre to show his skill as a secutor, while the indignant senate and people watched and applauded. His cruelty proved at last fatal to himself.

He had shed with impunity the noblest blood of Rome; he perished as soon as he was dreaded by his own domestics. A cup of drugged wine, delivered by his favourite concubine, plunged him in a deep sleep. At the instigation of Laetus, his Praetorian prefect, a robust youth was admitted into his chamber,

and strangled him without resistance. With secrecy and celerity the conspirators sought out Pertinax, the prefect of the city, an ancient senator of consular rank, and persuaded him to accept the purple. A large donative secured them the support of the Praetorian guard, and the joyous senate bestowed upon the new Augustus the titles of imperial power. For eighty-six days Pertinax ruled the empire with firmness and moderation, but the strictness of the ancient discipline that heat tempted to restore in the army excited the hatred of the Praetorian guards, and the new emperor was struck down on March 28, 193.

III—AN EMPIRE AT ACTION

The Praetorians had violated the sanctity of the throne by the atrocious murder of Pertinax; they dishonoured the majesty of it with their subsequent conduct. They ran out upon the ramparts of the city, and with a loud voice proclaimed that the Roman world was to be disposed of to the best bidder by public auction. Sulpicianus, father-in-law of Pertinax, and Didius Julianus bid against each other for the prize. It fell to Julian, who offered upwards of £200 sterling to each of the soldiers, and the author of this ignominious bargain received the insignia of the empire and the acknowledgments of a trembling senate.

The news of this disgraceful auction was received by the legions of the frontiers with surprise, with indignation and, perhaps, with envy. Albinus, governor of Britain, Niger, governor of Syria, and Septimius Severus, a native of Africa, commander of the Pannonian army, prepared to avenge the death of Pertinax and to establish their own claims to the vacant throne. Marching night and day, Severus crossed the Julian Alps, swept aside the feeble defences of Julian and put an end to a reign of power which had lasted but sixty-six days, and had been purchased with such immense treasure. Having secured the supreme authority, Severus turned his arms against his two competitors, and within three years, and in the course of two or three battles, established his position and brought about the death of both Albinus and Niger.

Though he regarded the Roman Empire as his own private property, though he showed no little animosity towards the senate, Severus ruled with strictness, discernment and impartiality, favouring, perhaps, the cause of the poor and oppressed, not so much from motives of humanity as to humble the pride of greatness and to sink all his subjects to the same common level of absolute dependence. The prosperity of Rome revived, and a profound peace reigned throughout the world.

At the same time Severus was guilty of two acts which were detrimental to the future interests of the republic. He relaxed the discipline of the army, increased their pay beyond the example of former times, re-established the Praetorian guards, who had been abolished for their transaction with Julian, and welded more firmly the chains of tyranny by filling the senate with his creatures, who echoed his views of passive obedience and descanted on the inevitable mischiefs of freedom. At the age of sixty-five in the year 211, he expired at York of a disorder which was aggravated by the labours of a campaign against the Caledonians and the irritation caused by the quarrels of his sons, Caracalla and Geta.

In his last moments Severus recommended concord to his sons, and his sons to the army. The two youths were proclaimed jointly emperors of Rome, and the government of the civilized world was entrusted to the hands of brothers who were implacable enemies. A latent civil war brooded in the city, and hardly more than a year passed before the assassins of Caracalla put an end to an impossible situation by murdering Geta in the arms of the Empress Julia, his mother.

The crime went not unpunished. Consciousness of his guilt prompted Caracalla to remove from the world whatever would remind him of his murdered brother. Twenty thousand persons of both sexes suffered death under the vague appellation of the friends of Geta. Leaving Rome a year after the commission of this crime, he spent the remainder of his reign in the several provinces of the empire, each of which in turn became the scene of his rapine and cruelty. The fears of Macrinus, the controller of the civil affairs of the Praetorian prefecture, brought about his death in the neighbourhood of Carrhae in Syria on April 8, 217.

For a little more than a year his successor governed the empire, but the necessary step of reforming the army brought about his ruin. On June 7, 218, he succumbed to the superior fortune of Elagabalus, the grandson of Severus, a youth trained in all the superstitions and vices of the East.

Under this sovereign Rome was prostituted to the vilest vices of which human nature is capable. Corrupted by his youth and his fortune, Elagabalus abandoned himself to the grossest pleasures with ungoverned fury. To confound the order of seasons and climates, to sport with the passions and prejudices of his subjects, and to subvert every law of nature and decency were in the number of his most delicious amusements. The sum of his infamy was reached when the master of the Roman world affected to copy the dress and manners of the female sex. The shame and disgust of the soldiers resulted in his murder on March 10, 222, and the proclamation of his cousin Alexander Severus.

Again the necessity of restoring discipline within the army led to the ruin of the emperor, and, despite thirteen years of just and moderate government, Alexander was murdered in his tent on March 19, 235, on the banks of the Rhine, and Maximin, his chief lieutenant, a Thracian, reigned in his stead.

IV—TYRANNY AND DISASTER

Fear of contempt, for his origin was mean and barbarian, made Maximin one of the cruellest tyrants that ever oppressed the Roman world. Those who had spurned, and those who had protected the Thracian, were guilty of the same crime, the knowledge of his original obscurity; and for this knowledge thousands were put to death. During the three years of his reign he disdained to visit either Rome or Italy, but from the banks of the Rhine

and the Danube oppressed the whole state and trampled on every principle of law and justice. The tyrant's avarice ruined not only private citizens, but seized the municipal funds of the cities and stripped the very temples of their gold and silver offerings.

Groaning under this oppression, the people of Africa rose in rebellion, and compelled Gordianus, their pro-consul, and his son to accept the purple and seek the confirmation of their election by the senate. The defeat and death of the two Gordians compelled the senate either to submit to the cruel anger of Maximin or to elect a new sovereign. In their despair they chose the latter course. Maximus and Balbinus, on July 9, 237, were declared emperors, and to appease the people the grandson of Gordian, a boy of thirteen, was invested with the ornaments and title of Caesar. The Emperor Maximus advanced to meet the furious tyrant, but the stroke of domestic conspiracy prevented the further eruption of civil war. Maximin and his son were murdered by their disappointed troops in front of Aquileia.

Three months later, Maximus and Balbinus, on July 15, 238, fell victims to their own virtues at the hands of the Praetorian guard and the younger Gordian remained sole emperor. At the end of six years, he, too, after an innocent and virtuous reign, succumbed to the ambition of the prefect Philip, while engaged in a war with Persia, and in March 244, the Roman world was compelled to recognize the sovereignty of an Arabian robber. Returning to Rome, Philip celebrated the secular games, on the accomplishment of the full period of a thousand years from the foundation of Rome. From that date, which marked the fifth time that these rites had been performed in the history of the city, for the next twenty years the Roman world was afflicted by barbarous invaders and military tyrants, and the ruined empire seemed to approach the last and fatal moment of its dissolution.

Six emperors in turn succeeded to the sceptre of Philip and ended their lives, either as the victims of military licence, or in the vain attempt to stay the triumphal eruption of the Goths and the Franks and the Suevi. In three expeditions the Goths seized the Bosporus, plundered Bithynia, ravaged Greece and threatened Italy, while the Franks invaded Gaul and overran Spain and the provinces of Africa. Some sparks of their ancient virtue enabled the senate to repulse the Suevi, who threatened Rome herself, but the miseries of the empire were not assuaged by this one triumph, and the successes of Sapor, king of Persia, in the East, seemed to foreshadow the immediate downfall of Rome. Six emperors and thirty tyrants attempted in vain to stay the course of disaster. Famine and pestilence, tumults and disorders, and a great diminution of the population marked this period, which ended with the death of the Emperor Gallienus on March 20, 268.

V—RESTORERS OF THE ROMAN WORLD

The empire, which had been oppressed and almost destroyed by the soldiers, the tyrants and the barbarians, was saved by a series of great princes, who derived their obscure origin from the martial provinces of Illyricum. Within a period of about thirty years, Claudius, Aurelian, Probus, Diocletian and his colleagues triumphed over the foreign and domestic enemies of the state, re-established, with a strongly, enforced military discipline, the strength of the frontier, and deserved the glorious title of Restorers of the Roman World.

Claudius gained a crushing victory over the Goths, whose discomfiture was completed by disease in the year 269. And his successor, Aurelian, in a reign of less than five years, put an end to the Gothic war, chastised the Germans who invaded Italy, recovered Gaul, Spain and Britain from the Roman usurpers, and destroyed the proud monarchy which Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra, had erected in the East on the ruins of the afflicted empire.

The murder of Aurelian in the East (January 275) led to a curious revival of the authority of the senate. During an interregnum of eight months the ancient assembly at Rome governed, with the consent of the army, the destinies of the empire, and appeared to regain with the election of Tacitus, one of their members, all their ancient prerogatives. Their authority expired, however, with the death of his successor, Probus, who delivered the empire once more from the invasions of the barbarians and succumbed to the too common fate of assassination in August 282.

Caius's death, by delivering the sceptre into the hands of his sons Cairnus and Numerian (December 25, 283), once more placed the Roman world at the mercy of profligacy and licentiousness. A year later Diocletian was elected emperor. It was the artful policy of Diocletian to destroy the last vestiges of the ancient constitution. Dividing his unwieldy power among three other associates—Maximian, a rough, brutal soldier, who ranked as Augustus; and Galerius and Constantius, who bore the inferior titles of Caesar—the emperor removed the centre of government by gradual steps from Rome. Diocletian and Maximian held their courts in the provinces, and the authority of the senators was destroyed by spoliation and death.

As Augustus had aimed to disguise his power in a pretence of modesty and simplicity, so Diocletian sought to display his unbounded authority by his magnificence. Ostentation was the first, division was the second, principle of the new system. He multiplied the wheels of the machine of government in every department. In the exercise of supreme power the two Augusti were to associate with themselves two Caesars, who, rising in their turn to the first rank, should supply an uninterrupted succession of emperors. The great increase of civil officers of the state resulted in an increase of taxes and, to quote the words of a contemporary, 'when the proportion of those who received exceeded the proportion of those who contributed, the provinces were oppressed by the tribute.'

VI—REIGN OF THE SIX EMPERORS

For twenty-one years Diocletian held sway, establishing, with the assistance of his associates, the might of the Roman arms in Britain, Africa, Egypt and Persia; and then, on May 1, 305, in a spacious plain in the neighbourhood of Nicomedia, divested himself of the purple and abdicated the throne. On the same day at Milan, Maximian reluctantly made his resignation of the imperial dignity.

According to the rules of the new constitution, Constantius and Galerius assumed the title of Augustus and nominated Maximin and Severus as Caesars. The elaborate machinery devised by Diocletian at once broke down. Galerius, who was supported by Severus, intrigued for the possession of the whole Roman world. Constantine, the son of Constantius, on account of his popularity with the army and the people, excited his suspicion, and only the flight of Constantine saved him from death. He made his way to Gaul and, after taking part in a campaign against the Caledonians, received the title of Augustus in the imperial palace at York on the death of Constantius.

Civil war once more raged. Maxentius, the son of Maximian, was declared Emperor of Rome, and, with the assistance of his father, who broke from his retirement, defended his title against Severus, who was taken prisoner at Ravenna and executed at Rome in February 307. Galerius, who had raised Licinius to fill the post vacated by the death of Severus, invaded Italy to re-establish his authority, but was compelled to retire.

There were now six emperors: Maximian and his son Maxentius and Constantine in the West; in the East, Galerius, Maximin and Licinius. The second resignation of Maximian, and his renewed attempt to seize the imperial power by seducing the soldiers of Constantine, and his subsequent execution at Marseilles in February 310, reduced the number to five. Galerius died of a lingering disorder in the following year, and the civil war that broke out between Maxentius and Constantine, culminating in a battle near Rome in 312, placed the sceptre of the West in the hands of the son of Constantius.

The empire was now divided between Constantine and Licinius, and the ambition of the two princes rendered peace impossible. In the years 315 and 323 civil conflict broke out, ending, after the battle of Adrianople and the siege of Byzantium, in a culminating victory for Constantine in the field of Chrysopolis, in September. Licinius, taken prisoner, laid himself and his purple at the feet of his lord and master, and was duly executed.

By successive steps from his first assuming the purple at York to the resignation of Licinius, Constantine had reached the undivided sovereignty of the Roman world. His success contributed to the decline of the empire by the expense of blood and treasure and by the perpetual increase as well of the taxes as of the military establishments. The foundation of Constantinople at Byzantium and the establishment of the Christian religion in the Empire were the immediate and memorable consequences of this revolution.

VII—DECAY OF THE EMPIRE UNDER CONSTANTINE

The unfortunate Licinius was the last rival who opposed the greatness of Constantine. After a tranquil and prosperous reign, the conqueror bequeathed to his family the inheritance of the Roman Empire: a new capital, a new policy and a new religion; and the innovations which he established have been embraced and consecrated by succeeding generations.

Byzantium, which, under the more august name of Constantinople, was destined to preserve the shadow of the Roman power for nearly a thousand years after it had been extinguished by Rome herself, was the site selected for the new capital. Its boundary was traced by the emperor himself, and its circumference measured some sixteen miles. In a general decay of the arts no architect could be found worthy to decorate the new capital, and the cities of Greece and Asia were despoiled of their most valuable ornaments to supply this want of ability.

In the course of eight or ten years the city, with its beautiful forum, its circus, its imperial palace, its theatres, baths, churches and houses, was completed with more haste than care. The dedication of the new Rome was performed with all due pomp and ceremony, and a population was provided by the expedient of summoning some of the wealthiest families in the empire to reside within its walls.

The gradual decay of Rome had eliminated that simplicity of manners which was the just pride of the ancient republic. Under the autocratic system of Diocletian, a hierarchy of dependents had sprung up. The rank of each was marked with the most scrupulous exactness, and the purity of the Latin language was debased by the invention of the deceitful titles of your Sincerity, your Excellency, your Illustrious and Magnificent Highness.

The officials of the empire were divided into three classes of the Illustrious, Respectable, and Honourable. The consuls were still annually elected, but obtained the semblance of their ancient authority, not from the suffrages of the people, but from the whim of the emperor. On the morning of January 1 they assumed the ensigns of their dignity, and in the two capitals of the empire they celebrated their promotion to office by the annual games. As soon as they had discharged these customary duties, they retired into the shade of private life, to enjoy during the remainder of the year, the undisturbed contemplation of their own greatness. Their names served only as the legal date of the year in which they had filled the chair of Marius and of Cicero. Yet it was still felt and acknowledged in the last period of Roman servitude that this empty name might be compared with the possession of substantial power, and the emperors themselves, who disdained the faint shadow of the republic, were conscious that they acquired an additional splendour as often as they assumed the annual honours of the consular dignity.

Four prefects exercised jurisdiction over as many divisions of the empire, and two municipal prefects ruled Rome and Constantinople. The pro-consuls and vice-prefects belonged to the rank of Respectable, and the provincial magistrates to the lower class of Honourable.

In the military system, eight master-generals exercised their jurisdiction over the cavalry and the infantry, while thirty-five military commanders, with the titles of counts and dukes, under their orders, held sway in the provinces. The army itself was recruited with difficulty, for such was the horror of the profession of a soldier which afflicted the minds of the degenerate Romans that compulsory levies had to be made. The barbarian auxiliaries increased, and were included in the legions that surrounded the throne.

Seven ministers with the rank of Illustrious regulated the affairs of the palace, and a host of official spies and torturers swelled the number of the immediate followers of the sovereign.

The general tribute, or indiction, as it was called, was derived largely from the taxation of landed property. Every fifteen years an accurate census, or survey, was made of all lands, and the proprietor was compelled to state the true facts of his affairs under oath, and paid his contribution partly in gold and partly in kind. In addition to this land tax there was a capitation tax on every branch of commercial industry, and 'free gifts' were exacted from the cities and provinces on the occasion of any joyous event in the family of the emperor. The peculiar 'free gift' of the senate of Rome amounted to some £64,000 sterling.

Constantine celebrated the twentieth year of his reign at Rome in the year 326. The glory of his triumph was marred by the execution, or murder, of his son Crispus, whom he suspected of a conspiracy, and the reputation of the emperor who established the Christian religion in the Roman world was further stained by the death of his second wife, Fausta. With a successful war against the Goths in 331, and the expulsion of the Sarmatians in 334, his reign closed. He died at Nicomedia on May 22, 337.

VIII—THE DIVISION OF EAST AND WEST

The unity of the empire was again destroyed by the three sons of Constantine. A massacre of their kinsman preceded the separation of the Roman world between Constantius, Constans and Constantine. To the first fell Thrace and the East; to the second, Italy, Africa and Western Illyricum; to the third, as the eldest son, the new capital itself. Within three years civil war had eliminated one of the Augusti, in the person of Constantine, who was killed in an action against Constans in March 340. Internal discord relaxed the sinews of the empire, and the conflict among the emperors resulted in a doubtful war with Persia and the almost complete extinction of the Christian monarchy which had been founded for fifty-six years in Armenia.

Constans fell a victim to the ambitions of Magnentius (February 350) and the western empire was for a time divided between this unscrupulous soldier and Vitranio. The deposition of Vitranio and the defeat and death of Magnentius in 353 left Constantius sole emperor. He associated with himself successively as Caesars the two nephews of the great Constantine, Gallus and Julian. The first, being suspected, was destroyed in 354; the second succeeded to the purple in 361.

Trained in the school of the philosophers and proved as a commander in a series of successful campaigns against the German hordes, Julian brought to the throne a genius which, in other times, might have effected the reformation of the empire. The sufferings of his youth had associated in a mind susceptible of the most lively impressions the names of Christ and of Constantius, the ideas of slavery and religion. At the age of twenty he renounced the Christian faith and boldly asserted the doctrines of paganism.

His accession to the supreme power filled the minds of the Christians with horror and indignation. But instructed by history and reflection, Julian extended to all the inhabitants of the Roman world the benefits of a free and equal toleration, and the only hardship which he inflicted on the Christians was to deprive them of the power of tormenting their fellow subjects, whom they stigmatised with the odious titles of idolaters and heretics.

While re-establishing and reforming the old pagan system and attempting to subvert Christianity, he held out a hand of succour to the persecuted Jews, asked to be permitted to pay his grateful vows in the holy city of Jerusalem, and was only prevented from rebuilding the Temple by a supposed preternatural interference. He suppressed the authority of George, Archbishop of Alexandria, who had infamously persecuted and betrayed the people under his spiritual care, and that odious priest, who has been transformed by superstition into the renowned St. George of England, patron of chivalry, and of the Garter, fell a victim to the resentment of the Alexandrian multitude.

The Persian system of monarchy, introduced by Diocletian, was distasteful to the philosophic mind of Julian; he refused the title of lord and master, and attempted to restore in all its pristine simplicity the ancient government of the republic. In a campaign against the Persians he received a mortal wound; and, after delivering a philosophic discourse to his soldiers, and entering into a metaphysical argument on the nature of the soul, this extraordinary man passed away in the thirty-second year of his age, after an undisputed reign of scarcely two years, on June 26, 363.

The election of Jovian, the first of the domestics, by the acclamation of the soldiers, resulted in a disgraceful peace with the Persians, which aroused the anger and indignation of the Roman world, and the new emperor hardly survived this act of weakness for nine months (February 17, 364). The throne of the Roman world remained ten days without a master. Then the civil and military powers of the empire solemnly elected Valentinian as emperor at Nicaea in Bithynia.

The new Augustus divided the vast empire with his brother Valens, and this division marked the final separation of the western and eastern empires. Valens ruled in the East from the lower Danube to the confines of Persia, while Valentinian reserved for himself the remaining portion of the empire, from the extremity of Greece to the Caledonian rampart, and from the rampart of Caledonia to the foot of Mount Atlas. This arrangement continued, despite the almost successful revolt of Procopius in the East, until the death of Valentinian in 375, when the western empire was divided between his sons, Gratian and Valentinian II.

His reign had been notable for the stemming of the invasion of the Alemanni of Gaul, the incursions of the Burgundians and the Saxons, the restoration of Britain from the attacks of the Picts and Scots, the recovery of Africa by the emperor's general, Theodosius, and the diplomatic settlement with the approaching hordes of the Goths, who already swarmed upon the frontiers of the empire.

UNDER the three emperors the Roman world began to feel more severely the gradual pressure exerted by the hordes of barbarians that moved westward. In 376 the Goths, pursued by the Huns, who had come from the steppes of China into Europe, sought the protection of Valens, who succoured them by transporting them over the Danube into Roman territory. They repaid this clemency by uniting their arms with those of the Huns, and defeating and killing him at the battle of Hadrianople in 378.

To save the provinces from the ravages of the barbarians, Gratian appointed Theodosius, son of his father's general, emperor of the East, and the wisdom of his choice was justified by the success of one who added a new lustre to the title of Augustus. By prudent strategy Theodosius divided and defeated the Goths and compelled them to submit. The revolt of Maximus in Britain, the unavailing attempt of Gratian to suppress this usurper, and the death of the joint emperor of the West in the pursuit of this enterprise, called Theodosius from his campaign against the barbarians to take a part in the strife.

Maximus, who had destroyed one emperor, soon sought to establish his authority by removal of his colleague, Valentinian II. The support of Theodosius prevented the attempt, and, after being defeated in battle, Maximus was executed near Aquileia in June 388. The death of Valentinian II at the hands of Arbogastes, a Frank (May 392), and the brief usurpation of Eugenius, completed the civil wars of the reign, and Theodosius expired (January 17, 395) after an enjoyment of power marked by fruitful reforms in every department of the empire.

His sons Arcadius and Honorius succeeded respectively to the government of the East and the West. The symptoms of decay, which not even the wise rule of Theodosius had been able to remove, had grown more alarming. The luxury of the Romans was more shameless and dissolute and, as the increasing depredations of the barbarians had checked industry and diminished wealth, this profuse luxury must have been the result of that indolent despair which enjoys the present hour and declines the thoughts of futurity.

The secret and destructive poison of the age had affected the camps of the legions. The infantry had laid aside their armour and, discarding their shields, advanced, trembling, to meet the cavalry of the Goths and the arrows of the barbarians, who easily overwhelmed the naked soldiers, no longer deserving the name of Romans. The enervated legionaries abandoned their own and the public defence, and their pusillanimity may be considered the immediate cause of the downfall of the empire.

IX—RUIN BY GOTH, VANDAL AND HUN

THE genius of Rome expired with Theodosius. His sons within three months had once more sharply divided the empire. At a time when the only hope of delaying its ruin depended on the firm union of the two sections, the subjects of Arcadius and Honorius were instructed by their respective masters to view each other in a hostile light, to rejoice in their mutual calamity, and to embrace as their faithful allies the barbarians, whom they incited to invade the territories of their countrymen.

Honorius was fortunate for a time in the possession of a servant who rescued Africa from the usurper Gildo, saved for the Roman people the harvest of the province, drove back Alaric, king of the Goths, from Italy, and utterly crushed the horde of Germans who threatened Rome. But Stilicho's virtue and prowess met with the usual reward of an envious tyrant, and he was executed at Ravenna in 408.

Alarmed at the insecurity of Rome, Honorius about this time fixed the imperial residence within the naturally fortified city of Ravenna—an example which was afterwards imitated by his feeble successors, the Gothic kings and the Exarchs; and till the middle of the eighth century Ravenna was considered as the seat of government and the capital of Italy.

The reign of Arcadius in the East marked the complete division of the Roman world. His subjects assumed the language and manners of Greeks, and his form of government was a pure and simple monarchy. The name of the Roman republic, which so long preserved a faint tradition of freedom, was confined to the Latin provinces. A series of internal disputes, both civil and religious, marked his career of power, and his reign may be regarded as notable if only for the election of St. John Chrysostom to the head of the church of Constantinople. Arcadius died in May 408, and was succeeded by his supposed son, Theodosius, then a boy of seven, the reins of power being first held by the prefect Anthemius, and afterwards by his sister Pulcheria.

THE wisdom of Honorius, emperor of the West, in removing his capital to Ravenna, was soon justified by events. Alaric, king of the Goths, advanced in 408 to the gates of Rome and completely blockaded the city. In the course of a long siege, thousands of Romans died of plague and famine, and only a heavy ransom, amounting to £315,000, relieved the citizens from their terrible situation in the year 409.

In the same year Alaric again besieged Rome, after fruitless negotiations with Honorius, and his attempt once more proving successful, he created Attilus, prefect of the city, emperor, But the imprudent measures of his puppet sovereign exasperated Alaric. Attilus was formally deposed in 410, and the infuriated Goth besieged and sacked Rome and ravaged Italy. The spoil that the barbarians carried away with them comprised nearly all the movable wealth of the city.

The ancient capital was devastated, the exquisite works of art destroyed and nearly all the monuments of a glorious past sacrificed to the insatiate greed of the conquerors. Fire helped to complete the ruin wrought by the

Goths, and it is not easy to compute the multitude of citizens who, from an honourable station and a prosperous fortune, were suddenly reduced to the condition of captives and exiles.

THE complete ruin of Italy was prevented by the death of Alaric in 410. His successor, Adolphus, concluded a peace with Honorius, received the emperor's sister Placidia in marriage, and, as his ally, re-established the authority of Rome in Gaul and Spain. Death suspended his operations in 415. The assassination of his murderer on the seventh day of his usurpation gave the Gothic sceptre to Wallia, who completed the work of Adolphus and handed his conquests to the obedience of Honorius. These victories encouraged the court of Ravenna to decree the honours of a triumph to the feeble sovereign, and he entered Rome like the ancient conquerors of nations in 418.

During the reign of Honorius, the Goths, Burgundians and Franks were settled in Gaul. The maritime countries, between the Seine and the Loire, followed the example of Britain in 409, and threw off the yoke of the empire. Aquitaine, with its capital at Arles, received, under the title of the seven provinces, the right of convening an annual assembly for the management of its own affairs.

Honorius died in 423, and was succeeded by Valentinian III, the son of Placidia, widow of the Gothic king Adolphus, and the general Constantius. His long reign was marked by a series of disasters which foretold the rapidly approaching dissolution of the western empire.

Genseric, king of the Vandals, in 429 crossed into Africa, conquered the province and set up in the depopulated territory, with Carthage as his capital, a new rule and government. Italy was filled with fugitives from Africa, and a barbarian race, which had issued from the frozen regions of the north, established their victorious reign over one of the fairest provinces of the empire. Two years later, in 441, a new and even more terrible danger threatened the empire.

THE Goths and Vandals, flying before the Huns, had oppressed the western world. The hordes of these barbarians, now gathering strength in their union under their king, Attila, threatened an attack upon the eastern empire. In appearance their chieftain was terrible in the extreme; his portrait exhibits the genuine deformity of a modern Calmuck: a large head, a swarthy complexion, small, deep-seated eyes, a flat nose, a few hairs in the place of a beard, and a short, square body of nervous strength, though of a disproportioned form. He had a custom of fiercely rolling his eyes, as if he wished to enjoy the terror which he inspired.

This savage hero, who had subdued Germany and Scythia, and almost exterminated the Burgundians of the Rhine, and had conquered Scandinavia, was able to bring into the field 700,000 barbarians. An unsuccessful raid into Persia induced him to turn his attention to the eastern empire, and the enervated troops of Theodosius the Younger dissolved before the fury of his onset. He ravaged up to the very gates of Constantinople, and only a humiliating treaty preserved his dominion to the 'invincible Augustus' of the East.

AFTER the death of Theodosius the Younger and the accession of Marcian, the husband of Pulcheria, Attila threatened, in 450, both empires. An incursion of his hordes into Gaul was rendered abortive by the conduct of the patrician Aetius, who, uniting all the various troops of Gaul and Germany, the Saxons, the Burgundians, the Franks, under their Merovingian prince, and the Visigoths under their king, Theodoric, after two important battles, induced the Huns to retreat from the field of Châlons.

Attila, diverted from his purpose, turned into Italy, and the citizens of the various towns fled before the savage destroyer. Many families of Aquileia, Padua and the adjacent towns, found a safe refuge in the neighbouring islands of the Adriatic, where their place of refuge evolved, in time, into the famous Republic of Venice.

VALENTINIAN fled from Ravenna to Rome, prepared to desert his people and his empire. The fortitude of Aetius alone supported and preserved the tottering state. Leo, Bishop of Rome, in his sacerdotal robes, dared to demand the clemency of the savage king, and the intervention of St. Peter and St. Paul is supposed to have induced Attila to retire beyond the Danube with the Princess Honoria as his bride. He did not long survive this, his last campaign, and in 453 he died, and was buried amidst all the savage pomp and grief of his subjects. His death resolved the bonds that had united the various nations of which his subjects were composed and domestic discord quickly extinguished the empire of the Huns.

The courage and success of the patrician Aetius excited only the hatred of Valentinian and that prince closed his ignoble reign with the murder of the preserver of the state. He himself was killed through the instrumentality of Maximus, who thereby revenged the dishonour of his wife.

The reign of Maximus did not last the year. To complete his revenge, he compelled Eudoxia, the widow of his imperial victim to become his bride; and though the empress masked her real feelings, she conspired in secret to subvert his throne. She entered into secret negotiations with Genseric, king of the Vandals, and induced that successful warrior to invade Italy. But before the dire results of this conspiracy had come to a head, Maximus was killed in a tumult of the soldiers. It was impossible, however, to stay the hand of Genseric. From June 15 to June 29 he sacked and pillaged the ancient capital, and Eudoxia was compelled to follow the Vandal on his triumphal return to Carthage.

THE vacant throne was filled by the nomination of Theodoric, king of the Goths, who supported the claims of Avitus, master-general of the imperial cavalry, to the imperial purple (455). The senate of Rome bitterly opposed the elevation of this stranger, and though Avitul might have supported his title against the votes of an unarmed assembly, he fell immediately he incurred the resentment of Count Ricimer, one of the chief commanders of the barbarian troops who formed the military defence of Italy. At a distance from his Gothic allies, he was compelled to abdicate (October 16, 456), and Majorian was raised to fill his place.

X—THE LAST EMPEROR OF THE WEST

The successor of Avitus was a great and heroic character, such as sometimes arise in a degenerate age to vindicate the honour of the human species. In the ruin of the Roman world he loved his people, sympathised with their distress, and studied by judicial and effectual remedies to allay their sufferings. He reformed the most intolerable grievances of the taxes, attempted to restore and maintain the edifices of Rome, and to establish a new and healthier moral code. His military abilities and his fortune were not in proportion to his merits. An unsuccessful attempt against the Vandals to recover the lost provinces of Africa resulted in the loss of his fleet, and his return from this campaign ended his reign. He was deposed by Ricimer, and five days later died of dysentery, on August 7, 461.

At the command of Ricimer, the senate bestowed the imperial title on Libius Severus, who reigned as long as it suited his patron. The increasing difficulties, however, of the kingdom of Italy, due largely to the naval depredation of the Vandals, compelled Ricimer to seek the assistance of the emperor Leo, who had succeeded Marcian in the East in 457. Leo determined to extirpate the tyranny of the Vandals, and solemnly invested Anthemius with the diadem and purple of the West (467). He was sent in state to Rome, and the powers of the eastern empire were strenuously exerted to deliver Italy and the Mediterranean from the assaults of Genseric. But the failure of the expedition, the increasing anarchy in Gaul and Spain, and the intrigues of Ricimer, hastened the storm of destruction.

In 472, Ricimer raised the senator Olybrius to the purple and, advancing from Milan, entered and sacked Rome and murdered Anthemius (July 11, 472). Forty days after this calamitous event, the tyrant Ricimer died of a painful disease, and two months later Olybrius also died.

The emperor Leo nominated Julius Nepos to the vacant throne. After suppressing a rival in the person of Glycerius, Julius succumbed, in 475, to a furious sedition of the barbarian confederates, who, under the command of the patrician Orestes, marched from Rome to Ravenna. The troops would have made Orestes emperor, but when he declined they consented to acknowledge his son Augustulus as emperor of the West.

The ambition of the patrician might have seemed satisfied, but he soon discovered, before the end of the first year, that he must either be the slave or the victim of his barbarian mercenaries. The soldiers demanded a third part of the land of Italy. Orestes rejected the audacious demand, and his refusal was favourable to the ambition of Odoacer, a bold barbarian, who assured his fellow-soldiers that if they dared to associate under his command they might soon extort the justice that had been denied to their dutiful petition. Orestes was executed and Odoacer, resolving to abolish the useless and expensive office of emperor of the West, compelled Augustulus to be the instrument of his own disgrace.

He signified his resignation to the senate, and that assembly, still affecting the spirit of freedom and the forms of the constitution, addressed a letter to the emperor Zeno, who had succeeded Leo in the East. In this letter they solemnly disclaimed the necessity, or even the wish, for continuing any longer the imperial succession in Italy, since, in their opinion, 'the majesty of a sole monarch is sufficient to pervade and protect, at the same time, both the East and the West.' The republics, they declared, might safely confide in the civil and military virtues of Odoacer, and they humbly requested that the emperor would invest him with the title of Patrician and the administration of the diocese of Italy.

So ended, in the year 476, the empire of the West, and the last Roman emperor lived out his life in the Lucullan villa on the promontory of Misenum.

XI—THE GROWTH OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

The policy of the emperors and the estate, as far as it concerned religion, was happily seconded by the reflections of the enlightened, and by the habits of the superstitious part of their subjects. The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; by the magistrate as equally useful. Under this spirit of toleration the Christian church grew with great rapidity. Five main causes assisted this development.

1. The inflexible and intolerant zeal of the Christians, purified from the narrow and unsocial spirit of the Jewish religion.

2. The doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficacy to that important truth.

3. The miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive Church.

4. The pure and austere morals of the early Christians.

5. The union and discipline of the Christian republic, which gradually formed an independent and increasing state in the heart of the Roman Empire.

The early Christians of the mother church at Jerusalem subscribed to the Mosaic law, and the first fifteen bishops of Jerusalem were all circumcised Jews. But the Gentile church rejected the intolerable weight of Mosaic ceremonies, and at length refused to their more scrupulous brethren the same toleration which at first they had humbly solicited for their own practice.

After the ruin of the temple, of the city and of the public religion of the Jews, the Nazarenes, as the Christian Jews of Jerusalem were called, retired to the little town of Pella, from whence they could make easy and frequent pilgrimages to the Holy City. When the Emperor Hadrian forbade the Jewish people from approaching the precincts of the city, the Nazarenes escaped from the common proscription by disavowing the Mosaic law. A small remnant, however, still combined the Mosaic ceremonies with the Christian faith, and existed, until the fourth century, under the name of Ebeonites.

From the acknowledged truth of the Jewish religion the Ebeonites had concluded that it could never be abolished. From its supposed imperfection the sect of the Gnostics, as hastily inferred that it never was instituted by the wis-

dom of the Deity. They treated with profane derision the Mosaic account of the creation and fall of man, and refused to discover any of the features of the wise and omnipotent Father of the universe in the Jehovah of the Old Testament. They adored the Christ as the first and brightest emanation of the Deity, who appeared upon earth to rescue mankind from their various errors and to reveal a new system of truth and perfection.

The three sects of the primitive church, the orthodox, the Ebeonites and the Gnostics, were united in their abhorrence of idolatry and the pagan system of polytheism. Their avoidance, even despite the law, of pagan ceremonies, served to fortify the zeal of the Christians.

The immortality of the soul had been held by a few sages of Greece and Rome, who were unwilling to conform themselves with the beasts of the field, or to suppose that a being for whose dignity they entertained the most sincere admiration could be limited to a spot of earth, and to a few years of duration. But reason could not justify the spacious and noble principles of the disciples of Plato.

To the Christians alone the authority of Christ gave a certainty of a future life, and when the promise of eternal happiness was proposed to mankind on condition of adopting the faith and of observing the precepts of the Gospel, it is no wonder that so advantageous an offer should have been accepted by great numbers of every religion, of every rank, and of every province in the Roman Empire. The immediate expectation of the second coming of Christ and the reign of the Son of God with His saints for a thousand years, strengthened the ancient Christians against all trials and sufferings.

The supernatural gifts which even in this life were ascribed to the Christians above the rest of mankind must have conduced to their own comfort, and very frequently to the conviction of infidels. The gift of tongues, of vision and of prophecy, the power of expelling demons, of healing the sick and of raising the dead, were prodigies claimed by the Christian Church at the time of the apostles and their first disciples.

The duty of an historian does not call upon him to interpose his private judgement in a controversy as to the truth of these miracles, but he ought to attempt to define with precision the limits of that period to which we might be disposed to extend the gift of supernatural power. His task is perplexing, for every age bears testimony to the wonderful events for which it was distinguished ; but it is evident that there must have been some period in which miraculous powers were either suddenly or gradually withdrawn from the Christian Church. Whatever era is chosen for that purpose, it is clear that after that era credulity performed the office of faith, fanaticism assumed the language of inspiration, and the effects of accidents, or contrivance, were ascribed to supernatural causes.

Repentance for their past sins, and the laudable desire of supporting the reputation of the society in which they were engaged, rendered the lives of the primitive Christians much purer and more austere than those of their pagan contemporaries or their degenerate successors. They were insistent in their condemnation of pleasure and luxury and in their search after purity, were induced to approve reluctantly that institution of marriage which they were compelled to tolerate. A state of celibacy was regarded as the nearest approach to the divine perfection, and there were in the primitive church a great number of persons devoted to the profession of perpetual chastity.

The government of the primitive church was based on the principles of freedom and equality. The societies which were instituted in the cities of the Roman empire were united only by the ties of faith and charity. The want of discipline and human learning was supplied by the occasional assistance of the 'prophets'—men or women who, as often as they felt the divine impulse, poured forth the effusions of the spirit in the assembly of the faithful.

In the course of time bishops and presbyters exercised solely the functions of legislation and spiritual guidance. A hundred years after the death of the apostles, the bishop, acting as the president of the presbyterial college, administered the sacrament and discipline of the Church, managed the public funds and determined all such differences as the faithful were unwilling to expose before the tribunal of an idolatrous judge.

Every society formed within itself a separate and independent republic, and towards the end of the second century, realising the advantages that might result from a closer union of their interests and designs, these little states adopted the useful institution of a provincial synod. The bishops of the various churches met in the capital of the province at stated periods and issued their decrees or canons. The institution of synods was so well suited to private ambition and to public interest that it was received throughout the whole empire. A regular correspondence was established between the provincial councils, which mutually communicated and approved their respective proceedings and the Catholic Church soon assumed the form and acquired the strength of a great federative republic.

The authority of the bishops insensibly increased, and a new authority also sprang up. The meeting of the provincial synods in the capital of the province gave to the bishop of that capital a certain pre-eminence, and under the lofty title of Metropolitans and Primates, they usurped for themselves an authority similar to that which the bishops had so lately assumed above the inferior clergy. The bishop of Rome, as the bishop of the capital of the empire, claimed, and was allowed, a certain pre-eminence.

The community of goods which for a short time had been adopted in the primitive church was gradually abolished, and a system of voluntary gifts was substituted. In the time of the Emperor Decius it was the opinion of the magistrates that the Christians of Rome were possessed of very considerable wealth, and several laws, enacted with the same design as our statutes of mortmain, forbade real estate being given or bequeathed to any corporate body, without special sanctions. The bishops distributed these revenues, exercised the right of exclusion or excommunication of recalcitrant members of the Church, and maintained the dignity of their office with ever increasing pomp.

XII—THE DAYS OF PERSECUTION

The persecution of Christians by the Roman emperors must at first sight seem strange, when one considers their inoffensive mode of faith and worship. When one remembers the scepticism that prevailed among the pagans, and the tolerant view of all religions which was characteristic of the Roman citizen in the early years of the empire, this harshness seems all the more remarkable.

It can be explained partly by the misapprehension which existed in the mind of the pagan world as to the principles of the Christian faith, and partly by the organization of the sect. The Jews were allowed the exercise of their unsocial and exclusive faith. But the Jews were a nation; the Christians were a sect. Moreover, the Christians were regarded as apostates from the ancient faith of Moses, and worshipping no visible god, were held to be atheists.

The Roman policy also viewed with the utmost jealousy and distrust any association among its subjects, and the secret and nocturnal meetings of the Christians appeared peculiarly dangerous in the eyes of the law.

But in spite of this, the early Christians suffered little, and their innocence was protected by the ignorance and contempt of the magistrates. Even the passage in Tacitus which narrates how Nero, having destroyed Rome by fire, cruelly sacrificed to his horrible tortures numerous Christians to divert suspicion from himself is open to question on points of fact; at any rate, Nero's persecutions were confined to Rome.

They were oppressed by the Emperor Domitian. Trajan protected their meetings by requiring definite evidence of these illegal assemblies, and an informer who failed in his proofs was subject to a severe or capital penalty. But the edicts of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius protected the Church from the danger of popular clamour in times of disaster, declaring that the voice of the multitude should never be admitted as legal evidence to convict or to punish those unfortunate persons who had embraced the enthusiasm of the Christians.

If convicted of being a Christian, a prisoner was not necessarily to be punished. He was given the chance of casting a few grains of incense upon the pagan altar; and if he refused this, he might be subjected to the scourge and the rack. But the Roman magistrates were, as a class, humane, and the number of martyrs was inconsiderable. The authority of Origen and Dionysius annihilates that formidable army of martyrs, whose relics, drawn for the most part from the catacombs of Rome, have replenished so many churches and whose marvellous achievements have been the subject of so many volumes of holy romance.

The martyrdom of Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, on September 14, 258, was one of the most notable of that period. Under Marcus Antoninus, the Christians were treated harshly, but the tyrant Commodus protected them by his leniency. After a temporary period of persecution during the reign of Severus, the Christians enjoyed a calm from 211 to 249. The storms gathered again under Decius, and so vigorous was the persecution that the bishops of the most considerable cities were removed by exile or death.

XII—THE CHURCH UNDER CONSTANTINE

From 284 to 303, during the reign of Diocletian, the Christian Church enjoyed peace and prosperity, but in the latter year Galerius persuaded the emperor to renew the persecution of the sect. An edict on February 24 enacted that all churches throughout the empire should be demolished, and the punishment of death was pronounced against all who should presume to hold any secret assemblies for the purposes of religious worship. Many suffered martyrdom under this cruel enactment. Churches everywhere were burnt, and sacred books destroyed. Three more edicts published before March 304 led to the imprisonment of all persons of the ecclesiastical order, compelled the magistrates to exercise torture to subvert the religion of their Christian prisoners, and made it the duty, as well as the interest, of the imperial officers to discover and pursue the most obnoxious among the faithful.

But after six years of persecution, the mind of Galerius, softened by salutary reflection, induced him to attempt some reparation. In the edict of toleration which he published on April 31, 311, he expressed the hope 'that our indulgence will engage the Christians to offer up their prayers to the Deity whom they adore for our safety and prosperity, and for that of the Republic.'

The triumph of the great Constantine established the security of the Christian Church from the attacks of the pagans. Converted in 306, Constantine, as soon as he had achieved the conquest of Italy, issued the Edict of Milan (313) declaring that the places of worship which had been confiscated should be restored to the Church without dispute, without delay and without expense. Though himself never received by baptism into the Church, until his last moments, his powerful patronage of the Christians and his edicts of toleration removed all the temporal disadvantages which had hitherto retarded the progress of Christianity.

The faith of Christ became the national religion of the empire. The soldiers bore upon their helmets and upon their shields the sacred emblem of the Cross. All the machinery of government was employed to propagate the faith, not only within the empire but beyond its borders. Confirmed in his new religion by the miraculous vision of the Cross, Constantine consented to recognize the superiority of the ecclesiastical orders in all spiritual matters, while retaining himself the temporal power.

The persecution of heresy was carried out by Constantine with all the ardour of a convert. An edict confiscated the public property of the heretics to the use either of the revenue or the Catholic Church, and the penal regulations of Diocletian against the Christians were now employed against the schismatics. The Donatists, who maintained the apostolic succession of Donatus, primate of Carthage, as opposed to Caecilian, were suppressed in Africa, and a general synod attempted to regulate the faith of the Church.

The subject of the nature of the divine Trinity had early given rise to discussion. Of the three main heretical views, that of Arius and his disciples was the most prevalent. He

held in effect that the Son, by whom all things were made, though He had been begotten before all worlds, yet had not always existed. He shone only with the reflected light of His Almighty Father, and, like the sons of the Roman emperors, who were invested with the titles of Caesar or Augustus, He governed the universe.

The Tritheists advocated a system which seemed to establish three independent deities, while the Sabellian theory allowed only to the man Jesus the inspiration of the divine wisdom. The consubstantiality of the Father and of the Son had been established by the Council of Nicaea in 325, but the East ranged itself for the most part under the banner of Arian heresy. At first indifferent, Constantine at last persecuted the Arians, who later, under Constantius, were received into favour.

The great Athanasius, who was seated on the archiepiscopal throne of Egypt (326–373), maintained the Catholic faith. Condemned by the Council of Arles and Milan, thrice expelled from Alexandria, treated unmercifully by the agents of Constantius, Athanasius survived both that reign and the restoration of paganism under Julian and, protected by his people against the persecution of Valens, died in peace on May 2, 373.

Constantinople, which for forty years was the stronghold of Arianism, was converted to the orthodox faith under Theodosius by Gregory Nazianzen. A series of edicts were issued by the emperor, between the years 380 and 394, against the heretics, and in the Western empire the great Ambrose, archbishop of Milan, maintained, by his virtues and his discovery of the remains of two martyred saints, the banner of orthodoxy.

XIV—THE CONVERSION OF THE WORLD

THE pagan religion was finally destroyed about the year 390, and the faintest vestiges of it were not visible thirty years later. Its influence, however, might be observed in many of the ceremonies which were introduced into the Church, and the worship of martyrs and relics seemed to revive a system of polytheism by the worship of a hierarchy of saints. Among the most famous of the dignitaries of the Church at this period was the archbishop of Constantinople, who was distinguished by the epithet of Chrysostom, or the Golden Mouth. He attempted to purify the Eastern empire, excited the animosity of the Empress Eudoxia, and died in exile in 407.

The monastic system had been founded by Antony, an illiterate youth, in the year 305, by the establishment on Mount Cobyim, near the Red Sea, of a colony of ascetics who renounced all the business and pleasures in life as the price of eternal happiness. A long series of hermits, monks and anachorets propagated the system and, patronised by Athanasius, it spread to all parts of the world.

The monastic profession was an act of voluntary devotion. In their dress and diet its members preserved the most rigorous simplicity, and they subsisted entirely by their own manual exertions. But in the course of time this simplicity vanished, and, enriched by the offerings of the faithful, the monks assumed the pride of wealth and at last indulged in the luxury of extravagance.

The monks were divided into two classes—the Coenobites, who lived under a common and regular discipline; and the Anachorets, who indulged their unsocial independent fanaticism. Some of the latter grazed in the fields of Mesopotamia with the common herd, others usurped the den of some wild beast.

The conversion of the barbarians followed upon their invasion of the Roman world; but they were involved in the Arian heresy, and from their advocacy of that cause they were characterised by the name of heretics, an epithet more odious than that of barbarian. The bitterness engendered by this reproach confirmed them in their faith, and the Vandals in Africa persecuted the orthodox Catholic with all the vigour and cruel arts of religious tyranny. But the Catholics, superior to their adversaries in numbers and learning, maintained their faith pure and undefiled, not only in Africa but in Spain under the Visigoths and, in the ruin of these barbarian kingdoms, by the sixth century the triumph of orthodoxy was established.

THE conversion of the Spaniards resulted in a development fraught with much importance to the future of the Church. The zeal of the Council of Toledo improved the Nicene Creed by declaring the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, as well as from the Father—a weighty point of doctrine which produced long afterwards the schism of the Greek and Latin churches.

XV—THEODORIC THE OSTROGOTH

AFTER the fall of the Roman Empire in the West, an interval of fifty years, until the memorable reign of Justinian, is faintly marked by the obscure names and imperfect annals of Zeno, Anastasius and Justin, who successively ascended the throne of Constantinople. During the same period Italy revived and flourished under the government of a Gothic king, who might have deserved a statue among the best and bravest of the ancient Romans.

Theodoric the Ostrogoth, the fourteenth in lineal descent of the royal line of the Amali, was born in the neighbourhood of Vienna two years after the death of Attila. Sent, at the age of eight (463), as a hostage to the court of Leo, emperor of the East, he was educated at Constantinople, and succeeded, after his father's death, to the vacant throne of his people. In the domestic troubles that disturbed the reign of Leo's successor, Zeno (474-491), Theodoric alternately served or cruelly oppressed the subjects of the emperor.

The murmurs of the Goths, who complained that they were exposed to intolerable hardships while their king was dissolved in the luxury of Greece, determined Theodoric to attempt an adventure worthy of his courage and ambition. He boldly demanded the privilege of rescuing Rome from Odoacer, and at the head of his people forced his way, between the years 488 and 489, through hostile country into Italy. In three battles he triumphed over Odoacer, forced that monarch to capitulate on favourable

terms at Ravenna (493), and after pretending to allow him to share his sovereignty of Italy, assassinated him in the same year.

The long reign of Theodoric (493-526) was marked by a transient return of peace and prosperity to Italy. His domestic and foreign policy were dictated alike by wisdom and necessity. His people were settled on the land, which they held by military tenure. A series of matrimonial alliances secured him the support of the Franks, the Burgundians, the Visigoths, the Vandals and the Thuringians, and his sword preserved his territory from the incursions of rival barbarians and the two disastrous attacks (505 and 508) that envy prompted the Emperor Anastasius to attempt.

Himself an Arian, Theodoric treated with tolerance and justice his Catholic subjects. A Catholic rising against the Jews, which was immediately suppressed, and a mandate issued by the Emperor Justinian threatening the Arians by dread of punishment to come within the pale of the Church, drove Theodoric to the brink of persecution. Boetius, the last of the Romans whom Cato could have acknowledged for a countryman, and the virtuous Symmachus were sacrificed by a monarch who was driven from his position of tolerance by his subjects; and on August 30, 526, Theodoric expired in the palace of Ravenna, full of remorse and justly alarmed by the invisible terrors of futurity.

XVI—JUSTINIAN THE GREAT

The death of the emperor Anastasius had raised to the throne a Dardanian peasant, who by his arts secured the suffrage of the guards, despoiled and destroyed his more powerful rivals, and reigned as emperor under the name of Justin I from 518 to 527. He was succeeded by the great Justinian, who for thirty-eight years directed the government of the Roman Empire.

The Empress Theodora, who before her marriage had been a theatrical wanton, was seated, by the fondness of the emperor, on the throne as an equal and independent colleague in the sovereignty. Her rapacity, her cruelty and her pride were the subject of contemporary writings, but her benevolence to her less fortunate sisters, and her courage amidst the factions and dangers of the court, justly entitle her to a certain nobility of character.

Constantinople in the age of Justinian was torn by the factions of the circus. The rival bands of charioteers, who wore respectively liveries of green and blue, created in the capital of the East, as they had created in Rome, two factions among the populace. Justinian's support of the blues led to a serious sedition in the capital. At first opposed, the two factions were united by a common desire for vengeance. With the watchword 'Nika' (vanquish), which has given a name to this memorable sedition (January 532), the blues and greens raged in tumult through Constantinople for five days. The greens even dared to raise a new emperor, and Justinian might have perished had it not been for the heroic firmness of Theodora. At her command 3,000 veterans who could be trusted marched through the burning streets to the Hippodrome and there massacred the unresisting mob. But the disorders revived later, and the blue and green factions continued to afflict Justinian and to disturb the Eastern Empire.

That empire, after Rome was barbarous, still embraced the nations whom she had conquered beyond the Adriatic, and as far as the frontiers of Ethiopia and Persia. Justinian reigned over 64 provinces and 935 cities. The arts and agriculture flourished under his rule, but the avarice and profusion of Justinian oppressed the people. His expensive taste for building almost exhausted the resources of the empire. Heavy customs tolls, taxes on the food and industry of the poor, the exercise of intolerable monopolies, were not excused or compensated for by the parsimonious saving in the salaries of court officials, and even in the pay of the soldiers. His stately edifices were cemented with the blood and treasures of his people, and the rapacity and luxury of the emperor were imitated by the civil magistrates and officials.

The schools of Athens, which still kept the ancient philosophy, were suppressed by Justinian. The academy of the Platonics, the Lyceum af the Peripatetics, the Portico of the Stoics and the Garden of the Epicureans had long survived.

With the death of Simplicius, and his six companions, who terminate the long list of Grecian philosophers, the golden chain, as it was fondly styled, of the Platonic succession was broken, and the Edict of Justinian (529) imposed a perpetual silence on the schools of Athens.

The Roman consulship was also abolished by Justinian in 541; but this office, the title of which admonished the Romans of their ancient freedom, still lived in the minds of the people. They applauded the gracious condescension of successive princes by whom it was assumed in the first year of their reign, and three centuries elapsed after the death of Justinian before that obsolete office, which had been suppressed by law, could be abolished by custom.

The usurpation by Gelimer (530) of the Vandalic crown of Africa, which belonged of right to Hilderic, first encouraged Justinian to undertake the African war. Hilderic had granted toleration to the Catholics, and for this reason was held in reproach by his Arian subjects. His compulsory abdication afforded the emperor of the East an opportunity of interfering in the cause of orthodoxy.

A large army was entrusted to the command of Belisarius, one of those heroic names which are familiar to every age and to every nation. Proved in the Persian war, Belisarius was given unlimited authority. He set sail from Constantinople with a fleet of six hundred ships in June 533. He landed on the coast of Africa in September, defeated the degenerate Vandals, reduced Carthage within a few days, utterly vanquished Gelimer, and completed the conquest of the ancient Roman province by 534. The Vandals in Africa fled; and in the heart of a Moorish tribe a traveller has discovered the white complexion and flaxen hair of a Northern race.

In Italy, Amalasontha, the daughter of Theodoric, reigned on behalf of her son, Athalaric. On his death at the age of sixteen,

she contracted a marriage with Theodatus, whose mother was the sister of Theodoric, and, attempting to subvert that law of her country which declared that the succession can never pass from the lance to the distaff, proclaimed that she and her husband reigned jointly in Italy. The discontent of the Goths led to her exile and death in 535.

These domestic dissensions excited the ambition of Justinian. Belisarius was sent with another army to Sicily in 535 and, after subduing that island and suppressing a revolt in Africa, he invaded Italy in 536. The murder of Theodatus and the accession of Vitiges confronted him with a more worthy opponent. Policy dictated the retreat of the Goths, and Belisarius entered Rome (December 536). In March, Vitiges returned with a force of one hundred and fifty thousand men. The valour of the Roman general supported a siege of forty-one days and the intrigues of the Pope Silverius, who was exiled by his orders; and, finally, with the assistance of a seasonable reinforcement, Belisarius compelled the barbarians to retire in March of the following year. The conquest of Ravenna and the suppression of the invasion of the Franks completed the subjugation of the Gothic kingdom by December 539.

The success of Belisarius and the intrigues of his secret enemies had excited the jealousy of Justinian. He was recalled and the eunuch Narses was sent to Italy, as a powerful rival, to oppose the interests of the conqueror of Rome and Africa. The infidelity of Antonina, which excited her husband's just indignation, was excused by the Empress Theodora, and her powerful support was given to the wife of the last of the Roman heroes, who, after serving again against the Persians, returned to the capital, to be received not with honour and triumph, but with disgrace and contempt and a fine of £120,000.

The incursions of the Lombards, the Sclavonians, and the Avars and the Turks, and the successful raids of the king of Persia were among the number of the important events of the reign of Justinian. To maintain his position in Africa and Italy taxed his resources to their utmost limit. The victories of Justinian were pernicious to mankind; the desolation of Africa was such that in many parts a stranger might wander whole days without meeting the face of either a friend or an enemy.

THE revolts of the Goths, under their king, Totila (541), once more demanded the presence of Belisarius and, a hero on the banks of the Euphrates, a slave in the palace of Constantinople, he accepted with reluctance the painful task of supporting his own reputation and retrieving the faults of his successors. He was too late to save Rome from the Goths, by whom it was taken in December 546; but he recovered it in the following February. After his recall by his envious sovereign in September 548, Rome was once more taken by the Goths. The successful repulse of the Franks and Alemanni finally restored the kingdom to the rule of the emperor.

The last victory of the hero Belisarius was gained over the Bulgarians, who had crossed the frozen Danube and invaded the empire. A conspiracy against the life of the emperor was discovered. There were not wanting persons who accused Belisarius of being an accomplice; he was judged guilty, and from December to July he was guarded as a prisoner in his own palace. At length his innocence was acknowledged and his freedom and honours were restored, but he died about eight months after his deliverance (March 13, 565).

The emperor survived his death, only eight months, and passed away, in the eighty-third year of his life and the thirty-eighth of his reign, on November 14, 565. The most lasting memorial of his reign is to be found neither in his victories nor his monuments, but in the immortal words of the Code, the Pandects and the Institutes, in which the civil jurisprudence of the Romans was digested, and by means of which the public reason of the Romans has been silently or studiously transfused into the domestic institutions of the whole of Europe.

XVIII—GREGORY THE GREAT

JUSTINIAN was succeeded by his nephew, Justin II, who lived to see the conquest of the greater part of Italy by Alboin, king of the Lombards (568–570), the disaffection of the exarch, Narses, and the ruin of the Roman world.

During a period of 200 years Italy was unequally divided between the king of the Lombards and the exarchate of Ravenna. Rome relapsed into a state of misery. The Campania was reduced to the state of a dreary wilderness.

The name of Rome, indeed, might have been erased from the earth had not a vague tradition declared that two Jewish teachers, a tent-maker and a fisherman, had formerly been executed in the circus of Nero. At the end of 500 years their genuine or fictitious relics were adored as the paladium of Christian Rome.

The power as well as virtue of the apostles resided, with living energy, in the breast of Gregory the Great, whose pontificate lasted from 590 to 604, and in whose administration of his spiritual and temporal duties his virtues and his success justified the appellation of Great. He reconciled the Arians of Italy and Spain to the Catholic Church, conquered Britain in the name of the Cross, and established his right to interfere in the management of the episcopal provinces of Greece, Spain and Gaul. The merits of Gregory were treated by the Byzantine court with reproach and insult, but in the attachment of a grateful people he found the best right of a sovereign.

The short and virtuous reign of Tiberius (578–582), which succeeded that of Justin, made way for that of Maurice. For twenty years Maurice ruled with his honour. But parsimony led to his undoing, and in 602 he was murdered.

A like fate befell the Emperor Phocas who succumbed in 610 to the fortunes of Heraclius, the son of Crispus, exarch of Africa. For thirty-two years Heraclius ruled the Roman

world. In three campaigns he chastised the rising power of Persia, drove the armies of Chosroes from Syria, Palestine and Egypt, rescued Constantinople from the joint siege of the Avars and Persians (626), and finally reduced the Persian monarch to the defence of his kingdom. The murder of Chosroes by his son Siroes (628) concluded the successes of the emperor. A treaty of peace was arranged and Heraclius returned in triumph to Constantinople.

The next year he made the pilgrimage to Jerusalem to restore the true Cross to the Holy Sepulchre. But while his triumphs were being proclaimed, an obscure town on the confines of Syria was pillaged by the Saracens, and some troops who had advanced to its release were cut in pieces—an ordinary and trifling occurrence had it not been the prelude of a mighty revolution. These robbers were the apostles of Mahomed; their fanatic valour had emerged from the desert, and in the last eight years of his reign Heraclius lost to the Arabs the same provinces which he had rescued from the Persians.

Heraclius died in 612. His descendants continued to fill the throne in the persons of Constantine III (641), Heracleonas (641), Constans II (641), Constantine IV (668), Justinian II (685), until 711, when an interval of six years, divided into three reigns, made way for the Isaurian dynasty.

XIX—THE NEW ERA OF CHARLEMAGNE

LEO III ascended the throne on March 25, 718, and the purple descended to his family, by the rights of heredity, for three generations. The Isaurian dynasty is most notable for the part it played in ecclesiastical history.

The introduction of images into the Christian Church had confused the simplicity of religious worship. The education of Leo, his reason, perhaps his intercourse with Jews and Arabs, had inspired him with a hatred of images. By two edicts he proscribed the existence, as well as the use of religious pictures. This heresy of Leo and of his successors and descendants, Constantine V (741), Leo IV (775), and Constantine VI (780), whose blinding by his mother Irene is one of the most tragic stories of Roman history, justified the popes in rebelling against the authority of the emperor and in restoring and establishing the supremacy of Rome.

The first of the iconoclast (image-breaker) sovereigns had attempted to establish his heresy by force in Italy in 727, but the failure of the expedition confirmed the safety of the Catholics, the worship of images and the freedom of Roman Italy. The ancient capital, whose people were now so degraded that whenever a Frank or Lombard expressed contempt of a foe he called him a Roman, had been formed in the model of republican government.

Gregory II saved the city from the attacks of the Lombards, who had seized Ravenna and extinguished the series of Greek exarchs in 751. He secured the assistance of Pepin, and the real governor of the French monarchy—Charles Martel, who, by this signal victory over the Saracens, had saved Europe from the Mahomedan yoke. Twice—in 754 and 756—Pepin marched to the relief of the city. His son Charlemagne, in 774, seemed to secure the permanent safety of the ancient capital by the conquest of Lombardy, and for twenty-six years he ruled the Romans as his subjects. Nothing was lacking except the title of emperor.

Charlemagne, in the first transports of his victory, had presented the pope with the cities and islands which had formerly been annexed to the exarchate. In a cooler moment he eluded this gift, and claimed Rome as well as Ravenna as his own inalienable property. Robbed of their temporal power by force, the popes resorted to fraud. A document, known as the Forged Decretals, which assigned the free and perpetual sovereignty of Rome, Italy and the provinces of the West to the popes by Constantine, was presented by Pope Hadrian I to Charlemagne. This document served to absolve the popes from their debt of gratitude to the French monarch and excused the revolt of Rome from the authority of the Eastern. Empire.

THOUGH Constantinople returned, under Irene, to the employment of images, and the seventh general council of Nicea, September 24, 787, pronounced the worship of the Greeks as agreeable to scripture and reason, the division between the East and the West could not be avoided. The pope was driven to revive the Western Empire in order to secure the gift of the exarchy, to eradicate the claims of the Greeks and to restore the majesty of Rome from the debasement of a provincial town. The emperors of the West would receive their crown from the successor of St. Peter, and the Roman Church would require a zealous and respectable advocate.

Inspired by these motives, Pope Leo, who had nearly fallen a victim to a conspiracy (788), and had been saved and reinstated by Charlemagne, took the opportunity presented by the French king's visit to Rome to crown him emperor. On the festival of Christmas (800), in the church of St. Peter, Leo, after the celebration of the Holy Mysteries, suddenly placed a precious crown on his head. The dome resounded with the acclamations of the people. his head and body were consecrated with the royal unction, and he was saluted, or adored, by the pontiff after the example of the Caesars.

The dignity of his person, the length of his reign, the prosperity of his arms, the vigour of his government and the reverence of distant nations, distinguish Charlemagne from the royal crowd, and Europe dates a new era from his restoration of the Western Empire.

XX—ARABIA BEFORE MAHOMET

AMONG the Greeks and Latins, Arabia was divided into the three divisions of the sandy, the stony, and the happy. Though these ancient divisions are no longer preserved, the kingdom of Yemen, displays the limits of Happy Arabia, and, situated on the highlands that border the Indian Ocean, seems to justify the designation from its possession of a superior plenty of wood, water, fruits and animals. Here were situated the most ancient and populous cities of Arabia, but their profane lustre was eclipsed by the prophetic glories of

Medina and Mecca, near the Red Sea and at a distance from each other of two hundred and seventy miles. Mecca, by means of the port of Jedda, forty miles distant, was the market for the treasures of Africa which the caravans carried to Yemen and Syria.

Many ages before Mahomet, the intrepid valour of the Arabs had been severely felt by their neighbours in offensive and defensive war. Skilled in the use of the bow, the javelin and the scimitar, the conflicting tribes of the desert suspended their domestic feuds on the approach of the common enemy; but this confederacy dissolved in the distribution of the plunder, and the union of the nation consisted only in a vague resemblance of language and manners.

The spirit of rapine and revenge which characterised the Arabian tribes, or Saracens, to give them the general appellation employed by the Greeks and Latins, was tempered by the milder influence of trade and literature. In Arabia, as well as in Greece, the perfection of language outstripped the refinement of manners, and at a time when her language was entrusted simply to the memory of an illiterate people, her speech could diversify the five hundred names of a lion and the thousand of a sword.

The religion of the Saracens consisted in the worship of the sun, the moon and the fixed stars, but each tribe, each family, each independent warrior created and changed the rites and the object of his fantastic worship. They united, however, in common worship at the Ka'aba, or temple, of Mecca, and in the last months of each year the city and the temple were crowded with pilgrims, who presented their vows and offerings in the House of God.

The same rites which are now accomplished by the faithful Mussulman were then invented and practised by the superstitions of the idolaters. At an awful distance they cast away their garments; seven times with hasty steps they encircled the Ka'aba and kissed the black stone; seven times they visted and adored the adjacent mountain; seven times they threw stones into the valley of Mina; and the pilgrimage was achieved as at the present hour by a sacrifice of sheep and camels, and the burial of their hair and nails in consecrated ground.

The introduction of the Sabians, the Magians, the Jews and the Christians, served to confuse the religious worship of the tribes. Each Arab was free to elect or to compose his own private religion, and the rude superstition of his house was mingled with the sublime theology of saints and philosophers. Despite their practice of idolatry they consented to the belief in the existence of one supreme God, and accepted the Hebrew scriptures which had already been translated into Arabic.

XXI—THE PROPHET ARISES

By fraud or force the tribe of Koreish had acquired the custody of the Ka'aba, and the family of the Hashemites, belonging to that tribe, possessed by inheritance the sacerdotal office. Of this family, the most sacred and the most respectable in the eyes of their country, Mahomet was born (569).

His grandfather had rescued Mecca from the yoke of the Abyssinians, and had died leaving behind him six daughters and thirteen sons. Of these, Abdullah was the father of the prophet. Of his uncles, Abu Talib, the father of Ali, was the most celebrated, and acted as Mahomet's guide and guardian in his early youth when the prophet was bereft of his parents.

In his twenty-fifth year he entered into the service of Kadijah, a rich and noble widow of Mecca, who soon rewarded his fidelity with the gift of her hand and fortune. This judicious matron was content with her husband's domestic virtues, until in his fortieth year he assumed the title of a prophet and proclaimed the religion of the Koran.

According to the tradition of his companions Mahomet was distinguished by the beauty of his person; an outward gift which is seldom despised except by those to whom it has been refused. His memory was capacious and retentive, his wit easy and social, his imagination sublime, his judgement clear, rapid and decisive. But with these powers, Mahomet was an illiterate barbarian; yet, though never instructed in the arts of reading and writing, the book of nature and of man was open to his view, and while discountenancing the legend of his travels, we may suppose that among the throng of pilgrims that came yearly to Mecca, and in his association with the Jews and Christians who frequented the city of his birth, he gathered the material which enabled him to formulate and establish a new faith.

That faith, under the name of Islam, is compounded of an eternal truth, and necessary fiction, that there is only one God, and that Mahomet is the apostle of God.

The creed of Mahomet is free from the suspicion of polytheism, which was characteristic alike of paganism and the Christianity of the seventh century, and the Koran is a glorious testimony to the unity of God. All through the universe Mahomet's rational enthusiasm confessed and adored an infinite and eternal Being without form or place, present to our most secret thoughts, existing by the necessity of his own nature, and deriving from himself all moral and intellectual perfection.

While rejecting idolatry, Mahomet recognized the claim of all the Jewish patriarchs and prophets from Adam to Jesus. To the Founder of the Christian faith in particular, Mahomet taught his disciples a high and mysterious reverence. The wonders of the genuine and apocryphal gospels are profusely heaped on his head, and the Latin Church did not disdain to borrow from the Koran the immaculate conception of his mother. The piety of Moses and of Christ rejoiced in the assurance of a future prophet more illustrious than themselves; the evangelic promise of the Paraclete, or Holy Ghost, was prefigured in the name and accomplished in the person of Mahomet.

The Koran was delivered to Mahomet by the angel Gabriel, and was made known to the faithful in fragments, at the discretion of the prophet. These were taken down by his disciples on palm leaves and the shoulder-bones of mutton, and two years after his death were collected and published by his friend and successor, Abu Bekr. God alone could dictate this incomparable performance, but by the European the endless incoherent rhapsody of fable, precept and declamation will be read with

impatience. The loftiest strains of the Koran must yield to the sublime simplicity of the Book of Job, composed in a remote age, in the same country, and in the same language.

The precepts of Mahomet inculcate a simple and rational piety. Five prayers a day, frequent illustrations, certain seasons of fasting and alms, are the religious duties of a Mussulman, who is encouraged to hope that prayer will carry him half-way to God, fasting will bring him to the doorway of His palace, and alms will gain him admittance.

The interdiction of wine, peculiar to some orders of priests or hermits, is converged by Mahomet alone into a positive and general law. The charity of the Mahomedans descends to the animal creation; and the Koran repeatedly inculcates, not as a merit, but as a strict and indispensable duty, the relief of the indigent, and unfortunate. The day of judgement, and the slow distribution of rewards and punishments, copied from the Magian theology, fostered the faith of the disciples. The term of expiation in hell varies from 900 to 7,000 years; but the prophet has judiciously promised that all his disciples, whatever may be their sins, shall be saved, by their own faith and his intercession, from eternal damnation.

The abode of the blest, as imagined by Mahomet, was a paradise of the senses. Seventy-two *houris*, or black-eyed girls, of resplendent beauty, blooming youth, virgin purity and exquisite sensibility, will be created for the use of the meanest believer. The gates of Heaven will be open to both sexes, but Mahomet has not specified the male companion of the female elect, lest he should either alarm the jealousy of their former husbands, or disturb their felicity by the suspicion of an everlasting marriage. This image of a carnal paradise has provoked the indignation of the monks; they declaim against the impure religion of Mahomet, and his modest apologists are driven to the pure excuse of allegories.

XXII—CONVERSION BY WORD AND THE SWORD

THREE years were silently employed by Mahomet in the conversion of fourteen proselytes, among the most notable of whom was Ali, the son of his uncle Abu Talib. In the fourth year he boldly assumed the prophetic office, to show the light of divine truth to his family, and at the end of ten years had gathered together some hundred proselytes, including his uncle Hamza and the fierce and inflexible Omar. But his uncle Abu Talib, while protecting his nephew from the anger of the Koreish, who had long been jealous of the pre-eminence of the family of Hashem, refused to accept his gospel. His worship was interdicted, and the death of Abu Talib seemed to deliver his person to the justice of the gods and the unrelenting animosity of his enemies. His death was resolved, but an angel revealed the conspiracy, and in 622 Mahomet fled from Mecca to Medina.

This flight has fixed the memorable era of the Hegira, which, at the end of twelve centuries, still discriminates the lunar years of the Mahomedan nation. In this sanctuary his sect had been already widely propagated, and Mahomet was received as a prince and assumed the exercise of the regal and sacerdotal office.

The revelations of Mahomet now assumed a fiercer and more sanguinary tone; he now bade the faithful propagate his religion by the sword, and the success of his martial enterprises, the abundance of the spoil, the division of which was regulated by divine law, and the promise of paradise, allured roving Arabs to the standard of religion and plunder.

In the battles of Beder (623) and Chud (625), the prophet maintained his reputation against the hostile forces of the Koreish. The submission of the Jews (623–627) and the Arabian tribes (629) placed in his hands the two potent weapons of wealth and force, and in January 630 he entered Mecca, destroyed the idols of the Ka'aba and secured the profession of Islam by the people of the Holy City. The cause of paganism was destroyed in the valley of Honain in February of the same year, and by 632 his lieutenants on the shores of the Red Sea were saluted by the acclamations of a faithful people.

Mahomet first came into conflict with the Eastern Empire in 629. A raid into Palestine was opposed by the forces of the Emperor Heraclius, and in the doubtful contest that ensued the faithful Zeid was killed and Calid, for his heroic conduct, received the glorious appellation of the 'Sword of God.' A solemn declaration of war against the Romans followed, but prudence influenced the conduct of Mahomet, and ten days' journey from Medina and Damascus he halted, and declared himself satisfied with the peaceful profession of the emperor of the East.

At the age of sixty-three, in June 632, Mahomet passed away. He had expected the moment of dissolution with fortitude; his head was reclined on the lap of Ayesha, the best beloved of all his wives; he fainted with the violence of pain; recovering his spirits he raised his eyes towards the roof of the house and with a steady look, though a faltering voice, uttered the last broken, though articulate words, 'O God! . . pardon my sins. . . . Yes. . . . I come. . . among my fellow-citizens on high,' and thus expired on a carpet spread upon the floor.

XXIII—CONQUESTS OF MAHOMET'S SUCCESSORS

DESPITE the large indulgence of polygamy, Mahomet left but one daughter behind him, and the union of Ali, the head of the family of Hashem in his own right, with Fatima, seemed to mark him as the heir of the prophet. But the necessity of placating the rival factions of the Koreish gave the supreme power in succession into the hands of Abu Bekr, 632, of Omar, 634, and Othman, 644, and it was not until the death of Othman, in 655, that Ali ascended the throne. He succumbed to the stroke of an assassin in 661, and Moawiyah, the son of Abu-Sophian, the most obstinate of the prophet's enemies, reigned in his stead.

The discords resulting from the successions to the throne of Mecca have led to a bitter sectarian feud, which is still maintained in the immortal hatred of the Persians and Turks. The former, under the appellation of Shiites, maintained that Ali was the vicar of God and also that the first three successors to the prophet were usurpers.

The Sunnites, who belong to the orthodox party, respect alike the memory of the four caliphs, but assign the last and most humble place to the husband of Fatima, in the persuasion that the order of succession is definitely determined by the degrees of sanctity.

Of the sons of Ali, Hassan spent the remainder of his life in a humble cell near the tomb of his grandfather, and Hosein died a martyr at the hands of his enemies. The Shiites proclaim the glory of the twelve imams, or pontiffs, who include Ali, Hassan, Hosein, and the lineal descendants of Hosein to the twelfth generation. The last of the imams, conspicuous by the title of Mahdi, or the guide, concealed himself in a cavern near Bagdad; the time and place of his death are unknown and his votaries pretend that he still lives, and will appear before the day of judgement to overthrow the tyranny of Dejal, or the anti-Christ.

One hundred years after Mahomet's flight from Mecca, the reign of his successors extended from India to the Atlantic Ocean. Persia was invaded in 632, and by 651 its conquest was completed and the last Magian sovereign, Yezeegerd, after obtaining the assistance of the Emperor of China, who gave him an army of Turks with which to recover the inheritance of his father, was oppressed, defeated and eventually slaughtered by his barbarian allies (651). The Turks were driven back across the Oxus, and it was not until some sixty years later that Transoxiana was added to the Mahomedan world.

The conquest of Syria occupied some twenty-three years, from 632 to 655. The degenerate Romans struggled in vain against the Mahomedans, and a religion of peace was incapable of withstanding the frantic cry of 'Fight! Fight! Paradise! Paradise!' that re-echoed through the ranks of the Saracens. Damascus was besieged in 633. The army of the Emperor Heraclius, proceeding to the succour of the city, was defeated at Aiznadin on July 13, 633, and Damascus capitulated in the following year.

The citizens, who were allowed to depart in peace, were pursued by Calid, and the 'Sword of God' enjoyed the satisfaction of believing that not a Christian of either sex escaped the edge of his scimitars. Emesa was taken in 636. A Roman army was utterly defeated in the same year at Yermak. Aleppo and Antioch fell, and Heraclius, Emperor of the East, after bidding an eternal farewell to Syria, fled secretly to the safety of Constantinople. Jerusalem capitulated to Omar in 637, and by the year 655 Syria acknowledged the Moslem rule, supported the house of Ommiad, and her revenue, her soldiers and her ships were consecrated to enlarge on every side the empire of the caliphs.

Egypt was conquered by Amrou, who in his youth had been one of the most bitter opponents of Mahomet, but had achieved his assurance of Paradise by his sudden and secret acceptance of the true faith. After completing the conquest of Palestine, he had, in June 638, invaded Egypt with 4,000 Saracens, conquered Memphis, near the ruins of which Cairo, the town of victory, now stands, was eagerly welcomed by the Copts, or Jacobites, who secured as the price of their submission the practice of their religion, and a triumph over the Greek Church. In 641 he conquered Alexandria.

Under the brilliant administration of Amrou, peace and order were established in Egypt; a canal, at least eighty miles in length, was opened from the Nile to the Red Sea; and Arabia was supplied with a plenty of corn and provision from the fruitful valley of the Nile.

Africa was first invaded by Abdullah in 647, but its conquest was not completed until the year 709. After the conquest of Tripoli and the neighbouring country, the progress of the Saracens was suspended nearly twenty years. The heavy taxes imposed by the emperor on the patriarch of Carthage urged the oppressed citizens of Africa to seek the assistance of Moawiyah. Akbah advanced through the interior regions of North Africa, and, traversing the wilderness, in which his successors erected the splendid capitals of Fez and Morocco, was checked only by the waves of the Atlantic.

NINE years after the death of Akbah, the towns of the sea-coasts which still remained in the hands of the Greeks were assaulted. Carthage, after two battles with the allied forces of the Greeks and the Goths, fell in 698, and, with the final adoption of the Moslem faith by the Moors, the conquest of Africa was completed.

The treason of Count Julian, the general of the Goths, who had established their kingdom in Spain, introduced the arms of Mahomedans into Europe. Revenge for domestic wrong caused him to offer secretly his assistance to Musa, the Saracen leader. After a preliminary and successful attempt at invasion, the Saracens landed at Gibraltar, April 711, under the leadership of Tarik. The defection of Count Julian gained him a crushing victory at Xeres. A rapid march secured him Toledo, and his merciful justice towards the Christians, and his grateful attitude towards the Jews, who had secretly served his cause, enabled him to win without a blow city after city in the modern realms of Castile and Leon.

With the speed of a traveller he performed his victorious march of 700 miles from the Rock of Gibraltar to the Bay of Biscay. For his presumption in subduing a kingdom in the absence of his general, he was recalled by Musa and ignominiously scourged. Musa himself, after completing the conquest of Spain, and extracting a treaty from Theodemir, king of the Goths, was recalled from the prospective conquest of Gaul by the messenger of the caliph, and at Mecca he was convicted of vanity and falsehood and fined a sum that reduced him to poverty. He expired of the anguish of a broken heart, while Tarik, more favourably treated, was permitted to mingle with the crowd of slaves.

XXIV—DECLINE OF THE ARABIAN EMPIRE

FORTY-SIX years after the flight of Mahomet from Mecca, his disciples appeared in arms under the walls of Constantinople. For seven years (668–675) the forces of the Caliph Moawiyah attempted by siege and by assault to take the capital of the empire; but though the courage and vigilance of the reigning emperor, who disgraced the name of Constantine, held out little hope to his subjects, the solid and lofty walls, the enthusiasm of religion, the fear of

falling into the hands of the infidel, and the use of Greek fire, kept the city inviolate. The Saracens withdrew their forces and consented to pay a tribute to the Roman emperor (677).

During this first siege, Abu Ayub, one of the last of the companions of Mahomet, died, and was buried within the shadow of the city walls. During a period of 780 years till the conquest of Constantinople by Mohammed II, the place of his burial was neglected and unknown. A seasonable vision, however, revealed the holy spot at the foot of a wall; and the mosque of Ayub has been deservedly chosen for the symbol and martial inauguration of the Turkish sultans.

The second siege of Constantinople was attempted by the caliph Soliman (715). Again, after a siege of thirteen months, the same factors, together with the assistance of an army of Bulgarians, once more compelled the Moslems to retire in confusion.

The Greek fire, which was employed so successfully in the two sieges of Constantinople, was the invention of a native of Heliopolis, in Syria. One kind of this Greek, or marine, fire was undoubtedly gun-powder. Its manufacture was preserved by interest and superstition about 400 years by the Romans of the East. It was at length discovered, or stolen, by the Mahomedans, and, in the Holy Wars of Syria and Egypt, they retorted an invention contrived against themselves on the heads of the Christians.

Constantinople and the Greek fire might exclude the Arabs from the eastern entrance of Europe; but in the west, on the side of the Pyrenees, the provinces of Gaul were threatened and invaded by the conquerors of Spain (721). The weaknesses of the last of the Merovingian kings had almost dissolved the kingdom of the Franks. Gaul was divided among the tributary chiefs. This disunion seemed to favour the cause of the Moslems, and not even the heroic conduct of Eudes (Odo), Duke of Aquitaine, served to restrain the fortunes of the Saracens. After two attempts the south of France, from the mouth of the Garonne to that of the Rhône, assumed the manners and religion of Arabia. But these narrow limits were scorned by the spirit of Abderane. He besieged Arles, after crossing the Rhône, destroyed an army of Christians that attempted the relief of the city and, overrunning the provinces of Aquitaine and Burgundy, at length reached the banks of the Loire.

France and Christendom were saved by Charles, the illegitimate son of the elder Pepin, mayor, or duke, of the Franks. Carefully awaiting his opportunity, he met the enemy in the centre of France between Tours and Poitiers. The battle lasted seven days. Abderane was slain, the forces of the Saracens were dissolved by discord, and the morning of the eighth day saw the camp of the Moslems deserted. The victory of the Franks was complete, and the conquest of Gaul was never resumed by the Arabs. But for the victory at Tours, the Koran might now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.

A series of domestic disputes dissolved the union of the Mahomedan empire. The succession was disputed by three parties, distinguished by their dress. The Ommiades, who wore white, triumphed until 750, when the Abbassides, whose dress was black, and who supported the cause of the descendant of Abbas, the uncle of the prophet, mounted the throne. In the proscription of the Ommiades that followed, one of the royal family escaped, usurped the throne of Spain, and established at Cordova (756) a monarchical system which remained to his descendants for 250 years. His example was followed by the Fatimites of Egypt, who wore green, and supported the cause of the real, or pretended, descendant of Fatima.

The Abbassides maintained with Oriental magnificence their seat at Bagdad, which had been built on the eastern bank of the Tigris by Al Mansur. In the West the Ommiades of Spain supported with equal pomp the title of Commander of the Faithful. Their success, and the great increase of luxury consequent on that success, served to rob the Saracens of their martial ardour. They turned from war to the study of science and medicine and, though they scorned the wisdom of Greece and Rome, their discoveries in astronomy, anatomy, botany, chemistry and medicine were considerable. Universities were established at Bagdad and Cairo, and in Spain three hundred writers and seventy public libraries attested the progress of learning.

The wars of the romantic Haroun al Raschid against the Romans (781–805), the conquest and desolation of all the land from the Euxine to the island of Cyprus, the establishment of the Saracens in Sicily (878), and the invasion of Rome and the sack of St. Peter's (846), completed the success of the Mussulman arms before the decline of the Arabian Empire began. The introduction of Turkish mercenaries into Bagdad to support the throne of the Abbassides led to an outbreak of military licence (841–870). The Turks made and unmade caliphs, and domestic peace was only obtained by the dispersion of this force and the relaxation of strength and discipline. So uniform are the mischiefs of military discipline, that I seem to repeat the story of the Praetorians of Rome.

The establishment of nine separate independent dynasties within the empire hastened its downfall, and by the middle of the tenth century the caliphs of Bagdad were reduced by the internecine strife of their military guards to the primitive simplicity of the founder of their faith. Despoiled of their armour and their silken robes, they fasted, they prayed, and studied the Koran and the tradition of the Sunnites, bore with religious fortitude the triumphs of the insolent Fatimites, and witnessed the recovery of Antioch, the cities of Cilicia, and Cyprus by the Greeks, and a revival of the Roman fortunes.

XXV—BIRTH AND SWAY OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

The Western Empire, or Holy Roman Empire, as it has been called, which was re-established by Charlemagne (and lasted in shadow until the abdication of Francis II under the pressure of Napoleon in 1806), was not unworthy of its title. Between east and west the empire of the Franks extended from the Ebro to the Elbe or Vistula; between the north and south,

from the duchy of Beneventum to the River Eyder.

The personal and political importance of Charlemagne was magnified by the distress and division of the rest of Europe. The Greek emperor was addressed by him as brother instead of father; and as long as the imperial dignity of the West was usurped by a hero who united in his person both virtue and power, the Greeks respectfully saluted the *august* Charlemagne with the acclamations of 'Basileus' and 'Emperor of the Romans'; but as soon as these qualities were separated in the person of his son, Lewis the Pious (814–840), the Byzantine letters were inscribed 'To the King,' or, as he styles himself, the Emperor, 'of the Franks and Lombards.' When both power and virtue were extinct, they despoiled Lewis II of his hereditary title, and with the barbarous appellation of *Rex* degraded him amongst the crowd of Latin princes. The Greeks affected to despise the poverty and ignorance of the Western emperors, and in their last decline refused to prostitute to the kings of Germany the title of Roman Emperors.

The imperial title of the West remained in the family of Charlemagne until the deposition of Charles the Fat in 884. His insanity dissolved the empire into factions, and it was not until Otho, king of Germany, laid claim to the title, with fire and sword, that the Western Empire was restored (962). His conquest of Italy and delivery of the pope for ever fixed the imperial crown in the name and nation of Germany.

From that memorable era two maxims of public jurisprudence were introduced by force and ratified by time: (1) That the prince who was elected in the German Diet acquired from that instant the subject kingdoms of Italy and Rome; (2) but that he might not legally assume the titles of Emperor and Augustus till he had received the crown from the Roman pontiff.

The nominal power of the Western emperors was considerable. No pontiff could be legally consecrated till the emperor, the advocate of the Church, had graciously signified his approbation and consent. Gregory VII, in 1073, usurped this power, and fixed for ever in the college of cardinals the freedom and independence of election. Nominally, also, the emperors held sway in Rome, but this supremacy was annihilated in the thirteenth century. In the fourteenth century the power derived from his title was still recognised in Europe; the hereditary monarchs confessed the pre-eminence of his rank and dignity; he was the first of the Christian princes, the temporal head of the great republic of the West; to his person the title of 'Majesty' was long appropriated; and he disputed with the pope the sublime prerogative of creating kings and assembling councils.

The schools declared of Charles IV that he was the rightful sovereign of the earth from the rising to the setting sun. The subjects of the Eastern Empire were contemptuously referred to as Greeks, but this appellation was indignantly rejected by the prince and people to whom it was applied. Whatsoever changes had been introduced by the lapse of ages, they alleged a lineal and unbroken succession from Augustus and Constantine; and in the lowest period of degeneracy and decay the name of Roman adhered to the last fragments of the empire of Constantinople.

The persecution of images and their votaries in the East had separated Rome and Italy from the Byzantine throne, and prepared the way for the conquests of the Franks. The rise and triumph of the Mahomedans still further diminished the empire of the East. The successful inroads of the Bulgarians, Hungarians and Russians, who assaulted by sea or by land the provinces and the capital, seemed to advance the approach of its final dissolution. The Norman adventurers who founded a powerful kingdom in Apulia and Sicily, shook the throne of Constantinople (1146), and their hostile enterprises did not cease until the year 1185.

XXVI—LATIN RULERS OF CONSTANTINOPLE

Under the name of the Latins, the subjects of the pope, the nations of the West, enlisted under the banner of the Cross for the recovery or the release of the Holy Sepulchre. The Greek emperors were terrified and preserved by the myriads of pilgrims who marched to Jerusalem with Godfrey of Bouillon (1095–99) and the peers of Christendom. The second (1147) and third (1189) crusades trod in the footsteps of the first. Asia and Europe were mingled in a sacred war of two hundred years; and the Christian powers were bravely resisted and finally expelled (1191) by Saladin (1171–93) and the Mamelukes of Egypt.

In these memorable crusades a fleet and army of French and Venetians were diverted from Syria to the Thracian Bosporus; they assaulted the capital (1203), they subverted the Greek monarchy; and a dynasty of Latin princes was seated near three score years on the throne of Constantine.

During this period of captivity and exile, which lasted from 1204 to 1261, the purple was preserved by a succession of four monarchs, who maintained their title as the heirs of Augustus, though outcasts from their capital. The *de facto* sovereigns of Constantinople during this period, the Latin emperors of the houses of Flanders and Courtenay, provided five sovereigns for the usurped throne. By an agreement between the allied conquerors, the emperor of the East was nominated by the vote of twelve electors, chosen equally from the French and Venetians. To him, with all the titles and prerogatives of the Byzantine throne, a fourth part of the Greek monarchy was assigned; the remaining portions were equally shared between the republic of Venice and the barons of France.

Under this agreement, Baldwin, Count of Flanders and Hainault, was created emperor (1204–05). The idea of the Roman system, which, despite the passage of centuries devoted to the triumphs of the barbarians, had impressed itself on Europe, was seen in the emperor's letter to the Roman pontiff, in which he congratulated him on the restoration of his authority in the East.

The defeat and captivity of Baldwin in a war against the Bulgarians, and his subsequent death, placed the crown on the head of his brother Henry (1205–16). With him the imperial house of Flanders became extinct and Peter of Courtenay, Count of Auxerre (1217–19), assumed

the empire of the East. Peter was taken captive by Theodore, the legitimate sovereign of Constantinople, and his sons Robert (1221–28) and Baldwin II (1228–37) reigned in succession. The gradual recovery of their empire by the legitimate sovereigns of the East culminated in the capture of Constantinople by the Greeks (1261). The line of Latin sovereigns was extinct. Baldwin lived the remainder of his life a royal fugitive, soliciting the Catholic powers to join in his restoration. He died in 1272.

The family of Courtenay, who for long laid claim to the sonorous title of Emperor of the East, survived in Edessa, France and England. The Earls of Devonshire could claim a right to the imperial crown. They still retain the plaintive motto (*Ubi lapsus! Quid feci?*) which asserts the innocence and deplores the fall of their ancient house. While they sigh for past greatness, they are doubtless sensible of present blessings; in the long series of the Courtenay annals the most splendid era is likewise the most unfortunate; nor can an opulent peer of Britain envy the emperors of Constantinople, who wandered over Europe to solicit alms for the support of their dignity and the defence of their capital.

From the days of the Emperor Heraclius the Byzantine Empire had been most tranquil and prosperous when it could acquiesce in hereditary succession. Five dynasties—the Heraclian, Isaurian, Amorian, Basilian, and Comnenian families—enjoyed and transmitted the royal patrimony during their respective series of five, four, three, six and four generations.

In the intervals of these dynasties the succession is rapid and broken, and the name of a successful candidate is speedily erased by a more fortunate competitor; but the imperial house of Comnenius, though its direct line in male descent had expired with Andronicus I (1185) had been perpetuated by marriage in the female line, and had survived the exile from Constantinople, in the persons of the descendants of Theodore Lascaris.

Michael Palaeologus, who, through his mother, might claim perhaps a prior right to the throne of the Comnenii, usurped the imperial dignity on the recovery of Constantinople, cruelly blinded the young Emperor John, the legitimate heir of Theodore Lascaris, and reigned until 1282. His career of authority was notable for an attempt to unite the Greek and Roman churches —a union which was dissolved in 1283—and his instigation of the revolt in Sicily, which ended in the famous Sicilian Vespers (March 30, 1282), when 8,000 French were massacred.

By the arts of his diplomacy he saved his empire by involving the kingdoms of the West in rebellion and blood. From these seeds of discord uprose a generation of iron men, who assaulted and endangered the empire of his son, Andronicus the Elder (1282–1332). Thousands of Genoese and Catalans, released from the wars that Michael had aroused in the West, took service under his successor against the Turks. Other mercenaries flocked to their standard, and, under the name of the Great Company, they subverted the authority of the emperor, defeated his troops, laid waste his territory, united themselves with his enemies, and, finally, abandoning the banks of the Hellespont, marched into Greece. Here they overthrew the remnant of the Latin power, and for fourteen years (1311–26) the Great Company was the terror of the Grecian states.

Their factions drove them to acknowledge the sovereignty of the house of Arragon; and, during the remainder of the fourteenth century, Athens as a government or an appanage was successfully bestowed by the kings of Sicily. Conquered in turn by the French and Catalans, Athens at length became the capital of a state that extended over Thebes, Argos, Corinth, Delphi, and part of Thessaly, and was ruled by the family of Accaioli, plebeians of Florence (1384–1456). The last duke of this dynasty was strangled by Mahomed II, who educated his sons in the discipline of the seraglio.

The long reign of Andronicus the Elder ended in his abdication (May 24, 1328) after three civil wars with his son, the younger Andronicus, whom he had associated with him in the purple. In 1341 Andronicus the Younger died. The minority of his son, John Palaeologus, enabled the regent Cantacuzene to receive the imperial power. Voluntarily, or perhaps under the pressure of circumstances, Cantacuzene abdicated in 1355, and lived in retreat during a portion of the long reign of the emperor.

It was during the reign of John Palaeologus that the Eastern Empire was nearly subverted by the Genoese. On the return of the legitimate sovereign to Constantinople, the Genoese, who had established their factories and industries in the suburb of Galata, or Pera, were allowed to remain. They had received this honourable fief from the bounty of the emperor, and were indulged in the use of their laws.

In consideration of these benefits the republic of Genoa sealed a firm alliance with the Greeks, guaranteeing them the support of a prescribed naval armament in the event of war. During the civil wars the Genoese forces took advantage of the disunion of the Greeks, and by the skilful use of their power exacted a treaty by which they were granted a monopoly of trade and almost a right of dominion.

The Roman Empire (I smile in transcribing the name) might soon have sunk into a province of Genoa if the ambition of the republic had not been checked by the ruin of her freedom and naval power. Yet the spirit of commerce survived that of conquest; and the colony of Pera still awed the capital and navigated the Euxine till it was involved by the Turks in the final servitude of Constantinople itself.

XXVII—END OF THE ROMAN WORLD

Only three more sovereigns ruled the remnants of the Roman world after the reign of John Palaeologus, but the final downfall of the empire was delayed above fifty years by a series of events that had sapped the strength of the Mahomedan empire. The rise and triumph of the Moguls and Tartars under their emperors, descendants of Jenghiz Khan, had shaken the globe from China to Poland and Greece (1206–1304). The sultans were overthrown, and in the general disorder of the Mahomedan world a veteran and adventurous army, which included many Turcoman hordes, was dissolved into factions who, under various chiefs, lived a life of

rapine and plunder. Some of these served Aladin (1219–36), sultan of Iconium, and among these the fathers of the Ottoman line.

The force or horde, that Orthogrul ruled as the soldier and servant of Aladin recognized on his death the authority of his son Othman (1299–1326). Leading his forces through the passes of Mount Olympus, Othman invaded Bithynia and entered the territory of Nicomedia. In a long series of campaigns against the Christians, his hereditary troops were multiplied by the accession of captives and volunteers. Establishing himself, Othman maintained his position against the Greeks. In the last year of his reign he received the welcome news of the conquest of Prusa by his son Orchan. From the conquest of that town we may date the true era of the Ottoman Empire.

ORCHAN ruled from 1326 to 1360, achieved the conquest of Bithynia, and first led the Turks into Europe, and in 1353 established himself in the Chersonesus and occupied Gallipoli, the key of the Hellespont. Orchan was succeeded by Amurath I (1360–89), who in his turn gave way to Bajazet I (1389–1403). Bajazet carried his victorious arms from the Danube to the Euphrates, and the Roman world became contracted to a corner of Thrace, between the Propontis and the Black Sea, about fifty miles in length and thirty in breadth, a space of ground not more extensive than the lesser principalities of Germany or Italy, if the remains of Constantinople had not still represented the wealth and populousness of a kingdom.

Under Manuel (1391–1425), the son and successor of John Palaeologus, Constantinople would have fallen before the might of the Sultan Bajazet had not the Turkish Empire been oppressed by the revival of the Mogul power under the victorious Timour, or Tamerlane. After achieving a conquest of Persia (1380–93), of Tartary (1370–83), and Hindustan (1398–99), Timour, who aspired to the monarchy of the world, found himself at length face to face with the Sultan Bajazet. Bajazet was taken prisoner in the war that followed. Kept, probably only as a precaution, in an iron cage, Bajazet attended the marches of his conqueror, and died on March 9, 1403. Two years later, Timour also passed away on the road to China. Since the reign of his descendant Aurungzebe, his empire has been dissolved (1659–1707); the treasures of Delhi have been rifled by a Persian robber; and the riches of their kingdom are now possessed by the Christians of a remote island in the northern ocean.

Far different was the fate of the Ottoman monarchy. The massy trunk was bent to the ground, but it again rose with fresh vigour and more lively vegetation. After a period of civil war between the sons of Bajazet (1403-21), the Ottoman Empire was once more firmly established by his grandson, Amurath II (1421-51).

One of the first expeditions undertaken by the new sultan was the siege of Constantinople (1422), but the fortune rather than the genius of the Emperor Manuel prevented the attempt. Amurath was recalled to Asia by a domestic revolt, and the siege was raised.

WHILE the sultan led his Janissaries to new conquests, the Byzantine Empire was indulged in a servile and precarious respite of thirty years. Manuel sank into the grave, and John Palaeologus II (1425-48) was permitted to reign for an annual tribute of 300,000 aspers and the dereliction of almost all that he held beyond the suburbs of Constantinople.

Reduced now to the limits of distress, the Roman emperors sought the assistance of the Western powers. Manuel had visited most of the European countries in the hope of raising a crusade against the Turks. His successor, under the pretence of re-uniting the churches of East and West, imitated his methods. A pompous embassy accompanied him to Rome, and at the Council of Florence the union was accomplished, and the final peace of the church established in 1449.

ONE of the fruits of this imperial mission was the march of Ladislaus, king of Poland and Hungary, at the instigation of Pope Eugenius, against the Turks (1443). In two battles he overcame the forces of the sultan, and compelled him to restore Serbia and evacuate the Hungarian frontier. A truce of ten years, which was agreed upon by treaty, was broken in 1444, and Ladislaus met his death on the field of Warna (Nov. 10, 1444).

BY the generous command of the sultan a column was raised on the spot where he fell, recording the valour and bewailing the misfortunes of the Hungarian hero.

On November 1, 1448, Constantine, the last of the Roman emperors, assumed the purple of the Caesars. For three years he indulged himself in various private and public designs, the completion of which was interrupted by a Turkish war, and finally buried in the ruins of the empire.

XXVIII—THE GREAT SIEGE OF CONSTANTINOPLE

MAHOMED II succeeded his father Amurath on February 9, 1451. His hostile designs against the capital were immediately seen in the building of a fortress on the Bosporus, which commanded the source whence the city drew her supplies. In the following year a quarrel between some Greeks and Turks gave him the excuse of declaring war. His cannon—for the use of gunpowder, for some time the monopoly of the Christian world, had been betrayed to Amurath by the Genoese—commanded the port, and a tribute was exacted from all ships that entered the harbour. But the actual siege was delayed until the ensuing spring of 1453.

Mahomed, in person, surveyed the city, encouraged his soldiers and discussed with his generals and engineers the best means of making the assault. By his orders a huge cannon was built in Hadrianople. It fired a ball one mile, and to convey it to its position before the walls, a team of sixty oxen and the assistance of 200 men were employed. The Emperor Constantine, unable to excite the sympathy of Europe, attempted the best defence of which he was capable, with a force of 4,970 Romans and 2,000 Genoese. A chain was drawn across the mouth of the harbour, and whatever supplies arrived from Candia and the Black Sea were detained for the public service.

The siege of Constantinople, in which scarcely 7,000 soldiers had to defend a city sixteen miles in extent against the powers of the Ottoman Empire, commenced on April 6, 1453. The last Constantine deserves the name of a hero; his noble band of volunteers was inspired with Roman virtue, and the foreign auxiliaries supported the honour of the Western chivalry. But their inadequate stock of gunpowder was wasted in the operations of each day. Their ordnance was not powerful either in size or number; and if they possessed some heavy cannon, they feared to plant them on the walls, lest the aged structure should be shaken and overthrown by the explosion.

The great cannon of Mahomed could only be fired seven times in one day, but the weight and repetition of the shots made some impression on the walls. The Turks rushed to the edge of the ditch and attempted to fill the enormous chasm and to build a road to the assault. In the attack, as well as in the defence, ancient and modern artillery was employed. Cannon and mechanical engines, the bullet and the battering-ram, gunpowder and Greek fire, were engaged on both sides.

Christendom watched the struggle with coldness and apathy. Four ships, which successfully forced an entrance into the harbour, were the limit of their assistance. None the less, Mahomed meditated a retreat. Unless the city could be attacked from the harbour, its reduction appeared to be hopeless.

In this perplexity the genius of Mahomed executed a plan of a bold and marvellous cast. He transported his fleet over land for ten miles. In the course of one night four-score light galleys and brigantines painfully climbed the hill, steered over the plain, and were launched from the declivity into the shallow waters of the harbour, far above the molestation of the deeper vessels of the Greeks. A bridge, or mole, hastily built formed a base for one of his largest cannon. The galleys, with troops and scaling ladders, approached the most accessible side of the walls, and, after a siege of forty days, the diminutive garrison, exhausted by a double attack, could hope no longer to avert the fate of the capital.

On Monday, May 28, preparations were made for the final assault. Mahomed had inspired his soldiers with the hope of rewards in this world and the next. His camp re-echoed with the shouts of 'God is God; there is but one God, and Mahomet is the apostle of God'; and the sea and land, from Galata to the Seven Towers, were illuminated with the blaze of the Moslem fires.

FAR different was the state of the Christians. On that last night of the Roman Empire, Constantine Palaeologus, in his palace, addressed the noblest of the Greeks and the bravest of the allies on the duties and dangers that lay before them. It was the funeral oration of the Roman Empire. That same night the emperor and some faithful companions entered the Dome of St. Sofia, which, within a few hours, was to be converted into a mosque, and devoutly received, with tears and prayers, the sacrament of the Holy Communion. He reposed some moments in the palace, which resounded with cries and lamentations, solicited the pardon of all whom he might have injured, and mounted on horse-back to visit the guards and explore the motions of the enemy. The distress and fall of the last Constantine are more glorious than the long prosperity of the Byzantine Caesars.

AT daybreak on May 29 the Turks assaulted the city by sea and land. For two hours the Greeks sustained the assault with advantage, and the voice of the emperor was heard encouraging the soldiers to achieve by a last effort the deliverance of their country. The new and fresh forces of the Turks supplied the places of their wearied associates. From all sides the attack was pressed.

The number of the Ottomans was fifty, perhaps one hundred, times superior to that of the Christians, the double walls were reduced by the cannons to a heap of ruins, and at last one point was found which the besiegers could penetrate. Hassan, the Janissary, of gigantic stature and strength, ascended the outward fortification. The walls and towers were instantly covered with a swarm of Turks, and the Greeks, now driven from the vantage ground, were overwhelmed by increasing multitudes.

Amidst these multitudes, the emperor, who accomplished all the duties of a general and a soldier, was long seen and finally lost. His mournful exclamation was heard, 'Cannot there be found a Christian to cut off my head?' And his last fear was that of falling alive into the hands of the infidels. The prudent despair of Constantine cast away the purple. Amidst the tumult he fell by an unknown hand, and his body was buried under a mountain of the slain.

After his death, resistance and order were no more. Two thousand Greeks were put to the sword, and more would have perished had not avarice soon prevailed over cruelty.

It was thus, after a siege of fifty-three days, that Constantinople, which had defied the power of Chosroes and the caliphs, was irretrievably subdued by the arms of Mahomed II. Sixty thousand Greeks were driven through the streets like cattle and sold as slaves. The nuns were torn from the monasteries and compelled to enter the harems of their conquerors. The churches were plundered, and the gold and silver, the pearls and jewels, the vases and sacerdotal ornaments of St. Sofia were most wickedly converted to the service of mankind.

The cathedral itself, despoiled of its images and ornaments, was converted into a mosque and Mahomed II performed the *namaz* of prayer and thanksgiving at the great altar, where the Christian mysteries had so lately been celebrated before the last of the Caesars. The body of Constantine was discovered under a heap of slain, by the golden eagles embroidered on his shoes, and, after exposing the bloody trophy, Mahomed bestowed on his rival the honours of a decent funeral. Constantinople, desolated by bloodshed, was re-peopled and re-adorned by Mahomed. Its churches were shared between the two religions, and the Greeks were attracted back to their ancient capital by the assurance of their lives and the free exercise of their religion.

THE grief and terror of Europe when the fall of Constantinople became known revived, or seemed to revive, the old enthu-

siasm of the crusades. Pius II attempted to lead Christendom against the Turks, but on the very day on which he embarked his forces drew back, and he was compelled to abandon the attempt. The siege and sack of Otranto by the Turks put an end to all thoughts of a crusade, and the general consternation was only allayed by the death of Mahomed II in the fifty-first year of his age.

His lofty genius aspired to the conquest of Italy; he was possessed of a strong city and a capacious harbour, and the same reign might have been decorated with the trophies of the New and the Ancient Rome.

Europe in the Middle Ages

HENRY HALLAM

THE View of the State of Europe During the Middle Ages, commonly known as Hallam's Europe in the Middle Ages, was published by the author in 1818. It is a study of the period from the appearance of Clovis, the creator of the dominion of the Franks, to the close of the Middle Ages, the arbitrary dividing line being drawn at the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII of France. In this study is included that of the earlier Constitutional History of England, a subject which was further developed, as from the close of this period, in a later work.

I—FRANCE

THE Frankish dominion was established over the Roman province of Gaul by Clovis at the opening of the sixth century. The Merovingian dynasty degenerated rapidly and the power passed into the hands of the Mayors of the Palace—an office which became hereditary with Pepin Héristal and Charles Martel. With the sanction of the pope, the Merovingian king was deposed by Pepin, the son of Charles Martel, who was crowned king and overthrew the Lombard power in Italy.

Pepin was succeeded by Charlemagne, who completed the conquest of the Lombards, carried his arms into Spain as far as the Ebro and extended his power eastwards over the Saxon as far as the Elbe. In his person the Roman Empire was revived, and he was crowned Emperor at Rome on Christmas Day, A.D. 800. The great empire he had built up fell to pieces under his successors, who adopted the disastrous plan of partition amongst brothers.

France fell to the share of one branch of the Carlovingians. The Northmen were allowed to establish themselves in Normandy, and Germany was completely separated from France. The Carlovingians were replaced by Hugh Capet. The actual royal domain was small, and the kings of the house of Capet exercised little control over their great feudatories until the reign of Philip Augustus. That crafty monarch drew into his own hands the greater part of the immense territories held by the kings of England as French feudatories.

After a brief interval the craft of Philip Augustus was succeeded by the idealism of St. Louis, whose admirable character enabled him to achieve an extraordinary ascendancy over the imagination of his people. In spite of the disastrous failure of his crusading expeditions, the aggrandisement of the crown continued, especially under Philip the Fair; but the failure of direct heirs after the successive reigns of his three sons placed Philip of Valois on the throne, according to the Salic law of succession, in 1328.

On the pretext of claiming the succession for himself, Edward III began the great French war, which lasted, interrupted by only one regular pacification, for a hundred and twenty years. The brilliant personal qualities of Edward and the Black Prince, the great resources of England and the quality of the soldiery account for the British successes. After the peace of Bretigny, these triumphs were reversed, and the English lost their possessions; but when Charles VI ascended the throne disaster followed. France was rent by the rival factions of Burgundy and Orleans.

The troubled reigns of Richard II and Henry IV prevented England from taking advantage of these dissensions; but Henry V renewed the war, winning the battle of Agincourt in his first campaign and securing the Treaty of Troyes on his second invasion. After his death came that most marvellous revolution wrought by Joan of Arc, and the expulsion of the English from the country.

In France the effect of the war was to strengthen the crown as against the nobility, a process developed by the subtlety of Louis XI. Out of the long contest, in which the diplomatic skill of the king was pitted against the fiery ambitions of Charles of Burgundy, Louis extracted for himself sundry Burgundian provinces. The supremacy of the crown was secured in 1491, when his son, Charles VIII, acquired Brittany by marrying the Duchess Anne.

The essential distinction of ranks in France was found in the possession of land. Besides the national lands, there were lands reserved to the crown, which, under the name of benefices, were bestowed upon personal followers of the king, held more or less on military tenure; and the king's vassals in their turn acquired vassals for themselves by a similar process of sub-infeudation.

On the other hand, freeholders inclined, for the sake of protection, to 'commend themselves,' as the phrase was, to their stronger neighbours, and so to assume the relation of vassal to liege lord. The essential principle was a mutual contract of support and fidelity, confirmed by the ceremonies of homage, fealty and investiture; which conferred upon the lord the right of various reliefs, fines and rights capable of conversion into money payments.

Gentility, now hereditary, was derived from the tenure of land; the idea of it was empha-

sised by the adoption of surnames and armorial bearings. A close aristocracy was created, somewhat modified by the right claimed by the king of creating nobles. Below the gentle class were freemen, and the remainder of the population were serfs, or villeins. It was not impossible for villeins to purchase freedom.

Such legislation as there appears to have been was effected by the king, supported by a royal council, or a more general assembly of the barons. It was only by degrees that the royal ordinances came to be current in the fiefs of the greater vassals. It was Philip the Fair who introduced the general assembly of the three estates. This assembly very soon claimed the right of granting and refusing money as well as of bringing forward grievances. The kings of France, however, sought to avoid convocation of the states-general by obtaining grants from provincial assemblies of the three estates.

The old system of jurisdiction by elected officers was superseded by feudal jurisdiction, having three degrees of power and acting according to recognized local customs, varied by the right to ordeal by combat. The crown began to encroach on these feudal jurisdictions by the establishment of royal courts of appeal; but there also subsisted a supreme court of peers, to whom were added the king's household officers. The peers ceased by degrees to attend this court, while the crown multiplied the councillors of inferior rank, and this body became known as the Parliament of Paris—in effect an assembly of lawyers.

The decline of the feudal system was due mainly to the increasing power of the crown on the one hand and of the lower ranks on the other, more especially from the extension of the privileges of towns. But the feudal principle itself was weakened by the tendency to commute military service for money, enabling the crown to employ paid troops.

II—ITALY AND SPAIN

After the disruption of Charlemagne's empire, the imperial title was revived for the German Otto the Great of Saxony. His imperial supremacy was recognized in Italy, but though Italian unity had gone to pieces, his supremacy offended Italy. Still, from the time of Conrad of Franconia the election of the King of Germany was assumed, at least by him, to convey the sovereignty of Italy.

In the eleventh century Norman adventurers made themselves masters of Sicily and Southern Italy. In Northern Italy, on the other hand, the emperors favoured the development of free cities, owning only the imperial sovereignty and bending to self-government on republican lines.

The appearance on the scene in the twelfth century of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa introduced a period characterised by a threefold change—the victorious struggle of the northern cities for independence, the establishment of the temporal sovereignty of the papacy in the middle provinces, and the union of the kingdom of Naples to the dominions of the imperial house. The first quarrels with Milan led to the formation of the Lombard League and a long war, in which the battle of Legnano gave the confederates a decisive victory. The mutual rivalries of the states, however, prevented them from turning this to good account. Barbarossa's grandson, Frederick II, was a child of four when he succeeded to the Swabian inheritance and, through his mother, to that of Sicily.

It was now that the powerful Pope Innocent III so greatly extended the temporal power of the papacy, and that the rival parties of Guelfs and Ghibelins, adherents the one of the papacy, the other of the empire, were established as factions in practically every Italian city. When the young Frederick grew up he was drawn into a long struggle with the papacy, which ended in the overthrow of the imperial authority.

From this time the quarrels of Guelfs and Ghibelins for the most part became mere family feuds resting on no principles. Charles of Anjou was adopted as papal champion; the republics of the north were in effect controlled by despots for a brief moment. Rome revived her republicanism under the leadership of Rienzi. In the general chaos the principal interest attaches to the peculiar but highly complicated form of democracy developed in Florence, where the old patrician families were virtually disfranchised. Wild and disorderly as was the state of Florence the records certainly point to the conditions having been far worse in the cities ruled by the Visconti and their like.

Of all the northern cities Venice achieved the highest political position; isolated to a great extent from the political problems of the cities of Lombardy and Tuscany, she developed her wealth and her commerce by the sea. In effect her government was a close oligarchy possessed of complete control over elections which in theory were originally popular. The oligarchy reached its highest and narrowest development with the institution of the famous Council of Ten.

When the Roman empire was tottering the Visigoths established their dominion in Spain. In 712 Saracen invaders made themselves masters of the greater part of the peninsula. The Christians were driven into the more northern parts and formed a number of small states out of which were developed the kingdoms of Navarre, Leon and Castile, and Aragon. During the thirteenth century great territories were recovered from the Moors, but the advance ceased as the Moors were reduced to the compact kingdom of Granada. In the fourteenth century the struggle for Castile between Pedro the Cruel and his brother established the house of Trastamare on the throne. The crowns of Castile and Aragon were united by the marriage of Isabella and Ferdinand.

The government of the old Gothic monarchy was through the crown and a council of prelates and nobles. At a comparatively early date, however, the Cortes was attended by deputies from the town, though the number of these was afterwards closely limited.

The principle of taxation through representatives was recognized, and laws could neither be made nor annulled except in the Cortes. This constitutionalism was varied by the claim of the nobles to assume forcible control when matters were conducted in a fashion of which they disapproved.

III—THE GREAT EMPIRE AND THE PAPACY

When the German branch of the Carlovingian dynasty became extinct the five German nations—Franconia, Swabia, Bavaria, Saxony and Lorraine—resolved to make the German kingship elective. For some generations the crown was bestowed on the Saxon Ottos. On the extinction of their house in 1024 it was succeeded by a Franconian dynasty, which came into collision with the papacy under Pope Gregory VII. On the extinction of this line in 1137, Germany became divided between the partisans of the houses of Swabia and Saxony, the Wibelungs and Welfs—the origin of the Ghibelins and Guelfs. The Swabian house, the Hohenstauffen, gained the ascendancy in the person of Frederick Barbarossa.

The rule of the Swabian house is most intimately connected with Italian history. In the thirteenth century the principle that the right of election of the emperor lay with seven electors was apparently becoming established. These were the archbishops of Mentz, Trèves and Cologne, the Duke of Saxony, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the King of Bohemia and the Margrave of Brandenburg. In all other respects, however, several other dukes or princes were at least on an equality with the electors.

In 1272 the election fell on the capable Rudolph of Hapsburg, and for some time after this the emperors were chosen from the houses of Austria, Bavaria, or Luxembourg. A preponderating authority was given to the electors by the Golden Bull of Charles IV in 1355. The power of the emperor as against the princes was increased, as that of the latter was counterbalanced by the development of free cities. Considerable reforms were introduced at the close of our period, mainly by Maximilian.

Throughout the early Middle Ages the Church acquired enormous wealth and Church lands were free from taxation. It was not till a comparatively late period that the payment of tithes was enforced by law. Not infrequently the Church was despoiled by violence, but the balance was more than recovered by fraud. By the time of Charlemagne the clergy were almost exempt from civil jurisdiction and held practically an exclusive authority in matters of religion. The state, however, maintained its temporal supremacy.

It was under Gregory the Great that the papacy acquired its great supremacy over the provincial churches. As the power of the Church grew after the death of Charlemagne, partly from the inclination of weak kings to lean on ecclesiastical support, the papal claims to authority developed, and began to be maintained by the penalties of excommunication and interdict.

A period of extreme laxity in the tenth century was to be brought to a close in the eleventh, partly by the pressure brought to bear on the papacy by the Saxon emperors, but still more by the ambitious resolution of Gregory VII. This remarkable man was determined to assert the complete supremacy of the Holy See over all secular powers. He refused to recognize the right of secular princes to make ecclesiastical appointments within their own dominions, and he emphasised the distinction between the priesthood, as a caste having divine authority, and the laity by enforcing with the utmost strictness the ecclesiastical law of celibacy.

In the contest between Gregory and the emperor it seemed for a moment as if the secular power had won the victory; but, in fact, throughout the twelfth century, the claims which Gregory had put forward were becoming practically effective. These papal pretensions reached their climax in the great Pope Innocent III, who asserted with practical success the right to pronounce absolutely on all disputes between princes, or between princes and their subjects, and to depose those who rejected his authority. Throughout the thirteenth century Rome was once more mistress of the world.

At last, however, the papal aggressor met his match in Philip the Fair. When Boniface XIII died, his successors first submitted to the French monarchy and then became its nominees, while they resided at Avignon virtually under French control. The restoration of the Pontificate to Rome, in 1375, was shortly followed by the great schism. For some years there were two rival popes, each of whom was recognized by one or the other half of Western Christendom. This was terminated by the Council of Constance, which incidentally affirmed the supremacy of general councils over the pope. The following council at Basel was distinctly anti-papal; but the papacy had the better of the contest.

IV—ENGLAND

The Anglo-Saxon polity limited the succession of the crown to a particular house, but allowed a latitude of choice within that house. The community was divided into thanes, or gentry, ceorls or freemen, and serfs.

The Norman conquest involved a vast confiscation of property and the exclusion of the native English from political privileges. That the government was extremely tyrannical is certain. The crown derived its revenues from feudal dues, customs duties, tallages—that is, special charges on particular towns—and the war tax, called the danegelt; all, except the first, being arbitrary taxes. The violence of King John led to the demand of the barons for the great Charter, the keystone of English liberty, securing the persons and property of all freemen from arbitrary imprisonment or spoliation.

The reign of Edward I forms an epoch. The confirmation of the charters put an end to all arbitrary taxation; and the type of the English parliament was fixed. In the great councils the prelates and the greater barons had assembled. A system of representation is definitely formulated in Montfort's parliament of 1265. Whether the knights were elected by the freemen of the shire or only by the tenants in chief is not clear. Many towns were self-governing—independent, that is, of local magnates—under charters from the crown. Montfort's parliament is the first to which towns

sent representatives. Edward established the practice in his model parliament; probably in order to ensure that his demands for money from the towns might, in appearance at least, receive their formal assent.

Parliament was not definitely divided into two houses until the reign of Edward III. In this reign the commons succeeded in establishing the illegality of raising money without consent; the necessity that the two houses should concur for any alterations in the law; and the right of the commons to inquire into public abuses and to impeach public councillors.

In the next reign the commons asserted the right of examining the public expenditure. Moreover, the parliaments more openly and boldly expressed resentment at the acts of the king's ministers, and claimed rights of control. For a time, however, the king secured supremacy by a *coup d'état*, which, in turn, brought about his deposition and the accession of Henry IV, despite the absurd weakness of his title to the inheritance of the crown.

The rights thus acquired develop until the Wars of the Roses. Notably, redress of grievances becomes the condition of supply; and the inclination of the crown to claim a dispensing power is combated.

This continues during the minority of Henry VI; but the revival of dissatisfaction with the government leads to a renewed activity in the practice of impeachments; and parliament begins to display a marked sensitiveness on the question of its privileges. The commons further definitely express their exclusive right of originating money bills.

So far, the essential character of our constitution appears to be a monarchy, greatly limited by law, but swerving continually into irregular courses, which there was no constraint adequate to correct. There is absolutely no warrant for the theory that the king was merely a hereditary executive magistrate, the first officer of the state. The special advantage enjoyed by England lay in the absence of an aristocracy with interests antagonistic to those of the people.

The process by which the villein became a hired labourer is obscure, and an attempt was made to check it by the Statute of Labourers at the time of the Black Death. This was followed by the peasants' revolt of 1382, which corresponded to the far worse horrors of the French Jacquerie. Sharply though this was suppressed, the real object of the rising seemed to have been accomplished.

Of the period of the Wars of the Roses, it is here sufficient to say that it established the principle embodied in a statute of Henry VIII, that obedience to the *de facto* government is not to be punished on the ground that that government is not also *de jure*.

The History of the Conquest of Mexico

WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT

THE book here epitomized is itself no less a monument of courageous perseverance in the face of well-nigh overwhelming difficulty than is the story of adventure in an unknown land that it recounts. Obliged to abandon his legal career because of the loss of his sight, Prescott took up the study of Spanish history and, with the help of several secretaries, produced several works that are now recognized as standard histories. The History of the Conquest of Mexico was first published in 1843. It is a spirited narrative of a stirring episode. To use the words of the author's own description of his motive, Prescott has 'endeavoured to surround the reader with the spirit of the times, and, in a word, to make him a contemporary of the sixteenth century.' An epitome of his Conquest of Peru is in pages 74-77.

I—THE MEXICAN EMPIRE

OF all that extensive empire which once acknowledged the authority of Spain in the New World, no portion, for interest and importance, can be compared with Mexico, and this equally, whether we consider the variety of its soil and climate, the inexhaustible stores of its mineral wealth, its scenery, grand and picturesque beyond example, the character of its ancient inhabitants, not only far surpassing in intelligence that of the other North American races, but reminding us, by their monuments, of the primitive civilization of Egypt and Hindustan; and lastly, the peculiar circumstances of its conquest, adventurous and romantic as any legend devised by any Norman or Italian bard of chivalry. It is the purpose of the present narrative to exhibit the history of this conquest, and that of the remarkable man by whom it was achieved.

The country of the ancient Mexicans, or Aztecs, as they were called, formed but a very small part of the extensive territories comprehended in the modern republic of Mexico. The Aztecs first entered it from the north towards the beginning of the thirteenth century, but it was not until the year 1325 that, led by an auspicious omen, they laid the foundations of their future city by sinking piles into the shallows of the principal lake in the Mexican valley. Thus grew the capital known afterwards to Europeans as Mexico. The omen which led to the choice of this site—an eagle perched upon a cactus—is commemorated in the arms of the modern Mexican republic.

In the fifteenth century there was formed a remarkable league, unparalleled in history, according to which it was agreed between the states of Mexico, Tezcuco and the neighbouring little kingdom of Tlacopan that they should mutually support each other in their wars, and divide the spoil on a fixed scale. During a century of warfare this alliance was faithfully adhered to, and the confederates met with great success. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, just before the arrival of the Spaniards, the Aztec dominion reached across the con-

GEORGE GROTE was born at Beckenham, November 17, 1794. At the age of 16 he entered his father's bank, but he continued his studies. A philosophic radical, a keen politician and reformer, and pre-eminent among the educationists of the time, he took an active part in the foundation and organization of the University of London, where he founded the chair of Philosophy of Mind and Logic. He died June 18, 1871, and was buried in Westminster Abbey.

HENRY HALLAM was born July 9, 1777. He was educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford, and called to the Bar, but having independent means devoted himself to literature and chiefly history. Of his eleven children the most famous was Arthur Henry Hallam, immortalised by Alfred Tennyson in In Memoriam. Although a foremost figure in the literary world and an intimate friend of all the Whig magnates, Henry Hallam took no part in public life. He died January 21, 1859. This portrait is from the painting by Thomas Phillips.



FRANÇOIS PIERRE GUILLAUME GUIZOT was born at Nimes, October 4, 1787. In 1809, he first showed himself to be a writer of distinction, and three years later published an excellent translation of Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. This achievement led to his being appointed professor of history at the university of Paris; his many historical writings soon entitled him to be considered pre-eminent in this branch of learning and the master of a magnificent style. Although his fame is chiefly due to his work as an historian, Guizot was also a statesman of the first rank. He succeeded in maintaining friendly relations with Britain during the greater part (1840–46) of the period of his ministry. He fell from power at the revolution of 1848, and thereafter lived in retirement until his death, October 12, 1874.

WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT was born at Salem, Massachusetts, May 4, 1796. The son of a distinguished judge, he was educated at Harvard, where he graduated with distinction in 1814. While at college he lost the sight of one eye and the other became so badly affected that he was, for long spells, virtually blind. Thus obliged to abandon the legal profession he determined to devote himself to literature, especially history, which had always been a favourite study with him, and by patient memorising, the use of a writing frame and the help of readers and secretaries he wrote the works which are among the classics of the 19th century. At his death, which took place in Boston, January 27, 1859, his last work, The History of the Reign of Philip II, was left unfinished.



THOMAS BABINGTON, LORD MACAULAY, was born in Leicestershire in 1800, and died in 1859, after a distinguished political career both in this country and in India. It is as a great writer, however, that he is chiefly remembered. He turned to literature early in life, and won a name as an essayist of striking originality and power. His style is very vivid and epigrammatic, but it enabled him to excel rather as a descriptive writer, a painter of word-pictures, than as the critic that he aspired to be. He was too prone to sacrifice the dull whole truth for the picturesque half-truth; to substitute a rhetorical denunciation or a eulogy for reasoned judgements. Anybody who remembers his estimate of Boswell will understand how plausible, but how unfair a case Macaulay advanced against those whom he disliked. From the painting by Sir Francis Grant, P.R.A.



JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY historian and diplomatist, was born at Dorchester, Massachusetts, April 15, 1814. Graduating at Harvard, 1831, he then went to Europe to study at Berlin and Göttingen. On his return to America he published two novels which had no great success, and Motley accordingly directed his energies to the study of history, publishing his great Rise of the Dutch Republic in 1856. In 1861 he was appointed American minister to Austria, where he remained until 1867: and in 1869 General Grant sent him to represent the United States in England. Motley died May 29, 1877, at the Dorsetshire house of his daughter, near Dorchester. He was author also of The History of the United Netherlands.



JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE was born at Dartington, Devon, April 23, 1818. He became a fellow of Oriel College, took holy orders, and associated himself with the High Church movement. Influenced by Carlyle's thought, however, he renounced orthodox religion. He subsequently made Carlyle's acquaintance, and their friendship endured for the rest of Carlyle's life. The effects of his teaching are to be seen in Froude's glorification of strong men in his History of England and in the Life of Caesar. His works met with acclamation, despite the frenzy of criticism aroused by his histories and even by his books on travel. In 1892, Froude became professor of modern history at Oxford, and he died October 20, 1894. From the drawing by J. E. Goodall in the National Portrait Gallery.

tinent from the Atlantic to the Pacific. There was thus included in it territory thickly populated by various races, themselves warlike and little inferior to the Aztecs in social organization. What this organization was may be briefly indicated.

The government of the Aztecs, or Mexicans, was an elective monarchy, the sovereign being, however, always chosen from the same family. His power was almost absolute, the legislative power residing wholly with him, though justice was administered through an administrative system which differentiated the government from the despotisms of the East. Human life was protected, except in the sense that human sacrifices were common, the victims being often prisoners of war. Slavery was practised, but strictly regulated.

The Aztec code was, on the whole, stamped with the severity of a rude people relying on physical instead of moral means for the correction of evil. Still, it evinces a profound respect for the great principles of morality, and as clear a perception of those principles as is to be found in the most cultivated nations.

One instance of their advanced position is striking; hospitals were established in the principal cities for the cure of the sick and the permanent refuge of the disabled soldier, and surgeons were placed over them 'who were so far better than those in Europe,' says an old chronicler, 'that they did not protract the cure in order to increase their pay.'

In their religion the Aztecs recognized a supreme Creator and Lord of the universe, 'without whom man is as nothing, invisible, incorporeal, one God, of perfect perfection and purity, under whose wings we find repose and a sure defence.' But beside Him they recognized numerous gods, who presided over the changes of the seasons and the various occupations of man, and in whose honour they practised bloody rites.

Such were the people dwelling in the lovely Mexican valley, and wielding a power that stretched far beyond it, when the Spanish expedition led by Hernando Cortés landed on the coast. The expedition was the fruit of an age and a people eager for adventure, for gain, for glory, and for the conversion of barbaric peoples to the Christian faith. The Spaniards were established in the West Indian Islands and sought further extension of their dominion in the West, whence rumours of great treasure had reached them.

THUS it happened that Velasquez, the Spanish governor of Cuba, designed to send a fleet to explore the mainland, to gain what treasure he could by peaceful barter with the natives, and by any means he could to secure their conversion. It was commanded by Cortés, a man of extraordinary courage and ability and extraordinary gifts for leadership, to whose power both of control and of inspiration must be ascribed, in very great degree, the success of his amazing enterprise.

II—THE INVASION OF THE EMPIRE

IT was on February 18, 1519, that the little squadron finally set sail from Cuba for the coast of Yucatan. Before starting, Cortés addressed his soldiers in a manner both very characteristic of the man and typical of the tone which he took towards them on several occasions of great difficulty and danger, when, but for his highly courageous spirit and his unquestionably great power of personal influence, the expedition could only have found a most disastrous end.

Part of his speech was to this effect: 'I hold out to you a glorious prize, but it is to be won by incessant toil. Great things are achieved only by great exertions, and glory was never the reward of sloth. If I have laboured hard and staked my all on this undertaking, it is for the love of that renown which is the noblest recompense of man. But if any among you covet riches more, be but true to me, as I will be true to you and to the occasion, and I will make you masters of such as our countrymen have never dreamed of.

'You are few in number, but strong in resolution; and, if this does not falter, doubt not but that the Almighty, who has never deserted the Spaniard in his contest with the infidel, will shield you, though encompassed by a cloud of enemies, for your cause is a just cause, and you are to fight under the banner of the Cross. Go forward, then, with alacrity and confidence, and carry to a glorious issue the work so auspiciously begun.'

The first landing was made on the island of Cozumel, where the natives were forcibly converted to Christianity. Then, reaching the mainland, they were attacked by the natives of Tabasco, whom they soon reduced to submission. These made presents to the Spanish commander, including some female slaves. One of these, named by the Spaniards Marina, became of great use to the conquerors in the capacity of interpreter, and by her loyalty and intelligence became a powerful influence in the fortunes of the Spaniards.

The next event of consequence in the career of the conquerors was the foundation of the first colony of New Spain, the town of Villa Rica de Vera Cruz, on the seashore. Following this came the reduction of the warlike republic of Tlascala and the conclusion of an alliance with its inhabitants which proved of priceless value to the Spaniards in their long warfare with the Mexicans.

MORE than one embassy had reached the Spanish camp from Montezuma, the emperor of Mexico, bearing presents and conciliatory messages, but declining to receive the strangers in his capital. The basis of his conduct and of that of the bulk of his subjects towards the Spaniards was an ancient tradition concerning a beneficent deity named Quetzalcoatl, who had sailed away to the East, promising to return and reign once more over his people.

This traditional personage had a white skin and long dark hair, and the likeness of the Spaniards to him in this respect gave rise to the idea that they were his representatives and won them honour accordingly, while even to those tribes who were entirely hostile a supernatural terror clung around their name.

Montezuma, therefore, desired to conciliate them while seeking to prevent their approach to his capital. But this was the goal of their expedition, and Cortés, with his little army, never exceeding a few hundred in all, reinforced

by some Tlascalan auxiliaries, marched towards the capital.

Montezuma, on hearing of their approach, was plunged into despondency. 'Of what avail is resistance,' he is said to have exclaimed, 'when the gods have declared themselves against us? Yet I mourn most for the old and infirm, the women and children, too feeble to fight or to fly. For myself and the brave men round me, we must bare our breasts to the storm, and meet it as we may!'

Meanwhile, the Spaniards marched on, enchanted as they came by the beauty and the wealth of the city and its neighbourhood. It was built on piles in a great lake, and as they descended into the valley it seemed to them to be a reality embodying the fairest dreams of all those who had spoken of the New World and its dazzling glories. They passed along one of the causeways which constituted the only method of approach to the city, and as they entered they were met by Montezuma himself, in all his royal state.

Bowing to what seemed the inevitable, he admitted them to the capital, gave them a royal palace for their quarters and entertained them well. After a week, however, the Spaniards began to be doubtful of the security of their position and, to strengthen it, Cortés conceived and carried out the daring plan of gaining possession of Montezuma's person. With his usual audacity, he went to the palace, accompanied by some of his cavaliers, and compelled Montezuma to consent to transfer himself and his household to Spanish quarters. After this, Cortés demanded that he should recognize formally the supremacy of the Spanish emperor.

Montezuma agreed, and a large treasure, amounting in value to about one and a half million pounds sterling, was dispatched to Spain in token of his fealty. The ship conveying it to Spain touched at the coast of Cuba, and the news of Cortés's success inflamed afresh the jealousy of Velasquez, its governor, who had long repented of his choice of a commander. Therefore, in March 1520, he sent Narvaez, at the head of a rival expedition to overcome Cortés and appropriate the spoils.

But he had reckoned without the character of Cortés. Leaving a garrison in Mexico, the latter advanced by forced marches to meet Narvaez and took him unawares, entirely defeating his much superior force. More than this, he induced most of these troops to join him, and thus, reinforced also from Tlascala, marched back to Mexico. There his presence was greatly needed, for news had reached him that the Mexicans had risen and that the garrison was already in straits.

III—THE RETREAT FROM MEXICO

It was indeed in a serious position that Cortés found his troops, threatened by famine and surrounded by a hostile population. But he was so confident of his ability to overawe the insurgents that he wrote to that effect to the garrison of Vera Cruz by the same dispatches in which he informed them of his safe arrival in the capital. But scarcely had his messenger been gone half an hour when he returned breathless with terror and covered with wounds. 'The city,' he said, 'was all in arms! The drawbridges were raised and the enemy would soon be upon them!'

He spoke truth. It was not long before a hoarse, sullen sound became audible, like that of the roaring of distant waters. It grew louder and louder, till, from the parapet surrounding the enclosure, the great avenues which led to it might be seen dark with the masses of warriors, who came rolling on in a confused tide towards the fortress. At the same time the terraces and flat roofs in the neighbourhood were thronged with combatants brandishing their missiles, who seemed to have risen up as if by magic. It was a spectacle to appal the stoutest.

But this was only the prelude to the disasters that were to befall the Spaniards. The Mexicans made desperate assaults upon the Spanish quarters, in which both sides suffered severely. At last, Montezuma, at the request of Cortés, tried to interpose. But his subjects, in fury at what they considered his desertion of them, gave him a wound of which he died. The position became untenable, and Cortés decided on retreat. This was carried out at night and, owing to the failure of a plan for laying a portable bridge across those gaps in the causeway left by the drawbridges, the Spaniards were exposed to a fierce attack from the natives, which proved most disastrous.

Caught on the narrow space of the causeway, and forced to make their way as best they could across the gaps, they were almost overwhelmed by the throngs of their enemies. Cortés, who, with some of the vanguard, had reached comparative safety, dashed back into the thickest of the fight, where some of his comrades were making a last stand, and brought them out with him, so that at last all the survivors, a sadly stricken company, reached the mainland.

The story of the reconstruction by Cortés of his shattered and discouraged army is one of the most astonishing chapters in the whole history of the conquest. Wounded, impoverished, greatly reduced in numbers and broken in spirit by the terrible series of experiences through which they had passed, they demanded summarily that the expedition should be abandoned and themselves conveyed back to Cuba.

Before long the practical wisdom and personal influence of Cortés had recovered them, reanimated their spirits and inspired them with fresh zeal for conquest, and now for revenge. He added to their numbers the very men sent against him by Velasquez at this juncture, whom he persuaded to join him; and he had the same success with the members of another rival expedition from Jamaica. Eventually, he set out once more for Mexico, with a force of nearly six hundred Spaniards and a number of allies from Tlascala.

IV—THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF MEXICO

The siege of Mexico is one of the most memorable and most disastrous sieges of history. Cortés disposed his troops so as to occupy the three great causeways leading from the shore of the lake to the city, and thus cut off the enemy from their sources of supply.

He was strong in the possession of twelve brigantines, built by his orders, which swept the lake with their guns and frequently defeated the manoeuvres of the enemy, to whom a sailing ship was as new and as terrible a phenomenon as were firearms and cavalry. But the Aztecs were strong in numbers and in their deadly hatred of the invader. The young emperor, Guatemozin, opposed to the Spaniards a spirit as dauntless as that of Cortés himself.

Again and again, by fierce attack, by stratagem, and by their indefatigable labours, the Aztecs inflicted checks, and sometimes even disaster, upon the Spaniards. Many of these, and of their Indian allies, fell or were carried off to suffer the worst fate of the sacrificial victim. The priests promised the vengeance of the gods upon the strangers, and at one point Cortés saw his allies melting away from him under the power of this superstitious fear. But the threats were unfulfilled; the allies returned, and doom settled down upon the city. Famine and pestilence raged within it and all the worst horrors of a siege were suffered by the inhabitants.

But still they remained implacable, fighting to their last breath and refusing to listen to the repeated and urgent offers of Cortés to spare them and their property if they would capitulate. It was not until August 15, 1521, that the siege, which began in the latter part of May, was brought to an end. After a final offer of terms, which Guatemozin still refused, Cortés made the final assault, and carried the city in face of a resistance now sorely enfeebled but still heroic.

Guatemozin, attempting to escape with his wife and some followers to the shore of the lake, was intercepted by one of the brigantines and carried to Cortés. He bore himself with all the dignity that belonged to his courage, and was met by Cortés in a manner worthy of it. He and his train were courteously received and well entertained.

Meanwhile, at Guatemozin's request, the population of Mexico were allowed to leave the city for the surrounding country; and, after this, the Spaniards set themselves to the much-needed work of cleansing the city. They were greatly disappointed in their hope of treasure, which the Aztecs had so effectually hidden, that only a small part of the expected riches was ever discovered. It is a blot upon the history of the war that Cortés, yielding to the importunity of his soldiers, permitted Guatemozin to be tortured in order to gain information regarding the treasure. But no information of value could be wrung from him, and the treasure remained hidden.

At the very time of his distinguished successes in Mexico the fortunes of Cortés hung in the balance in Spain. His enemy Velasquez, governor of Cuba, and the latter's friends at home, made such complaints of his conduct that a commissioner was sent to Vera Cruz to apprehend Cortés and bring him to trial. But the hostile effort failed, and the commissioner sailed for Cuba, having accomplished nothing.

The friends of Cortés, on the other hand, made counter-charges, in which they showed that his enemies had done all in their power to hinder him in what was a magnificent effort on behalf of the Spanish dominion, and asked if the council were prepared to dishonour the man who, in the face of such obstacles, and with scarcely other resources than what he found in himself, had won an empire for Castile such as was possessed by no European potentate.

This appeal was irresistible. However irregular had been the manner of proceeding, no one could deny the grandeur of the results. The acts of Cortés were confirmed in their full extent. He was constituted Governor, Captain-General and Chief Justice of New Spain, as the province was called, and his army was complimented by the emperor fully acknowledging its services.

The news of this was received in New Spain with general acclamation. The mind of Cortés was set at ease as to the past, and he saw opening before him a noble theatre for future enterprise. His career, ever one of adventure and of arms, was still brilliant and still chequered. He fell once more under suspicion in Spain, and at last determined to present himself in person before his sovereign to assert his innocence and claim redress. Favourably received by Charles V, he subsequently returned to Mexico, pursued difficult and dangerous voyages of discovery, and ultimately returned to Spain, where he died in 1547.

The history of the conquest of Mexico is the history of Cortés, who was its very soul. He was a typical knight-errant; more than this, he was a great commander. There is probably no instance in history where so vast an enterprise has been achieved by means apparently so inadequate. He may be truly said to have effected the conquest by his own resources. It was the force of his genius that obtained command of the co-operation of the Indian tribes.

He arrested the arm that was lifted to smite him, and made it do battle in his behalf. When his own men deserted him, he did not desert himself. He brought together the most miscellaneous collection of mercenaries who ever fought under one standard—men with hardly a common tie, and burning with the spirit of jealousy and faction; wild tribes of the natives also, who had been sworn enemies from their cradles. Yet this motley congregation was assembled in one camp, to breathe one spirit and to move on a common principle of action.

As regards the whole character of his enterprise, which seems to modern eyes a bloody and at first quite unmerited war waged against the Indian nations, it must be remembered that Cortés and his soldiers fought in the belief that their victories were the victories of the Cross, and that any war resulting in the conversion of the enemy to Christianity, even as by force, was a righteous and meritorious war. This consideration dwelt in their minds, mingling, indeed, with the desire for glory and for gain, but without any doubt influencing them powerfully.

This is, at any rate, one of the clues to this extraordinary chapter of history, so full of suffering and bloodshed, and also of unsurpassed courage and heroism on every side.

The History of the Conquest of Peru

WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT

IN 1847, four years after the publication of his History of the Conquest of Mexico (see page 70) Prescott issued this, the companion work. He declared his object to have been to exhibit this history in all its romantic details, not merely portraying its most characteristic features but filling up the outline with the colouring of life so as to present a minute and faithful picture of the times. In the result he produced a most exceptionally picturesque narrative. Also it is an authoritative work on one of the most romantic, if also one of the darkest, episodes in history, and as it confirmed Prescott's high rank as a historian, so it established for him a popularity which remains undiminished.

I—THE REALM OF THE INCAS

AMONG the rumours which circulated among the ambitious adventurers of the New World, one of the most dazzling was that of a rich empire far to the south, a very El Dorado, where gold was as abundant as were the common metals in the Old World, and where precious stones were to be had almost for the picking up. These rumours fired the hopes of three men in the Spanish colony at Panamá—namely, Francisco Pizarro and Diego de Almagro, both soldiers of fortune, and Hernando de Luque, a Spanish priest. And it was primarily from the efforts of these three that that astonishing episode, the Spanish conquest of Peru, came to pass.

The character of that empire which the Spaniards discovered and undertook to conquer may be briefly sketched.

According to the traditions of Peru, there had come to that country, then lying in barbarism and darkness, two 'Children of the Sun,' who had taught them wise customs and the arts of civilization, and from whom had sprung by direct descent the incas, who thus ruled over them by a divine right. Beside the ruling inca, whose person and decrees received an honour that was almost worship, there were numerous nobles, also of the royal blood, who formed a ruling caste. These were held in great honour, and were evidently of a race superior to the common people, a fact to which the very shape of their skulls testifies.

The government was developed to an extraordinary pitch of control over even the private lives of the people. The whole land and produce of the country were divided into three parts, one for the Sun, the supreme national deity, one for the inca, and the third for the people. This last was divided among them according to their needs, especially according to the size of their families, and the distribution of land was made afresh each year. On this principle, no one could suffer from poverty, no one could rise by his efforts to a higher position than that which birth and circumstances allotted to him.

The government prescribed to every man his local habitation, his sphere of action, nay, the very nature and quality of that action. He ceased to be a free agent; it might almost be said that it relieved him of personal responsibility. Even his marriage was determined for him; from time to time all the men and women who had attained marriageable age were summoned to the great squares of their respective towns, and the hands of the couples joined by the presiding magistrate. The consent of the parents was required, and the preference of the parties was supposed to be consulted, but owing to the barriers imposed by the prescribed age of the parties this must have been within rather narrow limits. A dwelling was prepared for each couple at the charge of the district, and the prescribed portion of land assigned for their maintenance.

The country, as a whole, was divided into four great provinces, each ruled by a viceroy. Below him there was a minute subdivision of supervision and authority down to the division into decades, by which every tenth man was responsible for his nine countrymen.

The tribunals of justice were simple and swift in their procedure, and all responsible to the crown, to whom regular reports were forwarded, being thus put in a position to review and rectify any abuses in the administration of the law.

The organization of the country was altogether on a much higher level than that encountered by the Spaniards in any other part of the American continent. There was, for example, a complete census of the people periodically taken. There was a system of posts, carried by runners, more efficient and complete than any system in Europe.

There was, lastly, a method of embodying in the empire any conquered country, which can only be compared to the Roman method. Local customs were interfered with as little as possible, local gods were carried to Cuzco and honoured in the pantheon there, and the chiefs of the country were brought to the capital, where they were honoured and by every possible means attached to the new *régime*. The language of the capital was diffused everywhere, and every inducement to learn it offered, so that the difficulty presented by the variety of dialects was overcome.

THUS, the empire of the incas achieved a solidarity very different from the loose and often unwilling cohesion of the various parts of the Mexican empire, which was ready to fall to pieces as soon as opportunity offered. The Peruvian empire arose as one great fabric composed of numerous and even hostile tribes, yet, under the influence of a common religion, common language and common government, knit together as one nation, animated by a spirit of love for its institutions and devoted loyalty to its sovereign.

They all learnt thus to bow in unquestioning obedience to the decrees of the divine inca. For the government of the incas, while it was

the mildest, was the most searching of despotisms.

It was early in the sixteenth century that tidings of the golden empire in the south reached the Spaniards, and more than one effort was made to discover it. But these proved abortive, and it was not until after the brilliant conquest of Mexico by Cortés that the enterprise destined for success was set on foot. Then, in 1524, Francisco Pizarro, Almagro and Father Luque united their efforts to pursue the design of discovering and conquering this rich realm of the south. The first expedition, sailing under Pizarro in 1524, was unable to proceed more than a certain distance, owing to their inadequate numbers and scanty outfit, and returned to Panamá to seek reinforcements.

Then, in 1526, the three coadjutors signed a contract which has become famous. The two captains solemnly engaged to devote themselves to the undertaking until it should be accomplished, and to share equally with Father Luque all gains, both of land and treasure. This last provision was in recognition of the fact that the priest had supplied by far the greater part of the funds required, or apparently did so, for from another document it appears that he was only the representative of the licentiate, Gaspar de Espinosa, then at Panamá who really furnished the money.

The next expedition met with great vicissitudes, and it was only the invincible spirit of Pizarro which carried them as far as the Gulf of Guayaquil and the rich city of Tumbez. Hence they returned once more to Panamà, carrying this time better tidings, and again seeking reinforcements. But the governor of the colony gave them no encouragement, and at last it was decided that Pizarro should go to Spain and apply for help from the crown. He did so, and in 1529 was executed the memorable 'capitulation' which defined the powers and privileges of Pizarro.

It granted to Pizarro the right of discovery and conquest in the province of Peru—or New Castile, as it was then called—the title of governor, and a salary, with inferior honours for his associates; all these to be enjoyed on the conquest of the country and the salaries to be derived from its revenues. Pizarro was to provide for the good government and protection of the natives, and to carry with him a specified number of ecclesiastics to care for their spiritual welfare.

On Pizarro's return to America, he had to contend with the discontent of Almagro at the unequal distribution of authority and honours, but after he had been somewhat appeased by the efforts of Pizarro, the third expedition set sail in January 1531. It comprised three ships, carrying 180 men and 27 horses—a slender enough force for the conquest of an empire.

After various adventures the Spaniards landed at Tumbez and in May 1532 set out from there to march along the coast. After founding a town some thirty leagues south of Tumbez, which he named San Miguel, Pizarro marched into the interior, with the bold design of meeting the inca himself.

He came at a moment when Peru was but just emerging from a civil conflict, in which Atahualpa had routed the rival and more legitimate claimant to the throne of the incas, Huascar. On his march, Pizarro was met by an envoy from the inca, inviting him to visit him in his camp, with, as Pizarro guessed, no friendly intent. This coincided, however, with the purposes of Pizarro, and he pressed forward.

When his soldiers showed signs of discouragement in face of the great dangers before them, Pizarro addressed them thus: 'Let every one of you take heart and go forward like a good soldier, nothing daunted by the smallness of your numbers. For in the greatest extremity God ever fights for His own; and doubt not He will humble the pride of the heathen, and bring him to the knowledge of the true faith, the great end and object of the conquest.'

The enthusiasm of the troops was at once rekindled.

'Lead on,' they shouted, as he finished his address; 'lead on wherever you think best! We will follow with goodwill; and you shall see that we can do our duty in the cause of God and the king!'

They had need of all their daring. For when they had penetrated to Caxamalca they found the inca encamped there at the head of a great host of his subjects, and knew that if his uncertain friendliness towards them should evaporate, they would be in a desperate case.

Pizarro then determined to follow the example of Cortés, and gain possession of the sovereign's person. He achieved this by what can only be called an act of treachery; he invited the inca to visit his quarters and then, taking them unawares, killed a large number of his followers and took him prisoner.

The effect was precisely what Pizarro had hoped for. The 'Child of the Sun' once captured, the Indians, who had no law but his command, no confidence but in his leadership, fled, and the Spaniards remained masters of the situation.

They treated the inca at first with respect and, while keeping him a prisoner, allowed him a measure of freedom and free intercourse with his subjects. He soon saw a door of hope in the Spaniards' eagerness for gold, and offered an enormous ransom. The offer was accepted, and messengers were sent throughout the empire to collect it. At last it reached an amount in gold, of the value of nearly three and a half million pounds sterling, besides a quantity of silver.

But even this ransom did not suffice to reef the inca. Owing partly to the malevolence of an Indian interpreter, who bore the inca ill will, and partly to rumours of a general rising of the natives instigated by the inca, the army began to demand his life as necessary to their safety. Pizarro appeared to be opposed to this demand; but he yielded to his soldiers, and after a form of trial the inca was executed. But Pizarro cannot be acquitted of responsibility for a deed which formed the climax of one of the darkest chapters in Spanish colonial history, and it is probable that the design coincided well with his aims.

III—TRIUMPH OF PIZARRO AND HIS ASSASSINATION

THERE was nothing now to hinder the victorious march of the Spaniards to Cuzco, the Peruvian capital. They now numbered nearly five hundred, having been reinforced by the arrival of Almagro from Panamá.

In Cuzco they found great quantities of treasure, with the natural result that the prices of ordinary commodities rose enormously as the value of gold and silver declined, so only those few who returned with their present gains to their native country could be called wealthy.

All power was now in the hands of the Spaniards. Pizarro, indeed, placed upon the throne of the incas the legitimate heir, Manco, but it was only in order that he might be the puppet of his own purposes.

His next step was to found a new capital, which should be near enough to the sea-coast to meet the need of a commercial people. He determined upon the site of Lima on the festival of Epiphany 1535, and named it 'Ciudad de los Reyes,' or City of the Kings, in honour of the day. But this name was before long superseded by that of Lima, which arose from the corruption of a Peruvian name.

Meanwhile, Hernando Pizarro, the brother of Francisco, had sailed to Spain to report their success. He returned with royal letters confirming the previous grants to Francisco and his associates and bestowing upon Almagro a jurisdiction over a given tract of country beginning from the southern limit of Pizarro's government. This grant became a fruitful source of dissension between Almagro and the Pizarros, each claiming as within his jurisdiction the rich city of Cuzco, a question which the uncertain knowledge of distances in the newly explored country made it difficult to decide.

But the Spaniards had now for a time other occupation than the pursuit of their own quarrels. The inca Manco, escaping from the captivity in which he had lain for a time, put himself at the head of a host of Indians, said to number two hundred thousand, and laid siege to Cuzco early in February 1536.

The siege was memorable as calling out the most heroic displays of Indian and European valour and bringing the two races into deadlier conflict with each other than had yet occurred in the conquest of Peru. The Spaniards were hard pressed, for by means of burning arrows the Indians set the city on fire, and only their encampment in the midst of an open space enabled the Spaniards to endure the conflagration around. They suffered severely, too, from famine. The relief from Lima for which they looked did not come, as Pizarro was in no position to send help, and from this they feared the worst as to the fate of their companions.

Only the firm resolution of the Pizarro brothers and the other leaders within the city kept the army from attempting to force a way out, which would have meant the abandoning of the city. At last they were rewarded by the sight of the great host around them melting away. Seed-time had come, and the inca knew that it would be fatal for his people to neglect their fields and thus prepare starvation for themselves in the following year. Thus, though bodies of the enemy remained to watch the city, the siege was virtually raised and the most pressing danger passed.

While these events were happening, Almagro was engaged upon a memorable expedition to Chile. His troops suffered great privations, and hearing no good tidings of the country farther south, he was prevailed upon to return to Cuzco. Here, claiming the governorship, he captured Hernando and Gonzalo Pizarro, though refusing the counsel of his lieutenant that they should be put to death.

Then, proceeding to the coast, he met Francisco Pizarro, and a treaty was concluded between them, by which Almagro, pending instructions from Spain, was to retain Cuzco and Hernando Pizarro was to be set free, on condition of sailing for Spain. But Francisco broke the treaty as soon as made, and sent Hernando with an army against Almagro, warning the latter that unless he gave up Cuzco the responsibility of the consequences would be on his own head.

The two armies met at Las Salinas, and Almagro was defeated and imprisoned in Cuzco. Before long Hernando brought him to trial and to death. Hernando, on his return to Spain, suffered twenty years' imprisonment for this deed, which outraged both public sentiment and sense of justice.

FRANCISCO PIZARRO, though affecting to be shocked at the death of Almagro, cannot be acquitted of all share in it. So, indeed, the followers of Almagro thought, and they were goaded to still further hatred of the Pizarros by the poverty and contempt in which they now lived, as the survivors of a discredited party. The house of Almagro's son in Lima formed a centre of disaffection, to whose menace Pizarro showed remarkable blindness. He paid dearly for this excessive confidence, for on Sunday, June 26, 1541, he was attacked while sitting in his house among his friends and killed.

IV—LATER FORTUNES OF THE CONQUERORS

THE death of Pizarro did not prove in any sense a guarantee of peace among the Spaniards in Peru. At the time of his death, indeed, an envoy from the Spanish court was on his way to Peru, who from his integrity and wisdom might indeed have given rise to a hope that a happier day was about to dawn. He was endowed with powers to assume the governorship in the event of Pizarro's death, as well as instructions to bring about a more peaceful settlement of affairs. He arrived to find himself indeed the lawful governor, but had before him the task of enforcing his authority. This brought him into collision with the son of Almagro, at the head of a strong party of his father's followers. A bloody battle took place on the plains of Chupas, in which Vaca de Castro was victorious. Almagro was arrested at Cuzco and executed.

The history of the Spanish dominion now resolves itself into the history of warring factions, the chief hero of which was Gonzalo Pizarro,

one of the brothers of the great Pizarro. The Spaniards in Peru felt themselves deeply injured by the publication of regulations from Spain, by which a sudden check was put upon their spoliation and oppression of the natives, which had reached an extreme pitch of cruelty and destructiveness. They called upon Gonzalo to lead them in vindication of what they regarded as their privileges by right of conquest and of their service to the Spanish crown. His hands were strengthened by the rash and high-handed behaviour of Blasco Nuñez Vela, yet another official sent out from Spain to deal with this turbulent province.

Pizarro himself was an able and daring leader and, at least in his earlier years, of a chivalrous spirit, which made him beloved of his soldiers. He was soon acclaimed as governor by the Spaniards and was actually supreme in Peru.

But in the following year, 1545, the Spanish government selected an envoy who was to bring the now ascendant star of Pizarro to eclipse. This was an ecclesiastic named Pedro de la Gasca, a man of great resolution, penetration and knowledge of affairs. After varying fortunes, in which Pizarro for some time held his own, he was routed by the troops of Gasca. Pizarro surrendered to an officer, and was carried before Gasca.

Addressing him with severity, Gasca abruptly inquired why he had thrown the country into such confusion, raising the banner of revolt, usurping the government, and obstinately refusing the offer of grace that had been repeatedly made to him.

Gonzalo defended himself as having been elected by the people. 'It was my family,' he said, 'who conquered the country and, as their representative here, I felt I had a right to the government.'

To this Gasca replied, in a still severer tone, 'Your brother did, indeed, conquer the land; and for this the emperor was pleased to raise both him and you from the dust. He lived and died a loyal subject, and it only makes your ingratitude to your sovereign the more heinous.'

A sentence of death followed, and thus passed the last of Pizarro's name to rule in Peru.

Under the wise reforms instituted by Gasca, Peru was somewhat relieved to the disastrous effects of the Spanish occupation, and under the mild yet determined policy inaugurated by him, the ancient distractions of the country were permanently healed. With peace, prosperity returned within the borders of Peru, and this much-tried land settled down at last to a considerable measure of tranquillity and content.

The Chronicles of England

RAPHAEL HOLINSHED

APPEARING first in 1577, this history owed its inception to the Queen's printer, Reginald Wolfe. On the death of Wolfe in 1577, Raphael Holinshed (c. 1520-80) abridged the work and brought it out as The Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland. The Scottish section is largely a translation of Hector Boece's Scotorum Historiae. The second edition came out in 1587 but contained several passages which were considered offensive to the Queen and her Ministers. Accordingly the pages in question were excised by an order of the Privy Council. In 1723 the expurgations were published separately and in 1807-08 a complete reprint appeared. Shakespeare used Holinshed for the plots of many of his historical plays and of Cymbeline, Lear and Macbeth.

I—SOME ACCOUNT OF THE HISTORIE OF BRITAINE

As few or no nations can justlie boast themselves to have continued sithence their countrie was first replenished, without anie mixture, more or lesse, of forreine inhabitants; no more can this our Iland, whose manifold commodities have oft allured sundrie princes and famous capteines of the world to conquer and subdue the same unto their owne subjection. Manie sorts of people therefore have come in hither and settled themselves here in this Ile, and first of all other, a parcell of the lineage and posteritie of Japhet, brought in by Samothes, in the yeare 1910 after the creation of Adam.

Howbeit in process of time, and after they had indifferentlie replenished and furnished this Iland with people, Albion the giant repaired hither with a companie of his owne race proceeding from Cham, and not onelie annexed the same to his owne dominion, but brought all such as he found here of the line of Japhet into miserable servitude and most extreame thraldome. After him also, and within lesse than six hundred and two yeares, came Brute, the son of Sylvius, with a great train of the posteritie of the dispersed Trojans in 324 ships; who rendering the like courtesie unto the Chamminits as they had done before unto the seed of Japhet, brought them also wholie under his rule and governance, and dispossessing them he divided the countrie among such princes and capteines as he had led out of Grecia with him.

Then after some further space of time the Roman emperours subdued the land to their dominion; and after the coming of the Romans, it is hard to say with how manie sorts of people we were dailie pestered. For their armies did commonlie consist of manie sorts of people, and were (as I may call them) a confused mixture of all other countries and nations then living in the world. Howbeit I thinke it best, because they did all beare the title of Romans, to retaine onelie that name for them all, albeit they were wofull guests to this our Iland; sith that with them came all kinds of vice, all riot and excess of behaviour into our countrie, which their legions brought with them from each corner of their dominions.

Then did follow the Saxons, and the Danes, and at last the Normans, of whom it is worthilie

doubted whether they were more hard and cruell to their countriemen than the Danes, or more heavie and intollerable to our Iland than the Saxons or the Romans. For they were so cruellie bent to our utter subversion and overthrow, that in the beginning it was lesse reproach to be accounted a slave than an Englishman, or a drudge in anie filthie businesse than a Britaine; insomuch that everie French page was superiour to the greatest peere; and the losse of an Englishman's life but a pastime to such of them as contended in their braverie who should give the greatest strokes or wounds unto their bodies, when their toiling and drudgerie could not please them or satisfie their greedie humours. Yet such was our lot in those daies by the divine appointed order, that we must needs obey such as the Lord did set over us, and this because we refused grace, and would not heare when God by His preachers did call us so favourablie unto Him.

By all this, then, we perceive how from time to time this Iland hath not onelie beene a prey, but, as it were, a common receptacle for strangers, the naturall homelings or Britons being still cut shorter and shorter, till in the end they came not onelie to be driven into a corner of this region, but in time also verie like utterlie to have beene extinguished. Thus we see how England hath beene manie times subject to the reproach of conquest.

And whereas the Scots seeme to challenge manie famous victories also over us, it shall suffice for answer, that they deale in this as in the most part of their historie, which is to seeke great honour by lying and great renown by prating and craking. Indeed they have done great mischief in this Iland, and with extreame crueltie; but as for anie conquest the first is yet to heare of.

But beside those conquests afore-mentioned, Huntingdon, the old historiographer, speaketh of another, likelie (as he saith) to come one daie out of the North, which is a wind that bloweth no man to good, sith nothing is to be had in those parts but hunger and much cold.

II—OF RICHARD I AND HIS JOURNIE TO THE HOLIE LAND

Richard the First of that name, and second sonne of Henrie the Second, began his reign over England the sixth daie of Julie, in the yeare of our Lord 1189. He received the crowne with all due and accustomed sollemnitie at the hands of Baldwin, the archbishop of Canterburie, the third daie of September.

Upon this daie of King Richard's coronation, the Jewes that dwelt in London and in other parts of the realme, being there assembled, had but sorie hap, as it chanced. For they, meaning to honour the same coronation with their presence, and to present to the king some honourable gift whereby they might declare themselves glad for his advancement, and procure his friendship towards them, for the confirming of their privileges and liberties; he of a zealous mind to Christes religion, abhorring their nation (and doubting some sorcerie by them to be practised), commanded that they should not come within the church when he should receive the crowne, nor within the palace whilest he was at dinner.

But at dinner-time, among other that pressed in at the palace gate, divers of the Jewes were about to thrust in, till one of them was striken by a Christian, who alledging the king's commandement, kept them backe from comming within the palace. Which some of the unrulie people perceiving, and supposing it had beene done by the king's commandement, tooke lightlie occasion thereof, and falling upon the Jewes with staves, bats and stones, beat them and chased them home to their houses and lodgings. Then did they set fire on the houses, and the Jewes within were either smoldred and burnt to death, or else at their comming forth most cruellie received upon the points of speares, billes and swords of their adversaries that watched for them verie diligentlie.

This great riot well deserved sore and grievous punishment, but yet it passed over without correction, because of the hatred generallie conceived against the obstinate frowardnesse of the Jewes. Finallie, after the tumult was ceased, the king commanded that no man should hurt or harm any of the Jewes, and so they were restored to peace after they had susteined infinit damage.

No great while after this his coronation, the king sought to prepare himself to journey to the holie land, and to this end he had great need of money. Therefore he made such sale of things appertaining to him, as well in right of the crowne as otherwise, that it seemed to divers that he made his reckoning never to return again, in so much that some of his councillors told him plainlie that he did not well in making things awaie so freelie; unto whom he answered 'that in time of need it was no evill policie for a man to help himself with his owne,' and further, 'that if London at that time of need would be bought, he would surelie sell it, if he might meet with a convenient merchant that were able to give him monie enough for it.'

Then all things being readie, King Richard set forth and, after great hindrance by tempests, and at the hands of the men of Cyprus, who warred against him and were overcome, he came to the citie of Acres, which then was besieged by the Christian armie. Such was the valiancie of King Richard shown in manfull constraining of the citie that his praise was greatly bruted both amongst the Christians and also the Saracens.

At last, on the twelfth daie of Julie, in the yeare of grace 1192, the citie of Acres was surrendered into the Christian men's hands. These things being concluded, the French King Philip, upon envie and malice conceived against King Richard (although he pretended sickness for excuse), departed homewards. Now touching this departure, divers occasions are remembered by writers of the emulation and secret spite which he should bear towards King Richard.

But, howsoever, it came to passe, partlie through envie (as hath beene thought) conceived at the great deeds of King Richard, whose mightie power and valiantnesse he could not well abide, and partlie for other respects him moving, he took the sea with three gallies of the Genevois and returned into Italie, and so home into France, having promised first unto King Richard in the holie land, and after to pope Celestine at Rome, that he would not attempt any hurtfull enterprise against the English dominions till King Richard should be returned out of the holie land. But this promise

was not kept, for he sought to procure Earle John, King Richard's brother, to rebell against him, though he then sought it in vaine.

Yet were matters nowise peacefull within the realme of England, and because of this, and likewise because the froward humours of the French so greatlie hindered him in warring against the Saracens, King Richard determined fullie to depart homewards, and at last there was a peace concluded with Saladin. But on his journie homewards the king had but sorie hap, for he made shipwracke on the coast of Istria and then fell into captivitie; and this was the manner that it came to passe.

III—OF KING RICHARD'S CAPTIVITIE

KING RICHARD, doubting to fall into the hands of those who might bear him ill will, made the best shift he could to passe through quietlie, yet were many of his servants made captive, and he himself came with but three men to Vienna. There causing his servants to provide meat for him more sumptuous and fine than was thought requisite for so meane a person as he counterfeited then, he was straightway remarked, and some gave knowledge to the duke of Austrich named Leopold, who loved him not for some matter that had passed in the holie land. Moreover, his page, going about the towne to change gold and buy vittels, bewraied him, having by chance the king's gloves under his girdle: whereupon, being examined, for fear of tortures he confessed the truth.

The duke sent men to apprehend him, but he, being warie that he was descried, got him to his weapon; but they alledging the duke's commandement, he boldly answered 'that sith he must be taken, he being a king, would yeeld himselfe to none of the companie but to the duke alone.' The duke hearing of this, speedilie came unto him, whom he meeting, delivered up his sword, and committed him unto his custodie.

Then was he brought before the princes and lords of the empire, in whose presence the emperour charged him with diverse unlawfull doings. King Richard, notwithstanding the vaine and frivolous objections laid to his charge, made his answers always so pithilie and directlie to all that could be laid against him, and excused himselfe in everie point so thoroughlie, that the emperour much marvelled at his high wisdom and prudence, and not onelie greatlie commended him for the same, but from thenceforth used him more courteously. Yet did King Richard perceive that no excuses would serve, but that he must paie to his covetous host some great summe of monie for his hard entertainment. Therefore he sent the bishop of Salisburie into England to provide for the paiment of his ransome.

Finallie the king, after he had beene prisoner one yeare, six weeks and three daies, was set at libertie on Candlemass daie, and then with long and hastie journies, not keeping the high waies, he hasted forth towards England. It is reported that if he had lingered by the way, he had beene eftsoones apprehended. For the emperour being incensed against him by ambassadors that came from the French king, immediatlie after he was set forward, began to repent himselfe in that he had suffered him so soon to depart from him, and hereupon sent men after him with all speed to bring him backe if they could by any means overtake him, meaning as then to have kept him in perpetual prison. But these his knavish tricks being in the good providence of God defeated, King Richard at length in good safetie landed at Sandwich, and the morrow after came to Canterburie, where he was received with procession. From thence he came unto London, where he was received with great joy and gladnesse of the people, giving heartie thanks to almightie God for his safe return and deliverance.

THE same yeare that King Richard was taken by the duke of Austrich, one night in the month of Januarie, about the first watch of the night, the north-west side of the element appeared of such a ruddie colour as though it had burnt, without any clouds or other darknesse to cover it, so that the stars showed through that rednesse and might be verie well discerned. Divers bright strakes appeared to flash upwards now and then, dividing the rednesse, through the which the stars seemed to be of a bright sanguine colour.

In Februarie next issuing, one night after midnight the like wonder was seene, and shortly after newes came that the king was taken in Almaigne. And the same daie and selfe houre that the king arrived at Sandwich, whilst the sunne shone verie bright and cleare, there appeared a most brightsome and unaccustomed clearnesse, not farre distant from the sunne, as it were to the length and breadth of a man's personage, having a red shining brightnesse like to the rainbow, which strange sight when manie beheld, there were that prognosticated the king alreadie to be arrived.

IV—OF QUEEN ELIZABETH'S COMING INTO HER KINGDOM

AFTER all the stormie, tempestuous and blustering windie weather of Queene Marie was overblowne, the darksome clouds of discomfort dispersed, the palpable fogs and mists of most intollerable miserie consumed, and the dashing showers of persecution overpast, it pleased God to send England a calm and quiet season, a cleare and lovelie sunshine, and a world of blessings by good Queene Elizabeth, into whose gracious reign we are now to make an happie entrance as followeth.

On her entering the citie of London she was received of the people with prayers, wishes, welcomings, cries and tender words, all which argued a wonderfull earnest love of most obedient subjects towards their sovereign. And on the other side, her grace, by holding up her hands and merrie countenance to such as stood farre off, and most tender and gentle language to those that stood nigh unto her grace, did declare herselfe no lesse thankfullie to receive her people's good will than they lovinglie offered it to her.

And it was not onelie to those her subjects who were of noble birth that she showed herself thus verie gracious, but also to the poorer sort. How manie nosegaies did her grace receive at poore women's hands? How oftentimes staid she her chariot when she saw anie simple bodie offer to speake to her grace? Especiallie is it

to be remembered how a branch of rosemarie given her grace with a supplication about Fleetbridge was seene in her chariot till her grace came to Westminster not without the marvellous wondering of such as knew the presenter, and noted the queene's most gracious receiving and keeping the same. Therefore may the poore and needie looke for great hope at her grace's hand, who hath shown so loving a carefulnesse for them.

Moreover, because princes be set in their seat by God's appointing, and they must therefore first and chieflie tender the glorie of Him from whom their glorie issueth; it is to be noted in her grace that for so much as God hath so wonderfullie placed her in the seat of government of this realme, she in all her doings doth show herselfe most mindful of His goodness and mercie shewed unto her.

And one most notable signe thereof her grace gave at the verie time of her passage through London, for in the Tower, before ever she entered her chariot, she lifted up her eies to Heaven and saith as followeth.

'O Lord Almightie and everlasting God, I give Thee most heartie thanks that Thou hast beene so mercifull unto me as to spare me to behold this joyfull daie. And I acknowledge that Thou hast dealt as wonderfullie and as mercifullie with me as Thou diddest with Thy true and faithful servant Daniell Thy prophet, whom Thou delivredst out of the den from the crueltie of the greedie and raging lions; even so was I overwhelmed, and onelie by Thee delivered. To Thee, therefore, onelie be thankes, honor and praise, for ever. Amen.'

On Sundaie, the five and twentieth daie of Januarie, her majestie was with great sollemnitie crowned at Westminster, in the Abbey church there, by doctor Oglethorpe, bishop of Carlisle. She dined in Westminster hall which was richlie hung, and everything ordered in such royall manner as to such a regall and most solemn feast appertained. In the meanetime, whilst her grace sat at dinner, Sir Edward Dimmocke, knight, her champion by office, came riding into the hall in faire complete armour, mounted upon a beautiful courser, richlie trapped in cloth of gold, and in the midst of the hall cast down his gauntlet, with offer to fight in her quarell with anie man that should denie her to be the righteous and lawfull queene of this realme. The queene, taking a cup of gold full of wine, dranke to him thereof, and sent it to him for his fee. Finallie, this feast being celebrated with all due and fitting royall ceremonies, tooke end with great joy and contentation to all the beholders.

Yet, though there was thus an end of the ceremonies befitting the queene's coronation, her majesty was everywhere received with brave shows and with pageants, all for the love and respect that her subjects bare her. Thus on Whitsundaie, in the first year of her reign, the citizens of London set forth a muster before the queene's majestie at Greenwich in the parke there, of the number of 1,400 men, whereof 800 were pikes, armed in fine corselets, 400 shot in shirts of mail, and 200 halberdiers armed in Almaigne rivets; these were furnished forth by the crafts and companies of the citie. To everie hundred two wifflers were assigned, richlie appointed and apparelled for the purpose. There were also twelve wardens of the best companies mounted on horsebacke in coates of blacke velvet, to conduct them, with drums and fifes, and sixe ensigne all in jerkins of white sattin of Bridges, cut and lined with black sarsenet, and caps, hosen and scarfs according. The sergeant-majors, capteine Constable and capteine Sanders, brought them in order before the queene's presence, placing them in battell arraie, even as they should have fought; so the show was verie faire, the emperour's and the French king's ambassadors being present.

Verilie the queene hath ever shown herselfe forward and most willing that her faithfull subjects should be readie and skilfull in war as in peace. Thus in the fourteenth yeare of her reign, by order of her council, the citizens of London, assembling in their several halles, the masters chose out the most likelie and active persons to their companies to be pikemen and shot. To these were appointed divers valiant capteines, who to train them up in warlike feats, mustered them thrice everie weeke, teaching the gunners to handle their pieces.

In the arts of peace likewise, she is greatlie pleased with them who are good craftsmen, and shews them favour. In government we have peace and securitie, and do not greatlie fear those who may stir up wicked rebellion within our land, or may come against us from beyond the sea.

The Rise of the Dutch Republic

JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY

IN 1846 Motley began to collect materials for a history of Holland, and in 1851 he went to Europe to ransack its libraries. By the end of 1855 he had erected from the materials found a historical monument that will remain for ever a prominent literary landmark. The Rise of the Dutch Republic, first published in 1856, was received with enthusiasm in Europe and America. Its distinguishing characters are its graphic narrative and warm sympathy; Froude said of it that it is 'as complete as industry and genius can make it, and a book that will take its place among the finest stories in this or any language.' Guizot praised its research, but criticised the way in which Motley 'argues the cause of his client'—William of Orange.

I—WOE TO THE HERETIC

THE north-western corner of the vast plain which extends from the German Ocean to the Ural Mountains is occupied by the countries called the Netherlands.

The history of the development of the Netherland nation from the time of the Romans during sixteen centuries is ever marked by one prevailing characteristic, one master passion—the love of liberty, the instinct of self-government.

Compounded of the bravest Teutonic elements

—Batavian and Frisian—the people of this region has ever battled to the death with tyranny and throughout the dark ages struggled resolutely towards the light, wresting from a series of petty sovereigns a gradual and practical recognition of the claims of humanity.

With the advent of the Burgundian family, the power of the commons reached so high a point that it was able to measure itself, undaunted, with the spirit of arbitrary power. Peaceful in their pursuits, phlegmatic by temperament, the Netherlanders were yet the most belligerent and excitable population in Europe.

For more than a century the struggle for freedom, for civic life, went on, Philip the Good, Charles the Bold, Mary's husband Maximilian, and Charles V in turn assailing or undermining the bulwarks raised against the despotic principle.

At last, in the sixteenth century, a new and more powerful spirit, the genius of religious freedom, came to participate in the great conflict. Arbitrary power, incarnated in the second Charlemagne, assailed the new combination with unscrupulous, unforgiving fierceness. In the little Netherland territory humanity, bleeding but not killed, still stood at bay and defied the hunters. The two great powers had been gathering strength for centuries. They were soon to be matched in a longer and more determined combat than the world had ever seen.

On October 25, 1555, the Estates of the Netherlands were assembled in the great hall of the palace at Brussels to witness amidst pomp and splendour the dramatic abdication of Charles V as sovereign of the Netherlands in favour of his son Philip. The drama was well played. The happiness of the Netherlands was apparently the only object contemplated in the transaction, and the stage was drowned in tears.

And yet, what was the Emperor Charles to the inhabitants of the Netherlands that they should weep for him? Their interests had never been even a secondary consideration with their master. He had fulfilled no duty towards them; he had committed the gravest crimes against them; he was in constant conflict with their ancient and dearly bought political liberties.

Philip II, whom the Netherlands received as their new master, was a man of foreign birth and breeding, not speaking a word of their language. In 1548 he had made his first appearance in the Netherlands to receive homage as the future sovereign and to exchange oaths of mutual fidelity.

One of the earliest measures of Philip's reign was to re-enact the dread edict of 1550. This he did by the express advice of the Bishop of Arras. The edict set forth that no one should print, write, copy, keep, conceal, sell, buy, or give in churches, streets, or other places any book or writing by Luther, Calvin and other heretics reprobated by the Holy Church; nor break or injure the images of the Holy Virgin or canonised saints; nor in his house hold conventicles, or be present at any such, in which heretics or their adherents taught, baptised, or formed conspiracies against the Holy Church and the general welfare. Further, all lay persons were forbidden to converse or dispute concerning the Holy Scriptures openly or secretly, or to read, teach, or expound them; or to preach, or to entertain any of the opinions of the heretics.

Disobedience to this edict was to be punished as follows: Men to be executed with the sword, and women to be buried alive if they do not persist in their errors; if they do persist in them, then they are to be executed with fire, and all their property in both cases is to be confiscated to the crown. Those who failed to betray the suspected were to be liable to the same punishment, and also those who lodged, furnished with food, or favoured a heretic. Informers against suspected persons were to be entitled on conviction to one half of the property of the accused.

At first, however, the edict was not vigorously carried into effect anywhere. It was openly resisted in Holland; its proclamation was flatly refused in Antwerp and repudiated throughout Brabant. This disobedience was tolerated because Philip wanted money to carry on the war between Spain and France which shortly afterwards broke out.

At the close of the war, a treaty was entered into between France and Spain by which Philip and Henry II bound themselves to maintain the Catholic worship inviolate by all means in their power and to extinguish the increasing heresy in both kingdoms. There was a secret agreement to arrange for the Huguenot chiefs, throughout the realms of both, 'a Sicilian Vespers' upon the first occasion.

Henry died of a wound received from Montgomery in a tourney held to celebrate the conclusion of the treaty, and Catherine dei Medici became Queen-Regent of France, and deferred carrying out the plot till St. Bartholomew's Day fourteen years after.

II—THE NETHERLANDS ARE, AND WILL BE, FREE

Philip now set about the organization of the Netherlands provinces. Margaret, Duchess of Parma, was appointed regent, with three boards, a state council, a privy council and a council of finance, to assist in the government. It soon became evident that the real power of the government was exclusively in the hands of the Consulta—a committee of three members of the state council, by whose deliberation the regent was secretly to be guided on all important occasions; but in reality the conclave consisted of Anthony Perrenot, Bishop of Arras, afterwards Cardinal Granvelle. Stadtholders were appointed to the different provinces, of whom only Count Egmont for Flanders and William of Orange for Holland need be mentioned.

An assembly of the Estates met at Ghent on August 7, 1589, to receive the parting instructions of Philip previous to his departure for Spain. The king, in a speech made through the Bishop of Arras, owing to his inability to speak French or Flemish, submitted a 'request' for three million gold florins 'to be spent for the good of the country.' He made a violent attack on 'the new, reprobate and damnable sects that now infest the country,' and commanded the Regent Margaret 'accurately to cause to be enforced the edicts and decrees made for the extirpation of all sects and heresies.'

The Estates of all the provinces agreed, at a subsequent meeting with the king, to grant their quota of the 'request,' but made it a condition

precedent that the foreign troops, whose outrages and exactions had long been an intolerable burden on the country, should be withdrawn.

This enraged the king, but when a presentation was made of a separate remonstrance in the name of the States-General, signed by the Prince of Orange, Count Egmont and other leading patricians, against the pillaging, insults and disorders of the foreign soldiers, the king was furious. He dissembled at a later meeting, and took leave of the Estates with apparent cordiality.

Inspired by the Bishop of Arras, under secret instructions from Philip, the Regent Margaret resumed the execution of the edicts against heresies and heretics which had been permitted to slacken during the French war. As an additional security for the supremacy of the ancient religion, Philip induced the Pope, Paul IV, to issue, in May 1559, a Bull whereby three new archbishoprics were appointed, with fifteen subsidiary bishops and nine prebendaries, who were to act as inquisitors. The Spanish troops were to be kept in the provinces indefinitely.

Violent agitation took place throughout the whole of the Netherlands during the years 1560 and 1561 against the arbitrary policy embodied in the edict and the ruthless manner in which they were enforced in the new bishoprics, and against the continued presence of the foreign soldiery.

Foremost in resistance was the Prince of Orange, and he, with Egmont, the soldier hero of St. Quentin, and Admiral Horn united in a remarkable letter to the king, in which they said that the royal affairs would never be successfully conducted so long as they were entrusted to Cardinal Granvelle. Finally, Granvelle was recalled by Philip. But the Netherlands had now reached a condition of anarchy, confusion and corruption.

The four Estates of Flanders, in a solemn address to the king, described in vigorous language the enormities committed by the inquisitors and called upon Philip to suppress these horrible practices so manifestly in violation of the ancient charters which he had sworn to support warmly.

Philip, so far from having the least disposition to yield in this matter, dispatched orders in August 1564 to the regent, ordering that the decrees of the Council of Trent should be published and enforced without delay throughout the Netherlands. By these decrees the heretic was excluded, so far as ecclesiastical dogma could exclude him, from the pale of humanity, from consecrated earth and from eternal salvation.

The decrees conflicted with the privileges of the provinces, and at a meeting of the council William of Orange made a long and vehement discourse, in which he said that the king must be unequivocally informed that this whole machinery of placards and scaffolds, of new bishops and old hangmen, of decrees inquisitors and informers, must at once and for ever be abolished. Their day was over; the Netherlands were free provinces and were determined to vindicate their ancient privileges.

THE unique effect of these representations was stringent instructions from Philip to Margaret to keep the whole machinery of persecution constantly at work. Fifty thousand persons were put to death in obedience to the edicts, 30,000 of the best of the citizens migrated to England. Famine reigned in the land. Then followed the revolt of the confederate nobles and the episode of the 'wild beggars.'

Meantime, during the summer of 1556, many thousands of burghers, merchants, peasants and gentlemen were seen mustering and marching through the fields of every province, armed, but only to hear sermons and sing hymns in the open air, as it was unlawful to profane the churches with such rites. The duchess sent forth proclamations by hundreds, ordering the instant suppression of these assemblies and the arrest of the preachers. This brought the popular revolt to a head.

III—THE IMAGE-BREAKING CAMPAIGN

THERE were many hundreds of churches in the Netherlands profusely adorned with chapels. Many of them were filled with paintings, all were peopled with statues. Commencing on August 18, 1556, for the space of only six or seven summer days and nights, there raged a storm by which nearly every one of these temples was entirely rifled of its contents; not for plunder, but for destruction.

It began at Antwerp, on the occasion of a great procession, the object of which was to conduct around the city a colossal image of the Virgin. The rabble sacked thirty churches within the city walls, entered the monasteries, burnt their invaluable libraries and invaded the nunneries. The streets were filled with monks and nuns, running this way and that, shrieking and fluttering, to escape the claws of fiendish Calvinists.

The terror was imaginary, for not the least remarkable feature in these transactions was that neither insult nor injury was offered to man or woman, and that not a farthing's value of the immense amount of property was appropriated. Similar scenes were enacted in all the other provinces, with the exception of Limburg, Luxemburg and Namur.

The ministers of the reformed religion and the chiefs of the liberal party all denounced the image-breaking. The Prince of Orange deplored the riots. The leading confederate nobles characterised the insurrection as insensate, and many took severe measures against the ministers and reformers. The regent was beside herself with indignation and terror. Philip, when he heard the news of the insurrection, fell into a frenzy. 'It shall cost them very dear!' he cried. 'I swear it by the soul of my father!'

The religious war, before imminent, became inevitable. The duchess, inspired by terror, proposed to fly to Mons, but was restrained by the counsels of Orange, Horn and Egmont. On August 25 came the crowning act of what the reformers considered their most complete triumph and the regent her deepest degradation.

It was then found necessary, under the alarming aspect of affairs, that liberty of worship, in places where it had been already established, should be freely accorded to the new religion. Articles of agreement to this effect were drawn up and exchanged between the government and Louis of Nassau and fifteen others of the confederacy.

A corresponding pledge was signed by them,

that as long as the regent was true to her engagement they would consider their previous existing league annulled and would cordially assist in maintaining tranquillity and supporting the authority of his majesty. The important 'Accord' was then duly signed by the duchess. It declared that the Inquisition was abolished, that his majesty would soon issue a new general edict, expressly and unequivocally protecting the nobles against all evil consequences from past transactions, and that public preaching according to the forms of the new religion was to be practised in places where it had already taken place.

Thus, for a fleeting moment, there was a thrill of joy throughout the Netherlands. But it was all a delusion. While the leaders of the people were exerting themselves to suppress the insurrection and to avert ruin, the secret course pursued by the government may be condensed into the formula—dissimulation, procrastination and again dissimulation.

The 'Accord' was revoked by the duchess, and peremptory prohibition of all preaching within or without city walls was proclaimed. Further, a new oath of allegiance was demanded from all functionaries. The Prince of Orange spurned the proposition and renounced all his offices, desiring no longer to serve a government whose policy he did not approve and a king by whom he was suspected. Terrible massacres of Protestant heretics took place in many cities.

IV—ALVA THE TERRIBLE

It was determined at last that the Netherland heresy should be conquered by force of arms, and an army of 10,000 picked and veteran troops was dispatched from Spain under the Duke of Alva. The Duchess Margaret made no secret of her indignation at being superseded when Alva produced his commission appointing him captain-general and begging the duchess to co-operate with him in ordering all the cities of the Netherlands to receive the garrisons which he would send them.

In September 1567 the Duke of Alva established a new court for the trial of crimes committed 'during the recent period of troubles.' It was called the 'Council of Troubles,' but will be for ever known in history as the 'Blood Council.' It superseded all other institutions.

So well did this new and terrible engine perform its work that in less than three months 1,800 of the highest, the noblest and the most virtuous men in the land, including Count Egmont and Admiral Horn, suffered death. Further than that, the whole country became a charnel-house; columns and stakes in every street, the doorposts of private houses, the fences in the fields were laden with human carcasses, strangled, burnt, beheaded. Within a few months after the arrival of Alva the spirit of the nation seemed hopelessly broken.

The Duchess of Parma, who had demanded her release from the odious position of a cipher in a land where she had so lately been sovereign, at last obtained it and took her departure in December for Parma, thus finally closing her eventful career in the Netherlands. The Duke of Alva took up his position as governor-general, and amongst his first works was the erection of the celebrated citadel of Antwerp, not to protect, but to control the commercial capital of the provinces.

Events marched swiftly. On February 16, 1568, a sentence of the Inquisition condemned all the inhabitants of the Netherlands to death as heretics. From this universal doom only a few persons, especially named, were excepted; and a proclamation of the king, dated ten days later, confirmed this decree of the Inquisition and ordered it to be carried into instant execution, without regard to age, sex or condition. This is probably the most concise death warrant ever framed. Three millions of people, men, women and children, were sentenced to the scaffold.

The Prince of Orange at last threw down the gauntlet and published a reply to the active condemnation which had been pronounced against him in default of appearance before the Blood Council. It would, he said, be both death and degradation to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the infamous 'Council of Blood,' and he scorned to plead before he knew not what base knaves, not fit to be the valets of his companions and himself.

Preparations were at once made to levy troops and wage war against Philip's forces in the Netherlands. Then followed the long, ghastly struggle between the armies raised by the Prince of Orange and his brother, Count Louis of Nassau, who lost his life mysteriously at the battle of Mons, and those of Alva and the other governors-general who succeeded him—Don Louis de Requesens, the 'Grand Commander,' Don John of Austria, the hero of Lepanto, and Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma.

The records of butcheries and martyrdoms, including those during the sack and burning of Antwerp by the mutinous Spanish soldiery, are only relieved by the heroic exploits of the patriotic armies and burghers in the memorable defences of Haarlem, Leyden, Alkmaar and Mons.

At one time it seemed that the Prince of Orange and his forces were about to secure a complete triumph; but the news of the massacre of St. Bartholomew in Paris brought depression to the patriotic army and corresponding spirit to the Spanish armies, and the gleam faded. The most extraordinary feature of Alva's civil administration were fiscal decrees, which imposed taxes that destroyed the trade and manufactures of the country.

There were endless negotiations inspired by the States-General, the German Emperor and the Governments of France and England to secure a settlement of the Netherlands affairs, but these, owing to insincere diplomacy, were ineffective.

V—THE UNION OF THE PROVINCES

In the meantime, the union of Holland and Zealand had been accomplished, with the Prince of Orange as sovereign. The representatives of various provinces met with deputies from Holland and Zealand in Utrecht in January 1579, and agreed to a treaty of union which was ever regarded as the foundation of the Netherlands Republic.

The contracting provinces agreed to remain eternally united, while each was to retain its

particular privileges, liberties, customs and laws.

For two years there were a series of desultory military operations. The assembly of the united provinces met at The Hague on July 26, 1581, and solemnly declared their independence of Philip and renounced their allegiance for ever. This act, however, left the country divided into three portions—the Walloon or reconciled provinces; the united provinces under Anjou; and the northern provinces under Orange.

Early in February 1582 the Duke of Anjou arrived in the Netherlands from England with a considerable train. The articles of the treaty under which he was elected sovereign as Duke of Brabant made as stringent and as sensible a constitutional compact as could be desired by any Netherlands patriot. Taken in connexion with the ancient charters, which they expressly upheld, they left to the new sovereign no arbitrary power. He was the hereditary president of a representative republic.

The Duke of Anjou, however, became discontented with his position. Many nobles of high rank came from France to pay their homage to him, and in January 1583 he entered into a conspiracy to take possession of the principal cities in Flanders. He reserved to himself the capture of Antwerp, and concentrated his French troops at Borgehout, a village close to the walls of Antwerp.

A night attack was made on the city, but the burghers flew to arms and the force was either dead or captured. The enterprise, known as the 'French Fury,' was an absolute and disgraceful failure, and the duke fled to Berghem. Negotiations for reconciliation were entered into with the Duke of Anjou, who, however, left for Paris in June, never again to return to the Netherlands.

VI—THE ASSASSINATION OF WILLIAM OF ORANGE

The Princess Charlotte having died on May 5, 1582, the Prince of Orange was married for the fourth time on April 21, 1583, on this occasion to Louisa, daughter of the illustrious Coligny. In the summer of 1584 the prince and princess took up their residence at Delft, where Frederick Henry, afterwards the celebrated stadtholder, was born to them. During the previous two years no fewer than five distinct attempts to assassinate the prince had been made, and all of them with the privity of the Spanish government or at the direct instigation of King Philip or the Duke of Parma.

A sixth and successful attempt was now to be made. On Sunday morning, July 8, the Prince of Orange received news of the death of Anjou. The courier who brought the despatches was admitted to the prince's bedroom. He called himself Francis Guion, the son of a martyred Calvinist, but he was in reality Balthazar Gérard, a fanatical Catholic who had for years formed the design of murdering the Prince of Orange.

The interview was so entirely unexpected that Gérard had come unarmed and had formed no plans for escape. He pleaded to the officer on duty in the prince's house that he wanted to attend divine service in the church opposite, but that his attire was too shabby and travel-stained and that, without new shoes and stockings, he was unfit to join the congregation. Having heard this, the prince ordered instantly a sum of money to be given to him. With this fund Gérard the following day bought a pair of pistols and ammunition.

On Tuesday, July 10, the prince, his wife, family, and the burgomaster of Leewarden dined as usual, at mid-day. At two o'clock the company rose from table, the prince leading the way, intending to pass to his private apartments upstairs. He had reached the second stair when Gérard, who had obtained admission to the house on the plea that he wanted a passport, emerged from a sunken arch and, standing within a foot or two of the prince, discharged a pistol full at his heart. He was carried to a couch in the dining-room, where in a few minutes he died in the arms of his wife and sister.

The murderer succeeded in making his escape through a side door, and sped swiftly towards the ramparts, where a horse was waiting for him at the moat, but was followed and captured by several pages and halberdiers. He made no effort to deny his identity, but boldly avowed himself and his deed. Afterwards he was subjected to excruciating tortures and executed on July 14 with execrable barbarity.

The reward promised by Philip to the man who should murder Orange was paid to the father and mother of Gérard. The excellent parents were ennobled and enriched by the crime of their son, but, instead of receiving the 25,000 crowns promised in the ban issued by Philip in 1580 at the instigation of Cardinal Granvelle, they were granted three seignories in the Franche Comté and took their place at once among the landed aristocracy.

The prince was entombed on August 3 at Delft amid the tears of a whole nation. Never was a more extensive, unaffected and legitimate sorrow felt at the death of any human being. William the Silent had gone through life bearing the load of a people's sorrows upon his shoulders with a smiling face. The people were grateful and affectionate, for they trusted the character of their 'Father William,' and not all the clouds which calumny could collect ever dimmed to their eyes the radiance of that lofty mind to which they were accustomed in their darkest calamities to look for light.

The life and labours of Orange had established the emancipated commonwealth upon a secure foundation, but his death rendered hopeless the union of all the Netherlands at that time into one republic.

A History of England

JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE

FROUDE won permanent fame with the publication in 1856 of the first two instalments of his History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth, the last volumes of which, carrying the story to the defeat of the Armada, appeared in 1870. This is one of the most fascinating historical works in the language, written in a vivid and graphic prose and with a remarkable power of picturesque description that give vitality to all the figures in the pages and plausibility to their motives. Froude refused to treat history as a science; he claimed that the historian should concern himself with the dramatic aspect of his period, and this he does triumphantly.

I—THE CONDITION OF TUDOR ENGLAND

IN periods like the present, when knowledge is every day extending and the habits and thoughts of mankind are perpetually changing under the influence of new discoveries, it is no easy matter to throw ourselves back into a time in which for centuries the European world grew upon a single type, in which the forms of the father's thoughts were the forms of the son's and the late descendant was occupied in treading into paths the footprints of his ancestors.

So absolutely has change become the law of our present condition, that to cease to change is to lose place in the great race. Looking back over history, we see times of change and progress alternating with other times when life and thought have settled into permanent forms. Such was the condition of the Greeks through many ages before the Persian wars and such, again, became the condition of Europe when the Northern nations grafted religion and the laws of the Western empire on their own hardy natures.

A condition of things differing alike both inwardly and outwardly from that into which a happier fortune has introduced ourselves is necessarily obscure to us. In the alteration of our own characters we have lost the key which would interpret the characters of our fathers. But some broad conclusions as to what they were are, however, at least possible to us.

A rough census taken at the time of the Armada shows that the population was something under five millions. The feudal system, though practically modified, was still the organizing principle of the nation and the owner of land was bound to military service at home whenever occasion required. All land was held upon a strictly military principle. The state of the working classes can best be determined by a comparison of their wages with the price of food.

Both were, as far as possible, regulated by Act of Parliament. Wheat in the fourteenth century averaged 10d. the bushel; beef and pork were ½d. a pound; mutton was ¾d. The best pig or goose could be bought for 4d.; a good capon for 3d.; a chicken for 1d.; a hen for 2d. Strong beer which now costs 1s. 6d. a gallon was then 1d. a gallon, and table beer was less than a halfpenny.

A penny at the time of which we write must have been nearly equal in the reign of Henry VIII to the present shilling. For a penny the labourer could buy as much bread, beef, beer and wine as the labourer of to-day can for a shilling. Turning, then, to the question of wages, by the 3rd of the 6th of Henry VIII it was enacted that the master carpenters, masons, bricklayers, tilers, plumbers, glaziers, joiners and other employers of skilled workmen should give to each of their journeymen, if no meat and drink were allowed, sixpence a day for the first half year, fivepence a day for the other half; or fivepence-halfpenny for the yearly average. The common labourers were to receive fourpence a day for the first half year; for the remaining half, threepence.

The day labourer received what was equivalent to something near twenty shillings a week, the wages at present paid in English colonies; and this is far from being a full account of his advantages. The agricultural labourer held land in connexion with his house, while in most parishes there were large ranges of common and unenclosed forest land, which furnished fuel to him gratis, where pigs might range, and ducks and geese, and where, if he could afford a cow, he was in no danger of being unable to feed it; and so important was this privilege considered, that when the commons began to be largely enclosed, Parliament insisted that the working man should not be without some piece of ground on which he could employ his industry.

By the 7th of the 31st of Elizabeth it was ordered that no cottage should be built for residence without four acres of land at lowest being attached to it for the sole use of the occupants of such cottage.

The incomes of the great nobles cannot be determined, for they varied probably as much as they do now. Under Henry IV the average income of an earl was estimated at £2,000 a year. Under Henry VIII the third Duke of Buckingham, the wealthiest English peer, had £6,000. And the income of the Archbishop of Canterbury was rated at the same amount. But the establishments of such men were enormous. Their retinues in time of peace consisted of several hundred persons and in time of war a large share of the expenses was paid often out of private purses.

PASSING down to the body of the people, we find that £20 a year, and heavy duties to do for it, represented the condition of the squire of the parish. By the 2nd of Henry V 'the wages' of a parish priest were limited to £5 6s. 8d., except in cases where there was a special licence from the bishop, when they might be raised as high as £6. Both squire and priest had sufficient for comfort. Neither was able to establish any steep difference between himself and the common people, so far as concerned outward advantages.

TIMES were changed in England since the second Henry walked barefoot through the streets of Canterbury and knelt while the monks flogged him on the pavement in the Chapter House, doing penance for Becket's murder. The clergy had won the battle in the twelfth century because they deserved it. They were not free from fault and weakness, but it is indisputable that they felt the meaning of their profession. Their hearts were in their vows, their authority was exercised more justly, more nobly, than the authority of the crown; and therefore, with inevitable justice, the crown was compelled to stoop before them.

The victory was great, but, like many victories, it was fatal to the conquerors. It filled them with the vanity of power; they forgot their duties in their privileges and when, a century later, the conflict recommenced, the altering issue proved the altering nature of the conditions under which it was fought. The nation was ready for sweeping remedies. The people felt little loyalty to the pope. The clergy pursued their course to its natural end. They sank steadily into that condition which is inevitable, from the constitution of human nature, among men without faith, wealthy, powerful and luxuriously fed, yet condemned to celibacy and cut off from the common duties and common pleasures of ordinary life.

Many priests spent their time in hawking or hunting, in lounging at taverns, in the dissolute enjoyments of the world. If, however, there were no longer saints among the clergy, there could still arise among them a remarkable man. In Cardinal Wolsey, the king found an adviser who was essentially a transition minister, holding a middle place between an English statesman and a Catholic of the old order. Under Wolsey's influence, Henry made war with Louis of France in the pope's quarrel, entered the polemic lists with Luther and persecuted the English Protestants.

Fish's famous pamphlet shows the spirit that was seething. He spoke of what he had seen and knew. The monks, he tells the king, 'be they that have made a hundred thousand idle, dissolute women in your realm.' But Wolsey could interfere with neither bishops nor monks without a special dispensation from the pope. A new trouble arose for the nation in the desire of Henry to divorce Catherine of Aragon, who had been his deceased brother's wife, was six years older than himself and was an obstacle to the establishment of the kingdom. Her sons were dead, and she was beyond the period when more children could be expected. Though descent in the female line was not formally denied, no queen regent had ever, in fact, sat upon the throne; nor was the claim distinctly admitted, or the claim of the House of York would have been unquestionable. It was, therefore, with no little anxiety that the council of Henry VIII perceived his male children, on whom their hopes were centred, either born dead, or dying within a few days of birth.

The life of the Princess Mary was precarious, for her health was weak from her childhood. If she lived, her accession would be a temptation to insurrection; if she did not live and the king had no other children, a civil war was inevitable. The next heir in blood was James of Scotland, and gravely as statesmen desired the union of the two countries, in the existing mood of the people, the very stones in London streets, it was said, would rise up against a king of Scotland who entered England as sovereign.

So far were Henry and Catherine alike that both had imperious tempers and both were indomitably obstinate; but Henry was hot and impetuous, Catherine cold and self-contained. She had been the wife of Prince Arthur, eldest son of Henry VII, but the death of that prince occurred only five months after the marriage. The uncertainty of the laws of marriage and the innumerable refinements of the Roman canon law affecting the legitimacy of children had raised scruples of conscience in the mind of the king. The loss of his children must have appeared as a judicial sentence on a violation of the Divine law. The divorce presented itself to him as a moral obligation when national advantage combined with superstition to encourage what he secretly desired.

Wolsey, after thirty years' experience of public life, was as sanguine as a boy. Armed with this little lever of divorce, he saw himself in imagination the rebuilder of the Catholic faith and the deliverer of Europe from ecclesiastical revolt and from innovations of faith. The mass of the people hated Protestantism as he, a true friend of the Catholic cult, sincerely detested the reformation of Luther. He believed that the old life-tree of Catholicism, which in fact was but cumbering the ground, might bloom again in its old beauty. But a truer political prophet than Wolsey would have been found in the most ignorant of those poor men who were risking death and torture in disseminating the pernicious volumes of the English Testament.

CATHERINE being a Spanish princess, Henry, in 1527, formed a league with Francis I, with the object of breaking the Spanish alliance. The pope was requested to make use of his dispensing power to enable the king of England to marry a wife who could bear him children. Deeply as we deplore the outrage inflicted on Catherine, and the scandal and suffering occasioned by the dispute, it was in the highest degree fortunate that at the crisis of public dissatisfaction in England with the condition of the Church, a cause should have arisen which tested the whole question of Church authority in its highest form. It was no accident which connected a suit for divorce with the reformation of religion.

The Spanish emperor, Charles V, gave Catherine his unwavering support and refused to allow the pope to pass a judicial sentence of divorce. Catherine refused to yield. Another person now comes into conspicuous view. It has been with Anne Boleyn as with Catherine of Aragon—both are regarded as the victims of a tyranny which Catholics and Protestants unite to remember with horror and each has taken the place of a martyred saint in the hagiology of the respective creeds. Anne Boleyn was the second daughter of Sir Thomas Boleyn, a gentleman of noble family. She was educated in Paris, and in 1525 came back to England to be maid of honour to Queen Catherine and to be distinguished at the court by her talents, accomplishments and beauty.

The fortunes of Anne Boleyn were unhappily

linked with those of men to whom the greatest work ever yet accomplished in this country was committed. In the memorable year 1529, after the meeting of parliament, events moved apace. In six weeks astonished Church authorities saw bill after bill hurried up before the lords, by which successively the pleasant fountains of their incomes would be dried up to flow no longer. The great Reformation had commenced in earnest.

The carelessness of the bishops in the discharge of their most immediate duties obliged the legislature to trespass in the provinces most purely spiritual and to undertake the discipline of the clergy. Bill after bill struck hard and home on the privileges of the recreant clergy. The aged Bishop of Rochester complained to the lords that in the lower house the cry was nothing but 'Down with the Church.' Yet, so frightful were the abuses that called for radical reform that even persons who most disapprove of the reformation will not at the present time wonder at their enactment, or disapprove of their severity. The king treated the bishops, when they remonstrated, with the most contemptuous disrespect.

Archbishop Cranmer now adopted a singular expedient. He advised Henry to invite expressions from all the chief learned authorities throughout Europe as to the right of the pope to grant him a dispensation of dissolution of his marriage. The English universities, to escape imputations of treason and to avoid exciting Henry's wrath, gave replies such as would please him, that of Oxford being, however, the more decided of the two. Most of the Continental authorities declined to pronounce any dictum as to the powers of the pope.

III—THE FALL OF THE GREAT CHANCELLOR

THE fall of Wolsey was at hand. His enemies accused him of treason to the constitution by violating a law of the realm. He had acted as papal legate within the realm. The parliaments of Edward I, Edward III, Richard II, and Henry IV had by a series of statutes pronounced illegal all presentations by the pope to any office or dignity in the Anglican Church, under a penalty of *premunire*. Henry did not feel himself called on to shield his great minister, although the guilt extended to all who had recognized Wolsey in the capacity of papal legate. Indeed, it extended to the archbishops, bishops, the privy council, the two houses of parliament and indirectly to the nation itself. The higher clergy had been encouraged by Wolsey's position to commit those acts of despotism which had created so deep an animosity among the people. The overthrow of England's last ecclesiastical minister was to teach them that the privileges they had abused were at an end.

In February, 1531, Henry assumed the title, which was to occasion such momentous consequences, of 'Protector and only Supreme Head of the Church and Clergy of England.' The clergy were compelled to assent. Further serious steps marked the great breach with Rome. The annates, or first fruits, were abolished. Ever since the crusades a practice had existed in all the churches of Europe that bishops and archbishops, on presentation to their sees, should transmit to the pope one year's income. This impressive impost was now abrogated. It was a sign of the parting of the ways.

Henry laid his conduct open to the world, declaring truly what he desired, and seeking it by open means. He was determined to proceed with the divorce, and also to continue the reformation of the English Church. And he was in no small measure aided in the former resolve by the recommendation of Francis, for the French king advised him to act on the general opinion of Europe that his marriage with Catherine, as widow of his elder brother Arthur, was null, and at once make Anne Boleyn his wife. This counsel, so palatable to Henry, was administered at an interview between the two kings at Boulogne, in October 1532.

THE pope had trifled for six years with the momentous question and Henry was growing old. At the outset of the discussion the pope had said, 'Marry freely; fear nothing; and all shall be arranged as you desire.' But the pontiff, reduced to a dilemma by various causes, had fallen back on his Italian cunning, and had changed his attitude, listening to the appeals of Catherine and her powerful friends. And now he threatened Henry with excommunication.

Henry entered privately into matrimonial relations with Anne in November 1532 and the marriage was solemnly celebrated, with a gorgeous pageant, at Westminster Abbey in the following January. On July 24 the people gathering to church in every parish read, nailed to the church doors, a paper signed 'Henry R.,' setting forth that the Lady Catherine of Spain, heretofore called queen of England, was not to be called by that title any more, but princess dowager and so to be held and esteemed. The triumph of Anne was to last but three short years.

IV—THE BIRTH AND TRIUMPH OF PROTESTANTISM

WYCLIFFE'S labour had left only the Bible as the seed of a future life and no trace remained in the sixteenth century of the Lollardry of the fourteenth. But now Protestantism recommenced its enterprise in the growing desire for a nobler, holier insight into the will of God. In the year 1525 was enrolled in London a society calling itself The Association of Christian Brothers, Its paid agents went up and down the land carrying tracts and Testaments with them and enrolling in the order all who dared risk their lives in such a cause.

The Protestants thus isolated were waiting for direction, and men in such a temper are seldom left to wait in vain. Luther had kindled the spark which was to become a conflagration, in Germany, at Wittemberg, on October 31, 1517, by his denunciation of indulgences. His words found an echo and flew from lip to lip all through Western Europe. Tyndale, an Oxford student, went to Germany, saw Luther and under his direction translated into English the Gospels and Epistles. This led to the formation of the 'association' in London.

The authorities were alarmed. The bishops subscribed to buy up the translations of the Bible and these were burnt before a vast concourse in St. Paul's Churchyard.

But Wolsey for two years already had been suppressing the smaller monasteries. Simultaneously, Protestants were persecuted wherever they could be detected and seized. 'Little' Bilney, or 'Saint' Bilney, a distinguished Cambridge student, was burnt as a heretic at the stake, as were James Bainham, a barrister of the Middle Temple, and several other members of the 'association.' These were the first paladins of the reformation and the struggle went bravely forward. They were the knights who slew the dragons and made the earth habitable for common flesh and blood.

As yet but two men of the highest order of power were on the side of Protestantism—Latimer and Cromwell. These were now to come forward, pressed by circumstances which could no longer dispense with them. When the breach with the pope was made irreparable and the papal party at home had assumed an attitude of suspended insurrection, the fortunes of the Protestants entered into a new phase. The persecution ceased and those who were but lately its likely victims, hiding for their lives, passed at once by a sudden alternation into the sunshine of political favour.

Cromwell and Latimer together caught the movement as it went by and before it was over a work had been done in England which, when it was once accomplished, was accomplished for ever. The conservative party recovered their power and abused it as before; but the chains of the nation were broken, and no craft of kings or priests or statesmen could weld the magic links again. Latimer became famous as a preacher at Cambridge and was heard of by Henry, who sent for him and appointed him one of the royal chaplains. He was accused by the bishops of heresy, but was, on trial, absolved and sent back to his parish. Soon after, the tide turned and the reformation entered into a new phase.

THOMAS CROMWELL, like Latimer, of humble origin, was the *malleus monachorum*. Wolsey discovered his merit and employed him in breaking up the small monasteries which the pope had granted for the foundation of the new colleges. Cromwell remained with the great cardinal till his fall. It was then that the truly noble nature which was in him showed itself. The lords had passed a bill of impeachment against Wolsey—violent, vindictive and malevolent. It was to be submitted to the commons. Cromwell prepared an opposition and conducted the defence from his place in parliament so skilfully that he threw out the bill, saved Wolsey and gained such a reputation that he became Henry's secretary, representing the government in the House of Commons and was on the high road to power.

The reformation was blotted with a black and frightful stain. Towards the end of April 1536 certain members of the Privy Council were engaged in secretly collecting evidence which implicated the queen in adultery. In connexion with the terrible charge, as her accomplices, five gentlemen were arrested—Sir William Brereton, Mark Smeton, a court musician, Sir Henry Norris, Sir Francis Weston and, the accusation in his case being the most shocking, Lord Rochford, the queen's brother. The trial was hastily pushed forward and all were executed. The queen, who vehemently and piteously appealed to Henry, passionately protesting that she was absolutely innocent, was also condemned and was beheaded in public on Tower Hill.

Henry immediately after the tragedy married Jane, daughter of Sir John Seymour. The indecent haste is usually considered conclusive of the cause of Anne Boleyn's ruin. On October 12, 1537, a prince, so long and passionately hoped for, was born; but a sad calamity followed, for the queen took cold and died on October 24.

IN 1539 monastic life came to an end in England. The great monasteries were dissolved; the abbey lands were distributed partly amongst the old nobility and partly amongst the chapters of six new bishoprics. On January 6, 1540, was solemnised the marriage of Henry with Anne, daughter of the Duke of Cleves and sister-in-law of the Elector of Saxony. This event was brought about by the negotiations of Cromwell. The king was deeply displeased with the ungainly appearance of his bride when he met her on her landing, but retreat was impossible. Though Henry was personally kind to the new queen, the marriage made him wretched, and no time was lost in dissolving it.

Cromwell's enemies speedily hatched a conspiracy against the great statesman. He was arrested on a charge of high treason, was accused of corruption and heresy, of gaining wealth by bribery and extortion and, in spite of Cranmer's efforts to save him, passed to the scaffold on July 28, 1540. For eight years Cromwell, who had been ennobled as Earl of Essex, was supreme with king, parliament and convocation, and the nation, in the ferment of revolution, was absolutely controlled by him.

CONVOCATION had already dissolved the marriage of Henry and Anne, setting both free to contract and consummate other marriages without objection or delay. The queen had placidly given her consent. Handsome settlements were made on her in the shape of estates for her maintenance producing nearly three thousand a year. In August of the same year the king married, without delay of circumstance, Catherine, daughter of Lord Edmund Howard.

Brief indeed was her reign. In November 1541 she was charged with unfaithfulness to her marriage vows. The king was overwhelmed. Some dreadful spirit pursued his married life, tainting it with infamy.

Two gentlemen confessed their guilty connexion with the queen. They were hanged at Tyburn and the queen and Lady Rochford, who had been her confidential companion, suffered within the Tower. Once more the king ventured into marriage. Catherine, widow of Lord Latimer, his last choice, was selected, not in the interest of politics or religion, but by his own personal judgement; and this time he found the peace which he desired.

Henry died on January 28, 1547. He was attended in his last moments by Cranmer, having sent specially for the archbishop.

The king did nor leave the world without expressing his views on the future with elaborate explicitness. He spent the day before his death in conversation with Lord Hertford and Sir

William Paget on the condition of the country. By separate and earnest messages he commended Prince Edward to the care both of Charles V and of Francis I.

The earl, on the morning of Henry's death, hastened off to bring up the prince, who was in Hertfordshire with the Princess Elizabeth, and in the afternoon of Monday, the 31st, he arrived at the Tower with Edward. The Council was already in session and Hertford was appointed protector during the minority of Edward. Thus the reforming Protestant party was in full power. Cranmer set the willing example and the other prelates consented, or were compelled to imitate him, in an acknowledgment that all jurisdiction, ecclesiastical as well as secular, within the realm only emanated from the sovereign. In February it was ordered in council that Hertford should be duke of Somerset and that his brother, Sir Thomas Seymour, should be Lord Seymour of Sudleye; Lord Parr was to be marquis of Northampton; Lord Wriothesley, the chancellor, earl of Southampton; and Viscount Lisle was to be earl of Warwick. The duke of Somerset was the young king's uncle, and the real power was at once in his hands. But if he was ambitious, it was only—as he persuaded himself—to do good.

V—EDWARD AND THE CATHOLIC RESTORATION

UNDER Somerset's rule the spirit of iconoclasm spread fast and the reformation proceeded to completion. Churches were cleared of images and crucifixes were melted into coin. He gave the popular movement the formal sanction of the government. Injunctions were issued for the general purification of the churches. The Book of Homilies was issued as a guide to doctrine, care was taken that copies of the Bible were accessible in the parish churches and translations of Erasmus's Paraphrase of the New Testament were provided as a commentary.

Somerset was a brave general as well as a great statesman. He invaded Scotland during the first year of his protectorate, on account of the refusal of the Scottish government to ratify the contract entered into with Henry VIII, by which it was agreed that Mary Queen of Scots should marry Edward. At the memorable battle of Pinkie, on September 10, 1547, the Scots were completely beaten. But Somerset was hastily summoned southward. Intrigue was rife. His brother, Lord Seymour, had been caballing against him and was arrested, tried and beheaded on Tower Hill, on March 20, 1549.

But the fall of the protector himself was not long delayed, for under his administration of three years his policy gradually excited wide discontent. In various parts of the country insurrections had to be suppressed. The French king had taken away the young Scottish queen, the king's majesty's espouse, by which marriage the realms of England and Scotland should have been united in perpetual peace. Money had been wasted on the royal household. The alliance with Charles V had been trifled away. The princely name and princely splendour which Somerset affected, the vast fortune which he amassed amidst the ruin of the national finances and the palace—now known as Somerset House, London—which was rising before the eyes of the world amidst the national defeats and misfortunes, combined to embitter the irritation with which the council regarded him.

His great rival, John Dudley, Earl of Warwick, by constant insinuations both in and out of parliament, excited the national feeling against him to such a degree that at length the young king was constrained to sign his deposition. He seems to have entertained no strong attachment to his uncle. On December 1, 1551, he was tried before the lords for high treason and condemned. He was beheaded on Tower Hill on January 22, 1552.

The English public, often wildly wrong on general questions, are good judges, for the most part, of personal character; and so passionately was Somerset loved that those who were nearest the scaffold started forward to dip their handkerchiefs in his blood.

BEFORE this event, Dudley, by whose cruel treachery the tragedy had been brought about, had been created duke of Northumberland. The great aim of this nobleman was to secure the succession to the throne for his own family. With this purpose in view he married his son, Lord Guildford Dudley, to Lady Jane Grey, daughter of the duchess of Suffolk, to whom, by the will of Henry VIII, the crown would pass, in default of issue by Edward, Mary, or Elizabeth.

In April 1553, Edward, who had been removed to Greenwich in consequence of illness, grew rapidly worse. By the end of the month he was spitting blood and the country was felt to be on the eve of a new reign. The accession of Mary, who was personally popular, was looked forward to by the people as a matter of course. The ambitious Northumberland, however, worked on the mind of the feeble and dying king and succeeded in persuading him to declare both his sisters incapable of succeeding to the crown, as being illegitimate. The king died on July 6. The last male child of the Tudor race had ceased to suffer.

When Lady Jane was saluted by Northumberland and four other lords, all kneeling at her feet, as queen, she shook, covered her face with her hands and fell fainting to the ground. The next Monday, July 10, the royal barges came down the Thames from Richmond and at three in the afternoon Lady Jane landed at the broad staircase of the Tower, as queen, in undesired splendour. But that same evening messages came saying that Mary, whose right in law was unquestionable, had declared herself queen. She had sent addresses to the peers, commanding them on their allegiance to come to her.

Happily, the conspiracy in favour of Lady Jane was crushed without bloodshed, although it had seemed for a time as if the nation were on the brink of a civil war. But though Mary wished to spare Lady Jane and her husband, her intentions were frustrated by the determination of Renard, ambassador of the emperor. Northumberland was sent to the Tower and beheaded on August 22 and, in the following November, Lady Jane and her husband were also condemned. Mary long hesitated, but at length her scruples were overcome, she issued the fatal warrant on February 8, 1554, and four days later both were executed. Lady Jane was but a delicate girl of seventeen, but met her fate with the utmost heroism.

Stephen Gardiner, bishop of Winchester, became the chief instrument of the restoration of the Catholic faith under Mary. His fierce spirit soon began to display itself. In the fiery obstinacy of his determination this prelate speedily became the incarnate expression of the fury of the ecclesiastical faction, smarting, as they were, under their long degradation and under the irritating consciousness of those false oaths of submission which they had been compelled to swear to a power they loathed.

VI—THE ENGLISH REIGN OF TERROR

MARY listened to the worst counsels of each and her distempered humour settled into a confused ferocity. Both Gardiner and she resolved to secure the trial, condemnation and execution of her sister Elizabeth, but their plans utterly miscarried, for no evidence against her could be gathered. The princess was known to be favourable to the Protestant cause, but the attempts to prove her disloyalty to Mary were vain. She was imprisoned in the Tower and the fatal net appeared to be closing on her.

But though the danger of her murder was very great, the lords who had reluctantly permitted her to be imprisoned would not allow her to be openly sacrificed, nor indeed permit the queen to continue in the career of vengeance on which she had entered. The necessity of releasing Elizabeth from the Tower was an unspeakable annoyance to Mary. A confinement at Woodstock was the furthest stretch of severity that the country would, for the present, permit. On May 19, 1554, Elizabeth was taken up the river.

Vexations began to tell on Mary's spirit. She could not shake off her anxieties, or escape from the shadow of her subject's hatred. Insolent pamphlets were dropped in her path and in the offices of Whitehall. They were placed by mysterious hands in the sanctuary of her bedroom.

Her trials began to tell on her understanding. She was ill with hysterical longings; ill with the passions which Gardiner, as her chancellor, had provoked, but Paget, as leader of the opposing party, had disappointed. But she was now to become the wife of King Philip of Spain. Negotiations for this momentous marriage had been protracted and even after the contract had been signed, Philip seemed slow to arrive. The coolness manifested by his tardiness did much to aggravate the queen's despondency.

On July 20, 1554, he landed at Southampton. The atmospheric auspices were not cheering, for Philip, who had come from the sunny plains of Castile, from his window at Southampton looked out on a steady downfall of July rain. On the next Sunday he journeyed to Winchester, again in pouring rain. To the cathedral he went first, wet as he was. Mary was at the bishop's palace, a few hundred yards' distance. Mary could not wait and the same night the interview took place. Let the curtain fall over the meeting, let it close also over the wedding solemnities which followed with due splendour two days after. There are scenes in life which we regard with pity too deep for words. The unhappy queen, unloved, unlovable, yet with her parched heart thirsting for affection, was flinging herself upon a breast to which an iceberg was warm; upon a man to whom love was an unmeaning word.

Mary set about to complete the Catholic reaction. Gardiner, Bonner and four other prelates formed a court on January 28, 1555, in St. Mary Overy's Church, Southwark, and Hooper, bishop of Gloucester, and Canon Rogers of St. Paul's were brought up before them. Both were condemned as Protestants and both were burnt at the stake, the bishop at Gloucester, the canon at Smithfield. They suffered heroically. The Catholics had affected to sneer at the faith of their rivals. There was a general conviction among them that Protestants would all flinch at the last; that they had no 'doctrine that would abide the fire.' Many more victims were offered. The enemies of the Church were to submit or die. So said Gardiner and so said the papal legate and the queen, in the delirious belief that they were the chosen instruments of Providence.

The people, whom the cruelty of the party was reconverting to the reformation, while the fires of Smithfield blazed with a rapidity like that produced by the gift of tongues at Pentecost, regarded the martyrs with admiration as soldiers dying for their country. On Mary, sorrow was heaped on sorrow. Her expectation of a child was disappointed and Philip refused to stay in England. The horrible crusade against heretics became the business of the rest of her life. Archbishop Cranmer, Bishops Ridley and Latimer and many other persons of distinction were amongst the martyrs of the Marian persecution.

Mary's miseries were intensified month by month. War broke out between England and France. For ten years the French had cherished designs and on January 7, 1558, the famous stronghold of Calais fell into their hands. The effect of this misfortune on the queen was to produce utter prostration. She now well understood that both parliament and the nation were badly disposed towards her. But her end was at hand. After much suffering from dropsy and nervous debility, she prepared quietly for what she knew was inevitable.

On November 16, at midnight, taking leave of a world in which she had played so evil a part, Mary received the last rites of the Church. A few hours later the pope's legate, Cardinal Pole, followed her. Thus the reign of the pope in England and the reign of terror closed together.

History of the Rebellion in England

EARL OF CLARENDON

IT has been urged (with justice) that Lord Clarendon misrepresented facts and suppressed the truth when the truth seemed unpleasant to him, and that he was most inaccurate in his details. It has never been denied, however, that Clarendon was a great writer, or that he was a master of vivid narrative. He is, moreover, a very shrewd analyst of character, and the gallery of portraits embodied in the History of the Rebellion in England is of great interest and genuine historical value. Both his faults and his virtues may be set down to the fact that he actually participated in most of the events which he describes. The History was published between 1704 and 1707, after its author's death.

I—STRUGGLES BEGINNING

KING JAMES, in the end of March 1625, died, leaving his majesty that now is engaged in a war with Spain; but unprovided with money to manage it, though it was undertaken by the consent and advice of parliament, the people being naturally enough inclined to the war (having surfeited with the uninterrupted pleasures and plenty of twenty-two years of peace) and sufficiently inflamed against the Spaniard, but quickly weary of the charge of it. Therefore, after an unprosperous attempt by sea on Cadiz, and a still more unsuccessful one on France, at the Isle of Ré (for some difference had also begotten a war with that country), a general peace was shortly concluded with both kingdoms.

The exchequer was exhausted by the debts of King James and the war, so that the known revenue was anticipated and the king was driven into straits for his own support. Many ways were resorted to for supply, such as selling the crown lands, creating peers for money, and other particulars which no access of power or plenty could since repair.

Parliaments were summoned, and again dissolved; and that in the fourth year after the dissolution of the two former was determined with a declaration that no more assemblies of that nature should be expected, and all men should be inhibited on the penalty of censure so much as to speak of a parliament.

And here I cannot but let myself loose to say that no man can show me a source from whence these waters of bitterness we now taste have probably flowed than from these unseasonable, unskilful and precipitate dissolutions of parliaments. And whoever considers the acts of power and injustice in the intervals between parliaments will not be much scandalised at the warmth and vivacity displayed in their meetings.

In the second parliament it was proposed to grant five subsidies, a proportion (how contemptible soever in respect of the pressures now every day imposed) never before heard of in parliament. And that meeting being upon very unpopular and unplausible reasons immediately dissolved, those five subsidies were exacted throughout the whole kingdom with the same rigour as if in truth an act had passed to that purpose. And very many gentlemen of prime quality in all counties were, for refusing to pay the same, committed to prison.

The abrupt and ungracious breaking of the first two parliaments was wholly imputed to the duke of Buckingham by his favour with the king; and of the third, principally to the Lord Weston, then High Treasurer of England. And therefore the envy and hatred that attended them thereupon was insupportable, and was visibly the cause of the murder of the first (stabbed to the heart by the hand of an obscure villain).

Shortly after Buckingham's death the king promoted Dr. Laud, bishop of Bath and Wells, to the archbishopric of Canterbury. Unjust modes of raising money were instituted, which caused increasing discontent, especially the tax denominated ship money. A writ was directed to the sheriff of every county to provide a ship for the king's service, but with the writ were sent instructions that, instead of a ship, he should levy upon his county a sum of money for his majesty's use.

After the continued receipt of the ship money for four years, upon the refusal of Mr. Hampden, a private gentleman, to pay his share, the case was solemnly argued before all the judges of England in the exchequer chamber, and the tax was judged lawful; which judgement proved of more advantage and credit to the gentleman condemned than to the king's service.

II—THE HEATHER ON FIRE

THE king now resolved to make a progress into the north and to be solemnly crowned in his kingdom of Scotland, which he had never seen from the time he first left it at the age of two years. He had deeply imbibed his father's notions that an episcopal church was the most consistent with the royal authority, and he committed to a select number of the bishops in Scotland the framing of a liturgy for use there.

In 1638 Scotland assumed an attitude of determined resistance to the imposition of a liturgy and of episcopal church government. All the kingdom flocked to Edinburgh, as in a general cause that concerned their salvation. A general assembly was called and a national covenant was subscribed. Men were listed towards the raising of an army, Colonel Leslie being chosen general. The king thought it time to chastise the seditious by force, and in the end of the year 1638 declared his resolution to raise an army to suppress their rebellion.

This was the first alarm England received towards any trouble, after it had enjoyed for so many years the most uninterrupted prosperity

in a full and plentiful peace that any nation could be blessed with. The army was soon mustered and the king went to the borders. But negotiations for peace took place and civil war was averted by concessions on the part of the king, so that a treaty of pacification was entered upon. This event happened in the year 1639.

After for eleven years governing without a parliament, with Archbishop Laud and the earl of Strafford as his advisers, King Charles was constrained in 1640 to summon an English parliament, which, however, instead of at once complying with his demands, commenced by drawing up a list of grievances. Mr. Pym, a man of good reputation, but better known afterwards, led the remonstrances, observing that 'by the long intermission of parliaments many unwarrantable things had been practised, notwithstanding the great virtue of his majesty.' Disputes took place between the lords and commons, the latter claiming that the right of supply belonged solely to them.

The king speedily dissolved parliament and, the Scots having invaded England, proceeded to raise an army to resist them. The Scots entered Newcastle, and the earl of Strafford, weak after a sickness, was defeated and retreated to Durham. The king, with his army weakened and the treasury depleted, was in great straits. He was again constrained to call a parliament, which met on November 3, 1640.

It had a sad and melancholic aspect. The king himself did not ride with his accustomed equipage to Westminster, but went privately in his barge to the parliament stairs. The king being informed that Sir Thomas Gardiner, not having been returned a member, could not be chosen to be Speaker, his majesty appointed Mr. Lenthall, a bencher of Lincoln's Inn. In this parliament, also, Mr. Pym began the recital of grievances, and other members followed with invectives against the earl of Strafford, accusing him of high and imperious and tyrannical actions and of abusing his power and credit with the king.

After many hours of bitter inveighing it was moved that the earl might be forthwith impeached of high treason, which was no sooner mentioned than it found a universal approbation and consent from the whole house. With very little debate, the peers, in their turn, when the impeachment was sent up to them, resolved that he should be committed to the custody of the gentleman usher of the black rod; and next, by an accusation of high treason against him also, the archbishop of Canterbury was removed from the king's council.

The trial of the earl in Westminster Hall began on March 22, 1641, and lasted eighteen days. Both houses passed a bill of attainder. The king resolved never to give his consent to this measure, but a rabble of many thousands of people besieged Whitehall, crying out: 'Justice, justice! We will have justice!'

The privy council being called together, pressed the king to pass the bill of attainder, saying there was no other way to preserve himself and his posterity than by so doing; and therefore he ought to be more tender of the safety of the kingdom than of any one person howsoever. No one councillor interposed his opinion to support his master's magnanimity and innocence.

Thus in the end was extorted from the king a commission for some lords to sign the bill. This was as valid as if he had signed it himself, though they comforted him even with that circumstance, 'that his own hand was not in it.'

The earl was beheaded on May 12 on Tower Hill. Together with that of attainder of this nobleman, another bill was passed by the king of almost as fatal consequence to him and the kingdom as that was to the earl, 'the act for perpetual parliament.' Thus parliament could not be adjourned, prorogued, or dissolved without its consent.

III—KING AND PRELATES

GREAT offence was given to the commons by the action of the king in appointing new bishops to certain vacant sees at the very time when they were debating an act for taking away bishops' votes.

Unfortunately, the king sent to the House of Lords a remonstrance from the bishops against their constrained absence from the legislature. This led to violent scenes in the House of Commons, which might have been beneficial to him had he not been misadvised by Lord Digby. At this time many of his own council were adverse to him.

Injudiciously, the king caused Lord Kimbolton and five members of the commons to be accused of high treason, advised thereto by Lord Digby. The king's attorney, Herbert, delivered to parliament a paper, whereby, besides Lord Kimbolton, Denzil Hollis, Sir Arthur Haslerig, Mr. Pym, Mr. Hampden and Mr. Strode stood accused of conspiring against the king and parliament.

The sergeant-at-arms demanded the persons of the accused members to be delivered to him in his majesty's name, but the commons refused to comply with this demand as inconsistent with their privileges and dignity, sending a message to the king that the members should be forthcoming as soon as a legal charge should be preferred against them.

The next day the king, attended by his own guard and a few gentlemen, went into the house to the great amazement of all; and the Speaker leaving the chair, the king went into it. Asking the Speaker whether the accused members were in the house, and he making no answer, the king said he perceived that the birds had flown, but expected that they should be sent to him as soon as they returned, and assured them on the word of a king that no force was intended, but that he would proceed against them in a fair and legal way.

Both houses of parliament speedily manifested sympathy with the accused persons, and a committee of citizens was formed in the city for their defence. The proceedings of the king and his advisers were declared to be a high breach of the privileges of parliament. Such was the temper of the populace that the king thought it convenient to remove from London, and went with the queen to Hampton Court. The next day the members were brought in triumph to parliament by the trained bands of London.

IV—THE KING'S SIGNAL OF WAR

AFTER many disagreements with parliament the king, in 1642, published a declaration that had been long ready, in which he recapitulated all the insolent and rebellious actions which parliament had committed against him; and declared them 'to be guilty'; and forbade all his subjects to yield any obedience to them; and at the same time published his proclamation by which he 'required all men who could bear arms to repair to him at Nottingham by August 25, on which day he would set up his royal standard there, which all good subjects were obliged to attend.'

According to the proclamation, on August 25 the standard was erected about six in the evening of a very stormy day. But there was not yet a single regiment levied and brought there, so that the trained bands drawn thither by the sheriff were all the strength the king had for his person, and the guard of the standard. There appeared no conflux of men in obedience to the proclamation. The arms and ammunition had not yet come from York, and a general sadness covered the whole town, and the king himself appeared more melancholy than he used to be. The standard itself was blown down the same night it had been set up.

Intelligence was received the next day that the rebel army—for such the king had declared it—was, horse, foot and cannon, at Northampton, whereas his few cannon and ammunition were still at York. It was evident that all the strength he had to depend upon was his horse, which were under the command of Prince Rupert at Leicester, not more than 800 in number, whilst the enemy had, within less than twenty miles of that place, double the number of horse excellently well armed and appointed, and a body of 5,000 foot well trained and disciplined.

Very speedily intelligence came that Portsmouth was besieged by land and sea by the parliamentary forces, and soon came word that it was lost to the king through the neglect of Colonel Goring. The king removed to Derby, and then to Shrewsbury. Prince Rupert was successful in a skirmish at Worcester.

Banbury Castle surrendered to Charles, and, marching to Oxford, he there experienced a favourable reception and recruited his army. At the battle of Edgehill neither side gained the advantage, though altogether about 5,000 men fell on the field.

On June 13, 1645, the king heard that General Fairfax was advanced to Northampton with a strong army, much superior to the numbers he had formerly been advised of. The battle began at ten the next morning on a high ground about Naseby. The first charge was given by Prince Rupert, with his usual vigour, so that he bore down all before him, and was soon master of six pieces of cannon. But though the king's troops prevailed in the charge, they never rallied again in order, nor could they be brought to make a second charge. But the enemy, disciplined under such generals as Fairfax and Cromwell, though routed always formed again.

This was why the king's forces failed to win a decisive victory at Edgehill, and now at Naseby, after Prince Rupert's charge, Cromwell brought up his troops with such effect that in the end the king was compelled to quit the field, leaving Fairfax, who was commander-in-chief of the parliamentary army, master of his foot, cannon and baggage.

The king and Prince Rupert, with the broken troops, marched by stages to Hereford, where Prince Rupert left the king, to hasten to Bristol, that he might put that place in a state of defence.

V—ALL LOST

NOTHING can here be more wondered at than that the king should amuse himself about forming a new army in counties that had been vexed and worn out with the oppressions of his own troops, and not have immediately repaired into the west, where he had an army already formed. Cromwell having taken Winchester and Basing, the king sent some messages to parliament for peace, which were not regarded. A treaty between the king and the Scots was set on foot by the interposition of the French, but the parties disagreed about church government.

Having now no other resource, the king placed himself under the protection of the Scots army at Newark. The chancellor of Scotland told him that the parliament, after the battles that had been fought, had got the strongholds and forts of the kingdom into their hands, that they had gained a victory over all, and had a strong army to maintain it, so that they might do what they would with Church and State; that they desired neither him nor any of his race to reign any longer over them; and that if he declined to yield to the propositions made to him, all England would join against him to depose him.

With great magnanimity and resolution the king replied that they must proceed their own way, and that though they had all forsaken him, God had not. The Scots began to talk sturdily in answer to a demand that they should deliver up the king's person to parliament. They denied that the parliament had power absolutely to dispose of the king's person without their approbation; and the parliament as loudly replied that they had nothing to do in England but to observe orders.

But these discourses were only kept up till they could adjust accounts between them, and agree what price should be paid for the delivery of his person, whom one side was resolved to have, and the other as resolved not to keep. So they quickly agreed that, upon payment of £200,000 in hand, and security for as much more upon days agreed upon, they would deliver up the king.

AND upon this infamous contract that excellent prince was, in the end of January 1647, wickedly given up by his Scottish subjects to those of the English who were trusted by the parliament to receive him. He was brought to his own house at Holmby, in Northants, a place he had taken much delight in. Removed before long to Hampton Court, he escaped to the Isle of Wight, where he confided himself to Colonel Hammond, and was lodged in Carisbrook Castle.

In a speech in parliament Cromwell declared that the king was a man of great parts and a great understanding—faculties they had hitherto

endeavoured to have him thought to be without —but that he was so great a dissembler and so false a man that he was not to be trusted. He concluded, therefore, that no more messages should be sent to the king, but that they might enter on those counsels which were necessary without having further recourse to him, especially as at that very moment he was secretly treating with the Scottish commissioners how he might embroil the nation in a new war and destroy the parliament.

A committee being formed to prepare a charge of high treason against the king, of which Bradshaw was made president, his majesty was brought to St. James's, and it was concluded to have him publicly tried.

From the time of the king's arrival at St. James's, when he was delivered into the custody of Colonel Tomlinson, he was treated with much more rudeness and barbarity than ever before. No man was suffered to see or speak to him but the soldiers who were his guard.

When he was first brought to Westminster Hall, on January 20, 1649, before their high court of justice, he looked upon them and sat down without any manifestation of trouble, never stirring his hat, all the impudent judges sitting covered and fixing their eyes on him without the least show of respect. To the charges read out against him the king replied that for his actions he was accountable to none but God, though they had been such as he need not be ashamed of before all the world.

The several unheard-of insolences which this excellent prince was forced to submit to before that odious judicatory, his majestic behaviour, the pronouncing that horrible sentence upon the most innocent person in the world, the execution of that sentence by the most execrable murder ever committed since that of our blessed Saviour, and the circumstances thereof, are all so well known that the further mentioning it would but afflict and grieve the reader, and make the relation itself odious; and, therefore, no more shall be said here of that lamentable tragedy, so much to the dishonour of the nation and the religion professed by it.

The History of England

LORD MACAULAY

GREAT as was the popularity of Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome and of his collected Essays, it was eclipsed by that of his History of England, from the Accession of James II to the death of William III. The first two volumes appeared in 1848, the next two in 1855, and the unfinished fifth volume in 1861 after his death. Macaulay has been accused of allowing his Whig bias to distort his views. But, in the words of Sir Leslie Stephen, 'it does not seem that he was ever consciously unfair, and an historian without prejudices has hitherto meant a writer without imagination.' As a lucid and picturesque narrator Macaulay is almost unsurpassed, and his History will always be read for its brilliant style.

I—ENGLAND IN THE EARLIER TIMES

I PURPOSE to write the history of England from the accession of King James II down to a time within the memory of men still living. I shall recount the errors which, in a few months, alienated a loyal gentry and priesthood from the House of Stewart. I shall trace the course of that revolution which terminated the long struggle between our sovereigns and their parliaments, and bound up together the rights of the people and the title of the reigning dynasty.

Unless I greatly deceive myself, the general effect of this chequered narrative, faithfully recording disasters mingled with triumphs, will be to excite thankfulness in all religious minds and hope in the breasts of all patriots. For the history of our country during the period concerned is eminently the history of physical, of moral and of intellectual improvement.

Nothing in the early existence of Britain indicated the greatness she was destined to attain. Of the western provinces which obeyed the Caesars, she was the last conquered and the first flung away. Though she had been subjugated by the Roman arms, she received only a faint tincture of Roman arts and letters. No magnificent remains of Roman porches and aqueducts are to be found in Britain, and the scanty and superficial civilization which the islanders acquired from their southern masters was effaced by the calamities of the fifth century.

From the darkness that followed the ruin of the Western Empire Britain emerges as England. The conversion of the Saxon colonists to Christianity was the first of a long series of salutary revolutions. The Church has many times been compared to the ark of which we read in the Book of Genesis; but never was the resemblance more perfect than during that evil time when she rode alone, amidst darkness and tempest, on the deluge beneath which all the great works of ancient power and wisdom lay entombed, bearing within her that feeble germ from which a second and more glorious civilization was to spring.

EVEN the spiritual supremacy of the Pope was, in the Dark Ages, productive of far more good than evil. Its effect was to unite the nations of Western Europe in one great commonwealth. Into this federation our Saxon ancestors were now admitted. Learning followed in the train of Christianity. The poetry and eloquence of the Augustan age was assiduously studied in the Mercian and Northumbrian monasteries. The names of Bede and Alcuin were justly celebrated throughout Europe. Such was the state of our country when, in the ninth century, began the last great migration of the northern barbarians.

Large colonies of Danish adventurers established themselves in our island, and for many years the struggle continued between the two

fierce Teutonic breeds, each being alternately paramount. At length the north ceased to send forth fresh streams of piratical emigrants, and from that time the mutual aversion of Danes and Saxons began to subside. Intermarriage became frequent. The Danes learnt the religion of the Saxons, and the two dialects of one widespread language were blended. But the distinction between the two nations was by no means effaced when an event took place which prostrated both at the feet of a third people.

The Normans were then the foremost race of Christendom. Originally rovers from Scandinavia, conspicuous for their valour and ferocity, they had, after long being the terror of the Channel, founded a mighty state, which gradually extended its influence from its own Norman territory over the neighbouring districts of Brittany and Maine. They embraced Christianity and adopted the French tongue. They renounced the brutal intemperance of northern races, and became refined, polite and chivalrous, their nobles being distinguished by their graceful bearing and insinuating address.

THE Battle of Hastings and the events which followed it not only placed a Duke of Normandy on the English throne, but gave up the whole population of England to the tyranny of the Norman race. The subjugation of a nation has seldom, even in Asia, been more complete. During the century and a half which followed the Conquest, there is, to speak strictly, no English history. Had the Plantagenets, as at one time seemed likely, succeeded in uniting all France under their government, it is probable that England would never have had an independent existence. England owes her escape from dependence on French thought and customs to separation from Normandy, an event which her historians have generally represented as disastrous. The talents, and even the virtues of her first six French kings, were a curse to her. The follies and vices of the seventh, King John, were her salvation. He was driven from Normandy, and in England the two races were drawn together, both being alike aggrieved by the tyranny of a bad king. From that moment the prospects brightened, and here commences the history of the English nation.

In no country has the enmity of race been carried further than in England. In no country has that enmity been more completely effaced. Early in the fourteenth century the amalgamation of the races was all but complete, and a people inferior to none existing in the world had been formed by the mixture of three branches of the Teutonic family with each other, and with the aboriginal Britons.

A period of more than a hundred years followed, during which the chief object of the English was, by force of arms, to establish a great empire on the Continent. The effect of the successes of Edward III and Henry V was to make France for a time a province of England. A French king was brought prisoner to London; an English king was crowned at Paris.

The arts of peace were not neglected by our fathers during that period. English thinkers aspired to know, or dared to doubt, where bigots had been content to wonder and to believe. The same age which produced the Black Prince and Derby, Chandos and Hawkwood, produced also Geoffrey Chaucer and John Wycliffe. In so splendid and imperial a manner did the English people, properly so called, first take place among the nations of the world. But the spirit of the French people was at last aroused and, after many desperate struggles and with many bitter regrets, our ancestors gave up the contest.

II—THE FIRST CIVIL WAR

COOPED up once more within the limits of the island, the warlike people employed in civil strife those arms which had been the terror of Europe. Two factions, headed by two branches of the royal family, engaged in the long and fierce struggle known as the Wars of the White and Red Roses. It was at length universally acknowledged that the claims of all the contending Plantagenets were united in the House of Tudor.

It is now very long since the English people have by force subverted a government. During the hundred and sixty years which preceded the union of the Roses nine kings reigned in England. Six of these kings were deposed. Five lost their lives as well as their crowns. Yet it is certain that all through that period the English people were far better governed than were the Belgians under Philip the Good, or the French under that Louis who was styled the father of his people. The people, skilled in the use of arms, had in reserve that check of physical force which brought the proudest king to reason.

One wise policy was during the Middle Ages pursued by England alone. Though to the monarch belonged the power of the sword, the nation retained the power of the purse. The Continental nations ought to have acted likewise; as they failed to conserve this safeguard of representation with taxation, the consequence was that everywhere, excepting in England, parliamentary institutions ceased to exist. England owed this singular felicity to her insular situation.

The great events of the reigns of the Tudors and the Stewarts were followed by a crisis when the crown passed from Charles II to his brother, James II. The new king commenced his administration with a large measure of public goodwill. He was a prince who had been driven into exile by a faction which had tried to rob him of his birthright on the ground that he was a deadly enemy to the religion and laws of England. He had triumphed; he was on the throne, and his first act was to declare that he would defend the Church and respect the rights of the people.

But James had not been many hours king when violent disputes arose. The first was between two heads of the law, concerning customs and the levying of taxes. Moreover, the time drew near for summoning parliament, and the king's mind was haunted by an apprehension not to be mentioned, even at this distance of time, without shame and indignation. He was afraid that by summoning his parliament he might incur the displeasure of the King of

France. Rochester, Godolphin and Sunderland, who formed the interior cabinet, were perfectly aware that their late master, Charles II, had been in the habit of receiving money from the court of Versailles. They understood the expediency of keeping Louis in good humour, but knew that the summoning of the legislature was not a matter of choice.

As soon as the French king heard of the death of Charles and of the accession of James he hastened to send the latter a munificent donation of £35,000. James was not ashamed to shed tears of delight and gratitude.

The accession of James in 1685 had excited hopes and fears in every Continental court. One government alone, that of France, wished that the troubles that had distracted England for three generations might be eternal. All other governments, whether republican or monarchical, Protestant or Romanist, wished to see those troubles happily terminated. Under the kings of the House of Stewart she had been a blank in the map of Europe. The government was no longer a limited monarchy after the fashion of the Middle Ages; it had not yet become one after the modern fashion. The chief business of the sovereign was to infringe the privileges of the legislature, that of the legislature was to encroach on the prerogatives of the sovereign.

The effect of these jealousies was that our country, with all her vast resources, was of as little weight in Christendom as the duchy of Savoy or the duchy of Lorraine, and certainly of far less weight than the small province of Holland. France was deeply interested in prolonging this state of things. All other powers were deeply interested in bringing it to a close.

The king early put the loyalty of his Protestant friends to the proof. While he was a subject he had been in the habit of hearing mass with closed doors in a small oratory which had been fitted up for his wife. He now ordered the doors to be thrown open, so that all who came to pay to him their duty might see the ceremony.

A more serious innovation followed. Passion Week came, and the king determined to hear mass with the same pomp with which his predecessors had been surrounded. The rites of the Church of Rome were once more, after an interval of one hundred and twenty-seven years, performed at Westminster on Easter Sunday with regal splendour.

III—MONMOUTH AND HIS FATE

The English exiles in Holland induced the Duke of Monmouth, a natural son of Charles II, to attempt an invasion of England, and on June 11, 1685, he landed with about eighty men at Lyme. The little town was soon in an uproar with men running to and fro, and shouting "A Monmouth! A Monmouth! The Protestant religion!" An insurrection was inaugurated and recruits came in rapidly. But parliament was loyal, and the Commons ordered a bill of attainder against Monmouth for high treason. The rebel army was defeated in a fight at Sedgemoor, and Monmouth in his misery complained bitterly of the evil counsellors who had induced him to quit his happy retreat in Brabant. Fleeing from the field of battle, the unfortunate duke was found hidden in a ditch, was taken to London, lodged in the Tower, and beheaded, with the declaration on his lips, "I die a Protestant of the Church of England."

After the execution of Monmouth the counties that had risen against the government endured all the cruelties that a ferocious soldiery let loose on them could inflict. The number of victims butchered cannot now be ascertained, the vengance being left to the dissolute Colonel Percy Kirke. But a still more cruel massacre was schemed. Early in September Judge Jeffreys set out on that circuit of which the memory will last as long as our race and language. Opening his commission at Winchester, he ordered Alice Lisle to be burnt alive simply because she had given a meal and a hiding-place to wretched fugitives entreating her protection. The clergy of Winchester remonstrated with the brutal judge, but the utmost that could be obtained was that the sentence should be commuted from burning to beheading.

Then began the judicial massacre known as the Bloody Assize. Within a few weeks Jeffreys boasted that he had hanged more traitors than all his predecessors together since the Conquest. Nearly a thousand prisoners were also transported into slavery in the West Indian islands. No English sovereign has ever given stronger proofs of a cruel nature than James II. At his court Jeffreys, when he had done his work, leaving carnage, mourning and terror behind him, was cordially welcomed, for he was a judge after his master's own heart. James had watched the circuit with interest and delight. At a later period, when all men of all parties spoke with horror of the Bloody Assize, the wicked judge and the wicked king attempted to vindicate themselves by throwing the blame on each other.

The king soon went further. He made no secret of his intention to exert vigorously and systematically, for the destruction of the Established Church, all the powers he possessed as her head. He plainly declared that by a wise dispensation of Providence the Act of Supremacy would be the means of healing the fatal breach which it had caused. Henry and Elizabeth had usurped a dominion which rightfully belonged to the Holy See. That dominion had, in the course of succession, descended on an orthodox prince, and would by him be held in trust for the Holy See. He was authorised by law to suppress spiritual abuses; and the first spiritual abuse which he would repress would be the liberty which the Anglican clergy assumed of defending their own religion and of attacking the doctrines of Rome.

The temper of the nation was such as might well make James hesitate. During some months discontent steadily and rapidly rose. The celebration of the Roman Catholic worship had long been prohibited by Act of Parliament. During several generations no Roman Catholic clergyman had dared to exhibit himself in any public place with the badges of his office. Every Jesuit who set foot in this country was liable to be hanged, drawn and quartered.

But all disguise was now thrown off. Roman Catholic chapels arose all over the land. A society of Benedictine monks was lodged in St. James's Palace. Quarrels broke out between Protestant and Romanist soldiers. Samuel Johnson, a clergyman of the Church of England, who had issued a tract entitled A Humble and

Hearty Appeal to All English Protestants in the Army, was flung into gaol. He was then flogged and degraded from the priesthood. But the zeal of the Anglican clergy was displayed. They were led by a united phalanx, in the van of which appeared a rank of steady and skilful veterans, Tillotson, Stillingfleet, Prideaux, Patrick, Tenison, Wake. Great numbers of controversial tracts against popery were issued by these divines.

Scotland also rose in anger against the designs of the king, and if he had not been proof against all warning, the excitement in that country would have sufficed to admonish him. On March 18, 1687, he took a momentous step. He informed the Privy Council that he had determined to prorogue parliament till the end of November, and to grant, by his own authority, entire liberty of conscience to all his subjects. On April 4 appeared the memorable Declaration of Indulgence. In this document the king avowed that it was his earnest wish to see his people members of that Church to which he himself belonged. But since that could not be he announced his intention to protect them in the free exercise of their religion. He authorised both Roman Catholics and Protestant dissenters to perform their worship publicly.

That the declaration was unconstitutional is universally agreed, for a monarch competent to issue such a document is nothing less than an absolute ruler. This was, in point of fact, the most audacious of all attacks of the Stewarts on public freedom. The Anglican party was in amazement and terror, for it would now be exposed to the free attacks of its enemies on every side. And though dissenters appeared to be allowed relief, what guarantee was there for the sincerity of the court? It was notorious that James had been completely subjugated by the Jesuits, for, only a few days before the publication of the indulgence, that order had been honoured with a new mark of his confidence by his appointing as his confessor a Jesuit renegade named Warner.

IV—THE TRIAL OF THE SEVEN BISHOPS

A MEETING of bishops and other eminent divines was held at Lambeth Palace. The general feeling was that the king's declaration ought not to be read in the churches. After long deliberation, preceded by solemn prayer, a petition embodying the general sense was written by the archbishop with his own hand. The king was assured that the Church still was as she had ever been, faithful to the throne. But the declaration was illegal, for parliament had pronounced that the sovereign was not constitutionally competent to dispense with statutes in matters ecclesiastical. The archbishop and six of his suffragans signed the petition.

The six bishops crossed the river to Whitehall, but the archbishop, who had long been forbidden the court, did not accompany them. James directed that the bishops should be admitted to the royal presence, and they found him in very good humour, for he had heard from his tool, Cartwright, that they were disposed to obey the mandate, but wished to secure some little modifications in form.

After reading the petition, the king's countenance grew dark, and he exclaimed, "This is a standard of rebellion!" In vain did the prelates emphasise their protests of loyalty. The king persisted in characterising their action as being rebellious. The bishops respectfully retired, and that evening the petition appeared in print, was laid out in the coffee-houses and was cried about the streets. Everywhere people rose from their beds and came out to stop the hawkers, and the sale was so enormous that it was said the printer cleared a thousand pounds in a few hours by this penny broadside.

The London clergy disobeyed the royal order, for the declaration was read in only four churches in the city, where there were about a hundred. For a short time the king stood aghast at the violence of the tempest he had raised, but Jeffreys maintained that the government would be disgraced if such transgressors as the seven bishops were suffered to escape with a mere reprimand. They were notified that they must appear before the king in council.

On June 8 they were examined by the Privy Council, the result being their committal to the Tower. From all parts of the country came the report that other prelates had signed similar petitions, and that very few of the clergy throughout the land had obeyed the king. The public excitement in London was intense. While the bishops were before the council a great multitude filled the region all round Whitehall, and when the seven came forth, under a guard, thousands fell on their knees and prayed aloud for the men who had confronted a tyrant inflamed with the bigotry of Mary.

Before the day of trial the agitation spread to the farthest corners of the land. The bishops were charged with having published a false, malicious and seditious libel. But the case for the prosecution speedily broke down in the hands of the crown lawyers. They were vehemently hissed by the audience. The jury gave the verdict of 'Not Guilty.' As the news spread all London broke out into acclamation. The bishops were greeted with cries of "God bless you; you have saved us all to-day."

The king was greatly disturbed at the news of the acquittal, and exclaimed in French. "So much the worse for them." He was at the moment in the camp at Hounslow, where he had been reviewing the troops. Hearing a great shout behind him, he asked what the uproar meant. "Nothing," was the answer; "the soldiers are glad that the bishops are acquitted." "Do you call that nothing?" exclaimed the king. And then he repeated, "So much the worse for them." He might well be out of temper. His defeat had been complete and most humiliating.

In May 1688, while it was still uncertain whether the declaration would or would not be read in the churches, Edward Russell had repaired to The Hague, where he strongly represented to the Prince of Orange, husband of Mary, eldest daughter of James II, the state of the public mind, and had advised his highness to appear in England and to call the people to arms.

William had seen at a glance the whole importance of the crisis. "Now or never!" he exclaimed in Latin. He quickly received numerous assurances of support from England. Preparations were rapidly made, and on November 1, 1688, he set sail with his fleet,

and landed at Torbay on November 4. Resistance was impossible. The troops of James's army quietly deserted wholesale, many joining the Dutch camp at Honiton. First, the west of England, and then the north, revolted against James. Evil news poured in upon him. On December 11 the king fled from London secretly. His home in exile was at Saint Germains.

William and Mary were proclaimed King and Queen of the United Kingdom, and thus was consummated the English Revolution. It was of all revolutions the least violent and yet the most beneficent. It finally decided the great question whether the popular element which had, ever since the age of Fitzwalter and de Montfort, been found in the English polity, should be destroyed by the monarchical element, or should be suffered to develop itself freely, and to become dominant. The strife between the two principles had been long, fierce and doubtful. It had lasted through four reigns. The King at Arms, who proclaimed William and Mary before Whitehall Gate, did in truth announce that this great struggle was over; that there was entire union between the throne and the parliament; that England, long dependent and degraded, was again a power of the first rank; and that no reform which the two Houses should, after mature consideration, propose, would be obstinately withstood by the sovereign.

V—AFTER THE GREAT REVOLUTION

The revolution had been accomplished. The rejoicings throughout the land were enthusiastic. Still more cordial was the rejoicing among the Dutch when they learnt that the first minister of their commonwealth had been raised to a throne. James had during the last year of his reign been more hated in England by the Tories than by the Whigs, and not without cause, for to the Whigs he was only an enemy, and to the Tories he had been a faithless and a thankless friend.

One misfortune of the new king, which some reactionaries imputed to him as a crime, was his bad English. He spoke our language, but not well. Our literature he was incapable of enjoying or understanding. He never once appeared in the theatre. The poets who wrote Pindaric verse in his praise complained that their flights of sublimity were beyond his comprehension. But his wife did her best to supply what was wanting. She was excellently qualified to be the head of the court. She was English by birth and also in her tastes and feelings. The stainless purity of her private life and the attention she paid to her religious duties discouraged scandal as well as vice.

The year 1689 is not less important in the ecclesiastical than in the civil history of England, for in that year was granted the first legal indulgence to dissenters.

The discontent of the Roman Catholic Irishry with the revolution was intense. It grew so manifestly that James, assured that his cause was prospering in Ireland, landed, on March 12, 1689, at Kinsale. On March 24 he entered Dublin. This event created sorrow and alarm in England. An Irish army, raised by the Catholics, entered Ulster and laid siege to Londonderry, into which city two English regiments had been thrown by sea.

The heroic defence of Londonderry is one of the most thrilling episodes in the history of Ireland. By the desertion of the governor, Lundy, the city was left destitute of all military and all civil government. The number of men capable of bearing arms within the walls was seven thousand; and the whole world could not have furnished seven thousand men better qualified to meet a terrible emergency with clear judgement, dauntless valour and stubborn patience. After many onslaughts the advantage remained with the garrison. The siege was then turned into a blockade by the construction of a boom across the harbour by the besiegers. The citizens endured frightful hunger, for famine was extreme within the walls, but they never quailed. The siege, which lasted 105 days, and was the most memorable in the annals of the British Isles, was ended by the breaking of the boom by three ships from England, which brought reinforcements and provisions.

The Irish army retreated, and the next event —a very decisive one—was their defeat at the Battle of the Boyne, where William and James commanded their respective forces. The war ended with the capitulation of Limerick, and the French soldiers who had formed a great part of James's army left for France.

The year 1692 was marked by momentous events issuing from a scheme, in some respects well concerted, for the invasion of England by a French force, with the object of the restoration of James. A noble fleet of about eighty ships of the line was to convey this force to the shores of England, and in the French dockyards immense preparations were made. James had persuaded himself that even if the English fleet should fall in with him it would not oppose him. Indeed, he was too ready to believe anything written to him by his English correspondents.

No mightier armament had ever appeared in the English Channel than the fleet of allied British and Dutch ships, under the command of Admiral Russell. On May 19 it encountered the French fleet under the Count of Tourville, and a running fight took place which lasted during five fearful days, ending in the complete destruction of the French force off La Hogue. The news of this great victory was received in England with boundless joy. One of its happiest effects was the effectual calming of the public mind.

VI—THE DAY OF PROSPERITY

In this reign, 1694, was established the Bank of England. It was the result of a great change that had developed in a few years, for old men in William's reign could remember the days when there was not a single banking house in London. Goldsmiths had strong vaults in which masses of bullion could lie secure from fire and robbers, and at their shops in Lombard Street all payments in coin were made. William Paterson, an ingenious speculator, submitted to the government a plan for a national bank, which, after long debate, passed both houses of parliament.

In 1694 the king and the nation mourned

the death from smallpox—a disease always working havoc—of Queen Mary. During her illness William remained day and night at her bedside. The Dutch envoy wrote that the sight of his misery was enough to melt the hardest heart. When all hope was over, he said to Bishop Burnet, "There is no hope. I was the happiest man on earth, and I am the most miserable. She had no fault—none. You knew her well, but you could not know, none but myself could know, her goodness."

On the Continent the death of Mary excited various emotions. The Huguenots, in every part of Europe to which they had wandered, bewailed the Elect Lady, who had retrenched her own royal state in order to furnish board and shelter to the persecuted people of God. But the hopes of James and his companions in exile were now higher than they had been since the day of La Hogue. Indeed, the general opinion of politicians, both here and on the Continent, was that William would find it impossible to sustain himself much longer on the throne. He would not, it was said, have sustained himself so long but for the help of his wife, whose affability had conciliated many that were disgusted by his Dutch accent and habits. But all the statesmen of Europe were deceived and, strange to say, his reign was decidedly more prosperous after the decease of Mary than during her life.

During the month which followed his wife's death the king was incapable of exertion. His first letter was that of a heart-broken man. Even his martial ardour had been tamed by misery. "I tell you in confidence," he wrote to Heinsius, "that I feel myself to be no longer fit for military command. Yet I will try to do my duty, and I hope that God will strengthen me." So despondingly did he look forward to the most brilliant of his many campaigns.

All Europe was looking anxiously towards the Low Countries. A great French army, commanded by Villeroy, was collected in Flanders. William crossed to the Continent to take command of the Dutch and British troops, who mustered at Ghent. The Elector of Bavaria, at the head of a great force, lay near Brussels. William had set his heart on capturing Namur. After a siege hard pressed, that fortress, the strongest in Europe, fortified by Vauban, surrendered on August 26, 1695.

The war was ended by the signing of the treaty of Ryswick by the ambassadors of France, England, Spain and the United Provinces on September 20, 1697. King William was received in London with great popular rejoicing. There was indeed reason for joy and thankfulness. England had passed through severe trials and had come forth wonderfully renewed in health and vigour.

Ten years before it had seemed that both her liberty and her independence were no more. Her liberty she had vindicated by a just and necessary revolution. Her independence she had reconquered by a not less just and necessary war. All dangers were over. There was peace abroad and at home. Many signs justified the hope that the revolution of 1688 would be our last revolution. Public credit had been re-established, trade had revived, the exchequer was overflowing, and there was a sense of relief everywhere, from the Royal Exchange to the most secluded hamlets among the mountains of Wales and the fens of Lincolnshire.

EARLY in 1702 alarming reports were rife concerning William's state of health. Headaches and shivering fits returned on him almost daily, and it soon became evident that the great king's days were numbered. On February 20 William was ambling on a favourite horse, named Sorrel, through the park of Hampton Court. The horse stumbling on a mole-hill, went down on his knees. The king fell off and broke his collar-bone. The bone was set, and to a young and vigorous man such an accident would have been a trifle. But the frame of William was not in a condition to bear even the slightest shock. He felt that his time was short, and grieved, with such a grief as only noble spirits feel, to think that he must leave his work but half finished. On March 4 he was attacked by fever, and he was soon sinking fast. His end was worthy of his life. His intellect was not for a moment clouded. His fortitude was the more admirable because he was not willing to die. From the words which escaped him he seemed to be frequently engaged in mental prayer. The end came between seven and eight in the morning. When his remains were laid out, it was found that he wore next to his skin a piece of silk ribbon. It contained a gold ring and a lock of the hair of Mary.

The Age of Louis XIV

VOLTAIRE

IT was while in Berlin, between 1751 and 1753, on the invitation of Frederick the Great, that Voltaire finished and printed his Siècle de Louis XIV, a work which had occupied him intermittently for some ten or twelve years. Louis XIV had succeeded his father at the age of five in 1643 ; and throughout the fifty-three years which followed Mazarin's death his declaration ' L'état, c'est moi ' had been politically and socially a truth. He controlled France with an absolute sway ; and while he did not make France the dictator of Europe, under him she became the unchallenged leader of literary and artistic culture and taste. Voltaire's Age of Louis XIV contains a great mass of interesting matter treated by a man of acute intellect and high literary powers. An outline of his Age of Louis XV appears in pages 104-113.

I—FRANCE UNDER MAZARIN

WE do not propose to write merely a life of Louis XIV ; our aim is a far wider one. It is to give posterity a picture, not of the actions of a single man, but of the spirit of the men of an age the most enlightened on record.

Every period has produced its heroes and its politicians, every people has experienced revolutions ; the histories of all are of nearly equal value to those who desire merely to store their memory with facts. But the thinker, and that still rarer person the man of taste, recognizes only four epochs in the history of the world—those four fortunate ages in which the arts have been perfected ; the great age of the Greeks, the age of Caesar and of Augustus, the age which followed the fall of Constantinople, and the age of Louis XIV ; which last approached perfection more nearly than any of the others.

On the death of Louis XIII his queen, Anne of Austria, owed her acquisition of the regency to the Parlement of Paris. Anne was obliged to continue the war with Spain, in which the brilliant victories of the young Duc d'Enghien, known to fame as the Great Condé, brought him sudden glory, and unprecedented prestige to the arms of France.

But internally the national finances were in a terribly unsatisfactory state. The measures for raising funds adopted by the minister Mazarin were the more unpopular because he was himself an Italian. The Paris Parlement set itself in opposition to the minister ; the populace supported it ; the resistance was organized by Paul de Gondi, afterwards known as the Cardinal de Retz. The court had to flee from Paris to St. Germain. Condé was won over by the queen-regent ; but the nobles, hoping to recover the power which Richelieu had wrenched from them, took the popular side. And their wives and daughters surpassed them in energy.

A very striking contrast to the irresponsible frivolity with which the whole affair was conducted is presented by the grim orderliness with which England had at that very moment carried through the last act in the tragedy of King Charles I. In France the factions of the Fronde were controlled by love intrigues. Condé was victorious. But he was at feud with Mazarin, made himself personally unpopular, and found himself arrested when he might have made himself master of the government. A year later the tables were turned ; Mazarin had to fly and the Fronde released Condé. The civil war was renewed ; a war in which no principles were at stake, in which the popular party of yesterday was the unpopular party of to-day ; in which there were remarkable military achievements, much bloodshed and much suffering, and which finally wore itself out in 1653, when Mazarin returned to undisputed power. Louis XIV was then a boy of fifteen.

Mazarin had achieved a great diplomatic triumph by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ; but Spain had remained outside that group of treaties ; and, owing to the civil war of the Fronde, Condé's successes against her had been to a great extent made nugatory—and now Condé was a rebel and in command of Spanish troops. But Condé met his match in Turenne with a French army.

At this moment, Christina of Sweden was the only European sovereign who had any personal prestige. But Cromwell's achievements in England now made each of the European statesmen anxious for the English alliance ; and Cromwell chose France. The combined arms of France and England were triumphant in Flanders, when Cromwell died ; and his death changed the position of England. France was financially exhausted, and Mazarin now desired a satisfactory peace with Spain.

The result was the Treaty of the Pyrenees, by which the young King Louis took a Spanish princess in marriage, an alliance which ultimately led to the succession of a grandson of Louis to the Spanish throne. Immediately afterwards, Louis' cousin, Charles II, was recalled to the throne of England. This closing achievement of Mazarin had a triumphant aspect ; his position in France remained undisputed till his death in the next year (1661). He was a successful minister ; whether he was a great statesman is another question. His one real legacy to France was the acquisition of Alsace.

II—THE FRENCH SUPREMACY IN EUROPE

ON Mazarin's death Louis at once assumed personal rule. Since the death of Henry the Great, France had been governed by ministers ; now she was to be governed by the king—the power exercised by ministers was precisely circumscribed. Order and vigour were intro-

duced on all sides; the finances were regulated by Colbert, discipline was restored in the army, the creation of a fleet was begun. In all foreign courts Louis asserted the dignity of France; it was very soon evident that there was no foreign power of whom he need stand in fear. New connexions were established with Holland and Portugal. England under Charles II was of little account.

To a king on the watch for an opportunity an opportunity soon presents itself. Louis found his when Philip IV of Spain was succeeded by the feeble Charles II. He at once announced that Flanders reverted to his own wife, the new king's elder sister. He had already made his bargain with the Emperor Leopold, who had married the other infanta.

Louis' armies were overrunning Flanders in 1667, and Franche-Comté next year. Holland, a republic with John de Witt at its head, took alarm; and Sir William Temple succeeded in effecting the Triple Alliance between Holland, England and Sweden. Louis found it advisable to make peace, even at the price of surrendering Franche-Comté for the present.

Determined now, however, on the conquest of Holland, Louis had no difficulty in secretly detaching the voluptuary Charles II from the Dutch alliance. Holland itself was torn between the faction of the de Witts and the partisans of the young William of Orange. Overwhelming preparations were made for the utterly unwarrantable enterprise.

As the French armies poured into Holland, practically no resistance was offered. The government began to sue for peace. But the populace rose and massacred the de Witts; young William was made stadtholder. Ruyter defeated the combined French and English fleets at Sole Bay. William opened the dykes and laid the country under water, and negotiated secretly with the emperor and with Spain. Half Europe was being drawn into a league against Louis, who made the fatal mistake of following the advice of his war minister Louvois, instead of Condé and Turenne.

In every court in Europe Louis had his pensioners intriguing on his behalf. His newly created fleet was rapidly learning its work. On land he was served by the great engineer Vauban, by Turenne, Condé, and Condé's pupil, Luxembourg. He decided to direct his own next campaign against Franche-Comté. But during the year Turenne, who was conducting a separate campaign in Germany with extraordinary brilliancy, was killed; and after this year Condé took no further part in the war. Moreover, the Austrians were now in the field, under Montecuculi.

In 1676-8 town after town fell before Vauban, a master of siege work as of fortification; Louis, in many cases, being present in person. In other quarters, also, the French arms were successful. Especially noticeable were the maritime successes of Duquesne, who was proving himself a match for the Dutch commanders. Louis was practically fighting and beating half Europe single-handed, as he was now getting no effective help from England or his nominal ally, Sweden. Finally, in 1678, he was able practically to dictate his own terms to the allies. The peace had already been signed when William of Orange attacked Luxembourg before Mons; a victory, on the whole, for him, but entirely barren of results. With this peace of Nimeguen, Louis was at the height of his power.

By assuming the right of interpreting for himself the terms of the treaty, he employed the years of peace in extending his possessions. No other power could now compare with France, but in 1688 Louis stood alone, without any supporter, save James II of England. And he intensified the general dread by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the expulsion of the French Huguenots.

The determination of James to make himself absolute, and to restore Romanism in England, caused leading Englishmen to enter on a conspiracy—kept secret with extraordinary success—with William of Orange. The luckless monarch was abandoned on every hand, and fled from his kingdom to France, an object of universal mockery. Yet Louis resolved to aid him. A French force accompanied him to Ireland and Tourville defeated the united fleets of England and Holland. At last France was mistress of the seas; but James met with a complete overthrow at the Boyne. The defeated James, in his flight, hanged men who had taken part against him. The victorious William proclaimed a general pardon. Of two such men, it is easy to see which was certain to win.

Louis had already engaged himself in a fresh European war before William's landing in England. He still maintained his support of James. But his newly acquired sea power was severely shaken at La Hogue. On land, however, Louis' arms prospered. Luxembourg in Flanders, and Catinat in Italy, won the foremost military reputations in Europe. On the other hand, William proved himself one of those generals who can extract more advantage from a defeat than his enemies from a victory, as Steinkirk and Neerwinden both exemplified. France, however, succeeded in maintaining a superiority over her foes, but the strain before long made a peace necessary. She could not dictate terms as at Nimeguen. Nevertheless, the treaty of Ryswick, concluded in 1697, secured her substantial benefits.

III—THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

The general pacification was brief. North Europe was soon aflame with the wars of those remarkable monarchs, Charles XII and Peter the Great; and the rest of Europe over the Spanish succession. The mother and wife of Louis were each eldest daughters of a Spanish king; the mother and wife of the Emperor Leopold were their younger sisters. Austrian and French successions were both barred by renunciations; and the absorption of Spain by either power would upset utterly the balance of power in Europe. There was no one else with a plausible claim to succeed the childless and dying Charles II. European diplomacy effected treaties for partitioning the Spanish dominions; but ultimately Charles declared the grandson of Louis his heir. Louis, in defiance of treaties, accepted the legacy.

The whole weight of England was then thrown on to the side of the Austrian candidate by Louis' recognition of James Edward Stewart as rightful King of England. William, before he

died, had successfully brought about a grand alliance of European powers against Louis ; his death gave the conduct of the war to Marlborough. Anne was obliged to carry on her brother-in-law's policy. Elsewhere, kings make their subjects enter blindly on their own projects ; in London the king must enter upon those of his subjects.

When Louis entered on the war of the Spanish Succession he had already, though unconsciously, lost that grasp of affairs which had distinguished him ; while he still dictated the conduct of his ministers and his generals. The first commander who took the field against him was Prince Eugene of Savoy, a man born with those qualities which make a hero in war and a great man in peace. The able Catinat was superseded in Italy by Villeroi, whose failures, however, led to the substitution of Vendôme.

But the man who did more to injure the greatness of France than any other for centuries past was Marlborough—the general with the coolest head of his time ; as a politician the equal, and as a soldier immeasurably the superior, of William III. Between Marlborough and his great colleague Eugene there was always complete harmony and complete understanding, whether they were campaigning or negotiating.

In the Low Countries Marlborough gained ground steadily, without any great engagement. In Germany the French arms were successful, and at the end of 1703 a campaign was planned with Vienna for its objective. The advance was intercepted in 1704 by the junction of Eugene and the forces from Italy with Marlborough and an English force. The result was the tremendous overthrow of Hochstedt, or Blenheim. The French were driven over the Rhine.

Almost at the same moment English sailors surprised and captured the Rock of Gibraltar, which England still holds. In six weeks, too, the English mastered Valencia and Catalonia for the archduke, under the redoubtable Peterborough.

Affairs went better in Italy (1705) ; but in Flanders Villeroi was rash enough to challenge Marlborough at Ramillies in 1706. In half an hour the French army was completely routed, and lost 20,000 men ; city after city opened its gates to the conqueror ; Flanders was lost as far as Lille. Vendome was summoned to Italy to replace Villeroi, whereupon Eugene attacked the French in their lines before Turin and dispersed their army, which was forced to withdraw from Italy, leaving the Austrians masters there.

Louis seemed on the verge of ruin ; but Spain was loyal to the Bourbon. In 1707 Berwick won for the French the signal victory of Almanza. In Germany, Villars made progress. Louis actually designed an invasion of Great Britain in the name of the Pretender, but the scheme collapsed. He succeeded in placing a great army in the field in Flanders ; it was defeated by Marlborough and Eugene at Oudenarde. Eugene sat down before Lille, and took it. The lamentable plight of France was made worse by a cruel winter.

Louis found himself forced to sue for peace, but the terms of the allies were too intolerably humiliating. They demanded that Louis should assist in expelling his own grandson from Spain. " If I must make war, I would rather make it on my enemies than on my children," said Louis.

Once more an army took the field with indomitable courage. A desperate battle was fought by Villars against Marlborough and Eugene at Malplaquet. Villars was defeated, but with as much honour to the French as to the allies.

Louis again sued for peace, but the allies would not relax their monstrous demands. Marlborough, Eugene and the Dutch Heinsius all found their own interest in prolonging the war. But with the Bourbon cause apparently at its last gasp in Spain, the appearance there of Vendôme revived the spirit of resistance.

Then the death of the emperor and the succession to his position of his brother, the Spanish claimant, the Archduke Charles, meant that the allies were fighting to make one dominion of the Spanish and German empires. The steady advance of Marlborough in the Low Countries could not prevent a revulsion of popular sentiment, which brought about his recall and the practical withdrawal from the contest of England, where Bolingbroke and Oxford were now at the head of affairs. Under Villars, success returned to the French standards in Flanders.

Hence came in 1713 the peace of Utrecht, for the terms of which England was mainly responsible. It was fair and just, but the English ministry received scant justice for making it. The emperor refused at first to accept it ; but, when isolated, he agreed to its corollary, the peace of Rastadt. Philip was secured on the throne of Spain.

Never was there a war or a peace in which so many natural expectations were so completely reversed in the outcome. What Louis may have proposed to himself after it was over, no one can say, for he died the year after the treaty of Utrecht.

IV—THE COURT OF THE GRAND MONARQUE

The brilliancy and magnificence of the court, as well as the reign of Louis XIV, were such that the least details of his life seem interesting to posterity, just as they excited the curiosity of every court in Europe and of all his contemporaries. Such is the effect of a great reputation. We care more to know what passed in the cabinet and the court of an Augustus than for details of Attila's and Tamerlane's conquests.

One of the most curious affairs in this connexion is the mystery of the Man with the Iron Mask, who was placed in the Ile Sainte-Marguerite, just after Mazarin's death, was removed to the Bastille in 1690, and died in 1703. His identity has never been revealed. That he was a person of very great consideration is clear from the way in which he was treated ; yet no such person disappeared from public life. Those who knew the secret carried it with them to their graves.

Once the man scratched a message on a silver plate and flung it into the river. A fisherman who picked it up brought it to the governor. Asked if he had read the writing, he said, " No ; he could not read himself, and no one else had seen it." " It is lucky for you that you cannot read," said the governor. And the man was detained till the truth of his statement had been confirmed.

HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE was born at Lee, in Kent, November 24, 1821, son of a wealthy merchant, and was educated privately. The death of his father in 1840 left him independent, and the boy who was brought up in Toryism and Calvinism became a philosophic radical and free-thinker. He travelled for some years on the Continent, read widely, and had such remarkable linguistic gifts that he acquired facility in nineteen languages and fluency in seven. Always of delicate constitution, he exhausted himself physically by incessant hard work and in 1861 he left England for the East in search of health, but reaching Nazareth was attacked by fever and died at Damascus, May 29, 1862.

WALTER BAGEHOT was born at Langport, in Somersetshire, February 3, 1826. He was educated at Bristol and at University College, London, where he won distinction in mathematics, mental and moral philosophy and political economy. He was called to the Bar and then became a partner in his father's banking and ship-owning business. In 1858 he married the eldest daughter of James Wilson, founder of The Economist, and he held the editorship of that paper from 1860 until his death, which occurred at Langport, March 24, 1877.



WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY was born in the neighbourhood of Dublin, March 26, 1838, and was educated at Trinity College, where he graduated B.A. in 1859 and M.A. in 1863. In 1860 he wrote his first book, Religious Tendencies of the Age, followed by his biographical study of Irish politicians, and in 1863 there appeared his essay on The Declining Sense of the Miraculous, subsequently expanded into his History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe. Lecky was greatly interested in politics, being Unionist M.P. for Dublin University 1895-1903. He died October 22, 1903.



EDWARD AUGUSTUS FREEMAN was born at Harborne, Staffordshire, August 2, 1823, and educated at Trinity College, Oxford. In 1884 he was appointed Regius Professor of modern history at Oxford, but his health compelled him to spend much time abroad. He died at Alicante, Spain, March 16, 1892. Freeman's work, always based on an exhaustive study of original authorities, is careful and accurate, but extended by his passion for detail to portentous dimensions. His History of the Norman Conquest remains one of the finest contributions to world history that English literature has made.



PLATO, the Greek philosopher, moralist and seer, was born in 427 B.C. A disciple of Socrates, he became a teacher in the Academy, propounding the philosophy preserved in his Dialogues. Plato died in Athens, 347 B.C. This bust is in the Vatican Museum.

NICCOLÒ DI BERNARDO DEI MACHIAVELLI was born at Florence, May 3, 1469, and died June 22, 1527. In 1498, four years after the expulsion of the Medici, he was appointed secretary to the Ten. He held office until the return of the Medici in 1512, caused the downfall of his patron. His retirement was occupied by writing The Prince, Discourses, The Art of War, A History of Florence, and several plays.



MORE was born in London, February 7, 1478. At Oxford he laid the foundation of the scholarship which made him an admirable representative of Renaissance learning. He succeeded Wolsey as Lord Chancellor in 1529. After refusing to take any oath impugning the spiritual authority of the Pope, he was beheaded July 6, 1535. His best known writing is Utopia, describing an imaginary island commonwealth based on the idea of community of goods.

ARISTOTLE was born at Stagira, in Macedonia, 384 B.C. He studied under Plato 367 to 350, acted as tutor to Alexander the Great when a boy, and from 334 to 323 conducted his Peripatetic School at Athens. He died 322 B.C.

SIR THOMAS MORE

From the painting after Holbein in the National Portrait Gallery



MARCUS AURELIUS, joint emperor of Rome with Lucius Verus, was born A.D. 121. Adopted by Antoninus Pius, he succeeded him on the throne. His rule, from 161 till his death in 180, was burdened by much trouble in Rome and also in the rebellious provinces. He was a conscientious and moderate ruler, sincere alike in thought and act.

The king surpassed the whole court in the majestic beauty of his countenance; the sound of his voice won the hearts which were awed by his presence; his gait, appropriate to his person and his rank, would have been absurd in anyone else. In those who spoke with him he inspired an embarrassment which secretly flattered an agreeable consciousness of his own superiority. That old officer who began to ask some favour of him, lost his nerve, stammered, broke down, and finally said: "Sire, I do not tremble thus in the presence of your enemies," had little difficulty in obtaining his request.

Nothing won for him the applause of Europe so much as his unexampled munificence. A number of foreign savants and scholars were the recipients of presents or pensions; among Frenchmen who were similarly benefited were Racine, Quinault, Fléchier, Chapelain, Cotin, Lulli.

A series of ladies, from Mazarin's niece, Marie Mancini, to Mme. la Vallière and Mme. de Montespan, held sway over Louis' affections; but after the retirement of the last, Mme. de Maintenon, who had been her rival, became and remained supreme. The queen was dead; and Louis was privately married to her in January 1686, she being then past fifty.

Françoise d'Aubigné was born in 1635, of good family, but born and brought up in hard surroundings. She was married to Scarron in 1651; nine years later he died. Later, she was placed in charge of the king's illegitimate children. She supplanted Mme. de Montespan, to whom she owed her promotion, in the king's favour. The correspondence in the years preceding the marriage is an invaluable record of that mixture of religion and gallantry, of dignity and weakness, to which the human heart is so often prone, in Louis; and in the lady, of a piety and an ambition which never came into conflict. She never used her power to advance her own belongings.

In August 1715, Louis was attacked by a mortal malady. His heir was his great-grandson; the regency devolved on Orleans, the next prince of the blood. His powers were to be limited by Louis' will, but the will could not override the rights which the Paris Parlement declared were attached to the regency. The king's courage did not fail him as death drew near.

"I thought," he said to Mme. de Maintenon "that it was a harder thing to die." And to his servants: "Why do you weep? Did you think I was immortal?"

The words he spoke while he embraced the child who was his heir are significant.

"You are soon to be king of a great kingdom. Above all things, I would have you never forget your obligations to God. Remember that you owe to Him all that you are. Try to keep at peace with your neighbours. I have loved war too much. Do not imitate me in that, or in my excessive expenditure. Consider well in everything; try to be sure of what is best, and to follow that."

V—HOW FRANCE FLOURISHED UNDER LOUIS XIV

At the beginning of the reign the genius of Colbert, the restorer of the national finances, was largely employed on the extension of commerce, then almost entirely in the hands of the Dutch and English. Not only a navy, but a mercantile marine was created; the West India and East India companies were both established in 1664. Almost every year of Colbert's ministry was marked by the establishment of a new industry.

Paris was lighted and paved and policed, almost rebuilt. Louis had a marked taste for architecture, for gardens and for sculpture. The law owed many reforms to this monarch. The army was reorganized; merit, not rank, became the ground of promotion; the bayonet replaced the pike, and the artillery was greatly developed. When Louis began to rule there was no navy. Arsenals were created, sailors were trained, and a fleet came into being which matched those of Holland and England.

Even a brief summary shows the vast changes in the state accomplished by Louis. His ministers seconded his efforts admirably. Theirs is the credit for the details, for the execution; but the scheme, the general principles, were due to him. The magistrates would not have reformed the laws, order would not have been restored in the finances, discipline in the army, police throughout the kingdom; there would have been no fleet, no encouragements of the arts; none of all those improvements carried out systematically, simultaneously, resolutely, under various ministers, had there not been a master, greater than them all, imbued with the general conceptions and determined on their fulfilment.

The spirit of common sense, the spirit of criticism, gradually progressing, insensibly destroyed much superstition; insomuch that simple charges of sorcery were excluded from the courts in 1672. Such a measure would have been impossible under Henry IV or Louis XIII. Nevertheless, such superstitions were deeply rooted. Everyone believed in astrology; the comet of 1680 was regarded as a portent.

In science France was, indeed, outstripped by England and Florence. But in eloquence, poetry, literature and philosophy the French were the legislators of Europe. One of the works which most contributed to forming the national taste was the Maxims of La Rochefoucauld. But the work of genius which in itself summed up the perfections of prose and set the mould of language was Pascal's Lettres Provinciales. The age was characterised by the eloquence of Bossuet. The Télémaque of Fénelon, the Caractères of La Bruyère, were works of an order entirely original and without precedent.

Racine, less original than Corneille, owes a still increasing reputation to his unfailing elegance, correctness and truth; he carried the tender harmonies of poetry and the graces of language to their highest possible perfection. These men taught the nation to think, to feel and to express itself.

The other arts had made little progress in France before this period. Lulli introduced an order of music hitherto unknown. Poussin was our first great painter in the reign of Louis XIII; he has had no lack of successors. French sculpture has excelled in particular.

And we must remark on the extraordinary advance of England during this period. We can exhaust ourselves in criticising Milton, but

not in praising him. Dryden was equalled by no contemporary, surpassed by no predecessor. Addison's Cato is the one English tragedy of sustained beauty. Swift is a perfected Rabelais. Newton and Halley stand to-day supreme; and Locke is infinitely the superior of Plato.

VI—RELIGION UNDER LOUIS XIV

To preserve at once union with the see of Rome and maintain the liberties of the Gallican Church—her ancient rights; to make the bishops obedient as subjects without infringing on their rights as bishops; to make them contribute to the needs of the state without trespassing on their privileges, required a mixture of dexterity and firmness which Louis almost always showed.

The one serious and protracted quarrel with Rome arose over the royal claim to appoint bishops. The French Assembly of the Clergy supported the king; but the famous Four Resolutions of that body were ultimately repudiated by the bishops personally, with the king's consent.

Dogmatism is responsible for introducing among men the horror of wars of religion. Following the Reformation, Calvinism was largely identified with republican principles. In France the fierce struggles of Catholics and Huguenots were stayed by the accession of Henry IV; the Edict of Nantes secured to the former the privileges which their swords had practically won. But after his time they formed an organization which led to further contests, ended by Richelieu.

Favoured by Colbert, to Louis the Huguenots were suspect as rebels who had with difficulty been forced to submission. By him they were subjected to constantly increasing disabilities. At last the Huguenots disobeyed the edicts against them. Still harsher measures were adopted; and the climax came in 1685 with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, following on the 'dragonnades' in Alsace. Protestantism was proscribed. The effect was not the forcible conversion of the Calvinists, but their wholesale emigration; the transfer to foreign states of an admirable industrial and military population. Later, the people of the Cévennes rose, and were put down with great difficulty, though Jean Cavalier was their sole leader worthy the name. In fact, the struggle was really ended by a treaty, and Cavalier died a general of France.

Calvinism is the parent of civil wars. It shakes the foundations of states. Jansenism can excite only theological quarrels and wars of the pen. The Reformation attacked the power of the Church; Jansenism was concerned exclusively with abstract questions. The Jansenist disputes sprang from problems of grace and predestination, fate and freewill—that clueless labyrinth.

A HUNDRED years later, Cornelius Jansen, bishop of Ypres, revived these questions. Arnauld supported him. The views had authority from Augustine and Chrysostom, but Arnauld was condemned. The two establishments of Port Royal refused to sign the formularies condemning Jansen's book, and they had on their side the brilliant pen of Pascal. On the other were the Jesuits. Pascal, in the Lettres Provinciales, made the Jesuits ridiculous with his incomparable wit. The Jansenists were persecuted, but the persecution strengthened them.

But the crown, the bishops and the Jesuits were too strong for the Jansenists, especially when Le Tellier became the king's confessor. But the affair was not finally brought to a conclusion, and the opposing parties reconciled, till after the death of Louis. Ultimately, Jansenism became merely ridiculous. The fall of the Jesuits was to follow in due time.

The Age of Louis XV

VOLTAIRE

MUCH of the material contained in the Age of Louis XV was originally intended by Voltaire to be used in a history of the war of 1741, but after the publication of his Age of Louis XIV (see page 100) he issued the work in 1768 as a sequel to the earlier book. Voltaire's estimate of the Grand Monarque is more than a trifle flattering, but in the history of his successor the note of personal praise verges on the absurd. Louis XV was alive when the work was written, but when the exigencies of politeness to the monarch do not compel the author to embroider, and when he is not speaking of remote and barbarous regions, Voltaire's history is written with knowledge and penetration.

I—THE REGENCY

THE age of Louis XIV was an age of great men, of the arts, of culture and refinement. We have now to review that which followed it—stormy at the outset, abounding in splendour for fifty years, closing in gloom as it had begun in faction. Louis XV was an orphan and a child. It would have been a long and dangerous affair to summon the States-General to settle the powers of the regency. It was the Parlement of Paris which set aside the will of Louis XIV and declared his grandson, Philip of Orleans, possessed of the full powers.

The regent, who hoped to succeed to the throne of France, at once allied himself closely with England and broke with the Spanish court. Alberoni, the Spanish minister, bent on seizing Sicily and Sardinia, fabricated a huge plot against France and England; the plot was revealed and frustrated by the theft of certain papers which were placed in the hands of Orleans. War broke out. The English shattered the

Spanish fleet at Messina; Alberoni disappeared from European politics.

The agencies which threatened to make the regency stormy were all suppressed. The public tranquillity permitted the whole population to become absorbed in a great gamble. The Scottish adventurer, John Law, was permitted to set up his bank and the Mississippi Company on a system which, kept within due limits, would have been useful. The whole of the national finances passed under Law's control. The country was flooded with paper money. At the moment when public credit was collapsing with a crash, Law was made controller-general; immediately afterwards he was an almost penniless fugitive. France had but been the victim of an epidemic which attacked England and Holland, too. An immediate consequence of the disaster was that an immense number of people were impoverished; in sum nevertheless, the whole affair resulted in a general development of commercial enterprise.

The death of Dubois, the regent's minister, in 1723, was soon followed by that of the regent himself, just after the young king attained his majority. The Duke of Bourbon succeeded to the office of first minister. Like every member of his house, Bourbon was the victim of clerical antagonism; he was supplanted and driven from the court by Fleury, the king's tutor, afterwards cardinal. Up to the age of seventy-three, Fleury was regarded as an amiable man and a charming companion; at that age he took up the task of government, which he carried on for sixteen years with unfailing prosperity.

Happily for Europe, the first minister of England, Robert Walpole, was of a like pacific character. These two men continued to maintain nearly all Europe at peace till 1733. During this period two powers were established of which Europe had scarcely heard before—Russia, raised out of barbarism by Peter the Great, and Prussia. From Russia to Spain all Europe was at peace, when the death of the King of Poland, Augustus II of Saxony, plunged it once more into those discords from which it is so rarely free.

Stanislas Leczinski, whose daughter Louis had married, was duly elected; the emperor, supported by Russia, set up Augustus, son of the late king. France, in alliance with Spain and Sardinia, attacked Austria; England and Holland did not intervene. In the outcome, Lorraine went to France (temporarily to Stanislas), its Duke Francis taking Tuscany, while Don Carlos got Naples and Sicily.

The emperor died in 1740. His daughter Maria Theresa claimed the Austrian succession, guaranteed under the Pragmatic Sanction. Other claimants, notably the Elector of Bavaria, came forward for portions of the inheritance. Frederick of Prussia claimed Silesia; on Maria Theresa's refusal, his armies entered the province in December 1740. The Prussian infantry, by converting imminent defeat into decisive victory at Molwitz, proved its worth. The battle was the signal for a general conflagration.

The marshal and the chevalier of Belleisle were the controlling force in France; they negotiated alliances with Prussia, Poland and Bavaria; and the Elector entered the Austrian territory. England, Holland and Hanover would not, or could not, move. Maria Theresa threw herself on the support of her Hungarian subjects, who espoused her cause with enthusiasm. But Frederick made himself master of Silesia, and the Elector of Bavaria, now the Emperor Charles VII, captured Prague. Now, however, dissensions arose among the victors; and Charles of Lorraine, brother-in-law of Maria Theresa, conducted an effective defensive campaign in Bohemia. The war rolled back to the Rhine. By this time France and England, though professedly merely 'auxiliaries,' had really become principals in the war, and now (January 1743) Fleury died.

Spain and England were already at war with each other before the death of Charles VII. All Europe was involved in the general turmoil. In March 1744, Louis openly declared war both on England and on the Queen of Hungary (Maria Theresa). A French force under Conti entered Italy; but the Emperor Charles VII met with reverses. Marshal Noailles succeeded in entrapping George II of England and cutting his communications; the English, however, retrieved the position by their victory at Dettingen.

II—LOUIS XV IN FLANDERS

Such was the turmoil and chaos of war and politics when Louis XV entered on his first campaign. The Emperor Charles was at Frankfort; even the validity of his imperial title was challenged. Charles of Lorraine was summoning Alsace, the three bishoprics and Franche-Comté to return to the Austrian allegiance. The English were victorious on land and masters of the sea. France herself was menaced on her German frontier. Frederick of Prussia, having secured Silesia, had already made a separate peace with Maria Theresa. Holland was threatening to join the allies.

At this moment Louis was preparing to support a Jacobite insurrection in England, and himself took command of the French armies in Flanders. This energy was followed by the capture of one Flemish fortress after another. But the Austrian successes in Alsace drew him thither, while Marshal Saxe conducted the operations in Flanders. Frederick of Prussia renewed the French alliance at Frankfort, counterbalancing the recent treaty of Worms between the allies. Frederick's sudden march on Prague reversed the military situation.

A severe illness of the king demonstrated the passionate affection with which his subjects regarded him. On his recovery he again took the field. The fluctuations in the progress of the arms of the antagonists were extraordinarily violent and rapid, and the changes of German princes from one side to the other were kaleidoscopic. The death of the emperor in January 1745 seemed to have no effect on the hostilities. France and Prussia, practically without allies, maintained the conflict, which Austria hoped to turn to her own advantage.

Marshal Saxe was now investing Tournai; he was so ill that he had to be carried on a litter. The French force was joined by the king and the dauphin. An allied army was marching to relieve the beleaguered town. Fontenoy was the scene of the battle which ensued. As the line of English regiments advanced to capture the heights they were encountered by the French Guards. "Gentlemen of the French

Guard, fire!" cried Lord Charles Hay. "We never fire first; fire yourselves," came the answer. The hail of bullets brought down numbers on each side, but the English advanced as steadily as if they had been on parade. The French Guard were swept back. Nothing could break the English column; but it was unsupported. At the moment when the battle seemed lost to the French a last desperate attack was decided on. A mass of troops was hurled against the English, who were forced to fall back step by step.

But the victory was won; it opened the way to the conquest of Flanders. Both the king and the dauphin had been in the greatest personal danger, but had refused the entreaties of Marshal Saxe that they should retire.

It is remarkable that Louis at once made overtures for a peace congress, which must have been desirable to Maria Theresa, but the influence of England prevented the success of the proposals. Tournai fell, and Ghent soon afterwards, in spite of a gallant attempt on the part of the English to recover it at Mesle. Bruges, Oudenarde, Dendermont, Ostend followed suit. Louis returned to Paris.

Nevertheless, Austria prevailed at the imperial election. Francis of Lorraine, Grand Duke of Tuscany, and husband of Maria Theresa, became emperor, despite the protest of Prussia. Frederick's own victories, however, were crowned by his capture of Dresden; after which he again made peace for himself, and was hailed in Berlin as Frederick the Great.

It now became the object of France to use the conquest of the Netherlands as a means of obtaining what she wanted in Italy, and of Austria to obtain from France compensation for the cession of Silesia to Frederick.

In the Austrian Netherlands the success of the French arms continued; soon Holland itself was threatened. In the war in Italy, France continued to play the part of an auxiliary only. The achievements there of the Franco-Spanish forces in 1745 were nullified by Frederick's withdrawal from the war after Dresden. A series of subsequent disasters was crowned by the death of Philip V of Spain. Only by an obstinate battle were the troops enabled to evacuate Piacenza, instead of surrendering. Genoa itself was obliged to submit to the Austrians, at whose mercy Italy now lay. And, meanwhile, the squadrons of the English fleet swept the seas.

The Austrians were, with difficulty, forced back into Provence, but a sudden and violent revolution at Genoa compelled their return to Italy. Louis, master of the Austrian Netherlands, again made proposals for peace. A congress was called at Breda, but none of the other sovereigns desired peace. Holland might have made itself the peace-maker of Europe; it refused that function, and the resultant French invasion brought about the revival of the office of stadtholder, conferred on the Prince of Orange. The republic was thus converted into a monarchy somewhat less limited than those of England, Sweden and Poland.

III—EPISODES OF THE WAR

Meanwhile, the enterprise, the successes and the misfortunes of Prince Charles Edward in England were perhaps the most remarkable of the events which startled Europe. Despairing of French assistance under the conditions of the European war, the young prince adopted a rash design. With only seven comrades, he sailed for the shores of Scotland.

No sooner were 300 men assembled than the royal standard was raised, and the fact was communicated to the courts of France and Spain. Reaching Perth, Charles proclaimed himself regent for his father. More adherents came in. He marched on Edinburgh; the government troops withdrew to the castle and the city was in his hands. General Cope advanced against him. The Highlanders flung themselves on the English with swords and bucklers; the novel form of attack struck the foe with panic; the rout was complete; but the prince could not capture the castle. When, marching south, he reached Carlisle, London was in a ferment. When he arrived at Derby the shops and banks in London were closed.

Irish partisans of the Stewarts in France were eager to aid him by an invasion, but this was hopelessly impracticable. The Pretender, with his communications threatened, was obliged to retire from Derby. He routed the government troops at Falkirk. But the approach of Cumberland drove him to the highlands, and his supporters were shattered at Culloden.

The fate of three kingdoms was decided in a battle between two armies of 11,000 and 7,000 men respectively. The prince became a fugitive, wandering from island to island, often escaping his pursuers by a hair's breadth. At last he was able to embark for France, the arrival, presence and departure of the boats being concealed from the government by the loyalty of the people.

An immense number of executions took place, the last victim being the octogenarian Lord Lovat, who had been the prime mover in the enterprise. A young enthusiast named Painter offered to die in place of the old man—an occurrence scarcely possible outside of England. The unfortunate prince was forcibly ejected from France when peace was made.

Louis, successful wherever he was present in person with Marshal Saxe, but nowhere else, continued vain efforts to obtain peace, frustrated by the animosity of Austria and England, which now brought into the field a new ally, the Tsarina Elizabeth. Bent on seizing Maestricht, Marshal Saxe won the battle of Laufeld, but it was not sufficiently decisive. Bergen-op-Zoom, however, was captured by a surprise attack. In April 1748 the French forces concentrated on Maestricht.

Meanwhile, Commodore Anson had accomplished his great voyage round the world. It had occupied three and a half years, at the end of which Anson reached England, his ships laden with spoils to the value of £500,000.

It was not the English ministry but the enterprise of the New England merchants that contrived the capture of Louisburg, on the St. Lawrence, the key to the French possessions in North America. The New Englanders on their own initiative raised and equipped a force of 4,000 men; four men-of-war were sent to escort them. Louisburg fell after a siege of fifty days, and the whole French population of the colony was deported to France. The English command of the seas was so overwhelming that French maritime movements were utterly paralysed.

La Bourdonnais, however, had redeemed the honour of the French flag in India. Dupleix, governor of Pondicherri, in conjunction with La Bourdonnais, governor of Mauritius, attacked and took Madras. Dupleix, jealous of his colleague, broke the terms of the capitulation, though it was to La Bourdonnais that Madras surrendered. That great man's services were rewarded by rigorous imprisonment in the Bastille, while the charges made against him by Dupleix were investigated; he lived only long enough to learn of his acquittal. A British squadron besieged Pondicherri, but failed to take it, defended as it was with extreme skill and energy by Dupleix and Bussy.

At last, however, the fall of Maestricht was assured, and this taught Holland and the allies to accept the peace proposals which Louis had so persistently offered. The war ended with the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The chief gains were reaped by Frederick. Europe remained divided into two camps; France, Spain, the Sicilies, Prussia and Sweden on one side; the rest on the other.

IV—THE SEVEN YEARS WAR

Scarcely ever has the whole of Europe enjoyed such prosperous years as those from 1748 to 1755. Commerce flourished; the arts were held in honour; Europe was like a family reunited after its quarrels. Yet the coming troubles were heralded as it were by earthquakes, especially the devastating one of Lisbon. The first catastrophe was in Sweden, where a monarchist conspiracy was discovered and the conspirators executed.

What set Europe ablaze was an Anglo-French quarrel over a question of boundaries left undefined under the treaty of Utrecht. The colonists attacked each other. Louis threatened Hanover. A league between England, Russia and the empire seemed imminent; in fear of which Prussia sought alliance with England. France threatened the English coasts, but actually struck at Minorca and seized Port Mahon—for which Admiral Byng was court-martialled and shot.

And now we are confronted by the amazing spectacle of an Elector of Brandenburg holding at bay the attack of Russia, France, the house of Austria, half the empire and Sweden; a prodigy to be explained only by the superiority of the Prussian discipline and the Prussian general. Augustus of Saxony and Poland, Maria Theresa and Elizabeth of Russia each had their grievance against Frederick—the last a purely personal one. Frederick, his alliance rejected by France, had united himself to England and Hanover. Even France and Austria, immemorial rivals, were now joined against him.

Frederick, menaced on every hand, suddenly entered Saxony and compelled its submission. In the archives of Dresden he found warrant for his action. The emperor put him to the ban of the empire. Russia moved on Prussia through Poland; the French entered Cleves and threatened Hanover. Frederick, leaving containing forces on the east and west, dashed on Prague. His great victory was cancelled by the great defeat of Kolin. The English were defeated at Hastenbeck; but Cumberland's convention of Klosterseven was repudiated.

Soubise, advancing on Saxony, was routed by Frederick at Rosbach. Ferdinand of Brunswick, replacing Cumberland, held Richelieu in check. Though Frederick flashed into Silesia, it seemed that Austria and Russia must overwhelm him; but Russia was withdrawn from the war by court revolutions. The war raged on every side of Prussia.

But France met with nothing but disaster in every quarter of the globe. In India the French arms at first seemed successful. Dupleix supported a pretender to the throne of Arcot. The English supported the rival claimant. But from the day when Clive defeated Dupleix before Arcot the French power waned. Lally, who succeeded Dupleix in the Indian command, was vanquished at Wandewash. Pondicherri was captured. Returning to France, the hapless Lally was tried on several counts, acquitted on some, but condemned to death on others. Chandernagore also, in Bengal, had been lost. In India, nothing was left to France.

In Africa, too, nothing was left to her; the English captured both Senegal and Goree. In America the losses were far greater. Quebec and all Canada were taken—no very real loss, perhaps, for Canada always cost a great deal and gave very little in return. A tenth of the expenditure on that colony if devoted to uncultivated lands in France would have brought large profits. In the West Indies, Guadeloupe and Martinique were taken. A French fleet destined for a descent on Ireland was shattered or captured or lost in Quiberon Bay. England's naval superiority has been marked at every stage of history, but was now more overwhelming than ever.

It was at this moment that Choiseul endeavoured to unite the Bourbon dynasties; but the attempt was without effect. It only laid Spanish colonies at the mercy of the English. France was utterly exhausted. In 1763 peace was made. Practically all that England had won was ceded to her. The peace was as necessary as it was humiliating, and its consequence was even more bitter when it was found that the Canadian colonists preferred to become subjects of Great Britain rather than return to French soil.

V—THE LATER YEARS OF LOUIS XV

While 500,000 men were in arms over the election of an emperor, while Europe, America and India were being devastated, Frenchmen were absorbed in a petty warfare of the pen which made them forget Metz and Fontenoy, victories and disgraces, all that was setting Europe in turmoil. This was the mighty quarrel between the Paris Parlement and the ecclesiastical interest concerning the refusal of the sacraments to dying persons who would not accept the bull *Unigenitus*.

Thrice did the Parlement refuse to administer justice if its writs against the clericals were set aside, while the pacific king endeavoured to have all these matters referred to his own privy council, and exhorted, rebuked, or strove to

conciliate the antagonists. The storm spread from Paris to the provinces. Finally, the king issued an edict forbidding the intervention of the Parlement and enjoining moderation on the clericals; but the decree was very ill received.

Great, however, was the public consternation when a certain Daniens, crazed with religious excitement, succeeded in approaching the person of the king and stabbing him. Doubtless, as the man declared to the last, it was not his intention to kill Louis, and his motive was 'religion'—in this case anti-clericalism. The wound was not mortal, and Damiens suffered the doom of Ravaillac, the assassin of Henry IV.

An attempt on the life of the King of Portugal, Jesuit in its origin, led to the expulsion of the order from Portugal in 1761; and this was shortly followed in 1764 by its suppression in France and in all the Spanish and Bourbon possessions in Europe, Asia and America.

Another controversy with the Papacy cost nothing but ink and paper; but money and blood were needed to bring Corsica into subjection to France. The island was peopled largely by descendants of the ancient Carthaginians and Saracens, as well as by aborigines. For many centuries they had been subject to the Genoese Republic, but had for long been in revolt. In 1837 they had appealed to France, which intervened spasmodically, being occupied with larger conflicts.

In 1755 Pascal Paoli became the Corsican leader, a man of great qualities, who did enough for glory, but not enough either to free Corsica or to become her absolute ruler. The Genoese efforts at conquest were foiled; at last, in 1768, the republic ceded the island to France, with a nominal right of repurchase.

The bargain was good for Genoa; but could France make her purchase good? Paoli and the Corsicans would not accept a mere change of masters. That the resistance was crushed at last was due to Choiseul, as also was the prosperity of the American possessions still left to France. His ultimate reward was exile.

On May 10, 1774, Louis died of smallpox—contracted because he had refused to protect himself by inoculation. The nation, hitherto violently prejudiced against this preventive, learnt the lesson.

The legal reforms of Louis XV had been directed almost exclusively to establishing uniformity of procedure. The cruelties and absurdities of the criminal law, with all its arbitrary local variations, remained in force. Torture and confiscation of goods continued, though the first was entirely repudiated by the Greeks and Romans, and the second was only introduced by Sulla. French judges could still appeal to the tyrannies of Israelite kings for legal precedents. A majority of judges could still condemn a man to death, even when the protest of a minority demonstrated that the crime was not proved.

The same spirit of blind and narrow prejudice and ignorance which rejected inoculation for smallpox dealt the deadliest blows against the magnificent enterprise of the Encyclopédie. Nevertheless, it is certain that the knowledge of nature, the spirit which has challenged the time-honoured fables graced with the name of history, and a healthy metaphysic freed from the trammels and excrescences of scholasticism, are all the fruits of this age, and that reason has reached its highest perfection. The very experiments which have themselves been disastrous and ruinous failures have been incidentally the cause of valuable discoveries.

History of the French Revolution

THOMAS CARLYLE

IN 1834 Carlyle began work upon the History of the French Revolution, and the first volume was ready in 1835 when, through an accident, the only copy of the manuscript was burnt. Carlyle set to work again and finished the third volume in January, 1837, the History being published six months later. Never has the individuality of a historian so completely permeated his work; it is inconceivable that any other man should have written a single paragraph, almost a single sentence, of the French Revolution. Although it was impossible for Carlyle to assimilate all the wealth of material even then extant, the History, considered as a prose epic, has a permanent and unique value.

I—THE END OF AN ERA

On May 10, 1774, 'with a sound absolutely like thunder,' has the horologe of time struck, and an old era passed away. Is it the healthy peace or the ominous unhealthy, that rests on France for the next ten years? Dubarrydom and its D'Aiguillons are gone for ever. There is a young, still docile, well-intentioned king; a young, beautiful and bountiful, well-intentioned queen; and with them all France, as it were, become young. For controller general, a virtuous, philosophic Turgot. Philosophism sits joyful in her glittering saloons; 'the age of revolutions approaches' (as Jean Jacques wrote), but then of happy, blessed ones.

But with the working people it is not so well, whom we lump together into a kind of dim, compendious unity, monstrous but dim, far off, as the *canaille*. Visible in France is no such thing as a government. But beyond the Atlantic democracy is born; a sympathetic France rejoices over the rights of man. Rochambeaus, Lameths, Lafayettes have drawn their swords in this sacred quarrel; return, to be the missionaries of freedom. But, what of the finances, having no Fortunatus purse?

For there is the palpablest discrepancy between revenue and expenditure. Are we breaking down, then, into the horrors of national bankruptcy? Turgot, Necker and others have failed. What apparition, then, could be welcomer than that of M. de Calonne? A man

of indisputable genius, even fiscal genius, more or less; of intrinsically rich qualities! For all straits he has present remedy. Calonne also shall have trial! With a genius for persuading —before all things for borrowing; after three years of which, expedient heaped on expedient, the pile topples perilous.

Whereupon a new expedient once more astonishes the world, unheard of these hundred and sixty years—Convocation of the Notables. A round gross of notables, meeting in February 1787; all privileged persons. A deficit so enormous! Mismanagement, profusion, is too clear; peculation itself is hinted at. Calonne flies, storm-driven, over the horizon. To whom succeeds Loménie-Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse—adopting Calonne's plans, as Calonne had proposed to adopt Turgot's; and the notables are, as it were, organed out in kind of choral anthem of thanks, praises, promises.

Loménie issues conciliatory edicts, fiscal edicts. But if the Parlement of Paris refuse to register them? As it does, entering complaints instead. Loménie launches his thunderbolt, six score *lettres de cachet*; the Parlement is trundled off to Troyes, in Champagne, for a month. Yet two months later, when a royal session is held, to have edicts registered, there is no registering. Orleans has made the protest and cut his moorings.

The provincial parlements, moreover, back up the Paris Parlement with its demand for a States-General. Loménie hatches a cockatrice egg: but it is broken in premature manner; the plot discovered and denounced. Nevertheless, the Parlement is dispersed by D'Agoust with Gardes Françaises and Gardes Suisses. Still, however, will none of the provincial parlements register.

Deputations coming from Brittany meet to take counsel, being refused audience; become the Breton Club, first germ of the Jacobins' Society. Loménie at last announces that the States-General shall meet in the May of next year (1789). For the holding of which 'thinkers are invited' to furnish a plan.

II—THE STATES-GENERAL

Wherewith Loménie departs; flimsier mortal was seldom fated to do as weighty a mischief. The archbishop is thrown out and M. Necker is recalled. States-General will meet, if not in January, at least in May. But how to form it? On the model of the last States-General in 1614, says the Parlement, which means that the Tiers Etat will be of no account, if the noblesse and the clergy agree. Wherewith terminates the popularity of the Parlement. As for the 'thinkers,' it is a sheer snowing of pamphlets. And the Abbé Siéyès has come to Paris to ask three questions, and answer them: *What is the Third Estate? All. What has it hitherto been in our form of government? Nothing. What does it want? To become something.*

The grand questions are: Shall the States-General sit and vote in three separate bodies, or in one body, wherein the Tiers Etat shall have double representation? The notables are again summoned to decide, but vanish without decision. With those questions still unsettled, the election begins. And presently the national deputies are in Paris. Also there is a sputter; drudgery and rascality rising in St. Antoine, finally repressed by Gardes Suisses and grape-shot.

On Monday, May 4, is the baptism day of democracy, the extreme unction day of feudalism. Behold the procession of processions advancing towards Notre Dame—our commons, noblesse, clergy, the king himself. Which of these six hundred individuals in white cravat might one guess would become their king? He with the thick black locks, shaggy beetle-brows and rough-hewn face? Gabriel Honoré Riqueti de Mirabeau, the world-compeller, the type Frenchman of this epoch, as Voltaire of the last. And if Mirabeau is the greatest, who of these six hundred may be the meanest? Shall we say that anxious, slight, ineffectual-looking man, under thirty, in spectacles; complexion of an atrabiliar shade of pale sea-green, whose name is Maximilien Robespierre?

Coming into their hall on the morrow, the commons deputies perceive that they have it to themselves. The noblesse and the clergy are sitting separately, which the noblesse maintain to be right; no agreement is possible. After six weeks of inertia the commons deputies, on their own strength, are getting under way; declare themselves not Third Estate, but National Assembly. On June 20, shut out of their hall 'for repairs,' the deputies find refuge in the tennis court; take solemn oath that they will continue to meet till they have made the constitution. And to these are joined 149 of the clergy A royal session is held; the king propounds thirty-five articles, which if the estates do not confirm he will himself enforce. The commons remain immovable, joined now by the rest of the clergy and forty-eight noblesse. So triumphs the Third Estate.

War-god Broglie is at work, but grape-shot is good on one condition! The Gardes Françaises, it seems, will not fire; nor they only. Other troops, then? Rumour declares, and is verified, that Necker, people's minister, is dismissed. "To arms!" cried Camille Desmoulins, and innumerable voices yell responsive. Chaos comes. The Electoral Club, however, declares itself a provisional municipality, sends out parties to keep order in the streets that night, enrol a militia, with arms collected where one may. Better to name it National Guard! And while the crisis is going on Mirabeau is away, sad at heart for his dying, crabbed old father. Muskets are got from the Invalides; 28,000 National Guards are provided with matchlocks. And now to the Bastille! But to describe this siege perhaps transcends the talent of mortals. After four hours of world-Bedlam, it surrenders. The Bastille is down. "Why," said poor Louis, "that is a revolt." "Sire," answered Liancourt, "it is not a revolt; it is a revolution."

On the morrow, Louis paternally announces to the National Assembly reconciliation. Amid enthusiasm, President Bailly is proclaimed Maire of Paris, Lafayette general of the National Guard. And the first emigration of aristocrat irreconcilables takes place. The revolution is sanctioned. Nevertheless, see Saint Antoine, not to be curbed, dragging old Foulon and Berthier to the lanterne, after which the cloud disappears, as thunderclouds do.

III—MENADS AND FEAST OF PIKES

French Revolution means here the open, violent rebellion and victory of disemprisoned anarchy against corrupt, worn-out authority; till, the frenzy working itself out, the uncontrollable be got harnessed. A transcendental phenomenon, overstepping all rules and experience, the crowning phonomenon of our modern time.

The National Assembly takes the name Constituent; with endless debating, gets the rights of man written down and promulgated. A memorable night is August 4, when they abolish privilege, immunity, feudalism, root and branch, perfecting their theory of irregular verbs. Meanwhile, seventy-two châteaux have flamed aloft in the Mâconnais and Beaujolais alone. Ill stands it now with some of the seigneurs. And, glorious as the meridian, M. Necker is returning from Basel.

Pamphleteering, moreover, opens its abysmal throat wider and wider, never to close more. A Fourth Estate of able editors springs up, increases and multiplies, irrepressible, incalculable.

No, this revolution is not of the consolidating kind. Lafayette maintains order by his patrols; we hear of white cockades and, worse still, black cockades; and grain grows still more scarce. One Monday morning, maternity awakes to hear children weeping for bread, must forth into the streets. *Allons!* Let us assemble! To the Hôtel de Ville, to Versailles, to the lanterne! All women gather and go; crowds storm all stairs, force out all women; there is a universal 'press of women.' Who will storm the Hôtel de Ville, but for shifty usher Maillard, who snatches a drum, beats his Rogues' March to Versailles! And after them the National Guard, resolute in spite of *Mon Général* who, indeed, must go with them—St. Antoine having already gone. Maillard and his menads demand at Versailles bread; speech with the king for a deputation. The king speaks words of comfort. Words? But they want 'bread, not so much discoursing!'

Towards midnight comes Lafayette; seems to have saved the situation; gets to bed about five in the morning. But rascaldom, gathering about the château, breaks in. One of the royal bodyguard fires, whereupon the deluge pours in, would deal utter destruction but for the coming of the National Guard. The bodyguard mount the tricolour. There is no choice now. The king must from Versailles to Paris, in strange procession; finally reaches the long-deserted Palace of the Tuileries. It is Tuesday, October 6, 1789.

And so again, on clear arena under new conditions, with something even of a new stateliness, we begin a new course of action. Peace of a father restored to his children? Not only shall Paris be fed, but the king's hand be seen in that work—*King Louis, restorer of French liberty!*

Alone of men, Mirabeau may begin to discern clearly whither all this is tending. Patriotism, accordingly, regrets that his zeal seems to be getting cool. A man stout of heart, enigmatic, difficult to unmask! Meanwhile, finances give trouble enough. To appease the deficit we venture on a hazardous step, sale of the clergy's lands; a paper-money of *assignats*, bonds secured on that property, is decreed; and young Sansculottism thrives bravely, growing by hunger. Great and greater waxes President Danton in his Cordeliers section. This man also, like Mirabeau, has a natural *eye*.

And with the whole world forming itself into clubs, there is one club growing ever stronger, till it becomes immeasurably strong; which, having leased for itself the hall of the Jacobins' Convent, shall, under the title of the Jacobins' Club, become memorable to all times and lands; has become the mother society, with 300 shrill-tongued daughters in direct correspondence with her, has also already thrown off the mother club of the Cordeliers and the monarchist Feuillans.

In the midst of which a hopeful France on a sudden renews with enthusiasm the national oath; of loyalty to the king, the law, the constitution which the National Assembly *shall* make; in Paris, repeated in every town and district of France! Freedom by social contact; such was verily the gospel of that era.

From which springs a new idea: 'Why all France has not one federation and universal oath of brotherhood once for all?' other places than Paris having first set example of federation. The place for it, Paris; the scene to be worthy of it. Fifteen thousand men are at work on the Champs de Mars, hollowing it out into a national amphitheatre. One may hope it will be annual and perennial; a feast of pikes, notable among the high tides of the year!

Workmen being lazy, all Paris turns out to complete the preparations. From all points of the compass federates arrive. On July 13, 1790, 200,000 patriotic men and 100,000 patriotic women sit waiting in the Champs de Mars. The generalissimo swears in the name of armed France; the National Assembly swears; the king swears; be the welkin split with *vivats!* And the feast of pikes dances itself off and becomes defunct.

IV—THE END OF MIRABEAU

Of journals there are now some 133; among which, Marat, the People's Friend, unseen, croaks harsh thunder. Clubbism thrives and spreads, the Mother of Patriotism, sitting in the Jacobins, shining supreme over all. The pure patriots now, sitting on the extreme left, count only some thirty, Mirabeau not among the chosen; a virtuous Pétion; an incorruptible Robespierre; conspicuous, if seldom audible, Phillippe d'Orléans; and Barnave triumvirate.

The plan of royalty, if it have any, is that of flying over the frontiers; does not abandon the plan, yet never executes it. Nevertheless, Mirabeau and the queen of France have met, have parted with mutual trust. It is strange, secret as the mysteries, but indisputable. "Madame," he has said, "the monarchy is saved." Possible—if Fate intervene not. Patriotism suspects the design of flight; barking this time not at nothing. Suspects also the repairing of the castle of Vincennes; General Lafayette has to wrestle persuasively with St. Antoine.

On one royal person only can Mirabeau place

dependence—the queen. Had Mirabeau lived one other year! But man's years are numbered, and the tale of Mirabeau's is complete. The giant oaken strength of him is wasted; excess of effort, of excitement of all kinds; labour incessant, almost beyond credibility. "When I am gone," he has said, "the miseries I have held back will burst from all sides upon France." On April 2 he feels that the last of the days has risen for him. His death is Titanic, as his life has been. On the third evening is solemn public funeral. The chosen man of France is gone.

The French monarchy now is, in all human probability, lost. Many things invite to flight; but if the king fly, will there not be aristocrat Austrian invasion, butchery, replacement of feudalism, wars more than civil? The king desires to go to St. Cloud, but shall not; patriots will not let the horses go. But Count Fersen, an alert young Swedish soldier, has business on hand; has a new coach built, of the kind called Berline; has made other purchases. On the night of Monday, June 20, certain royal individuals are in a glass coach; Fersen is the coachman; out by the Barrier de Clichy, till we find the waiting Berline; then to Bondy, where is a chaise ready; and deft Fersen bids adieu.

With morning, and discovery, National Assembly adopts an attitude of sublime calm; Paris also; yet messages are flying. Moreover, at Saint Menehould, on the route of the Berline, suspicious patriots are wondering what certain lounging dragoons mean; while the Berline arrives not.

At last it comes; but Drouet, the village postmaster, sees a likeness; takes horse in swift pursuit. So rolls on the Berline, and the chase after it; till it comes to a dead stop in Varennes, where Drouet finds it—in time to stop departure. Louis steps out; all step out. The flight is ended, though not the spurring and riding of that night of spurs.

V—CONSTITUTION WILL NOT MARCH

In the last nights of September, Paris is dancing and flinging fireworks; the edifice of the constitution is completed, solemnly proffered by his majesty, solemnly accepted by him. There is to be a new Legislative Assembly, biennial; no members of the Constituent Assembly to sit therein, or for four years to be a minister, or hold a court appointment. So they vanish.

Among this new legislative see Condorcet, Brissot; most notable, Carnot. An effervescent, well intentioned set of senators; too combustible where continual sparks are flying, ordered to make the constitution march, for which marching three things bode ill—the French people, the French king, the French noblesse and the European world.

For there are troubles in cities of the south. Avignon, where Jourdan *coupe-tête* makes lurid appearance; Perpignan, northern Caen also. With factions, suspicions, want of bread and sugar, it is verily what they call *déchiré*, torn asunder, this poor country. And away over seas the Plain of Cap Français, one huge whirl of smoke and flame; one cause of the dearth of sugar. What King Louis is and cannot help being, we already know

And, thirdly, there is the European world. All kings and kinglets are astir, their brows clouded with menace. Swedish Gustav will lead coalised armies, Austria and Prussia speak at Pilnitz, lean Pitt looks out suspicious. Europe is in travail, the birth will be War. Worst feature of all, the emigrants at Coblentz, an extra-national Versailles.

Our revenue is assignats, our arms wrecked, disobedient, disorganized; what, then, shall we do? Dumouriez is summoned to Paris, quick, shifty, insuppressible; while royalist seigneurs cajole and, as you turn your legislative thumbscrew, king's veto steps in with magical paralysis.

Yet let not patriotism despair. Have we not a virtuous Pétion, Maire of Paris, a wholly patriotic municipality? Patriotism, moreover, has her constitution that *can* march, the mother society of the Jacobins; where may be heard Brissot, Danton, Robespierre, the incorruptible man.

Hope burst forth with appointment of a patriot ministry, this also his majesty will try. Roland, perchance Wife Roland, Dumouriez and others. Liberty is never named without another word, Equality. In April poor Louis, 'with tears in his eyes,' proposes that the assembly do now decree war. Let our three generals on the frontier look to it therefore, since Duke Brunswick has his drill-sergeants busy. We decree a camp of twenty thousand National Volunteers; the hereditary representative answers *veto!* Strict Roland, the whole patriot ministry, finds itself turned out.

Barbaroux writes to Marseilles for six hundred men who know how to die. On June 20 a tree of Liberty appears in Saint Antoine—a procession with for standard a pair of blaok breeches—pours down surging upon the Tuileries, breaks in. The king, the little prince royal, have to don the cap of liberty. Thus has the age of Chivalry gone and that of Hunger come.

Now from Marseilles are marching the six hundred men who know how to die, marching to the hymn of the Marseillaise. The country is in danger! Volunteer fighters gather. Demand is for forfeiture, abdication in favour of prince royal, which Legislature cannot pronounce. Therefore, on the night of August 9 the tocsin sounds; of Insurrection.

On August 18 the grim host is marching, immeasurable, born of the night. Of the squadrons of order, not one stirs. At the Tuileries the red Swiss look to their priming. Amid a double rank of National Guards the royal family 'marches' to the assembly. The Swiss stand to their post, peaceable yet immovable. One strangest patriot onlooker thinks that the Swiss, had they a commander, would beat; the name of him, Napoleon Buonaparte. Having none—— Honour to you, brave men, not martyrs, and yet almost more. Your work was to die, and ye did it. Our old patriot ministry is recalled; Roland; Danton Minister of Justice! Also, in the new municipality, Robespierre is sitting. Louis and his household are lodged in the Temple. The constitution is over! Dumouriez is commander-in-chief.

VI—REGICIDE

In this month of September 1792 whatsoever is cruel in the panic frenzy of twenty-five million men, whatsoever is great in the simultaneous death-defiance of twenty-five million men, stand here in abrupt contrast; all of black on one side, all of bright on the other. France crowding to the frontiers to defend itself from foreign despots, to town halls to defend itself from aristocrats, an insurrectionary Commune of Paris actual sovereign of France.

There is a new Tribunal of Justice dealing with aristocrats; but the Prussians have taken Longwy, and La Vendée is in revolt against the Revolution Danton gets a decree to search for arms and to imprison suspects, some four hundred being seized. Prussians have Verdun also, but Dumouriez, the many-counselled, has found a possible Thermopylae—if we can secure Argonne. But Paris knows not Argonne, and terror is in her streets, with defiance and frenzy. From a Sunday night to Thursday are a hundred hours, to be reckoned with the Bartholomew butchery; prisoners dragged out by sudden courts of wild justice to be massacred. These are the September massacres, the victims one thousand and eighty-nine. Horrible! But Brunswick is within a day's journey of us. 'We must put our enemies in fear.' Which has plainly been brought about.

Our new National Convention is getting chosen; already we date First Year of the Republic. And Dumouriez has snatched the Argonne passes; Brunswick must laboriously skirt round. On September 20, Brunswick attacks Valmy, all day cannonading Alsatian Kellerman with French sansculottes, who do *not* fly like poultry; finally retires; a day precious to France!

On the morrow our new National convention first sits; old legislative ending. Dumouriez, after brief appearance in Paris, returns to attack Netherlands, winter though it be.

France, then, has hurled back the invaders, and shattered her own constitution; a tremendous change. The nation has stripped itself of the old vestures; patriots of the type soon to be called Girondins have the problem of governing this naked nation. Constitution-making sets to work again; more practical matters offer many difficulties; for one thing, lack of grain; for another, what to do with a discrowned Louis Capet—all things, but most of all fear, pointing one way. Is there not on record a trial of Charles I?

Twice our Girondin friends have attacked September massacres, Robespierre dictatorship; not with success. On December 11, the king's trial has *emerged*, before the Convention; fifty-seven questions are put to him. Thereafter he withdraws, having answered—for the most part on the simple basis of *No*. On December 26, his advocate, Deséze, speaks for him. But there is to be debate. The outcome, on January 15—Guilty. The sentence, by majority of fifty-three, among them Egalité, once Orleans—Death. Lastly, no delay.

On the morrow, in the Place de la Revolution, he is brought to the guillotine; beside him, brave Abbé Edgeworth says, "Son of St. Louis, ascend to Heaven"; the axe clanks down; a king's life is shorn away. At home, this killing of a king has divided all friends; abroad it has united all enemies. England declares war; Spain declares war; all declare war. "The coalised kings threaten us; we hurl at their feet, as gage of battle, the head of a king."

VII—REIGN OF TERROR

Five weeks later, indignant French patriots rush to the grocers' shops; distribute sugar, weighing it out at a just rate of elevenpence; other things also; the grocer silently wringing his hands. What does this mean? Pitt has a hand in it, the gold of Pitt, all men think; whether it is Marat he has bought, as the Girondins say; or the Girondins, as the Jacobins say.

Moreover, Dumouriez is checked; Custine also in the Rhine country is checked; England and Spain are also taking the field; La Vendée has flamed out again with its war cry of *God and the King*. Fatherland is in danger! From our own traitors? 'Set up a tribunal for traitors and a maximum for grain,' say patriot Volunteers. Arrest twenty-two Girondins!—though not yet. In every township of France sit revolutionary committees for arrestment of suspects; notable also is the Tribunal Révolutionnaire, and our Supreme Committee of Public Safety.

In the meantime the Girondins have broken with Danton, ranged him against them, and are now at open war with the Mountain. Murat is attacked, acquitted with triumph. On Friday, May 31, we find a new insurrectionary general of the National Guard enveloping the Convention, which in three days, being thus surrounded by friends, ejects under arrestment thirty-two Girondins. Surely the true reign of Fraternity is now not far?

The Girondins are struck down, but in the country follows a ferment of Girondist risings. And on July 9, a fair Charlotte Corday is starting for Paris from Caen, with letter of introduction from Barbaroux to Dupernet, whom she sees, concerning family papers. On July 13, she drives to the residence of Marat, who is sick—a citoyenne who would do France a service; is admitted, plunges a knife into Marat's heart. So ends People's-Friend Marat. She submits, stately, to inevitable doom.

At Paris is to be a new feature of pikes, over yet a new constitution; statue of Nature, statue of Liberty, unveiled! *Republic one and indivisible—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, or Death!* A new calendar also, with months newnamed. But Toulon has thrown itself into the hands of the English, who will make a new Gibraltar of it! We beleaguer Toulon; having in our army there remarkable Artillery-Major Napoleon Buonaparte. Lyons also we beleaguer.

Committe of Public Safety promulgates levy *en masse*; heroically daring against foreign foes. Against domestic foes it issues the law of the suspects. The guillotine gets always quicker motion. Trial of the 'Widow Capet'; whence Marie Antoinette withdraws to die—not wanting to herself, the imperial woman! After her, the scaffold claims the twenty-two Girondins. Terror is become the order of the day.

THE suspect may well tremble; how much more the open rebels—the Girondin cities of the south! The guillotine goes always, yet not fast enough; you must try fusillading, and perhaps methods still frightfuller. Marseilles is taken, and under martial law. Toulon is once more the Republic's.

Beside which, behold destruction of the Catholic religion; indeed, for the time being, of religion itself; a new religion promulgated of the Goddess of Reason, with the first of the Feasts of Reason, ushered in with carmagnole dance.

Of massacring, altar-robbing Hébertism, is there beginning to be a sickening? Danton, Camille Desmoulins are weary of it; the Hébertists themselves are smitten; nineteen of them travel their last road in the tumbrils. "We should not strike save where it is useful to the Republic," says Danton; quarrels with Robespierre; Danton, Camille, others of the friends of mercy are arrested. At the trial, he shivers the witnesses to ruin thunderously; nevertheless, sentence is passed. On the scaffold he says, "Danton, no weakness! Thou wilt show my head to the people—it is worth showing." So passed this Danton; a very man; fiery-real, from the great fire-bosom of nature herself. Swift, ever swifter, goes the axe of Samson; Death pauses not. But on Prairial 20, the world is in holiday clothes in the Jardin National.

Incorruptible Robespierre, President of the Convention, has decreed the existence of the Supreme Being; will himself be priest and prophet; in sky-blue coat and black breeches! Nowise, however, checking the guillotine, going ever faster.

On July 26, when the Incorruptible addresses the Convention, there is dissonance. Such mutiny is like fire sputtering in the ship's powder-room. The Convention then must be purged, with aid of Henriot. But next day, amid cries of *Tyranny! Dictatorship!* the Convention decrees that Robespierre 'is accused'; with Couthon and St. Just; decreed 'out of law'; Paris, after brief tumult, sides with Convention. So on July 28, 1794, the tumbrils go with this motley batch of outlaws. This is the end of the Reign of Terror. The nation resolves itself into a committee of mercy.

AND still there is no bread, and no constitution; Paris rises once again, flowing towards the Tuileries; checked in one day with two blank cannon-shots, by Pichegru, conqueror of Holland. Abbé Siéyès provides yet another constitution; unpleasing to sundry who will not be dispersed. To suppress whom, a young artillery officer is named commandant; who with whiff of grape-shot does very promptly suppress them; and the thing we specifically call French Revolution is blown into space.

History of Civilization in Europe

F. P. G. GUIZOT

IT was in 1812 that Guizot was first appointed to the chair of modern history at the Sorbonne. Later, politics occupied him much, but literature and history were his greatest personal interests, and from 1820 onwards he displayed astonishing literary activity. To this period belongs the first part of his History of the Revolution in England, from Charles I to Charles II, a work completed during his exile in England after 1848. Between 1828 and 1830 he delivered a course of lectures which raised his reputation as a historian to its highest point and established him as one of the best writers in Europe. These lectures formed the basis of his History of Civilization in Europe (1828) and of his History of Civilization in France (1830), both classics. The former was translated by Hazlitt.

I—FEUDALISM AND THE CHURCH

THE subject I propose to consider is the civilization of Europe—its origins, its progress, its aims, its character. The fact of civilization belongs to what is called the philosophic portion of history; it is a vague, obscure, complex fact, very difficult, I admit, to explain and describe, but none the less requiring explanation and description. It is, indeed, the greatest historical fact, to which all others contribute; it is a kind of ocean which makes the wealth of a people, and in the bosom of which all the elements of the people's life, all the forces of its existence, are joined in unity.

There is an essential difference between modern European and other civilizations. The characteristic of other civilizations has been unity; they seem to have emanated from a single fact, a single idea. In Egypt and India the theocratic principle was dominant; in the Greek and Phoenician republics, the democratic principle. The civilization of modern Europe on the contrary, is diverse, confused, stormy; all the forms and principles of social organization, theocratic, monarchical, aristocratic, democratic, co-exist in it; there are infinite gradations of liberty, wealth, influence. All the various forces are in a state of constant struggle; yet all of them have a certain family resemblance, as it were, that one cannot but recognize.

These diverse elements, for all their conflict, cannot any one of them extinguish any other; each has to dwell with the rest, make a compromise with the rest. The outcome, then, of this diversity and struggle is liberty; and here is the grand and true superiority of the European over other civilizations. European civilization, if I may say so, has entered into eternal truth; it advances in the ways of God.

It would be an important confirmation of my assertion as to the diverse character of our civilization if we should find in its very cradle the causes and the elements of that diversity. And,

indeed, at the fall of the Roman empire, we do so find it.

Three forms of society, each entirely different from the other, are visible at the time of chaos. The municipalities survived, the last remnant of the imperial system. The Christian Church survived. And in the third place there were the barbarians, who brought with them a military organization and a hardy, individual independence that were wholly new to the peoples who had dwelt under the shelter of the empire. The barbarian epoch was the chaos of all the elements, the infancy of all the systems, a universal hubbub, in which even the conflict itself had no definite or permanent effects.

Europe laboured to escape from this confusion. At some times, and in some places, it was temporarily checked—in particular, by the great Charlemagne in his revival of the imperial power; but the confusion did not cease until its causes no longer acted. These causes were two—one material, one moral. The material cause was the irruption of fresh barbarian hordes. The moral cause was the lack of any ideas in common among men as to the structure of society. The old imperial fabric had disappeared; Charlemagne's restoration of it depended wholly on his own personality, and did not survive him; men had no ideas of any new structure—their intellectual horizon was limited to their own affairs. By the beginning of the tenth century the barbarian invasions ended, and as the populations settled down a new system appeared based partly on the barbarians' love of independence, partly on their plans of military gradation—the system of feudalism.

Everywhere society was dismembered; everywhere there was formed a multitude of small, obscure, isolated societies, consisting of the chief, his family, his retainers, and the wretched serfs over whom he ruled without restraint. The narrow, concentrated life of the feudal lord lent, undoubtedly, a great preponderance to domesticity in his affairs. The lord had his wife and children for his permanent society; they continually shared his interests, his destiny. It was in the bosom of the feudal family that woman gained her importance. The system excited developments of private character and passion that were, all things considered, noble. Chivalry was the daughter of feudalism.

But from the social point of view, feudalism failed to provide either legal order or political security. It contained elaborate obligations between the higher and lower orders of the feudal hierarchy, duties of protection on the one side and of service on the other. But these obligations could never be established as institutions There was no superior force to which all had to submit, no public opinion to make itself respected. Hence the system was without political guarantee to sustain it. Feudalism was as much opposed to the establishment of general order as to the extension of general liberty.

Meanwhile, the Church, adhering to its own principles, had steadily advanced along the route that it had marked out for itself in the early days of its organization. It was during the feudal epoch the only power that made for civilized development. All education was ecclesiastical; all the arts were in the service of the Church. It had, during the Dark Ages, won the barbarians to its fold by the gorgeous solemnity of its ritual; and, to protect itself against secular interference, it had declared the spiritual power to be independent of the temporal—the first great assertion, in the history of European civilization, of the liberty of thought.

In one set of respects, the Church during the feudal epoch satisfied the conditions of good government; in another, it did not. Its power was uniformly distributed; it drew its recruits from all classes and entrusted the rule to the most capable. It was in close touch with every grade of mankind; it was the most popular and accessible society of the time, the most open to all talents and all noble ambitions.

But, on the other hand, it failed in that all-important requisite of good government, respect for liberty. It denied the rights of individual reason in spiritual matters, and it claimed the right to compel belief—a claim that placed it in dependence upon the temporal powers, since, as a spiritual body, governing by influence and not by force, it could not persecute without the aid of the secular arm.

II—THE TOWNS

Like the Church, the municipalities survived the downfall of the Roman empire. Their history varied greatly in different parts of Europe, but none the less some observations can be made that are broadly accurate with respect to most of them.

From the fifth to the tenth century the state of the towns was a state neither of servitude nor of liberty. They suffered all the woes that are the fate of the weak; they were the prey of continual violence and depredation; yet in spite of the fearful disorders of the time, they preserved a certain importance. When feudalism was established, the towns lost such independence as they had possessed; they found themselves under the heel of feudal chiefs.

But feudalism did bring about a sort of peace, a sort of order; and with the slightest gleam of peace and order a man's hope revives, and on the revival of hope he takes to work. So it was with the towns. New wants were created; commerce and industry arose to satisfy them; wealth and population slowly returned. But industry and commerce were absolutely without security; the townsmen were exposed to merciless extortion and plundering at the hands of their feudal overlords. The only way in which the towns could defend themselves from the violence of their masters was by using violence themselves. So in the eleventh century we find town after town arising in revolt against its despot and winning from him a charter of liberty.

Although the insurrection was in a sense general, it was in no way concerted—it was not a rising of the combined citizens against the combined feudal aristocracy. All the towns found themselves exposed to much the same evils and rescued themselves in much the same manner. But each town acted for itself—did not go to the help of any other town. Hence these detached communities had no ambitions, no aspirations to national importance; their outlook was limited to themselves.

Although it may be broadly asserted that the emancipation did not alter the relations of the

citizens with the general government, that assertion must be modified in one respect. A link was established between the citizens and the king. Sometimes they appealed for his aid against their lord, sometimes the lord invoked him as judge; thus a relation was established between the king and the towns, and the citizens came into touch with the centre of the state.

III—THE AGE OF CENTRALISATION

From the fifth to the twelfth century society, as we have seen, contained kings, a lay aristocracy, a clergy, citizens, peasantry—the germs, in fact, of all that goes to make a nation and a government; yet no government, no nation. We have come across a multitude of particular forces, of local institutions, but nothing general, nothing public, nothing, properly speaking, political.

In the seventeeth and eighteenth centuries, on the contrary, all the classes and the particular forces have taken a secondary place, are shadowy and almost effaced; the stage is occupied by two great figures, government and people.

Here, if I am not mistaken, is the essential distinction between primitive Europe and modern Europe. Here is the change that was accomplished in the period extending from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. Viewed by itself, that period seems a characterless one of confusion without cause, of movement without direction, of agitation without result. Yet, in relation to the period that followed, this period had a tendency and a progress of its own; it slowly accomplished a vast work. It was the second period of European civilization—the period of attempt and experiment, succeeding that of origins and formation and preparing the way for that of development properly so called.

The first great event of this period was the crusades—a universal movement of all classes and all countries in moral unity, the truly heroic event of modern Europe. Besides the religious impulse that led to the crusades, there was another impulse. They gave to men an opportunity of widening their horizons, of indulging the taste for movement and adventure. The opportunity thus freely taken changed the face of society. Men's minds were opened, their ideas were extended, by contact with other races; European society was dragged out of the groove along which it had been travelling. The moral state of Europe was profoundly modified.

The social state underwent a similar change. Many of the smaller feudal lords sold their fiefs, or impoverished themselves by crusading, or lost much of their power during their absence. Property and power came into fewer hands; society was more centralised, no longer dispersed as it formerly was. The citizens, on their part, were no longer content with local industry and trade; they entered upon commerce on a grander scale with countries overseas. By the end of the crusades the march of society towards centralisation was in steady progress.

Already in the twelfth century a new idea of kingship had begun, very faintly, to make its appearance. In most European countries the king, under the feudal system, had been a head who could not enforce his headship. But there was, all the while, such a thing as kingship, and somebody bore the title of king; and society, striving to escape from feudal violence, and to get hold of real order and unity, had recourse to the king in an experimental way, to see, as one might say, what he could do. Gradually there developed the idea of the king as the protector of public order and justice and of the common interest, as the paramount magistrate—the idea that changed European society from a series of classes into a group of centralised states.

But the old order did not perish without efforts to perpetuate itself. These efforts were of two kinds; a particular class sought predominance, or it was proposed that the classes should agree to act in concert. To the first kind belonged the design of the Church to gain mastery over Europe that culminated with Pope Gregory VII. It failed, for three reasons —because Christianity is a purely moral force and not a temporal administrative force; because the ambitions of the Church were opposed by the feudal aristocracy; and because the celibacy of the clergy prevented the formation of a caste capable of theocratic organization.

Nothing, however, could arrest the march of centralisation. In France the war of independence against England brought a sense of national unity and purpose, and feudalism was finally overthrown, and the central power made dominant, by the policy of Louis XI. Similar edicts were brought about in Spain by the war against the Moors and the rule of Ferdinand. In England, feudalism was destroyed by the Wars of the Roses, and was succeeded by the Tudor despotism. In Germany, the House of Austria began its long ascendancy. Thus in the fifteenth century the new principles prevailed; the old forms, the old liberties were swept aside to make way for centralised government under absolute rulers.

At the same time another new fact entered the European history. The kings began to enter into relations with each other, to form alliances; diplomacy was created. Since it is in the nature of diplomacy to be conducted more or less secretly by a few persons, and since the peoples did not, and could not, greatly concern themselves in it, this development was wholly favourable to the strengthening of royalty.

IV—THE SPIRITUAL REVOLT

Although the Church, until the sixteenth century, had successfully suppressed all attempts at spiritual independence, yet the broadening of men's minds that began with the crusades and received a vigorous impetus from the Renaissance made its mark even in the fifteenth century upon ecclesiastical affairs.

Three main facts of the moral order are presented during this period: the ineffectual attempts of the councils of Constance and Basel to reform the Church from within; the ineffectual attempts at reform from without, the most notable of which was that of Huss in Bohemia; and the intellectual revolution that

accompanied the Renaissance. The way was thus prepared for the event that was inaugurated when Luther burnt the pope's bull at Wittenberg in 1520.

The Reformation was in reality a revolt of the human spirit against absolute power in spiritual affairs. The minds of men were, during the sixteenth century, in energetic movement, consumed by desire for progress ; the Church had become inert and stationary, yet it maintained all its pretentions and external importance. The Church, indeed, was less tyrannical than it had formerly been, and not more corrupt. But it had not advanced ; it had lost touch with human thought.

The Reformation, in all the lands that it reached, in all the lands where it played a great part, whether as conqueror or as conquered, resulted in general, constant and immense progress in liberty and activity of thought, and tended towards the emancipation of the human spirit. It did not attack temporal absolutism ; but the collision between temporal absolutism and spiritual freedom was bound to come.

V—THE POLITICAL REVOLT

Their first shock was in England, for England was a country of exceptional conditions, both civil and religious. The Reformation there had, in part, been the work of the kings themselves, and was incomplete ; the reformers remained militant, and denounced the bishops, as they had formerly denounced the pope. Moreover, the aspirations after civil liberty that were stirred up by the emancipation of thought had means of action in the old institutions of the country—the charter, the parliament, the laws, the precedents. Similar aspirations in Continental countries had no such means of action and led to nothing.

Two national desires coincided in England at this epoch—the desire for religious revolution and liberty, and the desire for political liberty and the overthrow of despotism. The two sets of reformers joined forces. For the political party, civil freedom was the end ; for the religious party, it was only a means ; but throughout the conflict the political party took the lead and the others followed. It was not until 1688 that the reformers finally attained their aim in the abolition of absolute power, spiritual and temporal ; and the accession of William of Orange in that year brought England into the great struggle that was raging on the Continent between the principle of despotism and the principle of freedom.

England differed from other European countries in that the essential diversity of European civilization was more pronounced there than anywhere else. Elsewhere, one element prevailed over the others until it was overthrown ; in England, even if one element was dominant, the others were strong and important. Elizabeth had to be far more wary with her nobles and commons than Louis XIV with his. For this reason Europe lagged behind England in civil freedom. But there was another reason—the influence of France.

During the seventeenth century, the French government was the strongest in Europe, and it was a despotic government. During the eighteenth century French thought was the most active and potent in Europe, and it was unboundedly free thought. Louis XIV did not, as is sometimes supposed, adopt as his principle the propagation of absolutism ; his aim was the strength and greatness of France, and to this end he fought and planned—just as William of Orange fought and planned, not against despotism, but against France.

Yet, after the death of Louis XIV the government immediately degenerated. This was inevitable. No system of government can be maintained without institutions, and a despot dislikes institutions. The rule of Louis XIV was great, powerful and brilliant, but it had no roots. The decrepit remains of it were, in the eighteenth century, brought face to face with a society in which free examination and free speculation had been carried to lengths never imagined before. Freedom of thought once again came to grips with absolute power.

The gravest and most instructive fact revealed to us by this grand spectacle of civilization is the danger, the insurmountable evil, of absolute power in any form—whether in the form of a despot like Louis XIV, or in that of the untrammelled human spirit that prevailed at the Revolution. Each human power has in itself a natural vice, a principle of weakness to which there has to be assigned a limit. It is only by general liberty of all rights, interests and opinions that each power can be restrained within its legitimate bounds, and intellectual freedom enabled to exist genuinely and to the advantage of the whole community.

History of Civilization in England

HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE

HAVING early resolved to produce some great historical work, Buckle gradually conceived the idea of a work which would concern itself not with the personal aspect of history, but with the advance of civilization, the intellectual progress of man. What he actually accomplished, the History of Civilization in England, was intended to be no more than an introduction, and even that introduction was never finished. The first volume was published in 1857, the second in 1861, only the studies of England, France, Spain and Scotland being completed. The work brought Buckle great fame in his lifetime, but the advance of historical method has rendered much of it obsolete.

I—GENERAL PRINCIPLES

THE believer in the possibility of a science of history is not called upon to hold either the doctrine of predestination or that of freedom of the will. The only positions which at the outset need to be conceded are that when we perform an action we perform it in consequence of some motive or motives; that those motives are the result of some antecedents; and that, therefore, if we were acquainted with the whole of the antecedents and with all the laws of their movements we could with unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results.

History is the modification of man by nature and of nature by man. We shall find a regularity in the variations of virtuous and vicious actions that proves them to be the result of large and general causes which, working upon the aggregate of society must produce certain consequences without regard to the decision of particular individuals.

Man is affected by purely physical agents—climate, food, soil, geographical conditions and active physical phenomena. In the earliest civilizations nature is more prominent than man, and the imagination is more stimulated than the understanding. In the European civilizations man is the more prominent, and the understanding is more stimulated than the imagination. Hence the advance of European civilization is characterised by a diminishing influence of physical laws and an increasing influence of mental laws.

Clearly, then, of the two classes of laws which regulate the progress of mankind the mental class is more important than the physical. The laws of the human mind will prove to be the ultimate basis of the history of Europe. These are not to be ascertained by the metaphysical method of studying the inquirer's own mind alone, but by the historical method of studying many minds. And this whether the metaphysician belongs to the school which starts by examining sensations, or to that which starts with examination of ideas.

Therefore, we must turn to the historical, and study mental phenomena as they appear in the actions of mankind at large. Mental progress is twofold, moral and intellectual, the first having relation to our duties, the second to our knowledge. It is a progress not of capacity, but in the circumstances under which capacity comes into play; not of internal power, but of external advantage. Now, whereas moral truths do not change, intellectual truths are constantly changing, from which we may infer that the progress of society is due, not to the moral knowledge, which is stationary, but to the intellectual knowledge, which is constantly advancing.

The history of many people will become more valuable for ascertaining the laws by which past events were governed in proportion as their movements have been least disturbed by external agencies. During the last three centuries these conditions have applied to England more than to any other country; since the action of the people has there been the least restricted by government and allowed the greatest freedom of play. Government intervention is habitually restrictive, and the best legislation has been that which abrogated former restrictive legislation.

Government, religion and literature are not the cause of civilization, but its effects. The higher religion enters only where the mind is intellectually prepared for its acceptance; elsewhere the forms may be adopted, but not the essence, as medieval Christianity was merely an adapted paganism. Similarly, a religion imposed by authority is accepted in its form, but not necessarily in its essence.

In the same way literature is valuable to a country in proportion as the population is capable of criticising and discriminating; that is, as it is intellectually prepared to select and sift the good from the bad.

II—CIVILIZATION IN ENGLAND

IT was the revival of the critical or sceptical spirit which remedied the three fundamental errors of the olden time. Where the spirit of doubt was quenched civilization continued to be stationary. Where it was allowed comparatively free play, as in England and France, there has arisen that constantly progressive knowledge to which these two great nations owe their prosperity.

In England its primary and most important consequence is the growth of religious toleration. From the time of Elizabeth it became impossible to profess religion as the avowed warrant for persecution. Hooker, at the end of her reign, rests the argument of his Ecclesiastical Polity on reason; and this is still more decisively the case with Chillingworth's Religion of Protestants not fifty years later. The double movement of scepticism had overthrown its controlling authority.

In precisely the same way Boyle—perhaps the greatest of our men of science between Bacon

and Newton—perpetually insists on the importance of individual experiments and the comparative unimportance of what we have received from antiquity.

The clergy had lost ground; their temporary alliance with James II was ended by the declaration of Indulgence. But they were half-hearted in their support of the Revolution, and scepticism received a fresh encouragement from the hostility between them and the new government; and the brief rally under Queen Anne was overwhelmed by the rise of Wesleyanism. Theology was finally severed from the department both of ethics and of government.

The eighteenth century is characterised by a craving after knowledge on the part of those classes from whom knowledge had hitherto been shut out. With the demand for knowledge came an increased simplicity in the literary form under which it was diffused. With the spirit of inquiry the desire for reform increased, but the movement was checked by a series of political combinations which demand attention

The accession of George III changed the conditions which had persisted since the accession of George I. The new king was able to head reaction. The only minister of ability he admitted to his counsels was Pitt, and Pitt retained power only by abandoning his principles. Nevertheless, a counter-reaction was created, to which England owes her great reforms of the nineteenth century.

III—DEVELOPMENT OF FRANCE

In France at the time of the Reformation the clergy were far more powerful than in England, and the theological contest was much more severe. Toleration began with Henry IV at the moment when Montaigne appeared as the prophet of scepticism. The death of King Henry was not followed by the reaction which might have been expected, and the rule of Richelieu was emphatically political in its motives and secular in its effects. It is curious to see that the Protestants were the illiberal party, while the cardinal remained resolutely liberal.

The difference between the development in France and England is due primarily to the recognition in England of the fact that no country can long remain prosperous or safe in which the people are not gradually extending their power, enlarging their privileges and incorporating themselves with the functions of the state. France, on the other hand, suffered far more from the spirit of protection, which is so dangerous, and yet so plausible, that it forms the most serious obstacle with which advancing civilization has to contend.

The great rebellion in England was a war of classes as well as of factions; on the one side the yeomanry and traders, on the other the nobles and the clergy. The corresponding war of the Fronde in France was not a class war at all; it was political, and in no way social. At bottom the English rebellion was democratic; the leaders of the Fronde were aristocrats, without any democratic leanings.

Thus in France the protective spirit maintained its ascendancy intensified. Literature and science, allied to and patronised by government, suffered demoralisation, and the age of Louis XIV was one of actual decay. After the death of Louis XIV the French discovered England and English literature. Our island, regarded hitherto as barbarous, was visited by nearly every Frenchman of note for the two succeeding generations. Voltaire, in particular, assimilated and disseminated English doctrines.

The consequent development of the liberal spirit brought literature into collision with the government. Inquiry was opposed to the interests of both nobles and clergy. Nearly every great man of letters in France was a victim of persecution. It might be said that the government deliberately made a personal enemy of every man of intellect in the country. We can only wonder, not that the revolution came, but that it was still so long delayed; but ingrained prejudices prevented the crown from being the first object of attack. The hostility of the men of letters was directed first against the Church and Christianity. Religious scepticism and political emancipation did not advance hand in hand; much that was worst in the actual revolution was due to the fact that the latter lagged behind.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries some progress had been made in the principles of writing history. Like everything else, history suffered from the rule of Louis XIV. Again the advance was inaugurated by Voltaire. His principle is to concentrate on important movements, not on idle details. This was not characteristic of the individual author only, but of the spirit of the age. It is equally present in the works of Montesquieu and Turgot. The defects of Montesquieu are chiefly due to the fact that his materials were intractable, because science had not yet reduced them to order by generalising the laws of their phenomena. In the second half of the eighteenth century the intellectual movement began to be turned directly against the state. Economical and financial inquiries began to absorb popular attention. Rousseau headed the political movement, whereas the government, in its financial straits, turned against the clergy, whose position was already undermined, and against whom Voltaire continued to direct his batteries.

The suppression of the Jesuits meant a revival of Jansenism. Jansenism is Calvinistic, and Calvinism is democratic; but the real concentration of French minds was on material questions. The foundations of religious beliefs had been undermined, and hence arose the painful prevalence of atheism. The period was one of progress in the study of material laws in every field. The national intellect had taken a new bent, and it was one which tended to violent social revolt. The hall of science is the temple of democracy. It was in these conditions that the eyes of Frenchmen were turned to the revolt in the cause of liberty of the American people. The spark was set to an inflammatory mass, and ignited a flame which never ceased its ravages until it had destroyed all that Frenchmen once held dear.

IV—REACTION IN SPAIN

I HAVE laid down four propositions which I have endeavoured to establish—that progress depends on a successful investigation of the laws of phenomena; that a spirit of scepticism is a condition of such investigation; that the influence of intellectual truths increases thereby relatively to that of moral truths; and that the great enemy of this progress is the protective spirit. We shall find these propositions verified in the history of Spain.

Physically, Spain most closely resembles those non-European countries where the influence of nature is more prominent than that of man, and whose civilizations are consequently influenced more by the imagination than by the understanding. In Spain, superstition is encouraged by the violent energies of nature. After the fall of the Roman Empire, Spain was first engaged in a long struggle on behalf of the Arianism of the Goths against the orthodoxy of the Franks. This was followed by centuries of struggle between the Christian Spaniards and the Mahomedan Moors. After the conquest of Granada, the King of Spain and Emperor, Charles V, posed primarily as the champion of religion and the enemy of heresy. His son Philip summarised his policy in the phrase that 'it is better not to reign at all than to reign over heretics.'

Loyalty was supported by superstition; each strengthened the other. Great foreign conquests were made, and a great military reputation was developed. But the people counted for nothing. The crown, the aristocracy and the clergy were supreme—the last more so than ever in the seventeenth century.

AT the beginning of the eighteenth century the Bourbon replaced the Hapsburg dynasty. The Bourbons sought to improve the country by weakening the Church, but failed to raise the people, who had become intellectually paralysed. The greatest efforts at improvement were made by Charles III; but Charles IV, unlike his predecessors, was a true Spaniard. The inevitable reaction set in.

In the nineteenth century individuals have striven for political reform, but they have been unable to make head against those general causes which have predetermined the country to superstition. Great as are the virtues for which the Spaniards have long been celebrated, those noble qualities are useless while ignorance is so gross and so general.

V—THE PARADOX OF SCOTTISH HISTORY

IN most respects Scotland affords a complete contrast to Spain, but in regard to superstition there is a striking similarity. Both nations have allowed their clergy to exercise immense sway; in both intolerance is a crying evil; and a bigotry is habitually displayed which is still more discreditable to Scotland than to Spain. It is the paradox of Scotch history that the people are liberal in politics and illiberal in religion.

The early history of Scotland is one of perpetual invasions down to the end of the fourteenth century. This had the double effect of strengthening the nobles while it weakened the citizens, and increasing the influence of the clergy while weakening that of the intellectual classes. The crown, overshadowed by the nobility, was forced to alliance with the Church.

The fifteenth century is a record of the struggles of the crown supported by the clergy against the nobility, whose power, however, they failed to break. At last, in the reign of James V, the crown and Church gained the ascendancy. The antagonism of the nobles to the Church was intensified, and consequently the nobles identified themselves with the Reformation.

The struggle continued during the regency which followed the death of James; but within twenty years the nobles had triumphed and the Church was destroyed. There was an immediate rupture between the nobility and the new clergy, who united themselves with the people and became the advocates of democracy. The crown and the nobles were now united in maintaining episcopacy, which became the special object of attack from the new clergy, who, despite the extravagance of their behaviour, became the great instruments in keeping alive and fostering the spirit of liberty.

When James VI became also James I of England, he used his new power to enforce episcopacy. Charles I continued his policy; but the reaction was gathering strength, and became open revolt in 1637. The democratic movement became directly political. When the great civil war followed, the Scots sold the king, who had surrendered to them, to the English, who executed him. They acknowledged his son, Charles II, but not till he had accepted the Covenant on ignominious terms.

AT the restoration Charles II was able to renew the oppressive policy of his father and grandfather. The restored bishops supported the crown; the people and the popular clergy were mercilessly persecuted. Matters became even worse under James II, but the revolution of 1688 ended the oppression. The exiled house found support in the Highlands not out of loyalty, but from the Highland preference for anarchy; and after 1745 the Highlanders themselves were powerless. The trading spirit rose and flourished, and the barbaric hereditary jurisdictions were abolished.

This last measure marked, but did not cause, the decadence of the power of the nobility. This had been brought about primarily by the union with England in 1707. In the legislature of Great Britain the Scotch peers were a negligible and despised factor. The *coup de grâce* was given by the rebellion of 1745. The law referred to expressed an already accomplished fact.

The union also encouraged the development of the mercantile and manufacturing classes, which, in turn, strengthened the democratic movement. Meanwhile, a great literature was also arising, bold and inquiring. Nevertheless, it failed to diminish the national superstition.

THIS illiberality in religion was caused in the first place by the power of the clergy. Religion was the essential feature of the Scotch war against Charles I. Theological interests dominated the secular because the clergy were the champions of the political movement.

Hence, in the seventeenth century, the clergy were enabled to extend and consolidate their own authority partly by means of that great engine of tyranny, the kirk sessions, partly through the credulity which accepted their claims to miraculous interpositions in their favour. To increase their own ascendancy, the clergy advanced monstrous doctrines concerning evil spirits and punishments in the next life; painted the Deity as cruel and jealous; discovered sinfulness hateful to God in the most harmless acts; punished the same with savage penalties; and so crushed out of Scotland all mirth and nearly all physical enjoyment.

Scottish literature of the eighteenth century failed to destroy this illiberality owing to the method of the Scotch philosophers. The school which arose was in reaction against the dominant theological spirit; but its method was deductive, not inductive. Now, the inductive method which ascends from experience to theory, is anti-theological. The deductive reasons down from theories whose validity is assumed; it is the method of theology itself. In Scotland the theological spirit had taken such firm hold that the inductive method could not have obtained a hearing; whereas in England and France this method has been generally followed.

The great secular philosophy of Scotland was initiated by Hutchinson. His system of morals was based not on revealed principles, but on laws ascertainable by human intelligence; his positions were in flat contradiction to those of the clergy. But his method assumes both intuitive faculties and intuitive knowledge.

The next and the greatest name is that of Adam Smith, whose works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and The Wealth of Nations must be taken in conjunction. In the first he works on the assumption that sympathy is the mainspring of human conduct. In the Wealth of Nations the mainspring is selfishness. The two are not contradictory, but complementary. Of the second book it may be said that it is probably the most important that has ever been written, whether we consider the amount of original thought which it contains or its practical influence.

Beside Adam Smith stands David Hume. An accomplished reasoner and a profound thinker, he lacked the invaluable quality of imagination. This is the underlying defect of his history. Important and novel as are Hume's doctrines his method was also deductive and, like Adam Smith, he rests little on experience. After these two, Reid was the most eminent among the purely speculative thinkers of Scotland, but he stands far below them both. To Hume the spirit of inquiry and scepticism is essential; to Reid it is a danger.

The deductive method was no less prevalent in physical philosophy. Now, induction is more accessible to the average understanding than deduction. The deductive character of this Scottish literature prevented it from having popular effect, and therefore from weakening the national superstition, from which Scotland, even to-day, has been unable to free herself.

The English Constitution

WALTER BAGEHOT

A MAN of wide culture and a scientific thinker with a clear, vigorous style, Walter Bagehot was a keen student of economic and political science and also of letters and life at large. His book The English Constitution was issued in 1867, and with his Physics and Politics (1872) and his Economic Studies, published posthumously, exercised an influence which is discernible in all the best books since written on constitutional government. Although later political developments have necessitated some modification of the positions laid down by Bagehot in The English Constitution, this work is likely to remain unchallenged as a human interpretation of that exceedingly human monument, the British constitution.

I—THE CABINET

No one can approach to an understanding of English institutions unless he divides them into two classes. In such institutions there are two parts. First, those which excite and preserve the reverence of the population, the dignified parts, if I may so call them; and, next, the efficient parts, those by which it, in fact, works and rules. Every institution must first win the loyalty and confidence of mankind and then employ that homage in the work of government.

The dignified parts of government are those which bring it force, which attract its motive power. The efficient parts only employ that power. If all subjects of the same government only thought of what was useful to them, the efficient members of the constitution would suffice and no impressive adjuncts would be needed. But it is not true that even the lower classes will be absorbed in the useful. The ruder sort of men will sacrifice all they hope for, all they have, themselves, for what is called an idea. The elements which excite the most easy reverence will be not the most useful, but the theatrical. It is the characteristic merit of the English constitution that its dignified parts are imposing and venerable, while its efficient part is simple and rather modern.

The efficient secret of the English constitution is the nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers. The connecting link is the cabinet. This is a committee of the legislative body, in choosing which, indirectly, but not directly, the legislature is nearly omnipotent. The prime minister is chosen by the House of Commons and is the head of the efficient part of the constitution. The queen is only at the head of its dignified part. The prime minister himself has to choose his associates, but can only do so out of a charmed circle.

The cabinet is an absolutely secret committee,

which can dissolve the assembly which appointed it. It is an executive which is at once the nominee of the legislature and can annihilate the legislature. The system stands in precise contrast to the presidential system, in which the legislative and executive powers are entirely independent.

Our system enables us to change our ruler suddenly on an emergency. Thus we could abolish the Aberdeen cabinet—which was in itself eminently adapted for every sort of difficulty save the one it had to meet, but wanted the daemonic element—and substitute a statesman who had the precise sort of merit wanted at the moment. But under a presidential government you can do nothing of the kind. There is no elastic element; everything is rigid, specified, dated. You have bespoken your government for the time and you must keep it. Moreover, under the English system all the leading statesmen are known quantities. But in America a new president before his election is usually an unknown quantity.

Cabinet government demands the mutual confidence of the electors, a calm national mind and what I may call rationality—a power involving intelligence, yet distinct from it. It demands also a competent legislature, which is a rarity.

A nation in which the mass of the people are intelligent, educated and comfortable can elect a good parliament. Or what I will call a deferential nation may do so—I mean one in which the numerical majority wishes to be ruled by the wiser minority. Of deferential countries England is the type. But it is not to their actual heavy, sensible middle-class rulers that the mass of the people yield deference, but to the theatrical show of society. The few rule by their hold, not over the reason of the multitude, but over their imaginations and their habits.

II—THE MONARCHY

The use of the queen in a dignified capacity is incalculable. The best reason why monarchy is a strong government is that it is an intelligible government; whereas a constitution is complex. Men are governed by the weakness of their imagination. To state the matter shortly, royalty is a government in which the attention of the nation is concentrated on one person doing interesting actions. A republic is a government in which that attention is divided between many who are all doing uninteresting actions. Secondly, if you ask the immense majority of the queen's subjects by what right she rules, they will say she rules by God's grace. They believe they have a mystic obligation to obey her. The crown is a visible symbol of unity with an atmosphere of dignity.

Thirdly, the queen is the head of society. If she were not so, the prime minister would be the first person in the country. As it is, the House of Commons attracts people who go there merely for social purposes; if the highest social rank was to be scrambled for in the House of Commons the number of social adventurers there would be even more numerous. It has been objected of late that English royalty is not splendid enough. It is compared with the French court, which is quite the most splendid thing in France; but the French emperor is magnified to emphasise the equality of everyone else. Great splendour in our court would incite competition. Fourthly, we have come to regard the crown as the head of our morality. Lastly, constitutional royalty acts as a disguise; it enables our real rulers to change without heedless people knowing it. Hence, perhaps, the value of constitutional royalty in times of transition.

Popular theory regards the sovereign as a co-ordinate authority with the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Also it holds that the queen is the executive. Neither is true. There is no authentic explicit information as to what the queen can do. The secrecy of the prerogative is an anomaly, but none the less essential to the utility of English royalty. Let us see how we should get on without a queen. We may suppose the House of Commons appointing the premier just as shareholders choose a director. If the predominant party were agreed as to its leader there would not be much difference at the beginning of an administration. But if the party were not agreed on its leader the necessity of the case would ensure that the chief forced on the minority by the majority would be an exceedingly capable man; where the judgement of the sovereign intervenes there is no such security. If, however, there are three parties, the primary condition of a cabinet polity is not satisfied. Under such circumstances the only way is for the moderate people of every party to combine in support of the government which, on the whole, suits every party best. In the choice of a fit minister, if the royal selection were always discreetly exercised, it would be an incalculable benefit, but in most cases the wisest course for the monarch would be inaction.

Now, the sovereign has three rights, the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to warn. In the course of a long reign a king would acquire the same advantage which a permanent under-secretary has over his superior, the parliamentary secretary. But whenever there is discussion between a king and the minister, the king's opinion would have its full weight, and the minister's would not. The whole position is evidently attractive to an intelligent, sagacious and original sovereign. But we cannot, either theoretically or practically, expect a lineal series of such kings. The only fit material for a constitutional king is a prince who begins early to reign, who in his youth is superior to pleasure, is willing to labour and has by nature a genius for discretion.

III—THE LORDS AND COMMONS

The use of the order of the lords in its dignified capacity is very great. The mass of men require symbols, and nobility is the symbol of mind. The order also prevents the rule of wealth. The Anglo-Saxon has a natural instinctive admiration of wealth for its own sake; but from the worst form of this our aristocracy preserves us, and the reverence for rank is not so base as the reverence for money, or the still worse idolatry of office. But as the picturesqueness of society diminishes, aristocracy loses the single instrument of its peculiar power.

The House of Lords as an assembly has always been not the first, but the second. The peers who are of the most importance are not the most important in the House of Peers. In theory, the House of Lords is of equal rank with the House of Commons; in practice it is not. The evil of two co-equal houses is obvious. If they disagree, all business is suspended. There ought to be an available decisive authority somewhere. The sovereign power must be 'come-at-able.' The English have made it so by the authority of the crown to create new peers. Before the Reform Act the members of the peerage swayed the House of Commons, and the two houses hardly collided except on questions of privilege. After the Reform Bill the house ceased to be one of latent directors and became one of temporary rejectors and palpable alterers.

It was the Duke of Wellington who presided over the change, and from the duke himself we may learn that the use of the House of Lords is not to be a bulwark against revolution. It cannot resist the people if the people is determined. It has not the control of necessary physical force. With a perfect lower house, the second chamber would be of scarcely any value; but besides the actual house, a revising and leisured legislature is extremely useful. The cabinet is so powerful in the Commons that it may inflict minor measures on the nation which the nation does not like. The executive is less powerful in the second chamber, which may consequently operate to impede minor instances of parliamentary tyranny.

The House of Lords has the advantage: first, of being possible; secondly, of being independent. It is accessible to no social bribe and it has leisure. On the other hand, it has defects. In appearance, which is the important thing, it is apathetic. Next, it belongs exclusively to one class, that of landowners. This would not so greatly matter if the House of Lords could be of more than common ability; but being an hereditary chamber, it cannot be so. There is only one kind of business in which our aristocracy retain a certain advantage. This is diplomacy. An aristocracy is, in its nature, better suited to such work. It is trained to the theatrical part of life; it is fit for that, if it is fit for anything. These various defects would have been lessened if the House of Lords had not resisted the creation of life peers.

The dignified aspect of the House of Commons is altogether secondary to its efficient use. Its main function is to choose our president. It elects the people whom it likes and it dismisses whom it dislikes, too. The premier is to the house what the house is to the nation. He must lead, but he can only lead whither they will follow. Its second function is expressive, to express the mind of the English people. Thirdly, it ought to teach the nation. Fourthly, to give information, especially of grievances—not, as in the old days, to the crown, but to the nation. And, lastly, there is the function of legislation. I do not separate the financial function from the rest of the legislative. In financial affairs it lies under an exceptional disability; it is only the minister who can propose to tax the people, whereas on common subjects any member can propose anything. The reason is that the house is never economical; but the cabinet is forced to be economical, because it has to impose the taxation to meet the expenditure.

Of all odd forms of government, the oddest really is this government by public meeting. The principle of parliament is obedience to leaders. Change your leader if you will; but while you have him, obey him, otherwise you will not be able to do anything at all. Leaders to-day do not keep their party together by bribes, but they can dissolve. Party organization is efficient because it is not composed of warm partisans. The way to lead is to affect a studied and illogical moderation.

Nor are the leaders themselves eager to carry party conclusions too far. When an opposition comes into power, ministers have a difficulty in making good their promises. They are in contact with the facts, which immediately acquire an inconvenient reality. But constituencies are immoderate and partisan. The schemes both of extreme democrats and of philosophers for changing the system of representation would prevent parliamentary government from working at all. Under a system of equal electoral districts and one-man vote, a parliament could not consist of moderate men.

A free government is that which the people subject to it voluntarily choose. If it goes by public opinion, the best opinion which the nation will accept, it is a good government of its kind. Tried by this rule, the House of Commons does its appointing business and the substantial part of its legislative task well.

IV—CHANGES OF MINISTRY

There is an event which frequently puzzles some people; this is, a change of ministry. All our administrators go out together. Is it wise so to change all our rulers? The practice produces three great evils. It brings in suddenly new and untried persons.

Secondly, the man knows he may have to leave his work in the middle, and very likely never come back to it.

Thirdly, a sudden change of ministers may easily cause a mischievous change of policy. A quick succession of chiefs do not learn from each other's experience.

Now, those who wish to remove the choice of ministers from parliament have not adequately considered what a parliament is. When you establish a predominant parliament you give over the rule of the country to a despot who has unlimited time and unlimited vanity. Every public department is liable to attack. It is helpless in parliament if it has no authorised defender. The heads of departments cannot satisfactorily be put up for the defence; but a parliamentary head connected by close ties with the ministry is a protecting machine. Party organization ensures the provision of such parliamentary heads. The alternative provided in America involves changing not only the head but the whole bureaucracy with each change of government.

This, it may be said, does not prove that this change is a good thing. It may, however, be proved that some change at any rate is necessary to a permanently perfect administration.

If we look at the Prussian bureaucracy, whatever success it may recently have achieved, it certainly does not please the most intelligent

persons at home. Obstinate officials set at defiance the liberal initiations of the government. In conflicts with simple citizens guilty officials are like men armed *cap-a-pie* fighting with the defenceless. The bureaucrat inevitably cares more for routine than for results.

So in a government office the intrusion of an exterior head of the office is really essential to its perfection. As Sir George Lewis said, ' It is not the business of a cabinet minister to work his department; his business is to see that it is properly worked.'

In short, a presidential government, or a hereditary government, are inferior to parliamentary government as administrative selectors. The revolutionary despot may indeed prove better, since his existence depends on his skill in doing so. If English government is not celebrated for efficiency, that is largely because it attempts to do so much. Another reason is that in the English constitution the dignified parts, which have an importance of their own, at the same time tend to diminish simple efficiency.

V—EXCELLENCIES AND ANOMALIES

In every state there must be somewhere a supreme authority on every point. In England, where we have the typical constitution, the ultimate authority is a newly elected House of Commons. Whatever the question on which it decides, a new House of Commons can despotically and finally resolve. No one can doubt the importance of singleness and unity. The excellence in the British constitution is that it has achieved this unity. This is primarily due to the provision which places the choice of the executive in ' the people's house.' But it could not have been effected without what I may call the ' safety valve ' and ' the regulator.'

The ' safety valve ' is the power of creating peers, the ' regulator ' is the cabinet's power of dissolving. The defects of a popular legislature are: caprice in selection, the sectarianism born of party organization, which is the necessary check on caprice, and the peculiar prejudices and interests of the particular parliament. Now, the caprice of parliament in the choice of a premier is best checked by the premier himself having the power of dissolution. But as a check on sectarianism such an extrinsic power as that of a capable constitutional king is more efficient. For checking the peculiar interests our colonial governors seem almost perfectly qualified. But the intervention of a constitutional monarch is only beneficial if he happens to be an exceptionally wise man. The peculiar interests of a specific parliament are seldom in danger of overriding national interests; hence, on the whole, the advantage of the premier being the real dissolving authority.

The power of creating peers, vested in the premier, serves constantly to modify the character of the second chamber. What we may call the catastrophic creation of peers is different. That the power should reside in the king would again be beneficial only in the case of the exceptional monarch. Taken altogether, we find that hereditary royalty is not essential to parliamentary government. Our conclusion is that though a king with high courage and fine discretion, a king with a genius for the place, is always useful, and at rare moments priceless, yet a common king is of no use at a crisis, while, in the common course of things, he will do, and need do, nothing.

Our constitution is full of anomalies. Some of them are, no doubt, impeding and mischievous. Half the world believes that the Englishman is born illogical. As a matter of fact, I am inclined to believe that the English care more even than the French for simplicity; but the constitution is not logical. The complexity we tolerate is that which has grown up. Any new complexity is detestable to the English mind. Let anyone try to advocate a plan of suffrage reform at all out of the way, and see how many adherents he can collect.

This great political question of the day, the suffrage question, is made exceedingly difficult by this history of ours. We shall find on investigation that so far from an ultra-democratic suffrage giving us a more homogeneous and decided House of Commons it would give us a less homogeneous and more timid house. With us democracy would mean the rule of money and increasingly of new money working for its own ends.

THE PHILOSOPHERS

THE APOLOGY
THE REPUBLIC
THE SYMPOSIUM
PLATO (c. 427-347 B.C.)

THE ETHICS
THE POLITICS
ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.)

DISCOURSES AND ENCHEIRIDION
EPICTETUS (c. A.D. 60- c.138)

MEDITATIONS
MARCUS AURELIUS (121-180)

CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY
BOETHIUS (c. 474-525)

1516
UTOPIA
SIR THOMAS MORE

1532
THE PRINCE
MACHIAVELLI

1605
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING
FRANCIS BACON

1621
ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY
ROBERT BURTON

1625
RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE
HUGO GROTIUS

1637
DISCOURSE ON METHOD
RENÉ DESCARTES

1651
LEVIATHAN
THOMAS HOBBES

1677
ETHICS
BARUCH DE SPINOZA

1690
ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
JOHN LOCKE

1710
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
GEORGE BERKELEY

1726
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU

1741
ESSAYS, MORAL AND POLITICAL
DAVID HUME

1756
THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL
EDMUND BURKE

1776
WEALTH OF NATIONS
ADAM SMITH

1781
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

1788
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
IMMANUEL KANT

1789
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
JEREMY BENTHAM

1790
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
EDMUND BURKE

1790, 1792
THE RIGHTS OF MAN

1794
THE AGE OF REASON
THOMAS PAINE

1798
ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION
THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS

1800
THE VOCATION OF MAN
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE

1818
THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

1825
AIDS TO REFLECTION
SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE

1830-42
A COURSE OF POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY
AUGUSTE COMTE

1832
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
G. W. F. HEGEL

1833-34
SARTOR RESARTUS
THOMAS CARLYLE

1843
A SYSTEM OF LOGIC

1848
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICIAL ECONOMY

1859
ON LIBERTY
JOHN STUART MILL

1862
FIRST PRINCIPLES
HERBERT SPENCER

1863
UTILITARIANISM
JOHN STUART MILL

1865
RISE AND INFLUENCE OF RATIONALISM IN EUROPE
W. E. H. LECKY

1883-4
THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA
FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE

1879-93
PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS
HERBERT SPENCER

1893
DEGENERATION
MAX SIMON NORDAU

1903
HUMAN PERSONALITY
FREDERICK W. H. MYERS

The Apology

PLATO

APPEARING some years after the trial of Socrates, the Apology is ostensibly an account of that trial and the philosopher's defence on the charge of corrupting the Athenian youth. Actually it is an exposition of all that was best in the doctrines of Socrates, who was as misunderstood by most of his followers as by his enemies. To the bourgeoisie of Athens the master's aim was to turn his pupils into caustic critics and somewhat arrogant and self-satisfied revolutionaries. Socrates had spent himself largely in destructive criticism, but he had something constructive to put in its place. His death prevented him from disseminating his theories. The Apology set Socrates right with the world.

I—THE INDICTMENT AND THE REAL CHARGES

WHAT my accusers have said, Athenians, has been most specious, but none of it is true. The falsehood which most astonished me was that you must beware of being beguiled by my consummate eloquence; for I am not eloquent at all, unless speaking pure truth be eloquence. You will hear me speak without adornments and without premeditation, in my everyday language. I am seventy years old, yet this is my first appearance in the courts and I have no experience of forensic arts. All I ask is that you will take heed whether what I say be just.

It is just that I should begin by defending myself against my accusers from of old, in priority to Anytus and these other latter-day accusers. For, skilful as these are, I fear those more—those who from your youth have been untruthfully warning you against one Socrates, a wise man, who speculates about everything in heaven and under the earth, and tries to make the worse cause better. Their charge is the craftier, because you think that a man who does as they say has no thought for the gods. I cannot name these gentlemen precisely, beyond indicating that one is a writer of comedies; I cannot meet and refute them individually. However, I must try to enter a brief defence. I think I know where my difficulty will lie; but the issue will be as the gods choose.

Now, what is the basis of this charge, on which Meletus also relies? 'Socrates is an evil-doer, a busybody, who pries into things in heaven and under the earth, and teaches the same things to others.' You all saw the Socrates in the comedy of Aristophanes engaged in these pursuits. I have nothing to say against such inquiries; but do not let Meletus charge me with them, for I have no part in them. Many of you have heard me talk, but never one on these subjects. From this you should be able to gauge the other things that are said against me.

Equally untrue is the charge that I make a paid business of teaching my neighbours. It is a fine thing to be able to impart knowledge like Gorgias and Prodicus and Hippias, who can go from city to city and draw to converse with them young men who pay for the privilege instead of enjoying their companions' society for nothing. I am told there is one Evenus, a Parian, practising now, whose fee is five minæ. It must be delightful to possess such valuable knowledge and to impart it—if they do possess it. I should like to do it myself, but I do not possess the knowledge.

"Whence, then, comes the trouble, Socrates?" you will say; "if you have been doing nothing unusual, how have these rumours and slanders arisen?"

I will tell you what I take to be the explanation. It is due to a certain wisdom with which I seem to be endowed—not superhuman at all like that of these gentlemen. I speak not arrogantly, but on the evidence of the Oracle of Delphi, who told Chaerephon, a man known to you, that there was no wiser man than Socrates. Now, I am not conscious of possessing wisdom; but the god cannot lie. What did he mean?

Well, I tried to find out, by going to a man reputed wise, thinking to prove that there were wiser men. But I found him not wise at all, though he fancied himself so. I sought to show him this, but he was only very much annoyed. I concluded that, after all, I was wiser than he in one particular, because I was under no delusion that I possessed knowledge, as he was. I tried all the men reputed wise, one after the other, and made myself very unpopular, for the result was always the same. It was the same with the poets as with the politicians, and with the craftsmen as with the poets. The last did know something about their own particular art, and therefore imagined that they knew all about everything.

I went on, taking every opportunity of finding out whether people reputed wise, and thinking themselves so, were wise in reality, and pointing out that they were not. And because of my exposing the ignorance of others, I have got this groundless reputation of having knowledge myself, and have been made the object of many other calumnies. And young gentlemen of position who have heard me follow my example, and annoy people by exposing their ignorance; and this is all visited on me; and I am called an ill-conditioned person who corrupts youth. To prove which my calumniators have to fall back on charging me with prying into all things in heaven and under the earth, and the rest of it.

II—THE CROSS-EXAMINING OF MELETUS

SUCH is my answer to the charges which have been poured into your ears for a long time. Now let me defend myself against these later accusations of Meletus and the rest—the virtuous patriot Meletus. I am an evil-doer, a corrupter of youth, who pays no reverence

to the gods whom the city reveres, but to strange daemons. Not I, but Meletus is the evil-doer, who makes accusations so frivolous, pretending much concern for matters about which he has never troubled himself. Answer me, Meletus. You think it of the utmost importance that our youth should be made as excellent as possible?

Meletus: Certainly.

Socrates: Tell us, then, who is it that makes them better; for, of course, you know. You are silent? The laws, you say? The question was, 'Who?'

Mel.: The judges; all the judges.

Soc.: In other words, all the Athenian people—everyone but me? And I alone corrupt them? Truly, I am in ill plight! But in the case of all other animals, horses, for instance, there are only a few people who are able to improve them. Your answer shows that you have never bestowed attention on the care of young people. Next, tell me is it better for a man to dwell among good citizens or bad? The good, since the bad will injure him. I cannot, then, set about making bad citizens designedly. My friend, no man designedly brings injury upon himself. If I corrupt them, it must be undesignedly—reason good for admonishing and instructing me, which you have not done; but not for bringing me into court, which you have done! However, I corrupt them by teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes, but in strange deities? Do I teach that there are some gods, or that there are no gods at all?

Mel.: I say that you believe in no gods. You say the sun is a stone, and the moon earth.

Soc.: Most excellent Meletus, everyone knows that Anaxagoras says so: you can buy that information for a drachma! Do I really appear to you to revere no gods?

Mel.: No, no gods at all.

Soc.: Now, that is incredible! You must have manufactured this riddle out of sheer wantonness, for in the indictment you charge me with reverencing gods! Can anyone believe that there are human affairs, or equine affairs, or instrumental affairs without believing that there are men or horses or instruments? You say expressly that I believe in daemonic affairs, therefore in daemons; but daemons are a sort of gods, or the offspring of gods. Therefore, you cannot possibly believe that I do not believe in gods. Really, I have sufficiently answered the indictment. If I am condemned, it will not be on the indictment of Meletus, but on popular calumnies; which have condemned good men before me, and assuredly I shall not be the last.

III—THE DEFENCE

It may be suggested that I ought to be ashamed of practices which have brought me into danger of death. Risk of death is not to be taken into account in any action which really matters at all. If it ought to be, the heroes before Troy were bad characters! Every man should stand to his post, come life, come death. Should I have stood to my post and faced death when on service at Potidaea, but have failed through fear of death when the deity imposed on me a certain course of action?

Whether to die be evil or good, I know not, though many think they know it to be evil. But to disobey authority, human or divine, I know to be evil; and I will not do what I know to be evil to avoid what may in fact be good. Insomuch that if you now offer to set me free on condition that I should cease from these pursuits on pain of death, I should reply: 'Men of Athens, I love and honour you, but I will obey god rather than you; and while I breathe and have the power I will not cease from the pursuit of philosophy, or from exhorting and warning you, as I have done hitherto, against caring much for riches and nothing for the perfecting of your souls. This is the bidding of god. If to speak thus be to corrupt youth, then I corrupt youth. But he who says I speak other things than this talks vanity; and this I will do, though the penalty were many deaths.'

Do not murmur, but listen, for you will profit. If you put me to death, you will harm yourselves more than me, for it is worse to do wrong than to suffer it. You will not easily find another to serve as the gadfly which rouses a noble horse—as I have done, being commissioned thereto by god. For that I have made no profit for myself from this course my poverty proves.

If it seems absurd that I should meddle thus with each man privately, but take no part in public affairs, that is because of the divine or daemonic influence of which I have spoken, named also in mockery by Meletus in the indictment. This is a voice which checks but never urges me on. Indeed, had I meddled with politics, I should have been dead long ago.

But I have never posed as an instructor or taken money for giving instruction. Anyone who chooses can question me and hear what I have to say. People take pleasure in my society, because they like to hear those exposed who deem themselves wise but are not; this duty god has laid on me by oracles and dreams and every mode of divine authority. If I am corrupting or have corrupted youth, why do none of these bear witness against me, or their fathers or brothers or other kinsman? Many I see around me who should do so if this charge were true; yet all are ready to assist me.

This, and the like, is what I have to say in my defence. Perhaps some of you, thinking how, in a like case with mine but less exigent, he has sought the compassion of the court with tears and pleadings of his children and kinsfolk, will be indignant that I do none of these things, though I have three boys of my own. That is not out of disrespect to you, but because I think it would be unbeseeming to me. Such displays, as though death were something altogether terrifying, are to me astonishing and degrading to our city in the sight of strangers, for persons reputed to excel in anything, as in some respects I am held to excel the generality.

But apart from credit, I count that we ought to inform and convince our judges, not seek to sway them by entreaties; that they may judge rightly according to the laws, and not by

favour. For you are sworn. And how should I persuade you to break your oath, who am charged by Meletus with impiety? For by so doing, I should be persuading you to disbelief in the gods, and making that very charge against myself. To you and to the gods I leave it, that I may be judged as shall be best for you and for me.

IV—AFTER THE VERDICT

YOUR condemnation does not grieve me, for various reasons, one of which is that I fully expected it. What surprises me is the small majority by which it was carried. Evidently, Meletus, if left to himself, would have failed to win the few votes needed to save him from the fine.

Well, the sentence he fixes is death, and I have to propose an alternative—presumably, the sentence I deserve. I have neglected all the ordinary pursuits and ambitions of men—which would have been no good either to me or to you—that I might benefit each man privately, by persuading him to give attention to himself first—how to attain his own best and wisest—and his mere affairs afterwards, and the city in like manner. The proper reward is that I should be maintained in the Prytaneum as a public benefactor.

You may think this merely a piece of insolence, but it is not so. I am not conscious of having wronged any man. Time does not permit me to prove my case, and I will not admit guilt by owning that I deserve punishment by a fine. What have I to fear? The penalty fixed by Meletus, as to which I do not know whether it is good or bad? Shall I, to escape this, choose something which is certainly bad? Imprisonment, to be the slave of the Eleven? A fine, to be a prisoner till I pay it?—which comes to the same thing, as I cannot pay. Exile? If my fellow citizens cannot put up with me, how can I expect strangers to do so?

Why cannot I go, and hold my tongue, you may ask. That is the one thing which I cannot do. That would be to disobey the god, and the life would not be worth living, though you do not believe me. I might undertake to pay a mina. However, as Plato and Crito and Appollodorus urge me to name thirty minae, for which they will be security, I propose thirty minae.

. . . . .

Your enemies will reproach you, Athenians, for having put to death that wise man Socrates. Yet you would have had but a short time to wait, for I am old. I speak to those of you who have condemned me. I am condemned, not for lack of argument, but because I have not chosen to plead after the methods that would have been pleasant and flattering to you, but degrading to me.

But to you, my true judges, who voted for my acquittal, I would speak while yet we may. I have to tell you that my warning daemon has in no way withstood the course I have taken, and the reason, assuredly, is that I have done what is best, gaining blessing, death being no evil at all. For death is either only to cease from sensations altogether as in a dreamless sleep, and that is no loss; or else it is a passing to another place where all the dead are—the heroes, the poets, the wise men of old. How priceless were it to hold converse with them and question them!

But be you hopeful with regard to death, for to the good man, neither in life nor in death is there anything that can harm him. And for me, I am confident that it is better to die than to live. Therefore I have no resentment against those who have caused my death. And now we go, I to death and you to life; but which of us to the better state, God alone knoweth.

The Republic

PLATO

HOW much of Socrates' teaching is contained in Plato's expositions of it is difficult to say, since very definite developments evidently took place in Plato's views. The series of dialogues in which Socrates takes the leading part are the foundation of all idealistic philosophy, and as literary masterpieces remain unmatched. Of all Plato's works The Republic is undoubtedly the one which has had the widest influence. In it Socrates is engaged in a disputation of which the object is to discover the meaning of justice, and this leads to the description of the building up of that ideal commonwealth from which the dialogue derives its title.

I—HOW THE ARGUMENT AROSE

I HAD gone with Glaucon to attend the celebration of the festival of Bendis—the Thracian Artemis—a picturesque affair, and we were just leaving when Polemarchus insisted on carrying us off by main force to the house of his father, Cephalus. There we found a small company assembled. The old gentleman received us with hearty geniality; he is ageing, but would not see any hardship in that, if you take age good-humouredly. Of course, he owned that being wealthy makes a difference, but not all the difference. The best of wealth is that you need not do things which anger the gods and entail punishment in the hereafter; there is no occasion for you to lie, or be in debt to gods or men. And this consciousness of your own justice is a great consolation.

"But," said I, "what is justice? Is it always to speak the truth, and always to let a man have his property? There are circumstances——"

"I must go," said he. "Polemarchus shall do the arguing."

This set us discussing the nature of justice.

Glaucon took up the cudgels, after a preliminary skirmish with Thrasymachus.

Assuming justice to be desirable—is it so for itself and by itself, or only for its results; or both? The world at large puts it in the second category as an inconvenient necessity. To suffer injustice is an evil, and to protect themselves from that the weak combine to prevent injustice from being done. But if anyone had the ring of Gyges which made him invisible, so that he could go his own way without let or hindrance, he would get all the pleasures he could out of life without troubling about the justice of it.

Again, imagine, on the one hand, your really consummate rogue who gets credit for all the virtues and is surrounded by all the material factors of happiness; and, on the other hand, a man of utter rectitude, on whom circumstances combine to fix the stigma of iniquity. He will be rejected, scourged, crucified; while the other is enjoying wealth, honour, everything and can afford to make his peace with the gods into the bargain.

Then Adeimantus took the field in support of his brother.

"The poets," he said, "hold forth about the rewards of virtue here and hereafter. But we see the unrighteous prospering mightily; and the religious mendicants come to rich folks and offer to sell them indulgences on easy terms. A keen-witted lad is bound to argue that it is only the appearance of justice that is needed for prosperity; while the gods can be reconciled cheaply. This dwelling on the temporal rewards of justice is fatal. What we expect of you is to show us the inherent value of justice—justice itself, not the appearance of it."

"Well argued," said I, "especially as you reject your own conclusion. I can but try, though the task be hard. But my weak sight may enable me to read large characters better than small. The general may throw light upon the particular. Justice is the virtue of the state as well as of the individual; finding it in the state, the greater, may help us to find it in the individual, the less."

II—THE SOCRATIC UTOPIA

Society arises because different people are the better skilled to supply different wants, and the wants of each are supplied by mutual arrangement and division of labour. Wants multiply; the community grows; it exchanges its own for foreign products; merchants and markets are added to the producers; and when folk begin to hire servants you have a complete city or state living a life of simplicity.

We will go on and develop every luxury of civilization. But then our city and its neighbours will be wanting each other's lands. We must have soldiers. Our best guardians will be a select band, those who are of the right temper and thoroughly trained; fierce to foes but gentle to friends like that true philosopher, the dog, to whom knowledge is the test. The known are friends, the unknown foes—knowledge begets gentleness.

So our guardians must be trained to knowledge; we must educate them. Music and gymnastic, our national intellectual and physical training, must be taught. Literature comes first, and really we teach things that are not true before we teach things that are true—fables before facts. But over these we must exercise a rigid censorship, excluding what is essentially false.

We must have no stories which attribute harmful things to the gods. God must be represented as He is—the author of good always, of evil never; also as having in Him no variableness, neither shadow of turning. God has no need of disguises. The lie in the soul—essential falsehood—is to Him abhorrent, and He has no need of such deceptions as may be innocent or even laudable for men. God must be shown always as utterly true.

Similarly, we must not have stories which inspire dread of death; no Achilles saying in the under-world that it were better to be a slave in the flesh than Lord of the Shades. And again, no heroes—and gods still less—giving way to frantic lamentations and uncontrolled emotions, even uncontrolled laughter.

Truth must be inculcated; medicinal untruths, so to speak, are the prerogative of our rulers alone, and must be permitted to no one else. Temperance, which means self-control and obedience to authority, is essential, and is not always characteristic of Homer's gods and heroes! We must exclude a long list of most unedifying passages on this score. As for pictures of the afflictions of the righteous and the prosperity of the unjust, we must wait, as we have not yet defined justice. We turn to the poetical forms in which the stories should be embodied.

The possible forms are the simply descriptive, the imitative and the mixture of the two; narrative drama and narrative mixed with dialogue. Our guardians ought to eschew imitation altogether, or at least to imitate only the good and noble. The act of imitating an evil character is demoralising. Imitation must be restricted within the narrowest practicable limits.

But who are to be our actual rulers? The best of the elders, whose firmness and consistency have stood the test of temptation. To them we transfer the title of guardians, calling the younger men auxiliaries. And we must try to induce everyone—guardians, soldiers, citizens—to believe in one quite magnificent lie: that they, like the men in the Cadmus myth, were fashioned in the ground, their common mother; that they are brothers and sisters, but of different metals—gold, silver, brass, iron; not necessarily of the same metal as their parents; and must take rank according to the metal whereof they are made.

And now our soldiers must pitch their camp for the defence of the city. Soldiering is their business, not money-making. They must live in common, supported efficiently by the state, having no private property.

III—OF JUSTICE AND COMMUNISM

But now we have to look for justice. Find the other three cardinal virtues first, and then justice will be distinguishable. Wisdom is in the guardians; if they be wise, the whole state will be wise. Courage we find in the soldiers; courage is the true estimation of

danger, and that has been ingrained in them by their education. Temperance, called mastery of self, is really the mastery of the better over the baser qualities; as in our state the better class controls the inferior. Temperance would seem to lie in the harmonious inter-relation of the different classes. Obviously, the remaining virtue of the state is the constant performance of his own particular function in the state, and not his neighbour's, by each member of the state. Let us see how that works out in the individual.

Shall we not find that there are three several qualities in the individual, each of which must in like manner do its own business; the intellectual, the passionate or spirited and the lustful? They must be separate, because one part of a thing cannot be doing contradictory things at the same time; your lusts bid you to do what your intelligence forbids; and the emotional quality is distinct from both desire and reason, though in alliance with reason. Well here you have wisdom and courage in the intellectual and spiritual parts, temperance in their mastery over desire; and justice is the virtue of the soul as a whole; of each part never failing to perform its own function and that alone. To ask, now, whether justice or injustice is the more profitable becomes ridiculous.

Now, we shall find that virtue is one, but that vice has several forms; as there is but one form of perfect state—ours—whether it happens to be called a monarchy if there be but one guardian, or an aristocracy if there be more; and, as it has four principal imperfect forms, so there are four main vices.

Here Glaucon and Adeimentus refused to let me go on; I had shirked a difficulty. What about women and children? My saying that the soldiers were to live in common might mean anything. What kind of communism was I demanding?

Well, there are two different questions: What is desirable? and What is possible? First, then, our defenders are our watchdogs. Glaucon knows all about dogs; we don't differentiate between males and females; the latter hunt with the pack. If women are similarly to have the same employments as men, they must have the same education in music and gymnastic. But should they share masculine employments? Do they differ from men in such a way that they should not? Women bear children, and men beget them; but apart from that, the differences are really only in degrees of capacity, not essential distinctions of quality; even as men differ among themselves. The natures being the same, the education must be the same and the same careers must be open.

But a second and more alarming wave threatens us: Community of wives and children. "You must prove both the possibility and the desirability of that." Men and women must be trained together and lived together, but not in licentiousness. They must be mated with the utmost care for procreation, the best being paired at due seasons, nominally by lot, and for the occasion. The offspring of the selected will have a common nursery; the mothers will not know which were their own children. Parentage will be permissible only between twenty-five and fifty-five, and between twenty and forty. The children begotten in the same batch of espousals will be brothers and sisters.

The absence of 'mine' and 'thine' will ensure unity, because it abolishes the primary cause of discord; common maintenance by the state removes all temptation either to meanness or cringing.

As to practicability: communism is suitable for war. The youngsters will be taken to watch any fighting; cowards will be degraded; valour will be honoured, and death on the field, with other supreme services to the state, will rank the hero among demigods. Against Greeks war must be conducted as against our own kith and kin. But as to the possibility of all this—this third threatening wave is the most terrific of all.

IV—OF PHILOSOPHY IN RULERS

It will be possible then, and only then, when kings are philosophers or philosophers kings.

The philosopher desires all knowledge. Justice, beauty, good, and so on are single, though their presentation is multiplex and variable. Curiosity about the multiplex particulars is not desire of knowledge, which is of the one constant idea—of that which is, as ignorance is of that which is not. What neither is nor is not, that which fluctuates and changes, is the subject matter of opinion, a state between knowledge and ignorance. Beauty is beauty always and everywhere; the things that look beautiful may be ugly from another point of view. Experience of beautiful things, curiosity about them, must be distinguished from knowledge of beauty; the philosopher is not to be confounded with the connoisseur, nor knowledge with opinion. The philosopher is he who has in his mind the perfect pattern of justice, beauty, truth; his is the knowledge of the eternal; he contemplates all time and all existence; no praises are too high for him.

"No doubt; still if that is so, why do philosophers always show themselves either fools or knaves in ordinary affairs?"

A ship's crew which does not understand that the art of navigation demands a knowledge of the stars will stigmatise a properly qualified pilot as a star-gazing idiot, and will prevent him from navigating. The world assumes that the philosopher's abstractions are folly, and rejects his guidance. The philosopher is the best kind of man; the corrupted philosopher is the worst; and the corrupting influences brought to bear are irresistible to all but the very strongest natures. The professional teachers of philosophy live not by leading popular opinion, but by pandering to it; a bastard brood trick themselves out as philosophers, while the true philosopher withdraws himself from so gross a world. Not in the soil of any existing state can philosophy grow naturally; planted in a suitable state, her divinity will be apparent.

I need no longer hesitate to say that we must make our guardians philosophers. The necessary combination of qualities is extremely rare. Our test must be thorough, for the soul must be trained up by the pursuit of all kinds of knowledge to the capacity for the pursuit of the highest—higher than justice and wisdom—the idea of the good.

The good is to the intellectual faculty what the sum is to that of vision; it is the source and cause of truth, which is the light whereby we perceive ideas; it is not truth, nor the ideas, but above them; their cause, as the sun is the source of light and the cause of growth.

Again, the material things with which the eye is concerned are in two categories—the copies, reflections or shadows of things, and actual things. Correspondingly the things perceived by the intellect are in a secondary region—as the mathematical—where everything is derived from hypotheses which are assumed to be first principles; or in a supreme region, in which hypotheses are only the steps by which we ascend to the real ultimate first principles themselves.

And it will follow further that the mind has four faculties appropriate to these four divisions, which we call respectively pure reason, understanding, conviction and perception of shadows; the first pair being concerned with being, the field of the intellect; the second pair with becoming, the field of opinion.

V—OF SHADOWS AND REALITIES

LET me speak a parable. Humanity—ourselves—are as people dwelling ever bound and fettered in a twilight cave, with our backs to the light. Behind us is a parapet, and beyond the parapet a fire; all that we see is the shadows thrown on the wall that faces us by figures passing along the parapet behind us; all we hear is the echo of their voices. Now, if some of us are turned round to face the light and look on the real figures, they will be dazzled at first, and much more if they are taken out into the light, and up to face the sun himself; but presently they will see perfectly and have all the joy thereof. Now send them back into the cave, and they will be apparently much blinder than the folk who have been there all the time, and their talk of what they have seen will be taken for the babbling of fools, or worse. Small wonder that those who have beheld the light have little mind to return to the twilight cave, which is the common world.

But remember—everyone in the cave possesses the faculty of sight if only his eyes be turned to the light. Loose the fetters of carnal desires which hold him with his back to the light, and every man *may* be converted and live. So we must select those who are most capable of facing the light, and see to it that they return to the cave, to give the cave-dwellers the benefit of their knowledge. And if this be for them a hardship, we must bear in mind, as before, that the good of the whole is what matters, not whether one or another may suffer hardship for the sake of the whole.

How, then, shall we train them to the passage from darkness to light? For this, our education in music and gymnastic is wholly inadequate. We must proceed first to the science of numbers, then of geometry and then of astronomy. And after astronomy, there is the sister science of abstract harmonics—not of audible sounds. All of which are but the prelude to the ultimate supreme science of dialectic, which carries the intelligence to the contemplation of the idea of the good, the ultimate goal. And here to attempt further explanation would be vanity. This is the science of the pure reason, the coping stone of knowledge.

WE saw long ago that our rulers must possess every endowment of mind and body, all cultivated to the highest degree. From the select we must again select, at twenty, those who are most fit for the next ten years' course of education; and from them, at thirty, we shall choose those who can, with confidence, be taken to face the light; who have been tested and found absolutely steadfast, not shaken by having got beyond the conventional view of things. We will give them five or six years of philosophy; then fifteen years of responsible office in the state; and at fifty they shall return to philosophy, subject to the call upon them to take up the duties of rulership and of educating their successors.

VI—OF STATE TYPES AND INDIVIDUAL TYPES

BEFORE this digression we were on the point of discussing the four vitiated forms of the state and the corresponding individual types. The four types of state, as we know them in Hellas, are: the Spartan, where personal ambition and honour rule, which we call timocracy; the oligarchical, where wealth rules; the democratic; and the arbitrary rule of the individual, which we call tyranny. The comparison of this last—the supremely unjust—with our own—the supremely just—will show whether justice or injustice be the more desirable.

The perfect state degenerates to timocracy when the state's numerical law of generation [an unsolved riddle] has not been properly observed, and inferior offspring have entered in consequence into the ruling body. The introduction of private property will cause them to assume towards the commonalty the attitude, not of guardians, but of masters, and to be at odds among themselves; also in their education, gymnastic will acquire predominance over music. Ambition and party spirit become the characteristic features. When, in an ill-ordered state, a great man withdraws from the corruption of politics into private life, we see the corresponding individual type in the son of such a one, egged on by his mother and by flattering companions to win back for himself at all costs the prestige which his father had resigned; personal ambition becomes his dominant characteristic.

Oligarchy is the next outcome of the introduction of private property; riches outweigh virtue, love of money the love of honour, and the rich procure for themselves the legal monopoly of political power. Here the state becomes divided, against itself—there is one state of the rich and another of the poor—and the poor will be divided into the merely incompetent and the actively dangerous, or predatory. And your corresponding individual is he whose father had won honours which had not saved him from ultimate ruin; so that the son rejects ambition and makes money his goal, till, for the sake of money, he will compass any baseness, though still only under a cloak of respectability.

In the oligarchy the avaricious encourage and foster extravagance in their neighbours. Men, ruined by moneylenders, turn on their moneyed rulers, overthrow them and give everyone a share in the government. The result is that the state is not one, nor two, but divers. Folk say what they like and do what they like, and anyone is a statesman who will wave the national flag. That is democracy. Such is the son of your miserly oligarch; deprived of unnecessary pleasures, he is tempted to wild dissipation. He has no education to help him to distinguish, and the vices of dissipation assume the aspect and title of virtue. He fluctuates from one point of view to another—is one thing to-day and another to-morrow.

And last we come to tyranny and the tyrannical man. Democratic licence develops into sheer anarchy. Jack is as good as his master. The predatory population become demagogues; they squeeze the decent citizens and drive them to adopt oligarchical methods; then the friend of the people appears; the protector, champion and hero by a familiar process becomes a military autocrat, who himself battens, as must also his mercenary soldiery, on the citizens; and our unhappy Demos finds that it has jumped out of the reek into the fire. Now, our democratical man was swayed by the devices and moods of the moment; his son will be swayed by the most irrational and most bestial of his appetites; be bully and tyrant, while slave of his own lusts. Your thorough blackguard of every species comes of this type, and the worst of all is he who achieves the tyranny of a state. See, then, how, even as the tyrannic state is the most utterly enslaved, so the tyrannic man is of all men the least free; and, beyond all others, the tyrant of a state.

PROCLAIM it, then, son of Ariston, that the most just of men is he who is master of himself, is of all men the happiest, whether gods and men recognize him or no.

VII—OF THE HAPPINESS OF THE JUST

NOW for second proof. Three kinds of pleasure correspond to the three elements of the soul—reason, spirit, desire. In each man one of the three is in the ascendant. One counts knowledge vain in comparison with the advantages of riches, another with those of honour; to the philosopher only truth counts. But he is the only one of them who makes his choice from experience of all three kinds. And he, the only qualified judge, places the satisfaction of the spirit second, and of desire lowest.

And yet a third proof. I fancy the only quite real pleasures are those of the philosopher. There is an intermediate state between pleasure and pain. To pass into this from pleasure is painful, and from pain is pleasurable. Now, the pleasures of the body are really nothing more than relief from pains of one kind or another. And, next, the pleasures of the soul, being of the eternal order, are necessarily more real than those of the body, which are fleeting—in fact, mere shadows of pleasure.

Much as I love and admire Homer I think our regulations as to poetry were particularly sound; but we must inquire further into the meaning of imitation. We saw before that all particular things are the presentations of some universal idea. There is one ultimate idea of bed, or chair, or table. What the joiner makes is a copy of that. All ideas are the creation of the master artificer, the demi-urge; of his creations all material things are copies. We can create things in a way by catching reflections of them in a mirror. But these are only copies of particular things from one point of view, partial copies of copies of the idea.

Such precisely are the creations of the painter, and in like manner of the poet. What they know and depict is not the realities, but mere appearances. If the poets knew the realities they would have left us something other than imitations of copies. Moreover, what they imitate is not the highest but the lower; not the truth of reason, but emotions of all sorts, which it should be our business not to excite but to control and allay. So we continue to prohibit the poetry which is imitation, however supreme, and allow only hymns to the gods, and praises of great men. We must no more admit the allurements of poesy than the attractions of ambition or of riches.

Greater far are the rewards of virtue than all we have yet shown; for an immortal soul shall heed nothing that is less than eternal.

"What, is the soul, then, immortal? Can you prove that?"

Yes, of a surety. In all things there are good and evil; a thing perishes of its own corruption, not of the corruption of aught external to it. If disease or injury of the body cannot corrupt the soul, *a fortiori* they cannot slay it; but injustice, the corruption of the soul, is not induced by injury to the body. If, then, the soul be not destroyed by sin, nothing else can destroy it, and it is immortal. The number of existing souls must, then, be constant; none perish, none are added, for additional immortal souls would have to come out of what is mortal, which is absurd.

Now, hitherto we have shown only that justice is in itself best for the soul, but now we see that its rewards, too, are unspeakably great. The gods, to whom the just are known, will reward them hereafter, if not here; and even in this world they have the better lot in the long run.

Let us, then, believing that the soul is indeed immortal, hold fast to knowledge and justice, that it may be well with us both here and hereafter.

The Symposium or Supper

PLATO

THIS wise and witty work of the great Athenian philosopher describes a debate supposed to have taken place at a supper party given by Agathon after he had won the annual prize for tragedy. The company included Socrates and Aristophanes, who took a delight in caricaturing Socrates on the stage; the brilliant, versatile and profligate Alcibiades is also introduced. The greater part of the dialogue consists of dissertations on the nature of Love; the whole is distinguished not only for subtle analysis and admirable characterisation, but as a picture of Athenian manners and for the portrait of Socrates drawn by Alcibiades.

I—THE ORIGIN AND OPENING OF THE DEBATE

THIS discussion took place a long time ago; I had my report of it from Aristodemus, a great admirer of Socrates, who was present. He told me that he met Socrates, looking unusually smart, and asked where he was going. "To dine with Agathon," said Socrates, whom Aristodemus then accompanied, by his invitation. On the way Socrates stopped, and told him to go on in front. On reaching Agathon's house he was hospitably welcomed to supper, and then discovered that Socrates had not arrived. He had taken up his stand in a neighbouring porch, and quite declined to come in till supper was half over. Besides Agathon, Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes and others were present.

When supper was over, the company resolved unanimously to limit its potations, as most of them were suffering from the previous night's excesses, except Socrates, who was equally prepared to drink everything or nothing, being quite invincible by liquor; and, instead of drinking, to debate on a subject to be proposed by Eryximachus.

"My plan," said Eryximachus, "is really the plan of Phaedrus, not mine. He is always complaining that psalms and hymns are addressed to all the other gods, but none to Love, who is so mighty a god. So my plan is that everyone shall speak his best in the praise of Love, beginning with Phaedrus."

"No one present can possibly vote against you," said Socrates. "Certainly not I, who avow myself to know nothing about any other subject, nor Agathon, nor Pausanias, nor very assuredly, Aristophanes, who is an unfailing devotee of Aphrodite and Dionysius."

The company again agreed unanimously, and Phaedrus opened his discourse.

"A great god is Love, worthy to be admired of gods and men. Moreover, he is the source of our greatest blessings. For to youth there can be none greater than a true lover and a true love. Not birth, nor wealth, nor honours, nor aught else shall so inspire a man as Love with all that makes life worthy, shame of base deeds, and noble emulation. For to be shamed before parents and companions is less bitter to a man than disgrace in the eyes of his beloved, or of a comrade to whom he is devoted. So that comrades in this kind would far sooner die than desert one another in peril.

"There is none so base but that Love may breathe into him the spirit of a hero. Love alone makes men ready to die for another's sake; and not men only, but women. And to prove this we need but to look at Alectis, the daughter of Pelias, who, for her husband's sake was willing to die, so greatly her love exceeded that of his father and mother. Which deed the gods themselves did so approve that they suffered her soul to be released from Hades, a thing granted most rarely. Therefore I say that, of all the gods, Love is the eldest and the most to be honoured, and he that in life and in death helps men most to the possession of virtue and happiness."

After Phaedrus had ended, and some others, Pausanias began.

"This would be well enough if Love were one, but there is more than one Love. As there is that elder heavenly Aphrodite, motherless daughter of Heaven, and that goddess of the vulgar, daughter of Zeus and Dione, so there is a heavenly Love and a vulgar Love. The worthy Love is that which invites us to love worthily. The one is sensual, of the flesh; the other of the mind, freeing us from all wantonness. Now, it is most honourable to love the most excellent, even though they be less fair than others. And to win love is honourable, and to be rejected is shameful; wherefore all manner of devices are permitted to the wooer such as are permitted to none seeking another goal; yet in the lover they have a certain grace and may be done without dishonour.

"But honour and dishonour lie not in the love itself, but in the manner of loving, whether it be done worthily. For the vulgar love is worthless, inconsistent and fleeting; but the love of the virtuous character abides throughout life."

II—THE ARGUMENTS OF ARISTOPHANES AND AGATHON

THE next to speak should have been Aristophanes; but he being afflicted with a hiccough, Eryximachus took up the tale. He seemed to identify love with harmony in the physical organization.

"I don't know why the harmony of my physical organization should demand such a noisy operation as sneezing," said Aristophanes; "my hiccough departed when I sneezed. However, I am not going to follow the lead of Pausanias and Eryximachus. If man understood the power of Love, he would have more temples and more homage than all the other gods, yet he gets none. I will unfold it. We must begin with the nature of man, which has changed. First of all there was a

third sex, the androgynous, combining the two, with four arms and legs, and the rest to match. When a man was in a hurry, he rolled, like a tumbler; and they were very strong. They became very troublesome to the Olympians, who could not afford to annihilate them; so Zeus resolved to cut them in half. Then the halves fell to embracing in their desire to get re-united. Hence the two sexes, and the perpetual endeavour of the two halves to get reincorporated. What your real lovers are really craving for is to become really one, soul and body, with their other half. But if we fail in piety, we are in danger of being quartered instead."

Agathon was arrested in a discussion into which Socrates was beguiling him, and entered in turn on his discourse.

"We have been describing Love's gifts instead of praising Love himself—of all the gods the happiest, the most excellent and the most beautiful. He is the most beautiful of all, for he is the youngest of all and the swiftest, since he outstrips in flight old age, which is hateful to him.

"For Love's virtue and power, mark that no violence is used by him, nor touches him; and he is most temperate, for he is stronger than all delights and desires. In courage Ares cannot match him, for he is master of Ares, who is possessed by the love of Aphrodite. Justice, then, and temperance and courage are his; and it remains to speak of his wisdom. First, then, I praise him as being myself a poet, just as Eryximachus praised him as a physician; for he is a poet so mighty that he can make a poet of him who was none before, and none can teach that which he knows not himself. His is the poesy of creation; Apollo himself was Love's pupil.

"Of old, necessity ruled among the gods, and fearful things were done. But when Love was born all blessings came with him. He brings peace among men, calm upon the sea, repose and sleep in sadness. He frees us from ill-will, and fills us with kindliness, brings all gentleness and expels all ungentleness, whom every man should follow with sweet hymns in his praise, taking his part in that song of beauty which Love sings, healing the troubles of all minds of gods and men."

III—SOCRATES DISCOURSES ON THE IMMORTALITY OF LOVE

When the applause subsided, "I was justified in my fears," said Socrates. "After a discourse of such consummate eloquence, how shall I say anything that will be listened to? I said I knew something about Love; but then I thought we were going to speak the truth on the subject; to give Love the honour which is his due; whereas the question has become one of seeing how we can praise Love most eloquently without regard to facts, and that is an art in which I am quite unskilled. But if you are content with mere truths expressed as they occur to me at the moment——"

Phaedrus bade him speak in whatever fashion he chose.

"Then, may I ask Agathon a few questions?"

"Certainly."

"Is Love love of something, or of nothing? A father is father of his child. A brother is brother of his brother and sister. Is Love in like manner love of something?"

"Certainly."

"It desires that of which it is the love, not possessing it?"

"Yes."

"When it no longer lacks, it no longer desires?"

"I suppose not."

"Well, then, Love is of something that it lacks. But you would have it that Love loves beauty; therefore it lacks beauty; therefore it is not beautiful. And the same argument applies to goodness as to beauty! However, let me tell you what the prophetess Diotima told me, for I have borrowed my argument from her, since I was arguing with her very much as Agathon has been doing just now.

"What is not beautiful or good, need not, therefore, be ugly or bad, just as there is a state of mind which is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but correct opinion. So Love is not a mortal, nor a god, since we have seen that he does not possess all beauty and goodness and happiness, which we must acknowledge the gods to possess, but is something intermediate, a daemon, interpreting between the divine and the human. Love is one of many such intermediaries. As to his birth, Plenty was his sire and Poverty his mother; he partakes of the nature of each. As the gods do not seek wisdom, since they imagine that they have it, but only the philosophers, who are neither of these; so Love is of necessity a philosopher, thirsting for wisdom as for all forms of beauty. Your mistake was in taking Love to be not the lover, but the beloved.

"Love, you say, desires the possession of beautiful things. What will he possess? The happy are happy in the possession of good things. Everyone desires to possess good things. But we do not admit that everyone loves, because we have selected a specific form of love, and chosen to apply to the species the name of a universal; just as every maker is properly a poet, but we have appropriated the name to a particular species of makers. Love, in reality is of every good, not of the missing half of oneself; desire that it should be ever present with it. It acts as the desire of generation in the beautiful, in relation both to body and soul, a something immortal in mortality as it were; not of the beautiful; but of immortality, necessarily, without which nothing can be ever present.

"As for the phenomena of Love permeating all the living creation, they express the mortal nature seeking to become deathless by the one possible process of generation. For the mortal achieves immortality by the constant replacing of that which perishes, not by its separate continuity. So this Love is a tendency towards eternity and great deeds done for the immortality they bring. Sexual love is the expression of this craving for immortality in the physical organism; the work of all creative art is its intellectual issue, and especially of that political wisdom which we call moderation and justice. In whatsoever field this desire of immortality by propagation moves us, we must be attracted by the beautiful, and by beauty of soul more divinely than by beauty of form. But the children of the intellect are more desirable than the children of the body; for the former

FRANCIS BACON, born January 22, 1561, younger son of Sir Nicholas Bacon, was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, and called to the Bar at Gray's Inn in 1582. Knighted by James I, he became lord chancellor in 1618, and was created Baron Verulam. Two years later he was created Viscount St. Albans. In 1621 he was charged with corruption and bribery, and he was lodged in the Tower and condemned to pay a heavy fine. The King remitting the fine, he retired from public life and died April 9, 1626. This portrait is in the National Portrait Gallery.



ROBERT BURTON was born at Lindley, Leicestershire, February 8, 1577, and educated at Nuneaton Grammar School, Sutton Coldfield Free School, and Brasenose College, Oxford, and was elected a student at Christ Church in 1599. In 1616 he was made vicar of St. Thomas's, Oxford, and became rector of Segrave, Leicestershire, in 1630. He died January 25, 1640, and was buried in Christ Church Cathedral.



THOMAS HOBBES was born at Westport, Malmesbury, Wiltshire, April 5, 1588, son of the vicar of Westport and Charlton, and was educated at Malmesbury School and Madgalen Hall, Oxford. From 1646 to 1648 he was mathematical instructor to the Prince of Wales. Died December 4, 1679.



HUGO GROTIUS, or Huig van Groot, was born at Delft, April 10, 1583, son of a lawyer. Having studied at Leiden and in France he became a practising lawyer. In 1603 he was appointed historiographer of the United Provinces and held other public posts, but his participation in politics led to his fall, and in 1619 he was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Having escaped, in 1634 he entered the Swedish service and became Swedish ambassador to France. He died August 28, 1645.

RENÉ DESCARTES was born at La Haye in Touraine, March 31, 1596, and educated at the Jesuit College of La Flêche in Anjou. He served in the army under Maurice of Orange and Tilly, took part in the siege of Rochelle and at the age of 33 withdrew to Holland where he devoted himself to his philosophical and literary labours and attained world-wide fame. He was invited to England by Charles I, to France by Richelieu and, in 1649, to Stockholm by Queen Christina of Sweden; but the climate proved too severe for him and he died there February 11, 1650. This portrait is from the painting by Franz Hals.



JOHN LOCKE was born at Wrington, Somersetshire, August 29, 1632. He went to Westminster and Christ Church, Oxford; but his nature rebelled against the system of education and the public disputations of the schools, and he found in Descartes his relish of philosophical things. From 1683 to 1689 he was forced, for political reasons, to stay in Holland, where the Essay was completed.

BARUCH DE SPINOZA was born of Jewish parents at Amsterdam on November 24, 1632. He received a thorough education in Hebrew and the Jewish medieval philosophers, and later in Latin and the modern thinkers. He soon won a local reputation as a philosopher, but was considered unorthodox by the Jews, and was excommunicated from the faith. His first book, the Short Treatise On God, On Man And His Well-being, brought him widespread recognition as a philosopher, and his important Theological-Political Treatise enhanced his reputation. It was, however, unintelligently banned by lay and ecclesiastical authorities, and because of this Spinoza's other valuable works were published after his death on February 21, 1677.



GEORGE BERKELEY was born near Thomastown, Kilkenny, March 12, 1685, and educated at Trinity College, Dublin, of which he became a fellow in 1707. He came to London in 1713 and formed the acquaintance of Steele, Swift, Pope and other notable literary men. In 1724, he emigrated to Newport, Rhode Island, with a view to founding a college at Bermuda for training missionaries to the North American Indians. The scheme fell through and Berkeley returned to London. In 1734 he was consecrated Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland and retained the bishopric until 1752 when he resigned and retired to Oxford, where he died January 14, 1753.

may bring the reward even of divine honours, but not the latter.

"He who would love rightly must from the beginning seek to hold intercourse with beautiful forms, and love one, wherein he would generate intellectual beauty. But the beauty in all forms is one, and his love of beauty in form would be divided among many forms; whereas beauty in the soul being more excellent, one beautiful soul would suffice him even though the beauty of the form withered. Thus he would be led up to the contemplation of universal beauty, and the one science thereof. The beauty thus revealed is eternal, without beginning at all times, and utterly, and to all. This is that to which they attain who advance by these steps from the contemplation of beauty in particulars to the revelation of the supreme beauty. Such a one is at last in contact not with shadows but with the ultimate reality, and if immortality be at all given to human beings, he is thereby become immortal."

IV—ALCIBIADES EULOGISES SOCRATES

But now there came a clamour of revellers, and the voice of Alcibiades without, calling for Agathon; and then he came in, very drunk. "Drunk I am," said he, "but I'll drink with you. If you won't, we'll crown Agathon and depart." Being bidden to come in, he dropped down by Agathon, and then discovered that Socrates was on his other side. "Heracles!" he cried, "wherever I go, Socrates is lying in wait for me."

"Protect me, Agathon," said Socrates, "I dare not speak to or look at anyone else when he is near, he is so jealous. I entreat you to reconcile us."

"I won't be reconciled," said Alcibiades. "But I'll crown him too. He is always victor, not once in a way like Agathon yesterday." And this he did.

"Our business," said Eryximachus, "is to speak in praise of Love; it is your turn."

"Socrates won't let me praise anyone but Socrates. I won't praise anyone else. Shall I attack him? May I speak the truth about him? I cannot be methodical in this condition; I must say the things as they come into my head.

"In the first place, he is just like a statue, the statue of the satyr Marsyas. Only, Socrates charms us by words instead of by musical pipings like him. Pericles and the rest cannot move me so; he even makes me ashamed of myself, till life ceases to be worth living, and I could wish to be quit of him altogether, only that would be worse. In spite of his professions, he cares no more for beauty than for any other external possessions, but when you get inside this Silenus, the divine images displayed are perfectly beautiful, and divine and wonderful.

"We messed together in camp before Potidaea. He was far the hardiest of us all; scanty fair, plenty, intolerable cold never disturbed him. In the rout of Delium he was a sight to behold. I was mounted; he was trudging off the field with Laches on foot; but he was so majestically calm that anyone could see he would make a desperate resistance if attacked; so no one ventured. The fact is, Socrates is like no one else that ever was—excepting the Silene and Satyrs; rude, not to say absurd, outside, but inside full of every conceivable excellence."

There was great laughter over the frankness of Alcibiades. However just then a fresh batch of revellers broke in. Eryximachus and Phaedrus went off to bed. Aristodemus fell asleep, and woke to find Socrates, Aristophanes and Agathon still talking and drinking, while Socrates was compelling the two dramatists to admit, against their convictions, that tragedy and comedy are a single art proper to one person. They went to sleep at last, and then Socrates went away.

The Ethics

ARISTOTLE

The Nicomachean Ethics contain the latest presentation of Aristotle's moral teaching, incorporating and supplementing the earlier Eudemian Ethics and Ethica Megala or Great Ethics. Its extreme condensation suggests that it is a compilation of summaries of lectures. It has profoundly influenced ethical thought, particularly the classification of the virtues and the doctrine that virtue lies in a 'mean' mind.

I—THE END OF LIFE AND THE MEANING OF VIRTUE

Every art and science, every action, has for its end some good, whether this be a form of activity or an actual product. The ends of minor arts are only means to the ends of superior arts. If there is one supreme end, this is The Good, inquiry into which belongs to the supreme social science [for which the Greek term is Politics]. The name given to this supreme good, the attainment of which is the object of politics, is happiness, good living or welfare.

But happiness itself is variously defined: some identify it with pleasure, others with honour—the first a degrading, and the second an inadequate view. Platonists find it in an abstract idea of good, a universal which precludes particulars. There is a great deal to be said against this doctrine, even as a question of logic or metaphysic; but apart from that, the theory is out of court, for the all-sufficient reason that its practical value is *nil*—knowledge of the universal good in the abstract is of no practical use in everyday life—a fundamental point for us.

If, then, there is a supreme dominating good to be aimed at, what are the essential characteristics it must display? The Good of all Goods, the Best, must be complete in itself,

a consummation. Whatsoever is a means to some end beyond fails so far of completeness; when we say that our end must be 'complete,' it follows that it must always be an end, never a means. It is not merely one amongst others of which it is the best, but the one in which all the others are summed up. It is of itself quite sufficient for the individual, and that not merely in isolation, but as a member of society.

Let us then define happiness as man's *work*—the performance of his function as man. Everything has some specific function, the performance of which is its good, and man, too, must have a specific function. Now, this cannot be the kind of life which he shares with the vegetable or with the brute creation, therefore it must be the active life of his distinctive—*i.e.* his rational—part, exercised in accordance with the virtue or virtues which perfect it, and in his life as a whole, not merely at moments.

Testing our conclusions by the judgements of common experience, we gather support from them. Goods external, and goods of the body, are reckoned inferior to goods of the soul, which is recognized as the seat of activities. The identification of happiness with virtue, however, necessitates the distinction between active virtue and virtuousness. As conducing to active virtue, the other kinds of goods are elements in happiness. We must assume it to be not something granted to us, outside our own control, but attainable by effort and education.

VIRTUES are of two kinds: of the intellect, acquired by study; and moral, acquired by practice. The moral virtues are not implanted by nature, but we have the capacity for them by nature and achieve them by practice, as by practice we acquire excellence in the arts, or control over our passions. Education, then, is of the utmost importance, since the state of virtue is the outcome of virtue in act.

The manner, the 'how' of action, must be in accord with right reason. Here, be it understood, we are not laying down universal propositions, but general rules which are modified by circumstances. Our activities must lie in a mean between the two extremes of excess and defect, and this applies both to the process of generating virtue and to its manifestation. The virtues are concerned with pleasure and pain, because these act as inducements or opposing influences; beauty, advantage and pleasure being the three standing inducements, and pleasure entering into both the others; so that in one aspect virtue is the best action in respect to pleasure.

But it does not lie in the mere act; the act must be born of knowledge, and of choice, done for its own sake, and persistently—the first, knowledge, being the least important; to make it the most important is a speculative error.

NOW, there are three modes of mind: feeling or passion, faculty and habit. We do not praise or blame passion in itself, or the faculty; therefore virtue can lie in neither, but must be found in habit or condition. The virtuous habit or condition is what enables that whereof it is the virtue to perform its function, which, in the case of man, is the activity of the soul, preserving always a middle course between excess and deficiency, by choice.

In another sense, however, we must remember that there are qualities in themselves wrong, and that virtue may be presented as not something intermediate, but a consummation. But when we name each of these virtues—courage, temperance, liberality, etc.; the social virtues, or good manners; the virtues concerned with the passions—we can name the corresponding excess or deficiency. Justice and the intellectual virtues demand a separate analysis.

Each virtue stands in opposition to each of the extremes, and each of these to the other extreme, though in some cases the virtue may be more antagonistic to one extreme than to the other; as courage, for example, is more antagonistic to cowardice than it is to rashness.

BEFORE proceeding with this analysis, we must examine the question of choice. To be praiseworthy, an act must be voluntary. An act is not voluntary if it is the outcome of external compulsion. Where there is a margin of choice, an act must still, on the whole, be regarded as voluntary, though done 'against our will.' Of properly involuntary acts, we must distinguish between the unintentional and the unwilling, meaning by the latter, in effect, what the agent would not have done if he had known.

Choice is not the same thing as a voluntary act; nor is it desire, or emotion, or exactly 'wish,' since we may wish for, but cannot make choice of, the unattainable. Nor is it deliberation—rather, it is the act of decision following deliberation. If man has the power to say yes, he has equally the power to say no, and is master of his own action. If we make a wrong choice through ignorance for which we are ourselves responsible, the ignorance itself is culpable, and cannot excuse the wrong choice; and so, when the choice is the outcome of a judgement disordered by bad habits, men cannot escape by saying they were made so—they made themselves so. To say they 'could not help' doing wrong things is only an evasion.

II—THE MORAL VIRTUES EXAMINED

VIRTUES, then, are habits, issuing in acts corresponding to those by which the habit was established, directed by right reason, every such act and the whole process being voluntary.

We may now turn to the analysis of the several virtues.

Courage has to do with fear. Not all kinds; for there are some things we ought to fear, such as dishonour and pauperism, the fear of which is compatible with dauntless courage, while the coward may not fear them. Fearlessness of what is in our control, and endurance of what is not, for the sake of true honour, constitute the courageous habit. Its excess is rashness or foolhardiness, the deficiency cowardice.

Akin to it, but still spurious, is the courage of which the motive is not honour but honours or reputation. Spurious also is the courage which arises from the knowledge that the danger is infinitesimal; so is that which is born of blind

anger, or of elated self-confidence, or of mere unconsciousness of danger. True courage lies in resisting a temptation to pleasure or to escaping pain, and, above all, death, for honour's sake. The exercise of a virtue may be very far from pleasant, except, of course, in so far as the end for which it was exercised is achieved.

Temperance is concerned with pleasures of the senses; mainly of touch, in a much less degree of taste; but not of sight, hearing or smell, except indirectly. Of carnal pleasures, some are common to all, some have an individual application. Temperance lies in being content to do without them, and desiring them only so far as they conduce to health and comfort. The characteristic of intemperance is that it has to do with pleasures only, not with pains. Hence, it is more purely voluntary than cowardice, as being less influenced by perturbing outward circumstances as concerns the particular case, though not the habit.

Liberality is concerned with money matters, and lies between extravagance and meanness. Really it means the right treatment of money, both in spending and receiving it—the former rather than the latter. A man is not really liberal who lavishes money for baser purposes, or takes it whence he should not, or fails to take due care of his property. The liberal man tends to err in the direction of lavishness. Extravagance is curable, but is frequently accompanied by carelessness as to the objects on which the money is spent and the sources from which it is obtained. The habit of meanness is apt to be ineradicable, and is displayed both in the acquisition and in the hoarding of money.

Munificence is a virtue concerned only with expenditure on a large scale, and it implies liberality. It lies between vulgar ostentation and niggardliness. It is possible only for the wealthy, and is concerned mainly with public works, but also with private occasions of ceremony. The error of vulgar ostentation is misdirection of expenditure, not excess. Niggardliness abstains from a proper expenditure.

MAGNANIMITY is the virtue of the aristocrat; its excess is self-glorification, its deficiency self-depreciation. The magnanimous man will bate nothing of his claim to honour, power and wealth, not as caring greatly for them, but as demanding what he knows to be his due. This character involves the possession of the virtues; the man must act in the grand manner and on the grand scale. He knows his own superiority, does not conceal it, and acts up to it. Self-glorification overrates its own capacities; self-depreciation underrates them and shuns responsibility, being the more reprehensible of the two.

There is a nameless virtue which stands to magnanimity in the same relation as that of liberality to munificence; these being concerned with honours, as those with money. The excess is ambition, the deficiency is the lack of it.

Good temper is a mean between ill-temper—whether of the irascible, the sulky, or the cantankerous kind—and poor-spiritedness.

Friendliness comes between the excessive desire to please and boorishness. It is a social virtue which might be defined as goodwill *plus* tact. Sincerity [there is no English term quite corresponding to the Greek] is the quality opposed on the one side to boastfulness, and on the other to mock-modesty; it is displayed by the man who acknowledges, but who never exaggerates, his own merits. In the social display of wit and humour there is a marked mean between the buffoon and the dullard or prig.

Shame is a term implying a feeling rather than a habit; like fear, it has a physical effect, producing blushes, and seems, in fact, to be fear of disrepute. To the young, it is a safeguard against vice; the virtuous man need never feel it; to be unable to feel it implies the habit of vice. Continence is not strictly a moral virtue.

III—OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

WE come now to justice. A specific habit differs from a specific faculty or science, as each of the latter covers opposites, *e.g.* the science of health is also the science of sickness; whereas the habit of justice does not cover but is opposed to the habit of injustice. Justice itself is a term used in various senses; and the senses in which injustice is used vary correspondingly.

Injustice includes law-breaking, grasping and unfairness. Grasping is taking too much of what is good only; unfairness is concerned with both what is good and what is injurious. But in the legal sense, whatever law lays down is assumed to be just. Law, however, covers the whole field of virtuous action as it affects our neighbours, so that in this general sense justice is an inclusive term equivalent to righteousness. We, however, must confine ourselves to the specific sense of the terms. Grasping is, in fact, included in unfairness, which is the real opposite of specific justice; it includes law-breaking only so far as the law is broken for the sake of gain.

The justice with which we are concerned has two branches: distributive, of honours and the like among citizens by the State, and of private property by contract and agreement; and corrective, the remedying of unfair distribution. There are always two parties, and justice is the mean between the unfairness which favours A and the unfairness which favours B.

Distributive justice takes into consideration the merits of the parties; corrective justice is concerned only with restoring a balance which has been disturbed. The distribution is a question not of equality, but of right proportion; and this applies to retribution, which is recognized as one of its aspects, *e.g.* the retribution for an officer striking a private and for a private striking an officer. Proportional requital is the economic basis of society, arrived at by the existence of a comparatively unfluctuating currency which provides a criterion.

In the State, as such, justice is obtained from the law and its administrators; justice is the virtue of the magistrate. Since he has nothing to gain or lose himself, it has been supposed that justice is 'another's good,' not our own. In the family, justice does not come in, the whole household being, in a sense, parts

of the *pater familias;* and as you cannot be unjust to yourself, you cannot be unjust to your household. In the State, what is just is fixed partly by the nature of things, partly by law or convention.

As to individual acts, injury may arise from a miscalculation, or from an incalculable accident; it becomes a wrong when it was intentional but not premeditated, an injustice when premeditated. An act *prima facie* unjust is not so if done with the free consent of the person injured. It is the agent of distribution, not the recipient, who is unjust (when they are different persons); and similarly, the agent, not the instrument. And even the agent of unjust distribution is not really unjust unless he was really actuated by motives of personal gain.

The performance of a particular act is easy. To perform it rightly as the outcome of a right habit, is not; nor is it easy to be confident as to what is right in the particular case. The man who is just, having the habit, does not find it easy to act unjustly.

What we must call equity may be opposed to justice but only in the legal sense of that term. It is justice freed from the errors incidental to the particular case, for which the law cannot provide. Injustice, again, is found in self-injury or suicide; which the law penalises, not because the individual thereby treats himself unjustly, but because he does an injustice to the community. It is only by metaphor that a man may be called unjust to himself, an expression which means that the relation between one part of him and another part of him is analogous to the unjust relation between persons.

IV—WISDOM, PRUDENCE AND CONTINENCE

The ensuing discussion of intellectual virtue requires some remarks on the soul. We distinguish in the rational part, that which knows, concerned with the unchanging; and that which reasons, concerned with the changing. Our intellects and our propensions—not our sense-perceptions, which are shared with animals—guide our actions and our apprehension of truth. Attraction and repulsion, in correspondence with affirmation and denial, combine to form right choice; the practical—as opposed to the pure—reason having an external object and being a motive power.

There are five modes of attaining truth: (1) Concerning things unalterable, defined as demonstrative science; (2) concerning the making of things changeable, art; (3) concerning the doing—not making—of things changeable, prudence; (4) intuitive reason, the basis of demonstrative science; (5) wisdom, the union of intuitive reason and science.

Wisdom and prudence are the two virtues of the intellect. Wisdom implies intuitive reason, which grasps undemonstrable first principles; it is concerned with the interests not of the moment, the individual, or the locality. Whereas prudence is concerned precisely with these; it is essentially practical. Wisdom cannot be identified with statesmanship; which, again, is not the same as prudence—which applies to the self and to the family as well as to the State; it differs from wisdom as requiring experience.

Wisdom, knowledge of the ultimate bases, is equally without practical bearing for those who have acquired a right habit and for those who have not; just as a knowledge of medical theory is of no use to the average man. But being an activity of the soul, *ipso facto*, it conduces to happiness. The general conclusion is that what we have called 'prudence' shows the means to the end which the moral virtues aim at. It is not a moral virtue, but the moral virtues accord with it. Both are necessary to the achievement of goodness.

We come now to a second group of qualities, concerned with conduct. We have dealt with the virtues and their opposing vices. We pass by the infra-human and the supra-human bestiality and holiness; but have still to deal with continence and its contrasted qualities, which are concerned with the passions.

In the popular view, continence, self-control, is adherence to our formed judgement. Incontinence is yielding to passion where we know it to be wrong, and may be indulged in the pursuit of vengeance, honour, or gain.

A number of *prima facie* contradictions are started out of the popular views. We find that a man does not act against complete knowledge or knowledge of which he is fully conscious. The knowledge may, so to speak, be there, but is in abeyance, a condition which is palpably exemplified in a drunken man.

Now, incontinence is concerned with pleasures, which are necessary—as for sustenance of life—and unnecessary but, *per se*, desirable, as honour. Incontinence is a term applied only by analogy in the case of the latter; its proper concern—as with the moral vice, which we called intemperance—is with the former. It implies, however, violent desire, which intemperance does not. We have examples of such desires in a morbid or diseased form, species of mania; but here again the term incontinence is only applied by analogy. Its legitimate application, in short, is restricted to the normal.

Incontinence in respect of anger is not so bad as in respect of desire. It is often constitutional, it is in itself painful, and it is not wanton, being in all three points unlike the other. What we spoke of as bestiality is more horrible than vice or incontinence, as being inhuman; but it does less harm. Incontinence means transgressing the ordinary standards in respect of pleasure and pain. Such transgression, when of set purpose, and not followed by repentance—consequently, incurable—is the moral vice of intemperance; which, being characterised by the absence of violent desire, is worse than incontinence. The latter is open, and is curable. The confusion between the two is due to their issuing in like acts; the passionate impulse is temporary; it is not a formed habit of wrong choice.

Continence is acting on conviction in resistance to passion; not merely sticking to any and every opinion, which is really rather more like incontinence. The other extreme, of actual apathy, is rare. Continence differs from temperance, as implying resistance to strong desires; whereas temperance implies that such desires are not active. Prudence—but not the acuteness which is sometimes confused with

prudence—is incompatible with incontinence, which is least curable when the outcome of weakness.

HERE it becomes necessary to make some inquiry as to pleasure and pain. Some maintain that pleasure is never good, some that it is partly good and partly not; some that it is good, but not the best. But it cannot be bad *per se*, since it may be defined as the unimpeded activity of a formed faculty. Pleasure, as such, is not a hindrance to any activity, but its fulfilment; *e.g.* the pleasure of speculative inquiry does not hinder it.

As a matter of fact, everyone does pursue pleasure; the denial that it is good results from thinking of it as meaning only bodily pleasures. And even they are not evil, but only the excessive pursuit of them. As to pleasure being fleeting, that is only because circumstances vary. The pleasure of the unchanging would be permanent.

V—FRIENDSHIP, ITS FOUNDATIONS AND VARIANTS

A QUALITY rendered as 'friendship'—though the Greek and English terms are not identical in content—now comes under examination. It is a relation to some other person or persons without which life is hardly worth living. Some account for it on the principle of 'like to like,' others on the opposite theory. Now, loveableness comes of goodness, or pleasantness, or usefulness. Love is not bestowed on the inanimate, and it must be mutual; it is to be distinguished from goodwill or devotion, which need not be reciprocated.

Genuine friendship must be based on goodness; what rests on pleasantness (as with the young), or on utility (as with the old), is only to be recognized conventionally as friendship. In perfection it cannot subsist without perfect mutual knowledge, and only between the good; hence it is not possible for anyone to have many real friends. Of the conventional forms, that which is born of intellectual sympathy is more enduring than what springs from sexual attraction; while what comes of utility is quite accidental. The former may develop into genuine friendship if there be virtue in both parties. Companionship is a necessary condition, in any case.

Variants of friendship, however, may subsist between unequals, as between parents and children, princes and subjects, men and women, where there is a difference in the character of the affection of the two parties. A certain degree of inequality—though we cannot lay down the limitation—makes 'friendship' a misnomer. One would not desire the actual apotheosis of a friend, because that would take him out of reach; it would end friendship. Friendship lies rather in the active loving than in being loved, though most people are more anxious to be loved than to love.

Every form of social community—typified in the State—involves relationships into which friendship enters. The relationships in the family correspond to those in States; monarch to subjects as father to children, tyrant to subjects as master to slaves; autocratic rule to that of the husband, oligarchic rule to that of the wife; what we call timocracy to the fraternal relation, and democracy to the entirely unregulated household. In some kinds of association, friendship takes the form of *esprit de corps*. Quarrels arise most readily in those friendships between equals which are based upon interest, and in friendships between unequals.

Friendship is a kind of exchange—equal between equals, and proportional between unequals; a repayment. This suggests various questions as to priority of claim—*e.g.* between paying your father's ransom and repaying a loan, both being in a sort the repayment of a debt. No fixed law can be laid down—*i.e.* it cannot be said that one obligation at all times and in all circumstances over-rides all others.

The dissolution of friendship is warranted when one party has become depraved, since he has changed from being the person who was the object of friendship. But he should not be given up while there is hope of restoring his character.

Friendship is not to be identified with goodwill, though the latter is a condition precedent; we may feel goodwill, but not friendship, towards a person we have never seen or spoken to. Unanimity of feeling—not as to facts, but as to ends and means—is a sort of equivalent to friendship in the body politic. The reason why conferring a benefit creates more affection than receiving it seems to be that the benefactor feels himself the maker of the other; we all incline to love what we produced—as parents their children, or the artist his own creations.

The good man is self-sufficing, but friends are desirable, if not actually necessary to him, as giving scope for the exercise of beneficent activities, not as conferring benefits upon him. Besides, man's highest activities must be exercised not in isolation, but as a member of society, and such life lacks completeness if without friends. Finally, friendship attains its completest realization where comradeship is complete; that is to say, in a common life.

VI—CONCLUSIONS REGARDING HAPPINESS

WE must revert once more to the question of pleasure and pain. To say that pleasure is not good is absurd; he who does so stultifies himself by his own acts.

It is desired for its own sake; its opposite is admittedly undesirable. But since it may be added to other good things, it cannot be *the* good: though to say that what every one desires is not good at all is folly. That it is not a 'quality,' or that it is 'indeterminate,' are irrelevant arguments, both statements applying to what are admittedly among 'goods.'

The doctrine that it is a process, again, will not hold water. Pleasure is a thing complete; whereas a process is complete at no moment unless it be that of its termination. It is the completion of its appropriate activity; not in the sense that a habit makes the activity complete, but as its accompaniment and complement. Continuous it is not, just as the activity is not. It is not the complete life, but is inseparable from it.

Pleasures, however, differ specifically and in value, as do the qualities with whose activities

they are associated. The pleasures proper to men are those associated with the activities proper to man as man, those shared with other animals being so only in a less degree.

It remains to recapitulate the sum of our conclusions regarding happiness. It is not a habit, but lies in the habitual activities—desirable in and for themselves not as means—exercised deliberately, excluding mere amusement. Man's highest faculty being intelligence, its activity is his highest happiness—contemplation; constant, sufficient, and sought not as a means but as an end.

This kind of happiness belongs to the gods also. Exclusively human, but below the other, is the fulfilment of the moral life, conditioned by human society, and more affected by environments and material wants. For contemplative activity, the barest material needs suffice. But this does not of itself induce the moral life, being apart from conduct.

To induce morality, not only knowledge, but the right habit of action—which does not follow from knowledge and may be implanted without it—is absolutely necessary. Compulsion may successfully establish the habit where argument might fail. Compulsion, therefore, is the proper course for the State to take.

The Politics

ARISTOTLE

ALTHOUGH preceded by the Republic of Plato, the Politics of Aristotle is the earliest extant treatise in which the subject is dealt with as a specific branch of practical science, and in obtaining data Aristotle examined the constitutions of over a hundred Greek states; to him, as to all Greeks, the city-state was the only state highly enough organized to deserve the name. His work substantially holds the field to the present day; and, if some of his doctrines are interesting primarily as illustrating the difference in the conditions of the ancient and modern world, others are as true of Europe to-day as they were of ancient Greece.

I—THE BASES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The natures of various forms of rule are not identical. To ascertain the fundamental differences let us begin at the beginning, with the genesis, or coming into being, of the state.

Starting with the household, three relations are implied—of parents and children, husband and wife, master and slaves. Slaves are a form of property, defined as an aggregate of the instruments conducive to life; animate instruments of action.

From the slave as property arises the general question of property, its acquisition and application. Naturally, necessary things are acquired by simple processes—hunting, fishing, husbandry, etc. But there is a further and differing art of acquisition by way of exchange. The simple barter of necessaries is also natural; but exchange becomes so no longer when it is made in terms of a standard medium, the currency. To the acquisition of property, as defined, and its employment there is a limit; but to the acquisition of money, which is only potentially property, there is none.

It is with this kind of accumulation that finance is concerned, while domestic economy has to do with actual property. Finance is in any case non-natural; it is most unnatural in the form of usury. Simple acquisition of property is natural and involves knowledge of agriculture and live-stock. Finance proper covers the commercial field. Between these is the production of what conduces only indirectly to life. Incidentally, we note that the most effective of financial devices is that of capturing a monopoly of the supply.

Returning to the government of the household, the moral virtues are demanded of the ruler; we do not deny them to its other members, whether women, slaves, or children; but the virtues of these are not identical with those of the head, their functions being different.

Turning to Plato's ideal commonwealth, our first criticism is that Plato's aim is to produce uniformity, whereas uniformity is destructive of the state, which depends on diversity of service rendered. We should maintain that diversity.

Secondly, the Platonic communism, especially of wives and children, fails of its purpose; joint ownership produces not harmony, but discord, besides reducing the individual's interest in what is merely shared. All the force of family affections is watered away, and there are boundless ugly possibilities arising from the actual ignorance of relationships.

Common possession of other goods, too, generally leads to quarrels. Voluntary or regulated sharing of distinctively private property is another thing. If the scheme had been in any way practicable, someone would have tried it before now.

Thirdly, Socrates never explains how far the ordinary citizens fall under the same rules as the guardians; unity among them is not provided for, nor subordination. To which three main criticisms other minor ones may, of course, be added.

Plato's variations from the Republic in his Laws help us little—*e.g.* there he puts his professional soldiery at 5,000, an incredibly large proportion for any state deserving the name. He omits foreign relations altogether; says nothing of how the population is to be kept within bounds; and the total result seems to be a polity professing to be a cross between democracy and despotism, and actually more of an oligarchy than anything else.

From the theorists we turn to known practical constitutions; and, first, to that of Sparta. The plan of securing leisure for the free citizen by having a large subject population involves danger from servile revolts. The licence allowed to women—an important factor in a military state—is a corrupting influence. The absorption of the land in a very few hands—women's, to

a very disproportionate degree—brought down the Spartiate population almost to vanishing point. The ephors, the real rulers, are elected from the whole free population by a childish method; so are the senators. As for the kings, the law emphasises the fact that they are distrusted. Poor and rich alike contribute to the common meals, which is unfair to the poor. Militarism is too obviously the one aim of the whole system, and the financial regulations foster avarice.

TRADITION says that the Spartan polity was borrowed from the Cretan, which differs from it in minor points of detail but has practically the same defects in the main. The polity of Carthage is akin to these two, with variations which are in its favour. It aims at securing a larger influence for merit as against chance in elections, but tends to find merit in wealth to a dangerous extent.

At Athens, Solon's legislation displaced the old oligarchy, strengthened the aristocratic element by the manner of election to offices of state, and introduced a democratic element by the judical system. It was the later demagogues who reduced the Solonian Constitution to the democracy we know. Of some half-dozen other legislators the names and a brief note are sufficient record.

II—OF CITIZENSHIP, GOVERNMENT AND KINGSHIP

THE virtue of a citizen as such differs from that of a good man as such in being specifically relative to the polity; hence it is not uniform, but varies as the polity varies. The virtue of a ruler is the virtue of a good man, combining moral virtue with what we name 'prudence' in the Ethics. But the citizen who is not a ruler does not, as such, require prudence. The citizen should, no doubt, have the capacity both for rule and for subjection—the subjection of a free man, not of a slave; but the virtues in the two spheres differ.

We classify politics as the seat of government is in one person, in few, or in the masses. The normal forms, which aim at the good of the community, are called kingship, aristocracy (the rule of the best) and constitutional government; the abnormal deviations which seek the benefit of the rulers, are called tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. Of these last the second means the domination of the rich over the poor, the third the domination of the poor over the rich. In one sense equality is just; in another, inequality; the democrat recognizes the first, but not the second; the oligarch the second, but not the first. Superior wealth does not constitute fundamental superiority; nor equality in freedom, as the others think, equality in all respects. It is by virtue that the distribution of political power should be regulated.

As to which is superior, the few or the many, there is force in the view that the many collectively strike a sounder average judgement than the few; and their collective interests are the more extensive. The masses should not be indiscriminately admitted to office, but should collectively choose the officers.

There are several qualities which go to good administration; superiority in one quality or another, such as birth or wealth, must not be assumed to involve superiority in the rest and treated as the sole criterion of inequality. The pre-eminence of a class in one of these qualities does not confer the right to rule; and, in the aggregate, the masses collectively seem to have the pre-eminence over any class.

The Greek kingship exemplified in Sparta is not a despotism, but supreme and permanent military command. The essential difference of tyranny is that the forces at command are mercenary, while the king's forces are armed subjects. Beside these stand the non-Greek forms of monarchy, which would be tyrannies if they were not hereditary, and the Aesymnetes, the elective tyranny, which would be kingship but that it is not hereditary. The kings of the heroic period, with larger powers than the Spartan, made those powers—acquired by personal prowess—hereditary; but they were gradually curtailed. Historically, aristocracy displaced monarchy; oligarchy aristocracy; tyranny the oligarchies, and democracy the tyrannies. Finally, there is the absolute monarch.

The vital objection to absolutism is that, besides being non-natural, the individual is arbitrary and corruptible, and the law is not. It may be held that even discretion in dealing with the law may be more safely vested in several persons than in one.

III—THE REQUIREMENTS OF A STATE

THE ideal polity is bound up with the ideal of individual life; and we have ascertained that individual happiness lies not in external goods but in the exercise of virtue. Further, the virtues, and therefore the happiness, of the state, are identical with those of the individual. Is it desirable for the individual that he should participate in affairs of state? Or for the state that all individuals should participate in its affairs? Mere desire of the individual or of the state to lord it over others is not right, though this is a common view. To accept responsibility for a due share in guiding and controlling others is quite distinct from this, and involves a corresponding readiness to accept control and guidance.

For the state, as for the individual, adequate external conditions are needed. Mere magnitude is not an advantage. A degree of magnitude is essential, as without it the state cannot be self-sufficing and independent; the limit is, that it must not be too big for all the citizens to have personal knowledge of each other, and to be gathered in a single controllable assembly.

As to situation, it requires communication with the sea, both for strategical and commercial reasons; but not so that the foreign element, which is found in all ports, may affect the citizens injuriously. The Greeks are happily situated in such a position as to develop both enterprise and intellectuality; whereas the Asiatics are intellectual but not enterprising, and the European barbarians enterprising but not intellectual. The union of the Greeks in one polity might secure them universal dominion.

Now, it is indispensable that the state should produce food, requiring husbandmen, provide mechanical arts, requiring mechanics, an army,

a propertied class, a government, a judical body and a priesthood.

The non-citizens alone will not be allowed to hold property. The distinction between citizens and non-citizens is permanent; between classes of citizens only temporary, though there is something to be said for the caste system. There is also benefit in common meals maintained by the state; but property should not be in common. Land should be in part public, and in part private; and the actual cultivators a servile population.

The situation of the city should be healthy and strategically adapted for defence, and it should be properly fortified; the details of arrangement for common meals and public buildings should accord with the convenience of the classes of citizens in the discharge of their public duties, and so with the extra-mural public buildings.

The external circumstances which condition happiness must be assumed. Given these, happiness lies in the habit of virtuous activity, attainable by natural disposition, habituation and reason. The application of these two is the business of education.

For obvious reasons education begins with care of the body, proceeds with the non-rational part of the soul, and works up to the rational Legislation should begin by regulating marriage, so as to ensure that the parents are physically fit. Cripples, if born, ought not to be reared.

Should education be on a fixed system? Conducted privately, or by the state? And what should the character of the system be?

Clearly, to the state the formation in its citizens of the character appropriate to the polity is of the highest importance. It should be a state affair, not controlled by private caprices. But the best methods are very disputable. Should useful pursuits, or moral training, or intellectual development be aimed at? Such useful pursuits as are not cramping to mind and morals may be taught. Reading, writing, design, gymnastic and music are the recognized curriculum; the first four on utilitarian grounds, the last apparently as a training in the right use of leisure, as distinct from strictly recreative amusement. Moreover, the aforesaid utilitarian subjects have ends other than utilitarian.

First comes gymnastic, which is apt to be mistakenly conducted on brutalising lines. Brutality does not imply valour.

Music is, in the first place, an amusement both recreative and pleasurable; also, it has a direct moral influence. For children the acquisition of musical skill is beneficial, as well as merely learning to appreciate music by listening to it; but not with instruments which tend to make them mechanical or check their progress in other ways. Moreover, only harmonies which have an ethical character should be admitted into education.

IV—OLIGARCHY, DEMOCRACY AND DESPOTISM

The study of political science demands examination of the polity ideally best; of the best practicable for a particular state; of the best practicable for the generality of states; and of the best attainable under certain hypothetical conditions. Government by the best, whether one or more—the ideal—we have discussed. There remain the varieties of oligarchy and democracy, which are many, and tyranny.

All variations are due to the differences of the parties or classes in the state. Popularly, they are grouped in two sets—democracy, including constitutional government; and oligarchy, including aristocracy. The former involves the domination of a poor majority over a rich minority, the latter of a rich minority over a poor majority. The classes are the agricultural, the mechanical, the trading, and the workers for hire; then the military, the priestly, the propertied, the executive, the deliberative and the judical. The personnel of these divisions may overlap.

In theory, the root principle of democracy is equality. A low property qualification for those admitted to equality, *i.e.* to office, is characteristic of some forms of democracy; the most vital differentiation is between those where the law is supreme, and those where it is at the mercy of a popular decree—for which the demagogues are responsible. This last cannot be recognized as a constitutional form of government at all.

A high property qualification produces an oligarchy—the domination of the wealthy minority. A variation places nomination to office in the hands of the executive; another makes office hereditary; and in a fourth, the executive overrides the law. Custom, however, may make what is in form democratic actually oligarchical; and *vice versa*.

In democracies, for the most part, practical considerations limit the candidature though not eligibility for office. In oligarchies, where virtue is a factor, the name of aristocracy is popularly misapplied to them.

Constitutional rule is really a fusion of democracy and oligarchy. It fixes a triple criterion for equality—of freedom, of wealth and of virtue. It approximates to aristocracy. It combines counteracting characteristics from oligarchy and democracy; or strikes a mean between them. Hence, according to the point of view, it is sometimes called one sometimes the other.

Of tyranny, or despotism, we noted two semi-regal kinds, the oriental and the elective or aesymnetic. Besides these there is the tyranny absolute.

In any state, individuals who are too richly endowed tend to wax arrogant; those at the other extreme tend to knavery. The best chance for constitutionalism is in the state where the largest body is intermediate; otherwise the relation between rulers and ruled becomes that of masters and slaves. A decently satisfied large middle class is a guarantee of order; where it is weak, oligarchy or democracy prevails.

Oligarchies employ misleading artifices—penalising the wealthy, but for failure to bear their share in the practices of public life whereby the oligarchical power is maintained. Similarly democracies proceed by offering the poor inducements to take their corresponding share in public life. Under a constitution, the two

methods should be combined, keeping both poor and rich up to the mark; and citizenship and carrying heavy armour should go together. The only rule as to property qualification is that it should be low enough to admit a majority.

The original constitutional governments, historically speaking, admitted only men who could mount themselves; then those who could bear arms as heavy infantry.

Every state has three departments—deliberative, executive, judicial. The first controls war and peace, and elections, as well as legislation. In a democracy, the whole body of citizens performs the whole deliberative function, or delegates fragments of it. As the exercise of that function is limited by high property qualification or otherwise, an oligarchy more or less pronounced is established. The power of veto, but not that of positive enactment, should be vested in the masses.

Executive office should mean offices involving independent deliberation, decision, and especially command. In a small state several of the necessary duties may be concentrated in the hands of one official. Offices, and especially official boards, appropriate to one form of polity are not necessarily appropriate to another. Thus, a preliminary council which submits the measures to the deliberative council is essentially oligarchic.

In the case of the judicial body, there is the question of limiting fields of jurisdiction to several courts; from the discussion whereof we gather information as to the diversities of procedure in the Greek states.

Democracies vary as the populations are husbandmen, mechanics, or hired labourers, or combinations, their institutions varying correspondingly. Their common principle is liberty in the senses of (*a*) personal liberty; and (*b*) sharing in the government—which involves alternating between ruling and being ruled, everyone being eligible and everyone an elector; appointments by lot; non-recurrence of tenure; and other corollaries.

Equality of heads and numerical control make the root theory. Thus, democracy finds justice in the decision of the arithmetical majority, oligarchy finds it in that of the wealthy. One would potentially prove wholesale spoliation just, the other tyranny (if there were one supremely wealthy individual). Whereas if rich and poor are antagonistic, justice would really hold the scales between them.

The best democratic population is agricultural or pastoral; being less degraded than mechanics, tradesmen, or hired labourers; and also having more difficulty in participating actively in public affairs. The most fatal form is where there is manhood suffrage. For the continuity of democracy, the wealthy must be reconciled to it by release from public services in consideration of cash, which will be used to relieve the burdens of the poor and keep them from schemes of spoliation. The rich also should be protected against wanton persecutions.

Oligarchy is nearest to constitutional government when most offices are open. As these are more and more restricted to the wealthy, it approximates to tyranny. An oligarchy should not be too exclusive in the admission of new members.

The executive, or officers of state, consist of the council which controls legislation, military-commanders and the civil service generally; officers and teachers of religion and priests; and also sundry special officials to be found in particular localities.

V—CAUSES OF REVOLUTION IN POLITIES

Revolutions arise from inequalities, numerical or qualitative—from a numerical mass claiming an equality denied them, or from a minority claiming a superiority denied them. A revolution may result either in a complete change of polity, or only in a modification of the existing one. An oligarchy is less permanent than a democracy, owing to factions within the oligarchical body.

In all revolutions, the condition which leads up to them is the desire of the many for equality, and the desire of the minority for effective superiority. The purposes with which they are set on foot are profit, honour, or avoidance of loss or dishonour. The inciting occasions are many; jealousy of those who have wealth and honour, official arrogance, fear of the law or of its abuse, personal rivalries, failure of the middle class to maintain a balance, race antagonisms, antagonism of localities, and others.

In democracies, revolutions are due mainly to demagogic attacks on wealth, leading the wealthy to combine, and they result in the establishment of an oligarchy or of a tyranny, a 'popular' military chief seizing the power for himself; or sometimes in replacing a moderate by an extreme democracy.

In oligarchies they spring from the oppressive conduct of the oligarchy, or from dissensions among the oligarchical body—*e.g.* exclusion of those who think themselves entitled to membership; attraction of the rôle of demagogue for individual members of the oligarchy; employment of mercenary troops, whose captain seizes power.

In aristocracies they arise from the jealousy of those excluded from power, personal ambitions, great inequality of wealth. In these, and in constitutional governments—the most stable of all—the main cause is the incomplete fusion of the three criteria, wealth, numbers and merit. The comparative stability of constitutions comes from the greater relative weight of numbers. They are, however, more liable to be revolutionised by external pressure. Equality in proportion to merit and security of rights are the true conditions of permanence.

For the preservation of polities, minor illegalities must be particularly guarded against: in oligarchies, personal rivalries, abuse of power by individuals (making short tenures of office advisable), insolence of privilege, tricks to deceive the masses; in oligarchies and constitutional states, excessive concentration of power in individuals or classes; oppression of the wealthy minority in democracies, and of the poor majority in oligarchies.

Of monarchy, the two types are the regal and the tyrannic. The king is the protector of the wealthy against spoliation, of the poor

against arrogance. His own or his family's virtues or services have given him the kingship; his aim is excellence, and his authority is maintained by a citizen bodyguard. The tyrant is not a protector; his aim is his personal gratification.

Under monarchies, injustice and arrogance are the causes of insurrection, or fear, or contempt for incompetence, coupled with ambition. Tyrannies are overthrown by collision with external forces, or by private intrigues in the tyrant's entourage, and generally in the same sort of way as extreme oligarchies or extreme democracies. Kingships are endangered by intrigues in the royal family, by the king's personal incompetence, or by his developing tyrannical attributes. Hereditary monarchies are in particular danger from incompetents succeeding. But in a complex society, kingship proper is all but impossible.

A kingship is maintained by the royal self-restraint. The tyrant relies on the material and moral degradation, incapacity and lack of mutual confidence among his subjects, which he fosters by espionage, executions, taxation and the encouragement of licence. Occasionally, the tyrant will seek to secure his position by playing the part and assuming the attributes of a king proper. The shrewd tyrant sees to it that he has the favour of the rich or of the poor.

Neither tyrannies nor oligarchies have proved long-lived.

Discourses and Encheiridion

EPICTETUS

THE Stoic philosopher Epictetus, born at Hierapolis, in Phrygia, about A.D. 50, was at first a slave at Rome, and on being freed devoted himself to philosophy. He lived and taught at Nicopolis in Epirus from about A.D. 90 to A.D. 138. He left no works, but his utterances were collected in four books of Discourses or Dissertations by his pupil and friend Arrian. In the Encheiridion Epictete—a Handbook to Epictetus compiled and condensed from the Discourses—Arrian gives the most authentic account of the philosophy of the Greek and Roman Stoics. The Discourses and Encheiridion of Epictetus have both been drawn upon in the following selections.

I—OF THE WILL AND OF GOD

THE reasoning faculty alone considers both itself and all other powers, and judges of the appearance of things. And, as was fit, this most excellent and superior faculty, the faculty of a right use of the appearances of things, is that alone which the gods have placed in our own power, while all the other matters they have placed not in our power. Was it because they would not? I rather think that if they could, they had granted us these, too; but they certainly could not. For, placed upon earth, and confined to such a body and such companions, how was it possible that we should not be hindered by things without us?

But what says Jupiter? 'O Epictetus, if it were possible, I had made this little body and possession of thine free, and not liable to hindrance. But now do not mistake: it is not thine own, but only a finer mixture of clay. Since, then, I could not give thee this, I have given thee a certain portion of myself—this faculty of exerting the powers of pursuit and avoidance, of desire and aversion and, in a word, the use of the appearances of things. Taking care of this point, and making what is thy own to consist in this, thou wilt never be restrained, never be hindered; thou wilt not groan, wilt not complain, wilt not flatter anyone. How then! Do all these advantages seem small to thee? Let them suffice, and thank the gods.'

But now, when it is in our power to take care of one thing, and apply ourselves to it, we choose rather to encumber ourselves with many—body, property, brother, friend, child, slave—and thus we are burdened and weighed down. When the weather happens not to be fair for sailing, we sit screwing ourselves and perpetually looking out for the way of the wind.

What then is to be done?

To make the best of what is in our power, and take the rest as it naturally happens.

And how is that?

As it pleases God.

To a reasonable creature, that alone is unsupportable which is unreasonable; everything reasonable may be supported. When Vespasian had sent to forbid Priscus Helvidius going to the senate, he said, "It is in your power to prevent my continuing a senator, but while I am one I must go."

"Well, then, at least be silent there."

"Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent."

"But I must ask it."

"And I must speak what appears to me to be right."

"But if you do I will put you to death."

"Did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You will do your part, and I mine; it is yours to kill, and mine to die intrepid; yours to banish me, mine to depart untroubled."

What good, then, did Priscus do, who was but a single person? Why, what good does the purple do to the garment? What but the being a shining character in himself, and setting a good example to others? Another, perhaps, if in such circumstances Caesar had forbidden his going to the senate, would have said, 'I am obliged to you for excusing me.' But such a one Caesar would not have forbidden, well knowing that he would either sit like a statue, or, if he spoke, would say what he knew to be agreeable to Caesar.

Only consider at what price you sell your own will and choice, man—if for nothing else, that you may not sell it for a trifle.

If a person could be persuaded, as he ought, of this principle, that we are all originally descended from God, and that He is the Father of gods and men, I conceive he never would think meanly or degenerately concerning himself. Suppose Caesar were to adopt you, there would be no bearing your haughty looks. Will you not be elated on knowing yourself to be the son of Jupiter, of God Himself? Yet, in fact, we are not elated; but having two things in our composition, intimately united, a body in common with the brutes, and reason and sentiment in common with the gods, many of us incline to this unhappy and mortal kindred, and only some few to the divine and happy one.

By means of this animal kindred some of us, deviating towards it, become like wolves, faithless and insidious and mischievous; others like lions, wild and savage and untamed; but most of us like foxes, wretches even among brutes. For what else is a slanderous and ill-natured man than a fox, or something still more wretched and mean?

To Triptolemus all men have raised temples and altars, because he gave us a milder kind of food; but to Him who has discovered and communicated to all the truth, the means not of living but of living well, who ever raised an altar or built a statue?

If what philosophers say of the kindred between God and man be true, what has anyone to do but, like Socrates, when he is asked what countryman he is, never to say that he is a citizen of Athens, or of Corinth, but of the world? Why may not he who has learnt that from God the seeds of being are descended, not only to my father or grandfather, but to all things that are produced and born on the earth—and especially to rational natures, as they alone are qualified to partake of a communication with the Deity, being connected with Him by reason—why may not such a one call himself a citizen of the world? Why not a son of God? And why shall he fear anything that happens among men? Shall kindred to Caesar enable a man to live secure, above contempt and fear; and shall not the having God for our Maker and Father and Guardian free us from griefs and terrors?

II—THE CITIZEN OF THE WORLD AND HIS HIGH CALLING

You are a distinct portion of the essence of God, and contain a certain part of Him in yourself. Why do not you consider whence you came? You carry a god about with you, wretch, and know nothing of it. Do you suppose I mean some god without you, of gold or silver? It is within yourself you carry Him, and profane Him, without being sensible of it, by impure thoughts and unclean actions. If even the image of God were present, you would not dare to act so; when God Himself is within you, and hears and sees all, are not you ashamed to think and act thus, insensible of your own nature and hateful to God?

You are a citizen of the world, and a part of it; not a subservient, but a principal part. You are capable of comprehending the divine economy and of considering the connexions of things. What then, does the character of a citizen promise? To hold no private interest, to deliberate of nothing as a separate individual but like the hand or the foot, which, if they had reason, and comprehended the constitution of nature, would never pursue, or desire, but with a reference to the whole.

'Ah, when shall I see Athens and the citadel again?'

Wretch, are not you contented with what you see every day? Can you see anything better than the sun, the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the sea? If, besides, you comprehend Him who administers the whole, and carry Him about in yourself, do you still long after pebbles and a fine rock?

Boldly make a desperate push, man, for prosperity, for freedom, for magnanimity. Lift up your head at last as free from slavery. Dare to look up to God, and say, 'Make use of me for the future as Thou wilt. I am of the same mind; I am equal with Thee. I refuse nothing which seems good to Thee. Lead me whither Thou wilt. Clothe me in whatever dress Thou wilt. Is it Thy will that I should be in a public or a private condition, dwell here or be banished, be poor or rich? Under all these circumstances I will make Thy defence to men. I will show what the nature of everything is.' No, rather sit alone in a warm place, and wait till your nurse comes to feed you. If Hercules had sat loitering at home, what would he have been? You are not Hercules, to extirpate the evils of others. Extirpate your own, then. Expel grief, fear, desire, envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance, from your mind.

But these can be no otherwise expelled than by looking up to God alone as your pattern and being consecrated to His commands. If you wish for anything else, you will, with sighs and groans, follow what is stronger than you, always seeking prosperity without, and never finding it. For you seek it where it is not, and neglect to seek it where it is.

III—OF SURRENDER TO THE WILL OF GOD

Have I ever been restrained from what I willed? Or compelled against my will? How is this possible? I have arranged my pursuits under the direction of God. Is it His will that I should have a fever? It is my will too. Is it His will that I should pursue anything? It is my will too. Is it His will that I should desire? It is my will too. Is it His will that I should obtain anything? It is mine too. Is it not His will? It is not mine. Is it His will that I should be tortured? Then it is my will to be tortured. Is it His will that I should die? Then it is my will to die.

He has given me whatever depends upon choice. The things in my power He has made incapable of hindrance or restraint. But how could He make a body of clay incapable of hindrance? Therefore He hath subjected my body, possessions, furniture, house, children, wife, to the revolution of the universe. He who gave takes away. For whence had I these things when I came into the world?

'But I would enjoy the feast still longer.' So perhaps would the spectators at Olympia see more combatants. But the solemnity is over. Go away. Depart like a grateful and modest person; make room for others.

Do not you know that sickness and death must overtake us? At what employment? The husbandman at his plough; the sailor on his voyage. At what employment would you be taken? At what employment ought you to be taken? If there is any better employment at which you can be taken, follow that.

For my own part, I would be engaged in nothing but the care of my own faculty of choice, how to render it undisturbed, unrestrained, uncompelled, free. I would be found studying this, that I may be able to say to God, 'Have I transgressed Thy commands? Have I perverted the powers, the senses, the preconceptions which Thou hast given me? Have I ever accused Thee or censured Thy dispensations? I have been sick because it was Thy pleasure. I have been poor, with joy. I have not been in power, because it was not Thy will, and power I have never desired. Have I not always approached Thee cheerfully, prepared to execute Thy commands? Is it Thy pleasure that I depart from this assembly? I depart. I give Thee thanks that Thou hast thought me worthy to have a share in it with Thee; to behold Thy works, and to join with Thee in comprehending Thy administration.'

Let death overtake me while I am thinking, writing, reading such things as these. Of things, some are in our power, others not. In our power are opinion, pursuit, desire, accession; in a word, whatever are our own actions. Not in our power are body, property, reputation, command; in a word, whatever are not our own actions.

Now, the things in our power are free, unrestrained, unhindered, while those not in our power are weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others. Remember, then, that if you suppose these latter things free, and what belongs to others your own, you will be hindered; you will lament; you will be disturbed; you will find fault with both gods and men. But if you regard that only as your own which is your own, and what is others' as theirs, no one will ever compel you; no one will restrain you; you will find fault with no one; you will accuse no one; you will do nothing against your will; you will have no enemy and will suffer no harm.

Aiming, therefore, at great things, remember that you must not allow yourself to be carried out of your course, however slightly.

Study to be able to say to every hostile appearance, 'You are but an appearance, and not the thing you appear to be.' Then examine it by your rules, and first and chiefly by this: whether it concerns the things in your own power or those which are not. And if it concerns anything not in your own power, be prepared to say it is nothing to you.

With regard to whatever objects either delight the mind, or contribute to use, or are loved with fondness, remember to tell yourself of what nature they are, beginning from the most trifling things. If you are fond of an earthen cup, remind yourself it is an earthen cup of which you are fond; thus, if it be broken, you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child, or your wife, remember you kiss a being subject to the accidents of humanity; thus you will not be disturbed if either die.

MEN are disturbed, not by things, but by their own notions regarding them.

Be not elated over excellences not your own. If a horse should be elated and say, 'I am handsome,' it would be supportable. But when you are elated and say, 'I have a handsome horse,' you are elated on what is, in fact, only the good of the horse.

Require not things to happen as you wish, but wish them to happen as they do happen. Then all will go well.

In every happening, inquire of your mind how to turn it to proper account.

Never say of anything, 'I have lost it,' but 'I have restored it.' Is your child dead? It is restored. Is your wife dead? She is restored. Is your estate taken away from you? Well, and is not that likewise restored? 'But he who took it away is a bad man.' What is it to you by whose hands He who gave it hath demanded it again? While He gives you to possess it, take care of it, but as of something not your own, like a passenger in an inn.

IV—OF TRANQUILLITY AND THE MEANS THERETO

IF you would improve, lay aside such reasonings as prevent tranquillity. It is better to die with hunger, exempt from grief and fear, than to live in affluence with perturbation. It is better your servant should be bad than you unhappy. Is a little oil spilt? A little wine stolen? Say to yourself, 'This is the purchase paid for peace, for tranquillity, and nothing is to be had for nothing.' When you call your servant, consider it possible he may not come at your call; or if he doth, that he may not do what you would have him do. He is not of such importance that it should be in his power to disturb you.

Be content to be thought foolish and stupid with regard to externals and unessentials. Do not wish to be thought to know. And though you appear to others to be somebody, distrust yourself. For be assured it is not easy at once to preserve your faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature and to secure externals, since while you are careful of the one you will neglect the other.

Behave in life as at an entertainment. Is anything brought round to you? Put out your hand and take your share, with moderation. Doth it pass by you? Do not stop it. Is it not yet come? Do not stretch forth your desire towards it, but wait till it reaches you. Thus do with regard to children, to a wife, to public posts, to riches, and you will be, some time or other, a worthy partner of the feasts of the gods. And if you do not so much as take the things set before you, but are able even to despise them, then you will not only be a partner of the gods' feasts, but of their empire.

Remember that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the Author pleases to make it. If short, of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it be His pleasure you should act a poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally. For this is your

business to act well the character assigned you; to choose it is another's.

To me all the portents are lucky, if I will. For whatever happens, it is in my power to derive advantage from it.

Remember that not he who gives ill language or a blow affronts, but the principle which represents these things as affronting. When, therefore, anyone provokes you, be assured that it is your own opinion which provokes you. Try first not to be hurried away with the appearance. For if you once gain time and respite you will more easily command yourself.

BE assured that the essential property of piety towards the gods is to form right opinions concerning them as existing and as governing the universe with goodness and justice. Fix yourself in the resolution to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them in all events, as produced by the most perfect understanding. Thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse them of neglecting you.

And it is not possible for this to be effected any other way than by withdrawing yourself from things not in your own power and placing good or evil in those only which are. For if you suppose any of the things not in your own power to be either good or evil, when you are disappointed at what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you must necessarily find fault with and blame the authors.

Be for the most part silent, or speak merely what is necessary. We may sparingly enter into discourse when occasion calls for it, but not on vulgar topics of gladiators, horse-races, feasts and so on; above all, not of men, so as either to blame, praise, or make comparisons.

If anyone tells you such a person speaks ill of you, make no excuses, but answer, 'He does not know my other faults, or he would not have mentioned only these.'

When you do anything from a clear judgement that it ought to be done, never shun the being seen to do it, even though the world should make a wrong supposition about it. For if you do not act right, shun the action itself; and if you do, why be afraid of mistaken censure?

When any person does ill by you, or speaks ill of you, remember that he acts or speaks from a supposition of its being his duty. Now, it is not possible that he should follow what appears right to you, but what appears so to himself. Therefore, if he misjudges, he is the person hurt, for he is the one deceived. Meekly bear, then, a person who reviles you, for you will say upon every occasion. 'It seemed so to him.'

The condition and characteristic of a vulgar person is that he never expects either benefit or hurt from himself, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is that he expects all hurt and benefit from himself. The marks of a proficient are that he censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, accuses no one, says nothing concerning himself as being anybody or knowing anything; when he is hindered or restrained, he accuses himself; when praised, he secretly laughs; if censured, he makes no defence. He suppresses all desire; transfers his aversion to things only which thwart the proper use of his own will; is gentle in all exercise of his powers; and does not care if he appears stupid or ignorant, but watches himself as an enemy.

WHATEVER rules of life you have deliberately proposed to yourself, abide by them as laws; and let whatever appears to you to be the best be to you an inviolable law. Socrates became perfect, improving himself in everything by attending to reason only. And though you be not yet a Socrates, live as one who would become a Socrates.

Upon all occasions we ought to have ready at hand these three maxims:

Conduct me, God, and thou, O Destiny,
Wherever your decrees have fixed my station.
I follow cheerfully. And did I not,
Wicked and wretched, I must follow still.

Whoe'er yields properly to Fate is deemed
Wise among men and knows the law of heaven.

'O Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be. Anytus and Melitus may kill me indeed, but hurt my soul they cannot.'

Meditations

MARCUS AELIUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS

THIS book, which Marcus Aurelius called his Self-Communings, consists of reflections jotted down by the emperor at odd moments. His world produced no other book which, like his, remains as an unfailing companion to every generation of the modern age. The charm of these fragmentary meditations depends greatly on their engaging candour and also on its writer's iron stoicism, but chiefly on the admirable and lovable human character which is consistently reflected in these pages.

I—THE CULTIVATION OF A PHILOSOPHICAL MIND

THE example of my grandfather Verus taught me to be candid and to control my temper.

By the memory of my father's character I learnt to be modest and manly. My mother taught me regard for religion, to be generous and open-handed, and neither to do an ill turn to anyone nor even to think of it. She bred me also to a plain and inexpensive way of living.

I owe it to my grandfather that I had not a public education, but had good masters at home. From my tutor I learnt not to identify myself with popular sporting interests, but to work hard, endure fatigue, and not to meddle with other people's affairs. Diognetus taught me to bear freedom and plain dealing in others, and gave me a taste for philosophy. Rusticus first set me to improve my character, and

prevented me from running after the vanity of the Sophists.

Apollonius showed me how to give my mind its due freedom, to disregard everything that was not true and reasonable and to maintain an equable temper under the most trying circumstances. Sextus taught me good humour, to be obliging and to bear with the ignorant and thoughtless. From Maximus I learnt to command myself and to put through business efficiently, without drudging or complaint.

From my adoptive father I learnt a smooth and inoffensive temper and a greatness proof against vanity and the impressions of pomp and power; I learnt that it was the part of a prince to check flattery, to have his exchequer well furnished, to be frugal in his expenses, not to worship the gods to superstition, but to be reserved, vigilant and well poised.

I thank the gods that my grandfathers, parents, sister, preceptors, relatives, friends and domestics were almost all persons of probity and that I never happened to disoblige any of them. By the goodness of the gods I was not provoked to expose my infirmities. I owe it to them also that my wife is so deferential, affectionate and frugal; and that when I had a mind to look into philosophy I did not spend too much time in reading or logic-chopping. All these points could never have been guarded without a protection from above.

II—PHILOSOPHY, THE MIND'S GREATEST SOLACE

PUT yourself in mind, every morning, that before that night you will meet with some meddlesome, ungrateful and abusive fellow, with some envious or unsociable churl. Remember that their perversity proceeds from ignorance of good and evil; and that since it has fallen to my share to understand the natural beauty of a good action and the deformity of an ill one; since I am satisfied that the disobliging person is of kin to me, our minds being both extracted from the Deity; since no man can do me a real injury because no man can force me to misbehave myself; I cannot therefore hate or be angry with one of my own nature and family. For we are all made for mutual assistance, no less than the parts of the body are for the service of the whole; whence it follows that clashing and opposition are utterly unnatural.

This being of mine consists of body, breath and that part which governs. Put away your books and face the matter itself. As for your body, value it no more than if you were just expiring; it is nothing but a little blood and bones. Your breath is but a little air pumped in and out. But the third part is your mind. Here make a stand. Consider that you are an old man, and do not let this noble part of you languish in slavery any longer. Let it not be overborne with selfish passions; let it not quarrel with fate, or be uneasy at the present, or afraid of the future. Providence shines clearly through the work of the gods. Let these reflections satisfy you, and make them your rule to live by. As for books, cease to be eager for them, that you may die in good humour heartily thanking the gods for what you have had.

Remember that you are a man and a Roman, and let your actions be done with dignity, gravity, humanity, freedom and justice; let every action be done as though it were your last. Have neither insincerity nor self-love. Man has to gain but few points in order to live a happy and godlike life.

And what, after all, is there to be afraid of in death? If the gods exist, you can suffer no harm; and if they do not exist, or take no care of us mortals, a world without gods or Providence is not worth a man's while to live in. But the being of the gods, and their concern in human affairs, is beyond dispute; and they have put it in every man's power not to fall into any calamity properly so called.

Living and dying, honour and infamy, pleasure and pain, riches and poverty—all these are common to the virtuous and the depraved, and are therefore intrinsically neither good nor evil. We live but for a moment; our being is in a perpetual flux, our faculties are dim, our bodies tend ever to corruption; the soul is an eddy, fortune is not to be guessed at and posthumous fame is oblivion. To what, then, may we trust? Why, to nothing but philosophy. This is, to keep the interior divinity from injury and disgrace, and superior to pleasure and pain, without any dissembling and pretence, and to acquiesce in one's appointed lot.

III—OF RESOLUTENESS FOR THAT WHICH IS BEST

OBSERVE that the least things and effects in nature are not without charm and beauty, as the little cracks in the crust of a loaf, though not intended by the baker, are agreeable and invite the appetite. Thus figs, when they are ripest, open and gape; and olives, when they are near decaying, are peculiarly attractive. The bending of an ear of corn, the frown of a lion, the foam of a boar, and many other like things, if you take them singly, are far from beautiful; but seen in their natural relations are characteristic and effective. So if a man have but inclination and thought to examine the product of the universe, he will find that the most unpromising appearances have their own appropriate charm.

Do not spend your thoughts upon other people, nor pry into the talk, fancies and projects of another, nor guess at what he is about, or why he is doing it. Think upon nothing but what you could willingly tell about, so that if your soul were laid open there would appear nothing but what was sincere, good-natured and public-spirited. A man thus qualified is a sort of priest and minister of the gods, and makes a right use of the divinity within him. Be cheerful; depend not at all on foreign supports, nor beg your happiness of another; do not throw away your legs to stand upon crutches.

If, in the whole compass of human life, you find anything preferable to justice and truth, temperance and fortitude, or to a mind self-satisfied with its own rational conduct and entirely resigned to fate, then turn to it as to your supreme happiness. But if there be nothing more valuable than the divinity within you, if all things are trifles in comparison with this, then do not divide your allegiance. Let your choice run all one way, and be resolute for that which is best. As for other speculations, throw them once for all out of your head.

IV—OF LOYALTY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF WISDOM

It is the custom of people to go to unfrequented places and to the seashore and to the hills for retirement; and you yourself have often desired this solitude. But, after all, this is only a vulgar fancy, for it is in your power to withdraw into yourself whenever you have a mind to it. One's own heart is a place the most free from crowd and noise in the world if only one's thoughts are serene and the mind well ordered. Make, therefore, frequent use of this retirement, therein to refresh your virtue. And to this end be always provided with a few short, uncontested notions, to keep your understanding true. Do not forget to retire to this solitude of yours; let there be no straining or struggling in the matter, but move at ease.

If understanding be common to us all, then reason, its cause, must be common, too. And so also must the reason which governs conduct by commands and prohibitions be common to us all. Mankind is therefore under one common law and so are fellow-citizens; and the whole world is but one commonwealth, for there is no other society in which mankind can be incorporated.

Do not suppose that you are hurt, and your complaint will cease.

If a man affronts you, do not defer to his opinion, or think just as he would have you do. No; look upon things as reality presents them. When incense is thrown upon the altar, one grain usually falls before another; but it matters not.

Adhere to the principles of wisdom, and those who now take you for a monkey or a beast will make a god of you in a week.

A thing is neither better nor worse for being praised. Do virtues stand in need of a good word, or are they the worse for a bad one? An emerald will shine none the less though its worth be not spoken of.

Whatever is agreeable to You, O Universe, is so to me, too. Your operations are never mis-timed. Whatever Your seasons bring is fruit for me, O Nature. From You all things proceed, subsist in You, and return to You. The poet said, 'Dear City of Cecrops'; shall we not say, 'Dear City of God'?

The greater part of what we say and do is unnecessary; and if this were only retrenched we should have more leisure and less disturbance. This applies to our thoughts also, for impertinence of thought leads to unnecessary action.

Mankind are poor, transitory things; one day in life, and the next turned to ashes. Therefore manage this minute wisely and part with it cheerfully; and like a ripe fruit, when you drop, make your acknowledgments to the tree that bore you.

V—OF SINCERITY IN ACTIONS

When you feel unwilling to rise early in the morning, make this short speech to yourself: 'I am getting up now to do the business of a man; and am I out of humour for going about that I was made for, and for the sake of which I was sent into the world? Was I then designed for nothing but to doze beneath the counterpane?' Surely action is the end of your being. Look upon the plants and birds, the ants, spiders and bees, and you will see that they are all exerting their nature and busy in their station. Shall not a man act like a man?

Be not ashamed of any action which is in accordance with nature, and never be misled by the fear of censure or reproach. Where honesty prompts you to say or do anything, let not the opinion of others hold you back. Go straight forward, pursuing your own and the common interest.

Some men, when they do you a kindness, ask for the payment of gratitude; others, more modest, remember the favour and look upon you as their debtor. But there are yet other benefactors who forget their good deeds; and these are like the vine, which is satisfied by being fruitful in its kind and bears a bunch of grapes without expecting any thanks for it. A truly kind man never talks of a good turn that he has done, but does another as soon as he can, just like a vine that bears again the next season.

We commonly say that Aesculapius has prescribed riding for one patient, walking for another, a cold bath for a third. In the same way we may say that the nature of the universe has ordered this or that person a disease, loss of limbs or estate, or some such other calamity. For as, in the first case, the word 'prescribed' means a direction for the health of the patient, so, in the latter, it means an application suitable for his constitution and destiny.

Be not uneasy, discouraged or out of humour, because practice falls short of precept in some particulars. If you happen to be vanquished, come on again, and be glad if most of what you do is worthy of a man.

We ought to live with the gods. This is done by being contented with the appointment of providence and by obeying the orders of that divinity which is God's deputy; and this divine authority is no more or less than that soul and reason which every man carries within him.

VI—OF LIBERALITY IN OUTLOOK

The best way of revenge is not to imitate the injury. Be always doing something serviceable to mankind; and let this constant generosity be your pleasure, not forgetting a due regard to God.

The world is either an aggregation of atoms, or it is a unity ruled by law and providence. If the first, what should I stay for, where nature is a chaos and things are blindly jumbled together? But if there is a providence, I adore the great Governor of the world, and am at ease and cheerful in the prospect of protection.

Suppose you had a stepmother and a mother at the same time; though you would pay regard to the first, your converse would be principally with the latter. Let the court and philosophy represent these two relations to me.

If an antagonist in the circus tears our flesh with his nails, or tilts against us with his head, we do not cry out foul play, nor are we offended, nor do we suspect him afterwards as a dangerous

person. Let us act thus in the other instances of life. When we receive a blow, let us think that we are but at a trial of skill and depart without malice or ill will.

It is enough to do my duty; as for other things, I will not be disturbed about them.

The vast continents of Europe and of Asia are but corners of the creation; the ocean is but a drop, and Mount Athos but a grain in respect of the universe; and the present instant of time is but a point to the extent of eternity.

When you have a mind to divert your fancy, try to consider the good qualities of your acquaintance—such as the enterprising vigour of this man, the modesty of another, the liberality of a third, and so on. Let this practice be always at hand.

VII—OF PATIENCE AND TOLERATION

What is wickedness? It is nothing new. When you are in danger of being shocked, consider that the sight is nothing but what you have frequently seen already. All ages and histories towns and families, are full of the same stories; there is nothing new to be met with, but all things are common and quickly over.

Nature works up the matter of the universe like wax; now it is a horse; soon you will find it melted down and run into the figure of a tree, then a man, then something else. Only for a brief time is it fixed in any species.

Antisthenes said: 'It is the fate of princes to be ill spoken of for their good deeds.'

Consider the course of the stars as if you were driving through the sky and kept them company. Such contemplations as these scour off the rust contracted by conversing here below.

Rational creatures are designed for the advantage of each other. A sociable temper is that for which human nature was principally intended.

It is a saying of Plato's that no one misses the truth by his own goodwill. The same may be said of honesty, sobriety, good nature and the like. Remember this for it will help to sweeten your temper.

Though the gods are immortal, and have had their patience tried through so many ages, yet they even provide liberally for us. And are you tired with evil men already, who are an unhappy mortal yourself?

VIII—OF THE TRIPLE RESPONSIBILITY

Every man has three relations to acquit himself in; his body, God, and his neighbours.

Have you seen a hand or a foot cut off and removed from the body? Just such a thing is the man who is discontented with destiny or cuts himself off by selfishness from the interest of mankind. But here is the fortunate aspect of the case—it lies in his power to set the limb on again. Consider the peculiar bounty of God to man in this privilege: He has set him above the necessity of breaking off from nature and providence at all; but supposing this misfortune to have occurred, it is in man's power to rejoin the body, and grow together again.

Do not take your whole life into your head at a time, nor burden yourself with the weight of the future. Neither what is past nor what is to come need afflict you, for you have only to deal with the present; and this is strangely lessened if you take it singly and by itself. Chide your fancy, therefore, if it grow faint.

Throw me into what climate or state you please, for all that I will keep my soul content. Is any misadventure big enough to ruffle my peace, or to make my mind mean, craving and servile? What is there that can justify such disorders?

Be not heavy in business, nor disturbed in conversation, nor rambling in thought. Do not burden yourself with too much employment. Do men curse you? This cannot prevent you from keeping a wise, temperate and upright mind. If a man standing by a lovely spring should rail at it, the water is none the worse for his foul language; and if he throw in dirt it will soon disappear and the fountain will be as wholesome as ever. How are you to keep your springs always running, that they may never stagnate into a pool? You must persevere in in the virtues of freedom, sincerity, moderation and good nature.

IX—OF MODERATION IN DEED AND WISH

Do not drudge like a galley-slave, nor do business in a laborious manner, as if you wish to be pitied or wondered at.

As virtue and vice consist in action, and not in the impressions of the senses, so it is not what they feel, but what they do, that makes mankind happy or miserable.

This man prays that he may gain such a woman; but do you rather pray that you may have no such inclination. Another invokes the gods to set him free from some troublesome circumstance; but let it be your petition that your mind may not be set upon such a wish. A third is devout in order to prevent the loss of his son; but I would have you pray rather against the fear of losing him. Let this be the rule for your devotions, and watch the event.

X—OF SINCERITY AND ITS REWARDS

O my soul, are you ever to be rightly good, sincere and uniform, and made more visible to yourself than the body that hangs about you? Are you ever likely to relish good nature and general kindness as you ought? Will you ever be fully satisfied, rise above wanting and wishing, and never desire to obtain your pleasure out of anything foreign, either living or inanimate? Are you ever likely to be so happily qualified as to converse with the gods and men in such a manner as neither to complain of them nor to be condemned by them?

Put it out of the power of all men to give you a bad name, and if anyone reports you not to be an honest or a good man let your practice give him the lie. This is quite feasible ; for who can hinder you from being just and sincere ?

There is no one so happy in his family and friends but that some of them, when they see him going, will rejoice at a good riddance. Let him be a person of never so much probity and prudence, yet someone will say at his grave : 'Well, our man of order and gravity is gone ; we shall be no more troubled with his discipline.' This is the best treatment a good man must expect.

XI—OF CALMNESS UNDER ILL USAGE

WHAT a brave soul it is that is always ready to depart from the body and is unconcerned as to whether she will be extinguished, scattered, or removed ! But she must be prepared upon reasonable grounds, and not out of mere obstinacy like the Christians ; her fortitude must have nothing of noise or of tragic ostentation, but must be grave and seemly.

How fulsome and hollow does that man seem who cries : 'I'm resolved to deal sincerely with you ! ' Hark you, friend, what need of all this flourish ? Let your actions speak. Your face ought to vouch for you. I would have virtue look out of the eye no less apparently than love does. A man of integrity and good nature can never be concealed, for his character is wrought into his countenance.

Gentleness and good humour are invincible, provided they are of the right stamp and without hypocrisy. This is the way to disarm the most outrageous person—to continue kind and unmoved under ill usage and to strike in at the right opportunity with advice. But let all be done out of mere love and kindness.

XII—THE FORTITUDE THAT IS ROMAN

I HAVE often wondered how it is that everyone should love himself best and yet value his neighbour's opinion of him more than his own. If any man should be ordered to turn his inside outwards and publish every thought and fancy as fast as they came into his head, he would not submit to so much as a day of this discipline. Thus it is that we dread our neighbour's judgement more than our own.

What a mighty privilege man is born to, since it is in his power not to do anything but what God Almighty approves, and to be satisfied with all the distributions of providence !

Reflect upon those who have made the most glorious figure or have met with the greatest misfortunes. Where are they all now ? They are vanished like a little smoke ; they are nothing but ashes, and a tale—or not even a tale. Recollect likewise everything of this sort : what Fabius Catullinus did at his country seat ; Lucius Lupus, in his garden ; Stertinius, at Baiae ; Tiberius, at Capreae ; Rufus, at Velia : in short, the overweening importance attached to anything whatsoever. The prize is insignificant and the game not worth the candle. It is much more becoming to a philosopher to stand clear of affectation, to be honest and moderate upon all occasions and to follow cheerfully wherever the gods lead on, remembering that nothing is more scandalous than a man who is proud of his humility.

Listen, friend ! You have been a burgher of this great city. What matter though you have lived in it fewer years or more ? If you have kept the laws of the corporation, the length or shortness of the time makes no difference. Where is the hardship, then, if nature, that planted you here, orders your removal ? You cannot say you are sent off by an unjust tyrant. No ! You quit the stage as fairly as a player does who has his discharge from the master of the revels.

'But I have only gone through three acts, and not held out to the end of the fifth ! '

True ; but in life three acts may complete the play. He is the only judge of completeness who first ordered your entrance and now orders your exit ; you are accountable for neither the one nor the other. Retire, therefore, in serenity, as He who dismisses you is serene.

The Consolation of Philosophy

BOETHIUS

ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS was born at Rome about A.D. 474. Elected sole consul in 510, through false accusations he was deprived of his offices, imprisoned at D . . . . and finally executed in 525. Boethius is the last Latin writer of ability who thoroughly understood the Greek language and literature. His chief aim was to transplant Greek learning into the Roman dominion, and he published translations of and commentaries on the works of Aristotle, Pythagoras, Ptolemy, Euclid and Archimedes. His De Consolatione Philosophiae was produced in captivity, and on the strength of it Boethius ranked high as a philosopher until the end of the Middle Ages. King Alfred and Chaucer translated parts of the Consolation of Philosophy.

I—THE SORROWS OF BOETHIUS

I WHO knew happy days, sat brooding over the sorrows which have come on me in my old age, and I had written in sad verses some complainings over my misfortunes, when it seemed to me that there appeared above my head a woman of a countenance exceeding venerable. Her eyes were of fiery glow, her complexion was lively, her aspect was vigorous and she seemed plainly not of my time or age.

Her stature was difficult to judge, for at one moment it exceeded not the common height, at another her forehead seemed to strike the sky; and when she raised her head higher, she began to pierce the very heavens, and to baffle the eyes of those who looked upon her. Her garments were of an imperishable fabric. On the lowermost edge was interwoven the Greek letter Π, which stands for political life, the life of action. On the topmost edge was the letter Θ, standing for the theoretical life, the life of thought; and between the two were to be seen steps, like a staircase, from the lower to the upper letter. The robe, moreover, had been torn by the hands of violent persons, who had each snatched away what he could clutch. [The Stoic, Epicurean and other philosophical sects which Boethius regards as heterodox.]

When she saw the muses of poesie standing by my bed, dictating the words of my lamentations, she was moved to wrath, her eyes flashed sternly and she addressed to them such words of upbraiding that the whole band dolefully left the chamber. I, dumbfounded, silently awaited what she might do next. Then, drawing near my couch, she bewailed the disorder of my mind, but presently declared that the occasion called rather for healing than for lamentation; that the symptoms were of lethargy, the usual sickness of deluded souls. Then, with a fold of her robe, she dried my eyes all swimming with tears.

Even so the clouds of my melancholy were broken up. I saw the clear sky and regained the power to recognise the face of my physician. Lifting up my eyes I beheld my nurse, Philosophy, whose halls I had frequented from my youth up.

"Ah, why," I cried, "mistress of all excellence hast thou come down from on high and entered the solitude of this my exile? Is it that thou, even as I, mayst be persecuted with false accusations?"

"Could I desert thee, child," said she, "and not lighten the burden which thou hast taken upon thee through the hatred of my name, by sharing this trouble? Thinkest thou that now, for the first time in an evil age, Wisdom hath been assailed by peril? The stories of the fate of Socrates, of Anaxagoras, of Zeno, of Arrius, of Seneca, of Soranus are not unknown to thee. These men were brought to destruction for no other reason than that, settled as they were in my principles, their lives were a manifest contrast to the ways of the wicked. Dost thou understand, or art thou dull as an ass to the sound of my lyre? Why dost thou weep?"

Then I, gathering what strength I could, began, "Is there any need of telling? Is not the cruelty of fortune against me plain enough, and all because I have faithfully followed thy precepts? Thou has enjoined by Plato's mouth the maxim that states would be happy, either if philosophers ruled them, or if it should so befall that their rulers should turn philosophers. I have tried to apply in the business of public administration the principles I learnt from thee. For this cause I have become involved in bitter and irreconcilable feuds. By baulking Conigastus in his assaults on the weak, and by thwarting the vile schemes of Trigguilla, and by rescuing the consul Paulinus from the gaping jaws of the court bloodhounds, and by saving Albinus from the penalties of a prejudged charge, I have laid up for myself a great store of enmities. And now that by lying informers I have been struck down, what is thy counsel, O, my mistress?"

II—THE VANITY OF FORTUNE'S GIFTS

PHILOSOPHY, after an interval of silence, thus began.

"If I have thoroughly ascertained the pining with regretful longing for thy former fortune. But thou thinkest that the siren called Fortune hath changed her ways towards thee. But rather in her very mutability hath she preserved towards thee her true constancy. Thou hast found out how changeful is the face of the blind goddess. If thou likest her, take her as she is and do not complain. If thou abhorrest her perfidy, turn from her in disdain and renounce her!"

"Thine admonishings are true," said I. "But in adverse fortune the worst sting of misery assuredly is to have been happy."

"Well," said she, "if thou art paying the penalty of a mistaken belief, thou canst not rightly impute the fault to circumstances. Come, reckon up how rich thou art in thy blessings! Thy wife yet lives with her gentleness and virtue. Think of thy sons and their consular dignity. Think how many other men are lacking in such blessings as are preserved to thee. As for riches, what are they but mere gold and heaps of money? Money is only precious when it is given away, and it can only fall to one man's lot by the impoverishment of others. And as for rank and power, these have often fallen to the worst of men, and then did ever an Etna work such mischief?"

"Thou knowest," I answered, "that ambition for worldly success hath but little swayed me. Yet I have desired opportunity for action, lest virtue, in default of exercise, should languish away."

Then said she: "This is that last infirmity which is able to allure noble minds. But how poor and unsubstantial a thing is glory. The whole of this earth's globe is as compared with the expanse of heaven no bigger than a point, and of this insignificant world only a fourth part is inhabited by living creatures, and vast portions of that part are usurped by sea, marsh and desert, so that little space is left for human beings. And of this how narrow is the area for human fame! Why, in Cicero's days, the fame of the Roman Republic had not yet crossed the Caucasus. Can the fame of a single Roman penetrate where the glory of the Roman name fails to pass? Moreover, what concern have choice spirits—for it is of such men we speak, men who seek glory by virtue—what concern have these with fame after the dissolution of the body in death?"

III—TRUE HAPPINESS AND FALSE

FOR a little space Philosophy was silent, and then she thus began again.

"I would now lead thee to felicity. The supreme good which men seek is *happiness*; at this they aim in various ways. Some seek it through wealth. Now, wealth cannot make

its possessor independent and free from all want; yet this is what it seems to promise. Every day the stronger wrest it from the weaker without his consent. So the wealth which a man thought would make him independent, actually puts him in need of further protection.

"Other men imagine that they can secure felicity by means of rank, for official dignity clothes him to whom it comes with honour and reverence. Have, then, offices of state such power as to plant virtue in the minds of their possessors and to drive out vice? Nay, they are rather wont to signalise iniquity than to chase it away. Thus, Catullus calls Nonius 'an ulcer-spot,' though 'sitting in the curule chair.' And even where high office brings dignity, does their repute last? Why, the prefecture, which was once a great power, is now but an empty name—a burden merely on the senator's fortune. The commissioner of the public corn was once a personage—now what is more contemptible than this office?

"But you may ask, Boethius, if the happiness of kings does not last? Well, antiquity is full of examples, as are these days also, of kings whose happiness has turned to calamity. There must needs be a balance of wretchedness in the lot of a king. The tyrant Damocles, who had made trial of the perils of his condition, figured the fears that haunt a throne under the image of a sword hanging over a man's head."

"Indeed," said I, "I see clearly enough that neither is independence to be found in wealth, not power in sovereignty, nor reverence in dignities, nor true joy in pleasures."

"Having set forth the form of false happiness, the next step is to show what true happiness is," said she. "That which is simple and indivisible by nature, human error separates, and transforms from the true and perfect to the false and imperfect. Happiness must not be sought in these things which severally are believed to afford only some of the blessings most to be desired. That is the true and perfect happiness which crowns one with the union of independence, power, reverence, renown and joy. It now remains that thou shouldst learn from what source this true happiness is to be sought. Since, as Plato maintains in the Timaeus, we ought, even in the most trivial matters, to implore the divine protection, what thinkest thou should we now do in order to deserve to find the seat of that highest good?"

"We must invoke the Father of all," said I, "for without this no enterprise sets out from a right beginning."

"Thou sayest well," said she. "Next, to consider where the dwelling-place of this happiness may be. The common belief of all mankind agrees that God, the supreme of all things, is good. Wherefore, lest we fall into an infinite regression, we must acknowledge the supreme God to be full of supreme and perfect good. But we have determined that true happiness is the perfect good; therefore, true happiness must dwell in the supreme Deity. Remember this, that the good is the sum and source of all desirable things, and that the essence of absolute good and of happiness is one and the same. But we have seen that God and true happiness are one and the same. Then we can safely conclude that God's essence is seated in absolute good, and nowhere else."

IV—GOOD AND ILL FORTUNE

At this point I mentioned to Philosophy that herein lay the chiefest cause of my grief, that, while there exists a good ruler of the universe, it is possible that there should be evil at all, still more that it should go unpunished, that wickedness should reign and flourish, and that virtue not only lacks its reward, but is even thrust down and trampled under the feet of the wicked and suffers punishment in place of crime.

Then said she, "It would indeed be infinitely astounding and of all monstrous things most horrible if, as thou esteemest, in the well-ordered home of so great a householder, the base vessels should be held in honour and the precious left to neglect. But it is not so. Thou shalt learn that by the will of God the good are always strong, the bad always weak and impotent; that vices never go unpunished, nor virtues unrewarded; that good fortune ever befalls the good and ill fortune the bad. For since, as I have already insisted, the absolute good is happiness, the good must be happy, for the very reason that they are good.

"In like manner, wickness itself is the reward of the unrighteous. Unrighteousness degrades the wicked below man's level. Thou canst not consider him human whom thou seest transformed by vice. The covetous man surely resembles a wolf. A restless, wrangling spirit is like some yelping cur. The secret fraudulent schemer is own brother to the fox. The passionate man, frenzied with rage, we might believe to be animated with the soul of a lion. The coward may be likened to the timid deer. He who is sunk in ignorance and stupidity lives like a dull ass. He who wallows in foul lusts is sunk in the pleasures of a hog."

Then said I, "This is very true. But inasmuch as the vicious vent their rage in the destruction of the good, I would this licence were not permitted them."

"Nor is it," said she. "Yet if that licence which thou believest to be permitted them were taken away, the punishment of the wicked would in great part be remitted. For verily, incredible as it may seem to some, it needs must be that the bad are more unfortunate when they have accomplished their desires than if they are unable to get them fulfilled."

"Yet," said I, "I earnestly wish they might speedily be quit of this misfortune by losing the ability to accomplish crime."

"They will lose it." said she, "sooner than perchance thou wishest or they themselves think likely. Their great expectation, the lofty fabric of their crimes, is oft overthrown by a sudden and unlooked-for ending, and this but sets a limit to their misery. And here is a further consideration. If baseness of its own nature makes men wretched, as it does, it is plain that a wrong involves the misery of the doer, not of the sufferer."

On this I said, "I see how there is a happiness and misery founded on the actual deserts of the righteous and wicked. Nevertheless, I wonder in myself whether there is not some

good and evil in fortune as the vulgar understand it. Surely no sensible man would rather be exiled, poor and disgraced, than dwell prosperously in his own country, powerful, wealthy and held in high honour. But now my belief in God's governance doth add amazement to amazement—for, seeing that He sometimes assigns fair fortune to the good and harsh fortune to the bad, and then again deals harshly with the good, and grants to the bad their hearts' desire, how does this differ from chance, unless some reason is discovered for it all?"

She answered, "This is what that extraordinary mystery of the order of destiny comes to—that something is done by One who knows, whereat the ignorant are astonished. It is the divine power alone to which things evil are also good, in that, by putting them to suitable use, it bringeth them to the end to some other good issue; for order in some way or other embraces all things, so that even that which has departed from the appointed laws of order, nevertheless falleth within an order, though another order, that nothing in the realm of Providence may be left to haphazard.

"Let us be content to apprehend this only, that God, the Creator of universal nature, likewise disposeth all things and guides them to good; and while He studies to preserve in likeness to Himself all that He has created, He banishes all evil from the borders of His commonweal through the links of fatal necessity. Whereby it comes to pass that, if thou look to disposing Providence, thou wilt nowhere find the evils which are supposed so to abound on earth."

V—FREE WILL AND GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE

She was about to pass on to other matters, when I broke in, saying, "I am even now experiencing one of the many difficulties which beset the question of Providence. I want to know whether thou deemest that there is any such thing as chance, and, if so, what it is?"

She made answer, "If chance be defined as a result produced by random movement without any link of casual connexion, I roundly affirm that there is no such thing as chance at all. What place can be left for random action when God constraineth all things to order? For *ex nihilo nihil* is sound doctrine which none of the ancients gainsaid. Now, if a thing arise without causes, it will appear to have arisen from nothing. With our good Aristotle, we may define what men commonly call chance as being an unexpected result flowing from a concurrence of causes where several factors had a definite end. But the meeting and concurrence of these causes arise from that inevitable chain of order which disposes all things in their due time and place."

"I agree that it is as thou sayest. But in this series of linked causes is there any freedom left to our will, or does the chain of Fate bind also the very motions of our souls?"

"There is freedom," said she; "nor, indeed can any creature be rational unless he be endowed with free will. For that which has the natural use of reason, of itself distinguishes what is to be shunned or desired. Now, everyone seeks what he judges desirable and avoids what he thinks should be shunned. Wherefore, beings endowed with reason possess also the faculty of free choice and refusal."

Then I said, "But now I am perplexed by a problem yet more difficult. If God foresees everything and can in no wise be deceived, that which He foresees to be about to happen must come to pass."

She answered, "Without doubt all things will come to pass which God foreknows as about to happen, but of these certain proceed of free will. The freedom of men's will stands unshaken and laws are not unrighteous, since their rewards and punishments are held forth to wills unbound by any necessity. God, Who foreknoweth all things, still looks down from above, and the ever-present eternity of His vision concurs with the future character of all our acts, and dispenses to the good, rewards, to the bad, punishments. Our hopes and prayers also are not fixed on God in vain. Therefore, withstand vice, practice virtue, lift up your souls to right hopes, offer humble prayers to Heaven. Great is the necessity of righteousness laid upon you if ye will not hide it from yourselves, seeing that all your actions are done before the eyes of a Judge who seeth all."

Utopia

SIR THOMAS MORE

WRITTEN in Latin, Sir Thomas More's political romance Utopia was published in 1516, under the title De Optimo Reipublicae Statu deque Nova Insula Utopia, the first English edition appearing in 1551. The work is typical of the Renaissance spirit of adventure and discovery, being inspired in part by More's study of Plato's Republic, Vespucci's Voyages, and Augustine's City of God. But although the theme of an ideal commonwealth was not original, More's romance gave a generic name to visionary schemes of social reform. To him are largely indebted later works on the same subject, from Bacon's New Atlantis and Campanella's City of the Sun to the idealisations of William Morris and H. G. Wells.

I—HOW MASTER MORE MET MASTER RAPHAEL HYTHLODAY

The most victorious and triumphant king of England, Henry VIII of that time, for the debatement of certain weighty matters sent me ambassador into Flanders, joined in commission with Cuthbert Tunstall, whose virtue and learning be of more excellency than that I am able to praise them. And whiles I was abiding at Antwerp, oftentimes

among other did visit me one Peter Gyles, a citizen thereof whom one day I chanced to espy talking with a stranger, with whom he brought me to speech. Which Raphael Hythloday had voyaged with Master Amerigo Vespucci, but parting from him had returned home by way of Taprobane and Calicut.

Now, as he told us, he had found great and wide deserts and wildernesses inhabited with wild beasts and serpents, but also towns and cities and weal-publiques full of people governed by good and wholesome laws, beside many other that were fond and foolish. Then I urging him that, both by learning and experience, he might be any king's counsellor for the weal-publique—

"You be deceived," quoth he. "For the most part all princes have more delights in warlike matters and feats of chivalry than in the good feats of peace."

Then he speaking of England, "Have you been in our country, sir?" quoth I.

"Yea, forsooth," quoth he, "and there was I much bound and beholden to John Norton, at that time cardinal, archbishop and lord chancellor, in whose counsel the king put much trust.

"Now," quoth he, "one day as I sat at his table, there was a layman cunning in the law who began to praise the rigorous justice that was done upon felons, and to marvel how thieves were nevertheless so rife.

"'Nay, sir,' said I; 'but the punishment passeth the limits of justice. For simple theft is not so great an offence that it ought to be punished with death, nor doth that refrain them, since they cannot live but by thieving. There be many servitors of idle gentlemen who, when their master is dead, and they be thrust forth, have no craft whereby to earn their bread, nor can find other service, who must either starve for hunger or manfully play the thieves.

"'Moreover, look how your sheep do consume and devour whole fields, houses and cities. For noblemen and gentlemen, yea, and certain abbots, holy men, God wot, where groweth the finest wool, do enclose all in pastures, pluck down towns, and leave naught standing but only the church, to make it a sheep-house. Whereby the husbandmen are thrust out of their own; and then what can they do else but steal, and then justly, God wot, be hanged? Furthermore, victuals and other matters are dearer, seeing rich men buy up all, and with their monopoly keep the market as it please them. Unless you find a remedy for these enormities, you shall in vain vaunt yourselves of executing justice upon felons.

"'Beside, it is a pernicious thing that a thief and a murderer should suffer the like punishment, seeing that thereby the thief is rather provoked to kill. But among the polylerytes in Persia there is a custom that they which be convict of felony are condemned to be common labourers, yet not harshly entreated, but condemned to death if they seek to run away. For they are also apparelled all alike, and to aid them is servitude for a free man.'

"Now the cardinal pronounced that this were a good order to take with vagabonds. But a certain parasite sayeth in jest that this were then an excellent order to take with the friars, seeing that they were the veriest vagabonds that be; a friar thereupon took the jest in very ill part, and could not refrain himself from calling the fellow ribald, villain and the son of perdition; whereat the jester became a scoffer indeed, for he could play a part in that play, no man better, making the friar more foolishly wroth than before.

"Now, none of them would have harkened to my counsel until the cardinal did approve it. So that if I were sitting in counsel with the French king, whose counsellors were all urging him to war; and should I counsel him not to meddle with Italy, but rather to tarry still at home; and should propose to him the decrees of the Achoriens which dwell over against the Island of Utopia, who, having by war conquered a new kingdom for their prince, constrained him to be content with his old kingdom and give over the new one to one of his friends; this, mine advice, Master More, how think you it would be heard and taken?"

"So God help me, not very thankfully," quoth I.

"Howbeit, Master More," quoth he, "doubtless, wheresoever possessions be private, where money beareth all the stroke, it is almost impossible that the weal-publique may be justly governed and prosperously flourish. And when I consider the wise and goodly ordinances of the Utopians, among whom, all things being in common, every man hath abundance of everything, yet are there very few laws; I do fully persuade myself that until this property be exiled and banished, perfect wealth shall never be among men. Which, if you had lived with me in Utopia, you would doubtless grant."

"Therefore, Master Raphael," quoth I, "pray you describe unto us this land."

II—OF THE ISLAND OF UTOPIA AND THE CUSTOMS OF ITS PEOPLE

The island of Utopia is shaped like a new moon, in breadth at the middle 200 miles, narrowing to the tips, which fetch about a compass of 500 miles, and are sundered by eleven miles, having in the space between them a high rock; so that that whole coast is a great haven, but the way into it is securely guarded by hidden rocks. It hath fifty-four large and fair cities, all built in one fashion and having like manners, institutions and laws. The chief and head is Amaurote, being the midmost. Every city hath an equal shire, with farms thereon; and of the husbandmen, half return each year to the city, their place being taken by a like number.

The city of Amaurote standeth four square, upon the River Anyder, and another lesser river floweth through it. The houses be fair and gorgeous, and the streets twenty foot broad; and at the back of each house a garden, whereby they set great store.

Each thirty families choose an officer, called a Siphogrant, and over every tenth siphogrant is a Tranibore. The prince is chosen for life by the siphogrants. All other offices are yearly, but the tranibores are not lightly changed. The prince and the tranibores hold council every third day, each day with two different siphogrants. They discuss no matter on the day that it is first brought forward. All the people are expert in husbandry, but each hath thereto his own proper craft of masonry or

cloth-working, or some other; and, for the most part, that of his father. They work only six hours, which is enough—yea, and more for the store and abundance of things requisite, because all do work. There be none that are idle or busied about unprofitable occupations. In all that city and shire there be scarce 500 persons that be licensed from labour, that be neither too old nor too weak to work. Such be they that have license to learning in place of work. Out of which learned order be chosen ambassadors, priests, tranibores and the prince.

For their clothing, they wear garments of skins for work, and woollen cloaks of one fashion and of the natural colour; and for the linen, they care only for the whiteness, and not the fineness; wherefore their apparel is of small cost.

The city consisteth of families; and for each family the law is there be not fewer than ten children, nor more than sixteen of about thirteen years. Which numbers they maintain by taking from one family and adding to another, or one city and another, or by their foreign cities which they have in the waste places of neighbour lands. The eldest citizen ruleth the family. In each quarter of the city is a market-place whither is brought the work of each family, and each taketh away that he needeth, without money or exchange.

To every thirty families there is a hall, whither cometh the whole siphogranty at the set hour of dinner or supper; and a nursery thereto. But in the country they dine and sup in their own houses. If any desire to visit another city, the prince giveth letters of licence. But wherever he goeth he must work the allotted task. All be partners, so that none may be poor or needy; and all the cities do send to the common council at Amaurote, so that what one lacketh another maketh good out of its abundance.

Their superfluities they exchange with other lands for what they themselves lack, which is little but iron; or for money, which they use but seldom, and that for the hiring of soldiers. Of gold and silver they make not rich vessels, but mean utensils, fetters and gyves; and jewels and precious stones they make toys for children.

Although there be not many that are appointed only to learning, yet all in childhood be instructed therein; and the more part do bestow in learning their spare hours. In the course of the stars and movings of the heavenly sphere they be expert, but for the deceitful divination thereof they never dreamed of it.

They dispute of the qualities of the soul and reason of virtue, and of pleasure, wherein they think the felicity of man to rest; they believe that the soul is immortal, and by the goodness of God ordained to felicity, and that to our virtues and good deeds rewards be appointed hereafter, and to evil deeds punishments. Which principles, if they were disannulled, there is no man but would diligently pursue pleasure by right or wrong. But now felicity resteth only in that pleasure that is good and honest. Virtue they define to be life according to nature, which prescribeth us a joyful life.

But of what they call counterfeit pleasures they make naught; as of pride in apparel and gems, or in vain honours; or of dicing; or hunting, which they deem the most abject kind of butchery. But of true pleasures they give to the soul intelligence and that pleasure that cometh of contemplation of the truth, and the pleasant remembrance of the good life past. Of pleasures of the body they count first those that be sensibly felt and perceived, and thereto the body's health, which lacking, there is no place for any pleasure. But chiefest they hold the pleasures of the mind, the consciousness of virtue and the good life. Making little of the pleasures of appetite, they yet count it madness to reject the same for a vain shadow of virtue.

For bondmen, they have malefactors of their own people, criminals condemned to death in other lands, or poor labourers of other lands who, of their own free will, choose rather to be in bondage with them. The sick they tend with great affection; but, if the disease be not only incurable but full of anguish, the priests exhort them that they should willingly die, but cause him not to die against his will.

The women marry not before eighteen years, the men four years later. But if one have offended before marriage, he or she whether it be, is sharply punished. And before marriage the man and the woman are showed each to the other by discreet persons. To mock a man for his deformity is counted great reproach.

They do not only fear their people from doing evil by punishments, but also allure them to virtue by rewards of honour. They have but few laws, reproving other nations that innumerable books of law and expositions upon the same be not sufficient. Furthermore, they banish all such as do craftily handle the laws, but think it meet that every man should plead his own matter.

III—OF THE WARS AND THE RELIGION OF THE UTOPIANS

As touching leagues they never make one with any nation, putting no trust therein; seeing the more and holier ceremonies the league is knit up with, the sooner it is broken. Who perchance would change their minds if they lived here? But they be of opinion that no man should be counted an enemy who hath done no injury, and that the fellowship of nature is a strong league.

They count nothing so much against glory as glory gotten in war. And though they do daily practise themselves in the discipline of war, they go not to battle but in defence of their own country or their friends, or to right some assured wrong. They be ashamed to win the victory with much bloodshed, but rejoice if they vanquish their enemies by craft. They set a great price upon the life or person of the enemy's prince and of other chief adversaries, counting that they thereby save the lives of many of both parts that had otherwise been slain; and stir up neighbour peoples against them.

They lure soldiers out of all countries to do battle with them, and especially a savage and fierce people called the Zapoletes, giving them greater wages than any other nation will. But of their own people they thrust not forth to battle any against his will; yet if women be willing, they do in set field stand every one by her husband's side, and each man is compassed

about by his own kinsfolk; and they be themselves stout and hardy and disdainful to be conquered. It is hard to say whether they be craftier in laying ambush or wittier in avoiding the same. Their weapons be arrows, and at handstrokes not swords but pole-axes; and engines for war they devise and invent wondrous wittily.

There be divers kinds of religion. Some worship for God the sun, some the moon; some there be that give worship to a man that was once of the most excellent virtue; some believe that there is a certain godly power unknown, everlasting, incomprehensible; but all believe that there is one God, Maker and Ruler of the whole world. But after they heard us speak of Christ, with glad minds they agreed unto the same.

And this is one of their ancientest laws, that no man shall be blamed for reasoning in the maintenance of his own religion, giving to every man free liberty to believe what he would. Saving that none should conceive so base and vile an opinion as to think that souls do perish with the body, or that the world runneth at all adventures, governed by no divine providence.

They have priests of exceeding holiness, and therefore very few. Both childhood and youth are instructed of them, not more in learning than in good manners.

"This," quoth he, "is that order of the commonwealth which, in my judgement, is not only the best, but also that which alone of good right may claim and take upon it the name of a commonwealth or weal-publique."

THUS when Raphael had made an end of his tale, though many things came to my mind, which in the manners and laws of that people seemed to be instituted and founded of no good reason; yet because I knew he was weary of talking, I said that we would choose another time to weigh and examine the same matters But, in the meantime, I, Thomas More, as I cannot agree and consent to all things that he said, so must I needs confess and grant that many things be in the Utopian weal-publique which in our cities I may rather wish for than hope after.

The Prince

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

THE fame of Niccolo Machiavelli rests mainly on his Il Principe, written probably about 1514, but not published until 1532, five years after the death of the author. The great question with which the work is concerned is: how a prince may establish and maintain the strongest possible government. According to Machiavelli moral principles must yield entirely to the dictates of pure expediency, and it follows that the world regarded by the prince must be always the same; the men in it growing neither better nor worse. Machiavelli's name has long been used in terms of reproach, due largely to incomplete understanding of his method. But there is no division among the critics as to the precision of his thought and the clarity of his style.

I—OF PRINCEDOMS WON BY MERIT

ALL states and governments are either republics or princedoms. Princedoms are either hereditary or new. Hereditary states are maintained with far less difficulty than new states, but in new princedoms difficulties abound.

And first if the princedom be joined on to ancient dominions of the prince, so as to form a mixed princedom, rebellion is a danger, for men are always ready to change masters. When a state rebels and is again got under it will not afterwards be lost so easily; for the prince will use the rebellion as a pretext to make himself more secure.

Such new states, when they are of the same province and tongue as the ancient dominions of the prince, are easily retained. It is enough to have rooted out the line of the reigning prince. But where the language and usages differ the difficulty is multiplied. One expedient is for the prince himself to dwell in the new state, as the Turk has done in Greece. Another is to send colonies into one or two places which may become keys to the province; for the cost of troops is far greater.

In such provinces, moreover, the prince should always make himself the protector of his weaker neighbours, without adding to their strength; but should humble the great, and never suffer a formidable stranger to acquire influence, as was the rule with the Romans. Whereas King Louis of France has in Italy done the direct opposite in every single respect. In especial we may draw from the French king's actions the general axiom, which never or rarely errs, that 'he who is the cause of another's greatness is himself undone.'

Now, all princedoms are governed in one of two ways: either by a sole prince served by ministers, or by a prince with barons who hold their rank not by favour but by right of descent. The Turk is an example of the first, the French king of the second. A state of the first kind is difficult to win, but when won is easily held, since the prince's family may be easily rooted out; but in such a state as France you may gain an entry, but to hold your ground afterwards is difficult, since you cannot root out the barons.

Hence we need not wonder at the ease wherewith Alexander was able to lay a firm hold on Asia; albeit he died before he had well entered on possession; since the dominion of Darius was of the same character as that of the Turk.

When the newly acquired state has hitherto lived under its own laws and in freedom there are three ways of holding it. The first is to destroy it; the second to reside in it; the third to leave it under its own laws, choosing for its governors from the inhabitants such as

will be friendly to you. But the safest course is either to destroy it or to go and live in it.

Where the prince himself is new, either merit or good fortune is implied, and if we consider the most excellent examples, such as Moses, Cyrus, Romulus and the like, we shall see that they owed to fortune nothing beyond the opportunity which they seized. Those who, like these, come to the princedom by virtuous paths acquire with difficulty, but keep with ease. Their difficulties arise because they are of necessity innovators. If, then, they have force of their own to employ, they seldom fail. Hence it comes that all armed prophets have been victorious and all unarmed prophets have been destroyed; as was the case with Savonarola.

II—OF PRINCEDOMS WON OTHERWISE THAN BY MERIT

Those who rise to princedom by mere good fortune have much trouble to maintain themselves; some lack both knowledge and the power to do so. Yet even if such a one be of great parts, he may lose what he has won, like Cesare Borgia.

It was impossible for the duke to aggrandise himself unless the states of Italy were thrown into confusion so that he might safely make himself master of some part of them. This was made easy for him as concerned Romagna by the conduct of the French and Venetians. The next step was to weaken the factions of the Orsini and the Colonnesi. Having scattered the Colonnesi, the Orsini were so won over as to be drawn in their simplicity into his hands at Sinigaglia. Having thus disposed of the leaders, he set about ingratiating himself with the population of Romagna and Urbino. He first set over the country a stern ruler to restore order. This end being accomplished, that stern but unpopular ruler was beheaded.

Next, as a new pope might be dangerous, he set himself to exterminate the kindred of those lords whom he had despoiled of their possessions, to win over the Roman nobility, and to secure a majority among the cardinals. But before the duke had completely consolidated his power his father, Pope Alexander VI, died. Even so, the skill with which he had laid the foundations of his power must have resulted in success had he not himself been almost at death's door at that critical moment. The one mistake he made was in the choice of the new pope, Julius II, and this error was the cause of his ultimate downfall.

A man may rise, however, to a princedom by paths of wickedness and crime; that is, not precisely by either merit or fortune. We may take as example first Agathocles the Sicilian. To slaughter fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be devoid of honour, pity and religion cannot be counted as merit. But the achievements of Agathocles can certainly not be ascribed to fortune. We cannot, therefore, attribute either to fortune or to merit what he accomplished without either.

For a modern instance we may consider Oliverotto of Fermo, who seized upon that town by a piece of monstrous treachery and merciless butchery; yet he established himself so firmly that he could not have been unseated had he not let himself be over-reached by Cesare Borgia.

Our lesson from these examples is that on seizing a state the usurper should make haste to inflict what injuries he must at one stroke, and afterwards win men over by benefits.

Next is the case of those who are made princes by the favour of their countrymen, which they owe to what may be termed a fortunate astuteness. If he be established by the favour of the people, to secure them against the oppression of the nobles, his position is stronger than if he owe it to the nobles; but in either case it is the people whom he must conciliate, and this I affirm in spite of the old saw, 'He who builds on the people builds on mire.'

Merit, or good fortune, is needed to acquire ecclesiastical princedoms, but not to maintain them, for they are upheld by the authority of religion. It is due to the policy of the Popes Alexander VI and Julius II that the temporal power of the pope has become so great; and from his holiness Pope Leo we may hope that as his predecessors made the papacy great with arms he will render it still greater and more venerable by his benignity and other countless virtues.

III—OF MAINTAINING A PRINCEDOM

A prince must defend his state with either his own subjects or mercenaries, or auxiliaries. Mercenaries are utterly untrustworthy; if their captain be not an able man the prince will probably be ruined, whereas if he be an able man he will be seeking a goal of his own. This has been perpetually exemplified among the cities and states of Italy which have sought to maintain themselves by taking foreigners into their pay.

But he who would deprive himself of every chance of success should have recourse to auxiliaries; that is, to the troops of a foreign potentate. For these are far more dangerous than mercenary arms, bringing ruin with them ready made. The better such troops are the more dangerous they are. From Hiero of Syracuse to Cesare Borgia, princes have become powerful in proportion as they could dispense with such aid and place their dependence upon national troops.

A prince, then, who would be powerful should have no care or thought but for war, lest he lose his dominions. If he be ignorant of military affairs he can neither be respected by the soldiers nor trust them. Therefore, he must both practise and study this art. For the practice, the chase in many respects provides an excellent training both in knowledge of the country and in vigour of the body. As to study, a prince should read histories, note the actions of great men and examine the causes of their victories and defeats, imitating those who have been renowned.

Anyone who would act up to a perfect standard of goodness in everything must be ruined among so many who are not good. It is essential therefore for a prince to have learnt

how to be other than good and to use, or not to use, his goodness as necessity requires.

It may be a good thing to be reputed liberal, but liberality without the reputation of it is hurtful. Display necessitates the imposition of taxes, whereby the prince becomes hateful; whereas through parsimony his revenue will be sufficient. Hence we have seen no princes accomplish great results save those who have been accounted miserly by the world.

Every prince should desire to be accounted merciful, not cruel; but a new prince cannot escape a name for cruelty, for he who quells disorder by a few signal examples will, in the end, be the more merciful.

Men are less careful how they offend him who makes himself loved than him who makes himself feared; yet should a prince inspire fear in such a fashion that, if he do not win love, he may escape hate; remembering that men will sooner forget the slaying of their father than the loss of their patrimony.

Princes who set little store by their word but have known how to over-reach men by their cunning have accomplished great things, and in the end got the better of those who trusted to honest dealing. The prince must be a lion, but he must also know how to play the fox. He who wishes to deceive will never fail to find willing dupes. The prince, in short, ought not to quit good courses if he can help it, but should know how to follow evil courses if he must.

A PRINCE must avoid being despised as well as being hated; therefore courage, wisdom and strength must be apparent in all his actions. Against such a one conspiracy is difficult. That prince is wise who devolves on others those matters that entail responsibility, and may therefore make him odious either to the nobles or to the commons, but reserves to himself the matters that relate to grace and favour.

What I have said is not contradicted by the history of the Roman emperors; for they had to choose between satisfying the soldiers and satisfying the people. It was imperative that at any cost they should maintain control of the soldiery, which scarce any of them could do without injustice to the people. If we examine their histories we shall find that they fully bear out the principles I have laid down.

But in our time the standing armies of princes have not the same power as the armies of the Roman Empire, and except under the Turk and the Soldan it is more needful to satisfy the people than to satisfy the soldiery.

IV—OF ARTIFICES

A NEW prince will never disarm his subjects, but will rather arm them, at least in part. For thus they become his partisans, whereas without them he must depend on mercenaries.

But a prince who adds a new state to his old possessions should disarm its inhabitants, relying on the soldiers of his own ancient dominions. Some have fostered feuds among their new subjects in order to keep them weak, but such a policy rarely proves useful in the end. The prince who acquires a new state will gain more strength by winning over and trusting those who were at first opposed to him than by relying on those who were at first his friends.

The prince who is more afraid of his subjects than of strangers ought to build fortresses, while he who is more afraid of strangers than of his subjects should leave them alone. The best fortress you can have is in not being hated by your subjects.

Nothing makes a prince so well thought of as to undertake great enterprises and give striking proofs of his capacity. Ferdinand of Aragon, in our own time, has become the foremost king in Christendom. If you consider his achievements, you will find them all great and some extraordinary. First he made war on Granada, and this was the foundation of his power. Under the cloak of religion, with what may be called pious cruelty, he cleared his kingdom of the Moors, made war on Africa, invaded Italy and finally attacked France; while his subjects, occupied with these great actions, had neither time nor opportunity to oppose them.

To retain a good minister the prince will bind him to himself by benefits. Above all, he will avoid being deceived by flatterers, and while he consults his counsellors should reflect and judge for himself. A prince who is not wise himself cannot be well advised by others.

The Italian princes who in our own times have lost their dominions have either been deficient in respect of arms, or have had the people against them, or have not known how to secure themselves against the nobles. As to the influence of fortune it may be the case that she is the mistress of one half of our actions, but leaves the control of the other half to ourselves. That prince will prosper most whose mode of acting best adapts itself to the character of the times; so that at one time a cautious temperament, and at another an impetuous temperament, will be the more successful.

Now, at this time the whole land of Italy is without a head, without order, beaten, spoiled, torn in pieces, overrun, and abandoned to destruction in every shape. She prays God to send someone to rescue her from these barbarous cruelties; she is eager to follow anyone who could undertake the part of a deliverer; nor does this seem too hard a task for you, the Magnificent Lorenzo of the illustrious house of Medici. The cause is just; we have before us unexampled proofs of Divine favour. Everything has concurred to promote your greatness. What remains to be done must be done by you, for God will not do everything Himself.

The Advancement of Learning

FRANCIS BACON

IN October 1605 Francis Bacon published his Treatise on the Advancement of Learning, a work designed to interest the king in the new philosophical ideas of which Bacon was the principal exponent; and in this book virtually the whole of his philosophy is implicitly contained. This review of the existing state of knowledge was intended to be made, later, into the first part of the Instauratio Magna (his project of a comprehensive treatise of all philosophical knowledge), under the title of Partitiones Scientiarum. Bacon constantly revised the work, and eventually had it translated into Latin under the title De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, and republished in this form, with considerable additions, in 1623.

FIRST BOOK

LET us weigh the dignity of knowledge in the balance with other things. In its archetype it is the Divine wisdom, or sapience, manifested in the creation. In the celestial hierarchy the supposed Dionysius of Athens places the angels of knowledge and illumination before those of office. Then, the first material form that was created was light, which corresponds in corporal things to knowledge in incorporal. The day wherein God contemplated His own works was blessed above the days wherein He accomplished them.

Man's first employment in Paradise consist of of the two chief parts of knowledge, the viewed creatures and the imposition of names. In the age before the Flood, Scripture honours the names of the inventors of music and of works in metal. Moses was accomplished in all the learning of the Egyptians. The book of Job is pregnant with natural philosophy. In Solomon, the gift of wisdom and learning is preferred before all other earthly and temporal felicity.

Our Saviour first showed His power to subdue ignorance by His conference with the doctors, before He showed His power to subdue nature by miracles; and the coming of the Holy Spirit was chiefly figured in the gift of tongues, which are the vehicles of knowledge.

St. Paul, most learned of the apostles, had his pen most used in the New Testament. Many of the ancient fathers of the Church were excellently read in all the learning of the heathen; and that heathen learning was preserved, amid Scythian and Saracen invasions, in the sacred bosom of the Church. And in our own day, when God has called the Roman church to account for degenerate manners and obnoxious doctrines, He has also ordained a renovation of all other knowledges; and, on the other side, the Jesuits by quickening the state of learning have done notable service to the Roman See.

Wherefore two principal services are performed to religion by human learning: first, the contemplation of God's works is an effectual inducement to the exaltation of His glory; and secondly, true learning is a singular preservative against unbelief.

To pass now to human proofs of the dignity of learning, we find that among the heathens the inventors of new arts, such as Ceres, Bacchus and Apollo, were consecrated among the gods themselves by apotheosis. The fable of Orpheus, wherein quarrelsome beasts stood sociably listening to the harp, aptly described the nature of men, among whom peace is maintained so long as they give ear to precepts, laws, and religion. It has been said that people would then be happy, when kings were philosophers, or philosophers kings; and history shows that the best times have ever been under learned princes.

As for the services of knowledge to private virtue, it takes away all levity, temerity and insolence by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both sides. It takes away vain admiration of anything, which is the root of all weakness. No man can marvel at the play of puppets that goes behind the curtain. And certainly, if a man meditate much upon the universal frame of nature, the earth with men upon it (the divineness of souls except) will not seem much other than an ant hill, where some ants carry corn, and some carry their young, and some go empty, and all to and fro a little heap of dust.

Knowledge crowns man's nature with power. It even gives fortune to particular persons; and it is hard to say whether arms or learning have advanced greater numbers.

Lastly, by learning, man excels man in that wherein man excels beasts. The great dignity of knowledge lies in immortality or continuance. Have not the verses of Homer continued twenty-five hundred years or more, without the loss of a syllable or letter, during which time infinite palaces, temples, castles, cities have been decayed and demolished? If the invention of the ship was thought so noble, which carries riches and commodities from place to place, and consociates the most remote regions in participation of their fruits, how much more are letters to be magnified? Popular and mistaken judgements will continue as they have ever been, but so will that also continue whereupon learning has ever relied, and which fails not.

"Wisdom is justified of her children."

SECOND BOOK

THE parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of man's understanding—history to his memory, poetry to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason. Divine learning receives the same distribution, so that theology consisteth of history of the Church; of parables, which are divine poetry; and of holy doctrine or precept. For prophecy is but

divine history, in which the narrative is before the fact.

History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical and literary; whereof the first three are extant, but the fourth is deficient. A true history of learning throughout the ages is wanting.

History of nature is of three sorts—of nature in course, of nature erring or varying, and of nature altered or worked; that is, history of creatures, history of marvels and history of arts. The first of these is extant in good perfection; the two others are handled so weakly that I note them as deficient.

The history of arts is of great use towards natural philosophy such as shall be operative to the benefit of man's life.

Civil history is of three kinds: memorials, perfect histories, and antiquities, comparable to unfinished, perfect and defaced pictures. Just or perfect history represents a time, a person or an action. The first we call chronicles; the second, lives; and the third, narrations or relations.

Of modern histories the greater part are beneath mediocrity. Annals and journals are a kind of history not to be forgotton; and there is also ruminated history, wherein political discourse and observations are mingled with the history of the events themselves.

Ecclesiastical history receives the same divisions with civil history, but may further be divided into history of the Church, history of prophecy and history of Providence. The first of these is not deficient, only I would that the sincerity of it were proportionate to its mass and quantity. The history of prophecy, sorting every prophecy with the event fulfilling the same, is deficient; but the history of Providence, and the notable examples of God's judgements and deliverances have passed through the labour of many. Orations, letters and apophthegms are appendices to history.

Thus much concerning history, which answers to memory.

Poetry refers to the imagination. In respect of its words it is but a character of style, but in respect of its matter it is nothing else but feigned history, which may as well be in prose as in verse. The use of this feigned history is to give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things denies it; poetry serves magnanimity, morality and delectation. It is divided into narrative, representative and allusive or parabolical poetry. In poetry I can report no deficience; it has sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind of learning.

In philosophy, the contemplations of man either penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected upon himself; whence arise three knowledges—divine philosophy, natural philosophy and human philosophy or humanity.

But it is good to erect one universal science, *Philosophia Prima*, 'primitive' or 'summary philosophy,' before we come where the ways part and divide; and this universal philosophy is a receptacle for all such profitable observations and axioms as do not fall within the compass of any of the special parts of philosophy or sciences, but are common and of a higher stage.

Divine philosophy, or natural theology, is that knowledge concerning God which may be obtained by the contemplation of His creatures; and in this I note an excess rather than a deficience, because of the extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy have received by being mixed together, making an heretical religion and a fabulous philosophy.

Of natural philosophy there are two parts, the inquisition of causes and the production of effects; speculative and operative; natural science and natural prudence.

Natural science is divided into physic and metaphysic. But since I have already defined a summary philosophy, and, again, a natural theology, both of which are commonly confounded with metaphysic, what is there remaining for metaphysic? This, that physic inquires concerning the material and efficient causes, but metaphysic handles the formal and final causes. So physic is in a middle term between natural history and metaphysic; for natural history describes the variety of things, physic the variable or respective causes, and metaphysic the fixed and constant causes.

Of metaphysic I find that it is partly omitted and partly misplaced. In mathematics, which I place as a part of metaphysic, I can report no deficience. But natural prudence, or the operative part of natural philosophy, is very deficient. It were desirable that there should be a calendar or inventory made of all the inventions whereof man is possessed, with a note of useful things not yet invented. A calendar, also, of doubts, and another of popular errors, are to be desired.

We come now to the knowledge of ourselves—that is, to human philosophy or humanity. First, a general study of human nature will have regard to the sympathies and concordances between mind and body. Then, since the good of man's body is of four kinds—health, beauty, strength and pleasure—the knowledge of the body is also of four kinds—medicine, decoration or cosmetic, athletic and the art voluptuary. Medicine has been more professed than laboured, and more laboured than advanced, the labour having been rather in circle than in progression.

The knowledge respecting the faculties of the mind is of two kinds, the one respecting understanding and reason, and the other respecting will, appetite and affection, the imagination being active in both provinces.

The intellectual arts are four—inquiry or invention, examination or judgement, custody or memory, and elocution or tradition; and these are severally divided into various sciences and arts. The knowledge of the appetite and will, or moral philosophy, leading to the culture and regiment of the mind, is very deficient.

Civil knowledge has three parts—conversation, negotiation and government—since man seeks in society comfort, use and protection. The first of these is well laboured, the second and third are deficient. Thus we conclude human philosophy, and turn to the sacred and inspired divinity, the port of all men's peregrinations.

Divinity has four main branches—faith, manners, liturgy and government—in which I can find no ground vacant and unsown, so diligent have men been, either in sowing of seed or tares.

The Anatomy of Melancholy

ROBERT BURTON

THE work by which Robert Burton is remembered is The Anatomy of Melancholy, one of the most fascinating books in literature. First published in 1621, it ran through six editions in thirty years, brought an estate to the bookseller Cripps, and was continually revised by its author. It is an enormous compendium of sound sense, sly humour, universal erudition, medieval science, fantastic conceits and noble sentiments, arranged as a methodical treatise and illustrated with numberless quotations from the wisdom of all the ages. The long preface, Democritus to the Reader, is one of the most interesting parts of the book.

I—DEMOCRITUS JUNIOR TO THE READER

GENTLE reader, I presume thou wilt be very inquisitive to know what antick or personate actor this is that so insolently intrudes upon this common theatre to the world's view, arrogating another man's name; whence he is, why he doth it and what he hath to say. Seek not after that which is hid; if the contents please thee, suppose the man in the moon to be the author; I would not willingly be known.

I call myself Democritus, to assume a little more liberty of speech, or, if you will needs know, for that reason which Hippocrates relates, how, coming to visit him one day, he found Democritus in his garden at Abdera, under a shady bower, with a book on his knees, busy at his study, sometimes writing, sometimes walking.

The subject of his book was melancholy and madness. About him lay the carcasses of many several beasts, newly by him cut up and anatomised; not that he did contemn God's creatures, but to find out the seat of this black bile, or melancholy, and how it is engendered in men's bodies, to the intent he might better cure it in himself, and by his writings teach others how to avoid it; which good intent of his Democritus Junior is bold to imitate, and because he left it imperfect and it is now lost, to revive again, prosecute and finish in this treatise. I seek not applause; I fear good men's censures, and to their favourable acceptance I submit my labours. But as the barking of a dog I contemn those malicious and scurrile obloquies, flouts, calumnies of railers and detractors.

Of the necessity of what I have said, if any man doubt of it, I shall desire him to make a brief survey of the world, as Cyprian adviseth Donate; supposing himself to be transported to the top of some high mountain, and thence to behold the tumults and chances of this wavering world, he cannot choose but either laugh at, or pity it. St. Hierom, out of a strong imagination, being in the wilderness, conceived that he saw them dancing in Rome; and if thou shalt climb to see, thou shalt soon perceive that all the world is mad, that it is melancholy, dotes; that it is a common prison of gulls, cheats, flatterers, etc., and needs to be reformed. Kingdoms and provinces are melancholy; cities and families, all creatures vegetal, sensible and rational, all sorts, sects, ages, conditions, are out of tune; from the highest to the lowest have need of physic. Who is not brain-sick? Oh, giddy-headed age! Mad endeavours! Mad actions!

If Democritus were alive now, and should but see the superstition of our age, our religious madness, so many professed Christians, yet so few imitators of Christ, so much talk and so little conscience, so many preachers and such little practice, such variety of sects—how dost thou think he might have been affected? What would he have said to see, hear and read so many bloody battles, such streams of blood able to turn mills, to make sport for princes, without any just cause? Men well proportioned, carefully brought up, able in body and mind, led like so many beasts to the slaughter in the flower of their years, without remorse and pity, killed for devils' food, 40,000 at once!

At once? That were tolerable; but these wars last always; and for many ages, nothing so familiar as this hacking and hewing, massacres, murders, desolations! Who made creatures, so peaceable, born to love, mercy, meekness, so to rave like beasts and run furiously to their own destruction?

How would our Democritus have been affected to see so many lawyers, advocates, so many tribunals, so little justice; so many laws, yet never more disorders; the tribunal a labyrinth; to see a lamb executed, a wolf pronounce sentence? What's the market but a place wherein they cozen one another, a trap? Nay, what's the world itself but a vast chaos, a theatre of hypocrisy, a shop of knavery, a scene of babbling, the academy of vice? A warfare, in which you must kill or be killed, wherein every man is for himself; no charity, love, friendship, fear of God, alliance, affinity, consanguinity, can contain them. Our goddess is Queen Money, to whom we daily offer sacrifice. It's not worth, virtue, wisdom, valour, learning, honesty, religion, for which we are respected, but money, greatness, office, honour.

All these things are easy to be discerned, but how would Democritus have been moved had he seen the secrets of our hearts! All the world is mad, and every member of it, and I can but wish myself and them a good physician, and all of us a better mind.

II—THE CAUSES OF MELANCHOLY

THE impulsive cause of these miseries in man was the sin of our first parent, Adam; and this, belike, is that which our poets have shadowed unto us in the tale of Pandora's box, which, being opened through her curiosity, filled the world full of all manner of diseases.

But as our sins are the principal cause, so the instrumental causes of our infirmities are as diverse as the infirmities themselves. Stars, heavens, elements, and all those creatures which God hath made, are armed against sinners. But the greatest enemy to man is man, his own executioner, a wolf, a devil to himself and others.

Again, no man amongst us so sound that hath not some impediment of body or mind. There are diseases acute and chronic, first and secondary, lethal, salutary, errant, fixed, simple, compound, etc. Melancholy is the most eminent of the diseases of the phantasy or imagination; and dotage, phrensy, madness, hydrophobia, lycanthropy, St. Vitus's dance and ecstasy are forms of it.

Melancholy is either in disposition or habit. In disposition it is that transitory melancholy which comes and goes upon every small occasion of sorrow; we call him melancholy that is dull, sad, sour, lumpish, ill-disposed and solitary; and from these dispositions no man living is free; none so wise, patient, happy, generous, or godly that can vindicate himself.

Melancholy is a cold and dry, thick, black and sour humour, purged from the spleen; it is a bridle to the other two hot humours, blood and choler, preserving them in the blood and nourishing the bones. Such as have the Moon, Saturn, Mercury, misaffected in their genitures; such as live in over-cold or over-hot climes; such as are solitary by nature; great students, given to much contemplation; such as lead a life out of action; all are most subject to melancholy.

Six things are much spoken of amongst physicians as principal causes of this disease; if a man be melancholy, he hath offended in one of the six. They are diet, air, exercise, sleeping, waking, and perturbations of the mind.

Idleness, the badge of gentry, or want of exercise, the bane of body and mind, the nurse of naughtiness, the chief author of all mischief, one of the seven deadly sins, and a sole cause of this and many other maladies, the devil's cushion and chief reposal, begets melancholy sooner than anything else. Such as live at ease, and have no ordinary employment to busy themselves about, cannot compose themselves to do aught; they cannot abide work, though it be necessary, easy, as to dress themselves, write a letter, or the like. He or she that is idle, be they never so rich, fortunate, happy, let them have all that heart can desire, they shall never be pleased, never well in body and mind, but weary still, sickly still, vexed still, loathing still, weeping, sighing, grieving, suspecting, offended with the world, with every object, wishing themselves gone or dead, or else carried away with some foolish phantasy or other.

Others, giving way to the passions and perturbations of fear, grief, shame, revenge, hatred, malice, etc. are torn in pieces, as Actaeon was with his dogs, and crucify their own souls. Every society and private family is full of envy; it takes hold of all sorts of men, from prince to ploughman; scarce three in a company, but there is siding, faction, emulation, between two of them, some jar, private grudge, heart-burning in the midst. You shall find scarce two great scholars in an age but with bitter invectives they fall foul one on the other. Being that we are so peevish and perverse, insolent and proud, so factious and seditious, malicious and envious, we do maul and vex one another, torture, disquiet and precipitate ourselves into that gulf of woes and cares, aggravate our misery and melancholy and heap upon us hell and eternal damnation.

III—THE CURE OF MELANCHOLY

'It matters not,' saith Paracelsus, 'whether it be God or the devil, angels or unclean spirits, cure him, so that he be eased.' Some have recourse to witches; but much better were it for patients that are troubled with melancholy to endure a little misery in this life than to hazard their souls' health for ever. All unlawful cures are to be refused, and it remains to treat of those that are admitted.

These are such as God hath appointed, by virtue of stones, herbs, plants, meats and the like, which are prepared and applied to our use by the art and industry of physicians, God's intermediate ministers. We must begin with prayer and then use physic; not one without the other, but both together.

Diet must be rectified in substance and in quantity; air rectified; for there is much in choice of place and of chamber, in opportune opening and shutting of windows and in walking abroad at convenient times. Exercise must be rectified of body and mind. Hawking, hunting, fishing are good, especially the last, which is still and quiet, and if so be the angler catch no fish, yet he hath a wholesome walk and pleasant shade by the sweet silver streams.

But the most pleasant of all pastimes is to make a merry journey now and then with some good companions, to visit friends, see cities, castles, towns, to walk amongst orchards, gardens, bowers, to disport in some pleasant plain. St. Bernard, in the description of his monastery, is almost ravished with the pleasures of it. 'Good God,' saith he, 'what a company of pleasures hast Thou made for man!'

But what is so fit and proper to expel idleness and melancholy as study? What so full of content as to read, and see maps, pictures, statues, jewels and marbles, so exquisite to be beheld that, as Chrysostom thinketh, 'if any man be sickly or troubled in mind, and shall but stand over against one of Pheidias's images, he will forget all care in an instant?'

If thou receivest wrong, compose thyself with patience to bear it. Thou shalt find greatest ease to be quiet. I say the same of scoffs, slanders, detractions, which tend to our disgrace; 'tis but opinion; if we would neglect or contemn them, they would reflect disgrace on them that offered them.

'Yea, but I am ashamed, disgraced, degraded, exploded; my notorious crimes and villainies are come to light!'

Be content; 'tis but a nine days' wonder; 'tis heavy, ghastly, fearful news at first, but thine offence will be forgotten in an instant. Thou art not the first offender, nor shalt thou be the last. If he alone should accuse thee that were faultless, how many executioners, how many accusers, wouldst thou have? Shall every man have his desert, thou wouldst peradventure be a saint in comparison. Be not dismayed; it is human to err. Be penitent, ask forgiveness and vex thyself no more.

THERE will not be wanting those who will much discommend this treatise of love-melancholy, and object that it is too light for a divine, too phantastical, and fit only for a wanton poet. So that they may be admired for grave philosophers and staid carriage, they cannot abide to hear talk of love-toys; in all their outward actions they are averse; and yet, in their cogitations, they are all but as bad, if not worse than others. I am almost afraid to relate the passions which this tyrant love causeth among men; it hath wrought such stupendous and prodigious effects, such dire mischances, such foul offences.

As there be divers causes of this heroical love, so there be many good remedies, among which good counsel and persuasion are of great moment, especially if it proceed from a wise, fatherly, discreet person. They will lament and howl for a while; but let him proceed, by foreshewing the miserable dangers that will surely happen, the pains of hell, joys of paradise, and the like; and this is a very good means for abating of the evil that afflicts them, for love is learned of itself, but hardly left without a tutor.

In sober sadness, marriage is a bondage, a thraldom, a hindrance to all good enterprises; 'he hath married a wife, and therefore cannot come'; a rock on which many are saved, many are cast away. Not that the thing is evil in itself, or troublesome, but full of happiness and a thing which pleases God; but to indiscreet, sensual persons, it is a feral plague, many times an hell itself.

If thy wife be froward, all is in an uproar; if wise and learned, she will be insolent and peevish; if poor, she brings beggary; if young, she is wanton and untaught. Say the best, she is a commanding servant; thou hadst better have taken a good housewifely maid in her smock. Since, then, there is such hazard in the married state, keep thyself as thou art; 'tis good to match, much better to be free. Consider withal how free, how happy, how secure, how heavenly, in respect, a single man is.

But when all is said, since some be good, some bad, let's put it to the venture. Marry while thou mayest and take thy fortune as it falls. Be not so covetous, so distrustful, so curious and nice, but let's all marry; to-morrow is St. Valentine's Day. Since, then, marriage is the last and best cure of heroical love, all doubts are cured and impediments removed. Let us marry, therefore, and may God send us all good wives!

TAKE this for a corollary and conclusion; as thou tenderest thine own welfare in love-melancholy, in the melancholy of religion and in all other melancholy; observe this short precept—Be not solitary; be not idle.

The Rights of War and Peace

HUGO GROTIUS

GROTIUS'S first publication was the Mare Liberum (1609), asserting the freedom of the seas. His monumental work De Jure Belli et Pacis (The Rights of War and Peace) was published in 1625. An earlier work on this subject was a treatise On the Law of Spoil, written in 1604 but not published until 1868. He also wrote on theology, and his Annals of the Netherlands is the best contemporary account of the revolt against Spain. But it was the De Jure which made Grotius one of the great jurists of the world. It laid the foundations of modern international jurisprudence by the endeavour to weigh the often conflicting claims of law and morality as applied to the conduct of state towards state.

I—MOTIVES AND NATURE OF THE UNDERTAKING

BEING fully assured that there is some right common to all nations which takes place both in the preparations and in the course of war, I had many and weighty reasons inducing me to write a treatise upon it. I observed through the Christian world a licence in regard to war of which even barbarians ought to be ashamed. I observed people rush to arms upon frivolous, or, rather, no occasions at all; and once arms were taken up, good-bye to any reverence for law, whether divine or human. It was just as if a single declaration of war had liberated madness to commit all manner of crimes.

The spectacle of such monstrous barbarism brought many, and those in no wise ill men, to hold that a Christian, whose duty consists principally in loving all men, ought to be forbidden the use of arms. With them appear sometimes to agree Johannes Ferus and our countryman, Erasmus, men that were great lovers of peace both ecclesiastical and civil. But I suppose they had the same view as those have who, in order to make things that are crooked straight, usually bend them as much the other way. A cure must be applied as well to prevent believing that nothing, as that all things, is lawful.

Let the laws, then, be silent in the midst of arms; but only those laws that are civil and judicial, and proper for times of peace, not those other laws that are perpetual of obligation and suited to all times. For it was well said by Dion of Prusa [Chrysostom] that between enemies the written—that is, civil—laws are of no force, but the unwritten are; that is, those which nature dictates or the consent of nations has instituted. This is shown in that ancient formula of the Romans, 'My view is that these things must be recovered by a pure and just war.' The Romans, as Varro observed, also were slow in entering upon war, because they thought no war except a just one should be carried on. It was a saying of Camillus that wars ought to be managed with as much justice as valour, and of Scipio Africanus that the

Roman people began and ended their wars with justice. You can read in another author, 'There are laws of war, as there are laws of peace.'

Method of Investigation

What method we thought fit to use we have shown in fact rather than in theory in this treatise. It handles far the noblest part of jurisprudence. For in the first book, after premising some things concerning the origin of right, we have examined the general question whether any war is just. Afterwards, to discover the difference between a public and a private war, our business was to explain the extent of the supreme power, what people, what kings have it in full, who in part, who with a power of alienating it, and who have it without that power. And then we had to expound the duty of subjects to sovereigns.

The second book, undertaken to explain all the causes whence war may arise, shows at large what things are common, what personal, what right one person may have over another, what obligation arises from ownership, what is the rule of legal succession, what right accrues from covenant or contract, what the force and interpretation of treaties, what of an oath, both public and private, what may be due for damage done, what are the privileges of ambassadors, what the right of burying the dead and what the nature of punishments.

The third book has for its first subject-matter what is lawful in war. Then, having distinguished that which is done with bare impunity, or which is even defended as lawful among foreign nations, from that which is really blameless, it descends upon the several kinds of peace and all conventions concluded in war.

My first care was to refer the proofs of those things that belong to the law of nature to some such certain notions as none can deny without doing violence to his judgement. For the principles of that law, if you rightly consider, are manifest and self-evident, almost after the same manner as those things are that we perceive with our outward senses, which do not deceive us if the organs are rightly disposed and if other things necessary are not wanting.

I have likewise, towards the proof of this law, made use of the testimonies of philosophers, historians, poets and, in the last place, orators; not as if they were to be implicitly believed without enquiry; but that when men of different times and places unanimously affirm the same thing for truth, this ought to be ascribed to a general cause, which in the questions treated of by us can be no other than either a just inference drawn from the principles of nature, or an universal consent. One shows the law of nature, the other the law of nations.

II—WAR IN RELATION TO LAW

The law of nature is a dictate of right reason indicating that moral guilt or rectitude is inherent in any action according to its agreement or disagreement with our rational—and social—nature; and, consequently, that such an action is either forbidden or enjoined by God, the Author of our nature. The actions upon which such a dictate is given are in themselves either obligatory or unlawful, and must consequently be understood to be either commanded or forbidden by God Himself.

This natural law does not only respect such things as depend not upon human will, but also many things which are consequent to some act of that will. Thus, property, as now in use, was introduced by man's will, and, being once admitted, this law of nature informs us that it is a wicked thing to take away from any man against his will what is properly his own.

Wherefore Paulus, the civilian, says that theft is prohibited by the law of nature; Ulpian, that it is dishonourable by nature; and Euripides, that it is hateful to God. Furthermore, the law of nature is so unalterable that God Himself cannot change it. For though the power of God be infinite, yet there are some things to which this infinite power does not extend. For instance, as God Himself cannot effect that twice two should not be four, so neither can He effect that what is intrinsically evil should not be evil.

The Lawfulness of War

Among the first impressions of nature there is nothing repugnant to war; nay, all things rather favour it; for both the end of war—being the preservation of life or limbs, and either the securing or getting things useful to life—is very agreeable to those first motions of nature; and to make use of force in case of necessity is in no wise disagreeable thereunto, since nature has given to every animal strength to defend and help itself.

But right reason and the nature of society, which is to be examined in the second and chief place, do not prohibit all manner of violence, but only that which is repugnant to society—that is, which invades another's right; for the design of society is that everyone should quietly enjoy his own, with the help and by the united force of the whole community. It may be easily conceived that the necessity of having recourse to violent means for self-defence might have taken place, even though what we call 'property' had never been introduced. For our lives, limbs and liberties had still been properly our own and could not have been—without manifest injustice—invaded. So also to have made use of things then in common, and to have consumed them as far as nature required, had been the right of the first possessor; and if anyone had attempted to hinder him so doing, he had been guilty of a real injury.

Sovereignty and Right of Making War

Lawyers do not agree whether in those cases wherein it is allowed that inferior magistrates have a right to take up arms such a war ought to be called 'public.' Indeed, if by 'public' we mean only what is done by virtue of a magistrate's power, no doubt such wars are 'public'; and therefore they that in such a case resist the magistrate are liable to the punishments due to those that rebel against their superiors. But if 'public' be taken in a higher sense, for that which is regular, they are not public wars; because to render the idea complete there must be an express resolution of the sovereign and several other circumstances. Sovereign power is said to be that whose acts

are not subordinate to another's authority, so that they cannot be invalidated at the pleasure of any other human will.

Here we must reject their opinion who will have the supreme power to be always, and without exception, in the people; so that they may restrain or punish their kings as often as they abuse their power. What mischief this opinion has occasioned, and may yet occasion, if once the minds of people are fully possessed with it, every wise man sees.

There are others who fancy to themselves a reciprocal dependence between the king and the people, so that, according to them, the people ought to obey the king while he makes a good use of his power; but likewise, when he abuses it, he becomes in his turn dependent on the people. Now, if by what they say they mean only that our duty to our sovereign does not oblige us to do anything manifestly unjust, they say but the truth; but this implies no right to compel the king or to command him.

Indeed, all men have naturally a right to secure themselves from injuries by resistance, as we said before. But civil society being instituted for the preservation of peace, there immediately arises a superior right in the state over us and ours, so far as is necessary for that end. Therefore the state has a power to prohibit the unlimited use of that right towards every other person, for maintaining public peace and good order, which doubtless it does, for if that promiscuous right of resistance should be allowed there would be no longer a state, but a multitude without union.

Rebellion Admissible in Extreme Cases

Those princes who depend on the people—whether they at first were established on that footing, or their authority was thus regulated by a subsequent agreement, as in Sparta—if they offend against the laws and the state, may not only be resisted by force, but, if it be necessary, may be punished by death. If a king or other prince has abdicated his power or manifestly abandoned it, we may thereafter do the same to him as to any private individual; but negligence in discharging the functions of government is not to be taken for a real abdication. If a king alienates his kingdom, or renders it dependent on any other power, he forfeits the crown. If a king shall aim at the ruin of his whole people he loses his kingdom.

Justifiable Causes of War

Now, as many sources as there are of judicial actions, so many causes may there be of war. For where the methods of justice cease, war begins. Most men assign three just causes of war: self-defence, the recovery of one's own property, and punishment. If a man is assaulted in such a manner that his life shall appear in inevitable danger, he may not only make war upon, but very justly destroy, the aggressor; and from this instance, which everyone must allow us, it appears that such a private war may be just and lawful. I can by no means approve of what some authors have advanced, that by the law of nations it is permitted to take up arms to reduce the growing power of a prince or state, which, if too much augmented, may possibly injure us. In general, there is no just cause of war save injury done to rights of persons or property. International law, therefore, passes over into civil law, in many questions affecting possession or acquisition of rights, performance of contracts, or compensation for damage.

Property in the Sea

We affirm that none can have property in the sea, whether taken in the whole, or in respect to its principal branches. The cause which obliged mankind to desist from the custom of using things in common has nothing to do in this affair; for the sea is of so vast an extent that it is sufficient for all the uses that nations can draw thence, either as to water, fishing, or navigation. It seems to appear that the property and dominion of the sea might belong to him who is in possession of the lands on both sides, though it be open higher up, as a gulf, or above and below, as a strait—provided it is not too great a part of the sea compared with the lands on both sides. But it must be owned that in all parts of the sea that were known in the time of the Roman Empire, from the first ages even down to the time of Justinian, it was the law of nations that no people whatever should claim a property in the sea.

Now, if a certain space of sea may be, as it were, an appurtenance to the ground of a private person, so far as it is shut up there, and so inconsiderable that it may be thought part of their ground, and if this be not repugnant to the law of nature, why may not a part of the sea, surrounded with land, belong to one or more nations who are in possession of the shores?

But it is here to be noted that if in any place this law of nations about the sea should not be received, or though it were, should be afterwards abolished, it does not follow that a people, merely because they are in possession of the lands, are likewise in possession of the sea enclosed in them. Nor is an international act sufficient in this case; but the taking possession must, by an overt act, be signified and made known. And if afterwards the possession, thus gained by right of prior occupancy, shall be quitted, then the sea returns to its original nature.

It is also certain that he who is in possession of any part of the sea cannot lawfully hinder unarmed ships from sailing there; since such a passage, even through another's country, cannot justly be hindered, though it be commonly less necessary and more dangerous.

Jurisdiction and National Continuity

Property and jurisdiction may entirely cease by being abandoned. But there is another manner of their lapsing, when the subject in which the jurisdiction, or property, is vested ceases to be and leaves no successor. The body politic becomes extinct, either when all its members are destroyed; or when its constitution is broken up (as when subjects either are disunited on account of pestilence, or sedition; or, again, are by force so scattered that they cannot reunite, which often happens in a war)

A people, too, may lose all or some of those rights which they had in common; and this happens either when everyone is brought into slavery, or when, though they retain their personal liberty, they are yet deprived of sovereignty.

But if a people only leave their former place, then, provided their political form continue, they do not cease to be a people. The type



JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU was born at Geneva, June 28, 1712. After severing relations with Madame de Warens he settled in Paris in 1741, and devoted himself to literature. Religious and political heresies propounded in his works necessitated his withdrawal to Switzerland and, in 1766, to England. He returned to Paris in 1770, and died July 2, 1778. This portrait is from the original in the Musée Carnavalet, Paris.

DAVID HUME (1711-1776) was one of the most vital thinkers of modern times. In 1737 appeared A Treatise on Human Nature, and this was followed by Essays, Moral, Social and Political and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Hume's philosophy, as expressed in these works, is based on universal scepticism, and differs from contemporary French thought in being purely speculative and not written for political ends. This portrait is from the painting by Allan Ramsay.



IMMANUEL KANT was born at Königsberg on April 22, 1724, and died there on February 12, 1804. Son of a saddler of Scottish origin he achieved his doctorate at Königsberg University in 1755, and became professor of logic and metaphysics in 1770. His works include Thoughts on the True Estimate of Living Forces, 1747; General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, 1755; Observations on the Sense of the Beautiful and the Sublime, 1764; Dreams of a Visionary, 1766; a prelude in Latin to the Critique of Pure Reason, 1770; What is Enlightenment? 1784; Foundation of the Metaphysics of Ethics, 1785; and Metaphysical Elements of Legal Science, 1797.

ADAM SMITH was born at Kirkcaldy, June 5, 1723, and was educated at Glasgow University and Balliol College, Oxford. In 1751, he was chosen professor of logic at Glasgow, where from 1752 to 1763 he was professor of moral philosophy. After giving ten years mainly to writing and study, the result of his labours appeared in 1776 in his famous work The Wealth of Nations. He died July 17, 1790.



THOMAS PAINE was born at Thetford, Norfolk, January 29, 1737. He gave himself a good education, and became an exciseman, but after being dismissed from this service he went to America in 1774, where he began to write. His pamphlet, Common Sense, issued in 1776, favoured the independence of the colonies, and won him great popularity. During the subsequent war he fought in the colonial army and received a government appointment, from which he was later dismissed. He came to England in 1787, but the publication of The Rights of Man led to his fleeing from this country. In 1792 he was elected a member of the French Convention. He died on June 8, 1809.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE was born at Rammenau, Lusatia, May 19, 1762, son of a ribbon-weaver. The patronage of a neighbouring nobleman enabled him to receive a good education, and after studying at Jena University he acted as tutor in various families in Saxony, Switzerland, and Poland. At Königsberg he met Kant whose ardent disciple he became, and wrote his Critique of all Revelation, one result of the publication of which was his appointment to the professorship of philosophy at Jena. In 1799 charges of atheism were brought against him and he resigned his chair and retired to Berlin, where he lectured on philosophy. In 1807, when the French invaded Prussia, Fichte showed his fervent patriotism in his Addresses to the German Nation. He died at Berlin, January 27, 1814.



JEREMY BENTHAM, philosopher, jurist, and reformer, was born in London, February 15, 1748, the son of an attorney. Educated at Westminster and Oxford, he was called to the bar in 1772, but soon ceased to practise, although he spent the whole of his life in legal studies. For over twenty years he was negotiating with the government for the erection of a model prison, receiving £23,000 by way of compensation when the scheme was abandoned. A friend of the leading philosophers and statesmen of his day, Bentham gave a great impetus to radicalism by establishing The Westminster Review in 1823. He died June 6, 1832, his skeleton being preserved in the museum of University College, London.



EDMUND BURKE (1729-1797) is not the least brilliant figure in that brilliant eighteenth century company that also included Johnson and Sheridan, Garrick and Reynolds. He established his literary reputation in 1756 with his Vindication of Natural Society and his Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful, and he crowned it in 1790 when he published his Reflections on the Revolution in France. He entered parliament in 1769 and was a constant advocate of religious toleration, financial reform and an indulgent colonial policy. As a practical politician Burke is not immune against a charge of 'trimming,' but as the constant champion of evolution as opposed to revolution he became the apostle of conservatism. This portrait, by Sir Joshua Reynolds, is in the National Portrait Gallery

of government, whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, does not affect the point.

Aliens and Alliances

A PERMANENT abode ought not to be refused to strangers who, being expelled their own country, seek refuge elsewhere, provided they conform to the law as established and all other provisions for the avoidance of sedition.

Concerning leagues, it is often disputed whether they may be lawfully made with those who are not of the true religion. In respect of the law of nature this involves no doubt. For such right of alliance is common to all men, so as to admit of no exception on account of religion. As there is no harm in doing good to infidels, so neither is there any in entreating their assistance.

Here, then, we have not a case of intrinsic or absolute evil. It must be weighed in regard to circumstances; for we ought to take precautions lest by our too intimate relations we bring scandal or infection on the weak.

On Punitive Wars

WE must also know that kings, and those who are invested with a power equal to that of kings, have a right to exact punishments, not only for injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but likewise for those which are in any persons whatsoever grievous violations of the law of nature or of nations. For the liberty of consulting the benefit of human society by punishments, which at first was in every particular person, does now, since civil societies and courts of justice have been instituted, reside in those who are possessed of the supreme power—not as they have authority over others, but as they are in subjection to none.

On Mercenaries in an Unjust War

BUT as those alliances which are entered into with the promise of assistance in any war without regard to the cause are unlawful, so there is no course of life more abominable than that of soldiers, who, without considering the justice of the cause, fight for pay. Did they sell only their own lives it were no great matter; but they sell also the lives of many a harmless creature—as much more odious than hangmen, as it is worse to kill without a reason than with one. War is no fine employment; nay, it is so horrible a thing that nothing but absolute necessity, or true charity, can make it honourable.

III—RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN WARFARE

Of Fraud Against the Enemy.

IN things of a moral nature, those means which conduce to a certain end do assume the very nature of that end. Therefore we are supposed to be authorised to employ those things which are necessary to the obtaining our just rights. If I cannot otherwise save my life, I may by any force whatever repel him who attempts it, though perhaps he who does so is not in any way to blame. This right does not properly arise from the other's crime, but from the prerogative with which nature has invested me of defending myself.

The Roman lawyers accounted all fraud used against an enemy innocent; and that it mattered not whether a man baffled his enemy by force or fraud. But every promise confers a new and special right on him to whom the promise is made; and this holds good even among enemies, notwithstanding their open hostility, and that not only in express promises, but also in tacit ones, as when an interview is demanded.

In other speeches it is enough to clear us of a lie if the words be true in any sense not altogether unusual; but in things sworn (because therein we treat not only with men, but with God, to Whom we stand obliged by our oaths, though there arise no right at all to man) it is necessary that our words be true in that sense in which we sincerely believe those to whom we swear do understand them, so that we may perfectly abhor the impiety of those who do not scruple to affirm that it is as lawful to deceive men with oaths as children with playthings. Some kinds of fraud, though permitted by nature, are rejected by nations and persons out of a greatness of spirit or a confidence of strength.

Nowadays the hanging out of a white flag is a tacit sign of demanding a parley, and shall be as obligatory as if the request were in words.

By the law of nations all subjects of the sovereign from whom one has received an injury are liable to the rule of reprisals. For reprisals are much of the same nature with taxes which are introduced for the payment of public debts. Among subjects, the law of nations excepts from reprisals only the persons of ambassadors and their baggage, when they are not sent to our enemies. But by the civil law of nations the persons of women and children are privileged, and even the goods of scholars and such as engage in marketing. 'Tender age must excuse the child and her sex the woman,' says Seneca.

What we say of them may be generally said of all men whose manner of life is wholly averse from arms. If not for justice, yet for pity, we must not attempt anything which may prove the destruction of innocents, unless for extraordinary reasons and for the safety of many.

Treatment of the Conquered in the Matter of Government and Taxation

IF equity is indispensable and humanity praiseworthy in our relations with private persons, they are the more applicable towards a nation, or part of one, in that injury or good is more considerable when done to many. As other things may be obtained in a just war, so the right of a sovereign over a people, and the right which the people themselves have in regard to sovereignty, may be acquired, but only so far as it is allowable by the degree of retribution due to their offence or the value of any other obligation.

To this we may add the necessity of avoiding extreme danger. In national peril it is a cruel compassion to trust too much to a conquered enemy. Sallust records of the ancient Romans, 'Our ancestors, the most religious of mankind, took nothing from the vanquished but the power to hurt.' It is a reflection worthy of a Christian; and another of his remarks is to the like effect: 'Wise men make war for the sake of peace, and undergo labour in hopes of rest.' Agreeably to this, our Christian divines teach us that the end of war is to remove those things which disturb peace.

Before the days of Ninus, the custom was rather to defend the bounds of a state than to enlarge them. The prudent moderation of the old Romans comes very near to this exemplary innocence of primitive times. 'What would our empire now have been,' says Seneca, 'if sound policy had not intermixed conquered and conquerors?'

Lastly, what is very admirable, all within the compass of the Roman Empire were by the decree of the Emperor Antoninus made citizens of Rome. There is another kind of moderation in victory—to leave to the conquered, either kings or people, their own government.

The imposition of taxes is often not so much to re-imburse the charges of a war as for the security of both conqueror and conquered for the future. Petilius Cerialis, in Tacitus, thus argues for the Romans with the Lingones and other Gauls, 'We, though so often provoked, yet by right of victory exact of you only what is necessary to maintain peace. For the peace of nations cannot be maintained without arms, nor arms without pay, nor pay without taxes.'

Agreeable hereunto are matters concerning the surrender of arms, fleet, elephants, and ceasing to maintain forts and an army. But that their own government be left to the vanquished is not only agreeable to humanity but also to policy.

Neutrality

It is the duty of those not engaged in a war to do nothing that may strengthen him who prosecutes an ill cause, or to hinder the movements of him that hath a just cause, as we have said above; but in a dubious cause to behave themselves alike to both parties, as in suffering them to pass through their territory, in supplying their troops with provisions, and not relieving the besieged.

Arbitration

Though even concerning the arbitrators, by whose judgement both parties have agreed to stand, the civil law may provide, as in some places it has provided, that it be permissible to appeal and exhibit bills of complaint, yet this cannot hold between kings and nations. For here is no superior power which can hinder or annul the obligation of a promise. Their sentence must be upheld, whether fair or unfair.

Concluding Exhortation to Peace

And here I hope I may make an end, not that I have said all that might have been said, but what has been said may be enough to lay foundations, on which, if any other build a more stately fabric, so far shall he be from incurring my envy that he shall earn my gratitude.

Yet ere I dismiss my reader, just as before, when I treated of the design of undertaking war, I brought arguments to persuade all men to the utmost of their power to prevent it, so now I shall add some few admonitions that may be of use, both in war and after war, for the preservation of faith and peace. Violence is something brutish, and this is most prominent in war.

Wherefore the greater care must be taken to temper it with humanity, lest by too much imitating beasts we absolutely forget the man.

A safe peace is not too dearly bought at the expense of forgiving offenders, damages and charges, especially among Christians, to whom our Lord bequeathed peace. Peace being made, whatever the conditions, they must be strictly observed on account of that sacred obligation which we have proved attaches to faith. We ought scrupulously to beware not only of perfidy, but of whatsoever exasperates feeling. For what Cicero said of private friendships may be no less rightly applied to these public ones. All friendly relations are to be observed with the utmost devotion and honour, but particularly such as have been recovered from enmity by reconciliation.

May the Almighty (Who alone can do this) inscribe these maxims on the hearts of Christian powers; may He grant them also a mind with an understanding of law divine and human, and with a sense of being a ministry ordained to govern man—man, who of all His creatures is dearest to God.

Discourse on Method

RENÉ DESCARTES

DOUBT, not scepticism, was Descartes's philosophic starting point. Warned by the fate of Galileo, he withheld from publication during his lifetime his treatise on The World which he had finished in 1633. His search after philosophical certainty is explained in the Discourse on Method published in 1637. In 1641 he published Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, and he dealt with morals in Principia Philosophiae, and Traité des Passions de L'Ame. Descartes stands at the head of the school of mathematicians which linked up the mathematics of the Renaissance with modern mathematical writings. The invention of analytical geometry dates from the publication of his Geometry. His Discourse on Method is a landmark in the modern history of philosophic thought.

I—THE AIM OF THE DISCOURSE

Good sense or reason must be better distributed than anything else in the world, for no man desires more of it than he already has. This shows that reason is by nature equal in all men. If there is diversity of opinion, this arises from the fact that we conduct our thought by different ways and consider not the same things. It does not suffice that the understanding be good—it must be well applied.

My mind is no better than another's, but I have been lucky enough to chance on certain ways, which have led me to a certain method by means of which it seems to me that I may by degrees augment my knowledge to the modest measure of my intellect and my length of days. I shall be very glad to make plain in this Discourse the paths I have followed, and to picture my life so that all may judge of it, and by the

setting forth of their opinions may furnish me with yet other means of improvement.

It is my design not to teach the method which each man ought to follow for the right guidance of his reason, but only to show in what manner I have tried to conduct my own.

I had been nourished on letters from my infancy, but as soon as I had finished the customary course of study, I found myself hampered by so many doubts and errors that I seemed to have reaped no benefits, except that I had observed more and more of my ignorance. Yet I was at one of the most celebrated schools in Europe, and I was not held inferior to my fellow-students, some of whom were destined to take the place of our masters; nor did our age seem less fruitful of good wits than any which had gone before.

Though I did not cease to esteem the studies of the schools, I began to think that I had given enough time to languages, enough also to ancient books, their stories and their fables; for when a man spends too much time in travelling abroad he becomes a stranger in his own country; and so, when he is too curious concerning what went on in past ages, he is apt to remain ignorant of what is taking place in his own day. I set a high price on eloquence, and I was in love with poetry; I rejoiced in mathematics, but knew nothing of its true use.

I revered our theology, but, since the way to heaven lies open to the ignorant no less than to the learned, and the revealed truths which lead thither are beyond our intelligence, I did not dare to submit them to my feeble reasonings.

In philosophy there is no truth which is not disputed and which, consequently, is not doubtful; the other sciences all borrow their principles from philosophy.

Therefore, I entirely gave up the study of letters and employed the rest of my youth in travelling, being resolved to seek no other science than that which I might find within myself, or in the great Book of the World.

Here the best lesson that I learnt was not to believe too firmly anything of which I had learnt merely by example and custom; and thus little by little was delivered from many errors which are liable to obscure the light of nature and to diminish our capacity of hearing reason. Finally, I resolved one day to study myself in the same way, and in this it seems to me I succeeded much better than if I had never departed from either my country or my books.

II—THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS

BEING in Germany, on my way to rejoin the army after the coronation of the Emperor [Ferdinand II], I was lying at an inn where, in default of other conversation, I was at liberty to entertain my own thoughts. Of these, one of the first was that often there is less perfection in works which are composite than in those which issue from a single hand. Such was the case with buildings, cities, states; for a people which has made its laws from time to time to meet particular occasions will enjoy a less perfect polity than a people which from the beginning has observed the constitution of a far-sighted legislator. This is very certain, that the estate of true religion, which God alone has ordained, must be incomparably better guided than any other.

And again, I considered that as, during our childhood, we had been governed by our appetites and our tutors, which are often at variance, which neither of them perhaps always gave us the best counsel, it is almost impossible that our judgments should be so pure and so solid as they would have been if we had had the perfect use of our reason from the time of our birth and had never been guided by anything else.

Hence, as regarded the opinions that I had received into my belief, I thought that, as a private person may pull down his own house to build a finer, so I could not do better than remove them therefrom in order to replace them by sounder, or, after I should have adjusted them to the level of reason, to establish the same once more.

When I was younger I had studied logic, analytical geometry and algebra. Of these, I found that logic served rather for explaining things we already know; while of geometry and algebra, the former is so tied to the consideration of figures that it cannot exercise the understanding without wearying the imagination, and the latter is so bound down to certain rules and ciphers that it has been made a confused and obscure art which hampers the mind instead of a science which cultivates it. And as a state is better governed which has but few laws, and those strictly observed, I believed that I should find sufficient these four precepts:

THE first was never to accept anything as true when I did not recognize it clearly to be so—that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice, but to include in my opinions nothing beyond that which should present itself so clearly and distinctly to my mind that I might have no occasion to doubt it.

The second was to divide up the difficulties which I should examine into as many parts as possible, and as should be required for their better solution.

The third was to conduct my thoughts in order, by beginning with the simplest objects, so as to mount little by little, by stages, to the most complex knowledge, even supposing an order among things which did not naturally stand in an order of antecedent and consequent.

And the last was to make everywhere enumerations so complete, and surveys so wide, that I should be sure of omitting nothing.

Exact observation of these precepts gave me such facility in unravelling the questions comprehended in geometrical analysis and in algebra, that in two or three months not only did I find my way through many which I had formerly accounted too hard for me, but, towards the end, I seemed to be able to determine, in those which were new to me, by what means and to what extent it was possible to resolve them.

And so I promised myself that I would apply my system with equal success to the difficulties of other sciences; but since their principles must all be borrowed from philosophy, in which I found no certain principles of its own, I thought that before all else I must try to establish some therein. By way of preparation (for I was then but twenty-three years old) I must root up from my mind my previous bad opinion of it, and must practise my method in order that I might be confirmed in it.

III—A RULE OF LIFE

MEANWHILE I must have a rule of life as a shelter while my new house was in building, and this consisted of three or four maxims.

The first was to conform myself to the laws and customs of my country and to hold to the religion in which, by God's grace, I had been brought up; guiding myself, for the rest, by the least extreme opinions of the most intelligent. Among extremes I counted all promises by which a man curtails anything of his liberty; for I should have deemed it a grave fault against good sense if, because I approved something in a given moment, I had bound myself to accept it as good for ever after.

My second maxim was to follow resolutely even doubtful opinions when sure opinions were not available, just as the traveller, lost in some forest, had better walk straight forward, though in a chance direction; for thus he will arrive, if not precisely where he desires to be, at least at a better place than the middle of a forest.

My third maxim was to endeavour always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and to change my desires rather than the order of the world, and in general to bring myself to believe that there is nothing wholly in our power except our thoughts. And I believe that herein lay the secret of those philosophers who, in the days of old, could withdraw from the domination of fortune and, despite pain and poverty, challenge the felicity of their gods.

Finally, after looking out upon the divers occupations of men, I pondered that I could do no better than persevere in that which I had chosen—so deep was my content in discovering every day by its means truths which seemed to me important, yet were unknown to the world.

Having thus made myself sure of these maxims, and having set them apart together with the verities of faith, I judged that for the rest of my opinions I might set freely to work to divest myself of them. For nine years, therefore, I went up and down the world a spectator rather than an actor. These nine years slipped away before I had begun to seek for the foundations of any philosophy more certain, nor perhaps should I have dared to undertake the quest had it not been put about that I had already succeeded.

IV—'I THINK, THEREFORE I AM'

I HAD long since remarked that in matters of conduct it is necessary sometimes to follow opinions known to be uncertain, as if they were not subject to doubt; but, because now I was desirous to devote myself to the search after truth, I considered that I must do just the contrary, and reject as absolutely false everything concerning which I could imagine the least doubt to exist.

Thus, because our senses sometimes deceive us, I would suppose that nothing is such as they make us to imagine it; and because I was as likely to err as another in reasoning, I rejected as false all the reasons which I had formerly accepted as demonstrative; and finally, considering that all the thoughts we have when awake can come to us also when we sleep without any of them being true, I resolved to feign that everything which had ever entered my mind was no more truth than the illusion of my dreams.

But I observed that, while I was thus resolved to feign that everything was false, I who thought must of necessity be somewhat; and remarking this truth—*I think, therefore I am*—was so firm and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were unable to shake it, I judged that I could unhesitatingly accept it as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking. I could feign that there was no world, I could not feign that I did not exist. And I judged that I might take it as a general rule that the things which we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true, and that the only difficulty lies in the way of discerning which those things are that we conceive distinctly.

After this, reflecting upon the fact that I doubted, and that consequently my being was not quite perfected (for I saw that to *know* is a greater perfection than to *doubt*), I bethought me to inquire whence I had learnt to think of something more perfect than myself; and it was clear to me that this must come from some nature which was in fact more perfect. For other things I could regard as dependencies of my nature if they were real, and if they were not real they might proceed from nothing—that is to say, they might exist in me by way of defect.

But it could not be the same with the idea of a being more perfect than my own; for to derive it from nothing was manifestly impossible; and because it is no less repugnant that the more perfect should follow and depend upon the less perfect than that something should come forth out of nothing. I could not derive it from myself.

It remained, then, to conclude that it was put into me by a nature truly more perfect than was I and possessing in itself all the perfections of what I could form an idea—in a word, by God. To which I added that, since I knew some perfections which I did not possess, I was not the only being who existed, but that there must of necessity be some other being, more perfect, on whom I depended, and from whom I had acquired all that I possessed; for if I had existed alone and independent of all other, so that I had of myself all this little whereby I participated in the Perfect Being, I should have been able to have in myself all those other qualities which I knew myself to lack, and so to be infinite, eternal, immutable, omniscient, almighty—in fine, to possess all the perfections which I could observe in God.

PROPOSING to myself the geometer's subject matter, and then turning again to examine my idea of a Perfect Being, I found that existence was comprehended in that idea just as in the idea of a triangle is comprehended the notion that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles; and that consequently it is as certain that God, this Perfect Being is or exists, as any geometrical demonstration could be.

That there are many who persuade themselves that there is a difficulty in knowing Him is due to the scholastic maxim that there is nothing in the understanding which has not first been

in the senses; where the ideas of God and the soul have never been.

Than the existence of God all other things, even those which it seems to a man extravagant to doubt, such as his having a body, are less certain. Nor is there any reason sufficient to remove such doubt but such as presupposes the existence of God. From His existence it follows that our ideas or notions, being real things, and coming from God, cannot but be true in so far as they are clear and distinct. In so far as they contain falsity, they are confused and obscure, there is in them an element of mere negation (*elles participent du neant*); that is to say, they are thus confused in us because we ourselves are not all perfect. And it is evident that falsity or imperfection can no more come forth from God than can perfection proceed from nothingness. But, did we not know that all which is in us of the real and the true comes from a perfect and infinite being, however clear and distinct our ideas might be, we should have no reason for assurance that they possessed the final perfection—truth.

Reason instructs us that all our ideas must have some foundation of truth, for it could not be that the All-Perfect and the All-True should otherwise have put them into us; and because our reasonings are never so evident or so complete when we sleep as when we wake, although sometimes during sleep our imagination may be more vivid and positive, it also instructs us that such truth as our thoughts have will be in our waking thoughts rather than in our dreams.

V—WHY I DO NOT PUBLISH 'THE WORLD'

I HAVE always remained firm in my resolve to assume no other principle than that which I have used to demonstrate the existence of God and of the soul, and to receive nothing which did not seem to me clearer and more certain than the demonstrations of the philosophers had seemed before; yet not only have I found means of satisfying myself with regard to the principal difficulties which are usually treated of in philosophy, but also I have remarked certain laws which God has so established in nature, and of which He has implanted such notions in our souls, that we cannot doubt that they are observed in all which happens in the world.

The principal truths which flow from these I have tried to unfold in a treatise (On the World, or on Light), which certain considerations prevent me from publishing. This I concluded three years ago, and had begun to revise it for the printer, when I learnt that certain persons to whom I defer had disapproved an opinion on physics published a short time before by a certain person (Galileo, condemned by the Roman Inquisition in 1633), in which opinion I had noticed nothing prejudicial to religion; and this made me fear that there might be some among my opinions in which I was mistaken.

I now believe that I ought to continue to write all the things which I judge of importance, but ought in no wise to consent to their publication during my life. For my experience of the objections which might be made forbids me to hope for any profit from them. I have tried both friends and enemies, yet it has seldom happened that they have offered any objection which I had not in some measure foreseen; so that I have never, I may say, found a critic who did not seem to be either less rigorous or less fair-minded than myself.

Whereupon I gladly take this opportunity to beg those who shall come after us never to believe that the things which they are told come from me unless I have divulged them myself; and I am in nowise astonished at the extravagances attributed to those old philosophers whose writings have not come down to us. They were the greatest minds of their time, but have been ill reported.

Why, I am sure that the most devoted of those who now follow Aristotle would esteem themselves happy if they had as much knowledge of nature as he had, even on the condition that they should never have more! They are like ivy, which never mounts higher than the trees which support it, and which even comes down again after it has attained their summit. So at least, it seems to me, do they who, not content with knowing all that is explained by their author, would find in him the solution also of many difficulties of which he says nothing, and of which, perhaps, he never thought.

Yet their method of philosophising is very convenient for those who have but middling minds, for the obscurity of the distinctions and principles which they employ enables them to speak of all things as boldly as if they had knowledge of them, and sustain all they have to say against the most subtle and skilful without there being any means of convincing them; wherein they seem to me like a blind man who, in order to fight on equal terms with a man who has his sight, invites him into the depths of a cavern.

And I may say that it is to their interest that I should abstain from publishing the principles of the philosophy which I employ, for so simple and so evident are they that to publish them would be like opening windows into their caverns and letting in the day. But if they prefer acquaintance with a little truth, and desire to follow a plan like mine, there is no need for me to say to them any more in this discourse than I have already said.

For if they are capable of passing beyond what I have done, much rather will they be able to discover for themselves whatever I believe myself to have found out; besides which, the practice which they will acquire in seeking out easy things and thence passing to others which are more difficult, will stead them better than all my instructions.

But if some of the matters spoken about at the beginning of the Dioptrics and the Meteors [published with the Discourse on Method] should at first give offence because I have called them 'suppositions,' and have shown no desire to prove them, let the reader have patience to read the whole attentively, and I have hope that he will be satisfied.

The time remaining to me I have resolved to employ in trying to acquire some knowledge of nature, such that we may be able to draw from it more certain rules for medicine than those which we possess. And I hereby declare that I shall always hold myself more obliged to those by whose favour I enjoy my leisure undisturbed than I should be to any who should offer me the most esteemed employments in the world.

Leviathan

THOMAS HOBBES

THE development of Hobbes's greatest and best-known work was materially affected by the political unrest with which he found England seething on his return to it in 1637. Analysing the principles which underlay the dissensions, he found himself equally opposed to the theory of the divine right of kings and to the principles on which the Parliamentarians based their action. In the course of the following years he devoted himself to the construction of a science of politics and in 1651 he published Leviathan, or The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil. The work contains the most definite enunciation made up to that time of the doctrine of the social contract, which later took so different a shape in the hands of Rousseau.

I—OF MAN

NATURE, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the art of man so imitated that he can make an artificial animal. For by art is created that great leviathan called a commonwealth or state, which is but an artificial man; in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion; the magistrates and other officers the joints; reward and punishment the nerves; concord, health; discord, sickness; lastly, the pacts or covenants by which the parts were first set together resemble the 'fiat' of God at the Creation.

To describe this artificial man, I will consider: First, the matter and the artificer, both which is man; secondly, how it is made; thirdly, what is a Christian commonwealth; lastly, what is the kingdom of darkness.

And first, of man, The thoughts of man are, singly, every one a representation of some quality or accident of a body without us, called an object. There is no conception in the mind which has not first been begotten upon the organs of sense. The cause of sense is the eternal object which presseth upon the proper organ; not that, as hath been taught in the schools, the thing 'sendeth forth a visible or audible species.'

Imagination is the continuity of an image after the object is removed. When we would express that the image is decaying, we call it memory; in sleep, we call it dreams.

Of all invention, the most notable is that of speech, names, the register of thoughts; which are notes for remembrance, or signs, for transference. Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations. Words are wise men's counters, but the money of fools.

Reasoning is the reckoning, the addition and subtraction of the sequences of words, the sum being the conclusion. Which conclusions may be absurd, because men do not start—except in geometry—from the definitions of the words. Reason, therefore, implies speech.

In animals there are two sorts of motions—vital and voluntary. The beginings of motion within man are called 'endeavour.' Appetite is a motion towards; aversion a motion fromwards. Some are born in us, some are products of experience. The object of a man's appetite he calls 'good'; of his aversion, 'evil'; whether in promise (beautiful and ugly), in effect (pleasant, painful), or as means (useful, hurtful). Pleasures and pains arise from an object present, of the senses; or in expectation, of the mind. Thus 'pity' is the imagining of a like calamity befalling oneself.

'Deliberation' is the sum of the successive appetites or aversions which are concluded by the doing or not doing of the particular thing. 'Will' is the last appetite in deliberating. So, in the enquiry of the truth, opinions correspond to appetites, and the final judgement, the last opinion, to the will.

There are two kinds of knowledge; of 'fact,' and of 'the consequence of one affirmation to another.' The former is nothing else but sense and memory, and is absolute; the latter is called science, and is conditional. The register of the first is called history, natural or civil; that of the second is contained in books of philosophy, in corresponding groups—natural philosophy, and civil philosophy or politics. Natural philosophy breaks up into a number of groups, including mental and moral science.

Power is present means, whencesoever derived, to attain some future apparent good. Value is the price that will be given for the use of a man's power. To honour a man is to acknowledge his power; to dishonour him is to depreciate it. The public worth of a man is the value set on him by the commonwealth.

By manners, I mean those qualitites of mankind which are concerned with their living together in peace and unity. Desire of power tends to produce strife; other desires, as for ease, or for knowledge, incline men to obey a common power. To receive benefits, or to do injuries, greater than can be repaid or expiated, tends to make us hate the benefactor or the injured party.

II—OF CONTRACT AND SOVEREIGNTY

NATURE hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body and mind that are born in them, that one man cannot in respect of these claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend. From this equality ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. Therefore, if two men desire the same thing which they cannot both enjoy they become enemies, and seek each the destruction of the other, each mistrusting the other. So men invade each other, first for gain, second for safety, and third for reputation.

Hence, while men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in a state of war, every man against every man. In this state, notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place. Probably there never was actually such an universal condition; but we see it now among savage races and in the mutual relations of sovereigns. In this state of war, reason suggesteth articles of peace upon which men may agree; which articles are otherwise called the laws of nature.

The right 'of nature' is the right of self-preservation. 'Liberty' is the absence of impediments to the exercise of power. A 'law of nature' is a precept of reason forbidding a man to do what is destructive of his own life. In the state of nature every man has a 'right' to everything. Thus security comes only of the first fundamental law: 'To seek peace and follow it,' and 'by all means we can to defend ourselves.'

The second law follows: 'To lay down the right to everything, claiming only so much against others as we concede to others against ourselves.' This right being renounced or transferred, injustice is the revocation of that act. But since the object of a voluntary act is good to oneself, such renunciation is not valid if not good for oneself; hence a man cannot renounce the right of self-preservation.

The transferring of right, if not mutual, is free gift; if mutual, it is contract. When this is not simultaneous there is a covenant or pact. The covenant can become void only through some new fact arising after it was made. A covenant not to defend oneself against force by force is void *per se*.

The third law is: 'That men perform their covenants, made,' without which covenants are vain, and the state of war continues. The definition of injustice is 'the not-performance of a covenant.' No covenant is valid until there exists some power that can enforce the performance of it by penalties; that is, until there is a commonwealth. What is done to a man conformable to his own will signified to the doer is no injury to him.

The fourth law is that of 'gratitude'; that a man receiving a free gift endeavour that the giver may not suffer thereby. A fifth is 'complaisance'—that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. Others are pardon on repentance, and non-vindictiveness of punishment; and the common enjoyment—or, failing that, distribution by lot—of what cannot be equally divided.

Persons are either natural and actual, or fictitious and artificial, *i.e.* representing someone else, or even something else: as a church, a hospital, a bridge. When the representative has authority from the represented, we call the former the 'actor,' and the latter the 'author.' One person may artificially represent a multitude.

Now, men being in the state of nature may agree together; but there is no security, unless there be a power to enforce the covenant. Such a power can be created only if they agree together to confer all their own power on one man or one assembly; so that all the acts of such person or assembly have authority as from each one of them, and each one of them submits his individual will to that of such person or assembly. The multitude so united in one person is a commonwealth. This is the generation of that leviathan or mortal god to which, under the Immortal God, we owe our peace and defence.

He that carrieth this person is called 'sovereign,' and everyone beside is his 'subject.' This sovereign power may be attained either by natural force, 'acquisition,' or by voluntary 'institution.'

They that have instituted a commonwealth by covenant cannot make a new covenant contrary thereto without permission of the sovereign, since this is a breaking of their covenant with each other. On his part there is no covenant, so that breach of covenant by him cannot be pleaded as warranting abrogation of the covenant made. The sovereign cannot do the subjects injustice because, since he has their authority, what he does to them is done by their own will; so also they cannot punish him.

Since the sovereign was instituted for peace and defence, he controls the means to war and peace, and judges of opinions as conducing to peace or endangering it. He prescribes the rules of property, since in the state of nature there is no property; he has the right of adjudicature; of making war and peace with other commonwealths; of choosing all counsellors in peace and war; of rewarding and punishing, according to the law he has made, and of bestowing honour. Nay, if he grants away any of these powers the grant is null.

The sovereignty may be in one man, or in a limited assembly, or in an assembly of all—monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; these three forms only, though when they are misliked they are called other names. In any case, the power of the sovereign is absolute, whether a monarch or an assembly. He is the representative of the commonwealth, not deputies who may be chosen to tender petitions.

The three forms differ not in the power of the sovereign, but in their advantageousness. In monarchy, the private interest of the sovereign must coincide with that of the commonwealth as a whole; much more so than in aristocracy or democracy. An assembly cannot receive counsel secretly; a monarchy has the benefit of a single will instead of conflicting wills. There is no government by the mixture of the types, *e.g.* an elective 'king' is not a sovereign, but a minister.

Men submit themselves to an instituted sovereign, for fear of each other; to an acquired sovereignty, for fear of the sovereign. Acquired sovereignty or dominion is either by generation (paternal) or by conquest. A family, however, does not amount to a commonwealth, unless it be so great that it may not be subdued by war. Acquired sovereignty is absolute, for the same reasons as instituted sovereignty.

III—THE NATURAL COMMONWEALTH

Liberty is absence of impediments to motion. It is consistent with fear, also with necessity; for a voluntary act is yet necessary as having a cause which is a link in a chain of causes up to the First Cause, which is God. But men have created artificial

impediments or bonds called laws. The liberty of the subject lies only in such things as the sovereign has pretermitted, for he hath power to regulate all, even life and death, at his own will. The liberty praised in Rome and Athens was the liberty of the commonwealth as against other commonwealths.

The subject has liberty to disobey the sovereign's command if it contravene the law that the right of self-preservation cannot be abrogated, unless it be to endanger himself for the preservation of the commonwealth, as with soldiers. The subjects' obligation of obedience lasts so long as the sovereign's power of defending them, that being the purpose of his being made sovereign.

By systems I mean numbers of men joined in one interest. These are political, constituted by law; and private, permitted or forbidden by law. All, except a commonwealth, are subordinate to the commonwealth, and have not the character of sovereignty. The rights of governing bodies are only those expressly conceded by law, either generally or to them specifically. Systems in the commonwealth correspond to muscles in the natural body.

The nourishment of the commonwealth is its commodities or products, the distribution of which must be at the will of the sovereign, whether of land or of commodities, exchanged internally or trafficked abroad.

The procreation, or children, of a commonwealth are its 'plantations,' or 'colonies,' which may be commonwealths themselves, as children emancipated, or remain parts of the commonwealth.

By civil laws I mean those laws that men are bound to obey as members of any commonwealth. The sovereign is the sole legislator, and is not subject to the laws which he can repeal at pleasure. The civil laws are the laws of nature expressed as commands of the commonwealth, or the will of the sovereign so expressed; whatever is not the law of nature must be expressly made known and published. Both the law of nature and written law require interpretation, which is by sentence of the judge constituted by sovereign authority.

An intention of breaking the law is a sin; issuing in a breach of the law it is crime. Violation of the laws of nature is always and everywhere sin; it is crime only when a violation of the laws of a commonwealth. Unavoidable ignorance of a law is a complete excuse for breaking it, but ignorance due to lack of diligence is not unavoidable. Terror of present death, or the order of the sovereign, is a complete excuse. And many circumstances may serve as extenuation.

A punishment is an evil inflicted by public authority on him that hath done or omitted that which is said to be by the same authority a transgression of the law, to the end that the will of men may thereby be the better disposed to obedience. Now, this right of punishment is not transferred by the subjects to the sovereign, since they cannot surrender their right of self-defence against violence. But as all before had the natural right of hurting others, that right is left by the covenant to the sovereign alone, strengthened by the resignation thereof by the rest.

Punishments inflicted by man are 'corporal' or 'pecuniary,' or 'ignominy,' or 'imprisonment,' or 'exile,' or mixed of these. Corporal are capital, with or without torment, and less than capital. Pecuniary includes deprivation not only of money, but also of lands or other saleable goods; but such deprivation, if it is by way of compensation to the person injured, is not really punishment. Imprisonment, when it is only for the custody of a person accused, is not punishment. Exile is not so much a punishment as a command or permission to escape punishment, except when accompanied by deprivation of goods.

Infirmities of a commonwealth arise—from the first institution, when the sovereign has not assumed sufficient power; from such doctrines as that each man privately is the judge of good or evil actions, or sins if he obey the commonwealth against his 'conscience'; that the sovereign is subject to the civil laws; that private property excludes sovereign rights; that sovereign power may be divided, which is the worst of all; and from other causes, as of money grudged for wars, monopolies, over-potent subjects or corporations, insatiable desire of dominion. But when a country is conquered, that is the dissolution of the commonwealth.

Of the sovereign's duties the first is to surrender none of his powers, and the second to see that they be known, to which end, and the understanding of it, the people must be rightly instructed. Further, that he administer justice equally to all people, and impose equal taxes, and make good laws (I say good, not just, since no law can be unjust), and choose good counsellors.

Subjects owe simple obedience to the sovereign in all things whatsoever, except what is contrary to the laws of God. Therefore, it remains here to speak of the kingdom of God, Whose subjects are they that believe in Him. God declareth His laws either by natural reason, or by revelation, or by the voice of prophets. He is necessarily sovereign, for the one reason that He is omnipotent.

IV—OF A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH

Of God speaking by the voice of a prophet are two signs: that the prophet worketh miracles, and that he teacheth no other religion than that established. These two must go together. And since miracles have ceased, it is clear that God no longer speaks by prophets.

But He hath revealed Himself in Scripture—that is, in those books which are in the canon ordained. But whether their authority be derived from the civil sovereignty or is of a universal church to which all sovereigns are subordinate is another question. It may be seen, however, from Scripture that the kingdom of God therein spoken of is a civil kingdom, which is that kingdom of God by Christ which was interrupted by the revolt of the Israelites and the election of Saul.

A church is a term used in many senses, but in one only can it be treated as a person having power to will, command, or do any action whatever. And according to this sense I define a church to be 'a company of men professing Christian religion, united in the person

of one sovereign at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble.' It follows that a church that is assembled in any commonwealth that hath forbidden them to assemble is an unlawful assembly.

There are Christians in the dominions of several princes and states; but every one of them is subject to that commonwealth of which he is himself a member, and consequently cannot be subject to the commands of any other person. There is therefore no such universal church as all are bound to obey.

The original covenant with Abraham gave him the sole right, which is the inheritance of every sovereign, to punish any subject who should pretend to a private vision for the countenancing of any doctrine which Abraham should forbid. This covenant established that kingdom of God which was interrupted by the secular kingdom of Saul. The coming of Christ was to restore that kingdom by a new covenant; which kingdom was to be in another world after the Resurrection. The power ecclesiastical was left by Him to the apostles, but manifestly not a coercive power on earth, as Christ's own power on earth was not.

Christ, therefore, by His coming did not withdraw any of the power from civil sovereigns, and if they do commit the government of their subjects in matter of religion to the Pope, he holdeth that charge not as being above the civil sovereign, but by his authority.

But as for disagreement between the laws of God and the civil laws of the sovereign, the laws of God, which must in no wise be disobeyed, are those which are necessary to salvation; and these are summed up in the will to obey the law of God and the belief that Jesus is the Christ. But the private man may not set up to judge whether the ordinance of the sovereign be against the law of God or whether the doctrine which he imposeth consist with the belief that Jesus is the Christ.

But in the Scripture there is mention also of another power, the kingdom of Satan, 'the prince of the powers of the air,' which is a confederacy of deceivers that, to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavours by dark and erroneous doctrines to extinguish in them the light both of nature and of the Gospel, and so to dis-prepare them for the kingdom of God to come.'

And such darkness is wrought first by abusing the light of the Scriptures so that we know them not; secondly by introducing the demonology of the heathen poets; thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture divers relics of the religion and much of the erroneous philosophy of the Greeks; and, fourthly, by mingling with these false or uncertain traditions and feigned or uncertain history.

Ethics

BARUCH DE SPINOZA

THE Ethics was not published during Spinoza's lifetime owing to the rumours as to its nature and aims. When the work appeared, in 1677, it was proscribed by the states of Holland and West Friesland. Spinoza's system, expressed in a series of axioms, and undoubtedly influenced by both Descartes and Bruno, was a rather involved form of pantheism. It is quite untrue, however, to say that Spinoza was an atheist; the two forms of reality that he recognized are both dependent on God—the ultimate substance. His ethical teaching, too, may easily be misunderstood. The doctrine that a thing is good because it is desired, not desired because it is good, becomes definitely subversive when superficially interpreted.

I—CONCERNING GOD

BY God I understand absolutely infinite Being, that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each expressing eternal and infinite essence. If this be denied, conceive, if it be possible, that God does not exist. Then it follows that His essence does not involve existence, which is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

God is absolutely the first cause. He acts from the laws of His own nature only and is compelled by no one. For, outside of Himself, there can be nothing by which He may be determined to act. Therefore He acts solely from the laws of His own nature; and therefore, also, God alone is a free cause.

The omnipotence of God has been actual from eternity, and will be actual to eternity. The Divine intellect is the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence. Thus it is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of the human intellect, but it differs from our intellect both in essence and in existence. The same may be said of the Divine will and the human will.

The will cannot be called a free cause, but can only be termed necessary. The will is only a certain mode of thought, like the intellect. It requires a cause to determine it to action, and, therefore, cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause. Hence it follows that God does not act from freedom of the will. For the will needs a cause to determine it to act in a certain manner.

Things could have been produced by God in no other manner or order than that in which they have been. Things have been created by God in absolute perfection, because they have necessarily followed from His absolutely perfect nature.

Since in eternity there is no *when*, nor *before*, nor *after*, God cannot decree, nor could He ever have decreed anything other than He has decreed in the perfection of His nature. For if He had decreed something else about creation He would necessarily have had an intellect and a will different from those He now has. Could such a supposition be allowed, why cannot He now change His decree about creation yet remain perfect?

All things depend on the Divine power; but

God's will, because of His perfection, cannot be other than it is, and, therefore, things cannot be differently constituted. For to suppose otherwise is to subject God to fate, an absurdity which is not worth waste of time to refute.

The sum of the matter is that God necessarily exists; that He is one God; that He acts from the necessity of His nature; that He is the free cause of all things; that all things depend on Him; and that all things have been predestined by Him.

II—CONCERNING MIND AND BODY

I pass on to those things which must necessarily follow from the essence of the eternal and infinite God.

Thought is the attribute of God. Individual thoughts are modes of expressing the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner. The order and connexion of ideas coincides with the order and connexion of things; therefore God's power of thinking is equal to His power of acting. The circle existing in nature and the idea of an existing circle which is also in God are one and the same thing, exhibited through different attributes.

The first thing which forms the actual Being of the human mind is nothing else than the idea of an individual actually existing. The essence of man is formed by certain modes of the Divine attributes, that is to say, modes of thought. The idea is the first thing which forms the Being of the human mind. It must be an idea of an individual thing actually existing. Hence the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God.

The knowledge of everything which happens necessarily exists in God, in so far as He forms the nature of the human mind. Man thinks. Modes of thought, such as love, desire, or affections of the mind under whatever designation, do not exist, unless in the same individual exists an idea of a thing loved, desired, etc. But the idea may exist though no other mode of thinking exists. Therefore the essence of man does not necessarily involve existence.

We perecive that a body is affected in certain ways. No individual things are felt or perceived by us except bodies and modes of thought.

The object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, or a certain mode of actually existing extension, and nothing else. For if the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in God in so far as He has created our mind, but would be in Him so far as He has formed the mind of another thing.

But we have ideas of the affections of the body; therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body actually existing. It follows that man consists of mind and body and that the human body exists as we perceive it.

Hence we perceive not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also what is to be understood by the union of mind and body. But no one can adequately comprehend it without previously possessing adequate knowledge of the body. In proportion as one body is better adapted than another to act or suffer, the mind will at the same time be better adapted for perception. And the more independent a body may be of other bodies, the stronger will be the understanding of the mind. Thus we can determine the superiority of one mind over another.

The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that the human body exists except through the ideas and affections by which the body is affected. Indeed, the human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body. These ideas are in God. Thought is an attribute of God, and so the thought of the mind originates of necessity in Him. All the ideas which are in God always agree with those things of which they are ideas, and therefore they are all true.

Falsity consists in privation of knowledge, involved in confusion and mutilation of ideas; for instance, because they think themselves to be free; and the also reason for this opinion is that they are conscious of their own actions, and ignorant of the causes determining those actions. Nobody knows what the will is and how it moves to-day. Those who pretend otherwise, and invent locations of the soul, usually excite derision and disgust.

The more things the body possesses in common with other bodies, the more things will the mind be adapted to perceive. The human mind possesses an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. But the reason why men have not a knowledge of God as clear as that which they have of common notions is that they cannot imagine God as they can imagine bodies, and because they have attached the name of God to the images of things they are accustomed to see. This they can hardly avoid, because they are constantly affected by external bodies. And, indeed, most errors arise from our application of the wrong names to things.

In the mind there is no absolutely free will. The mind is determined to this or that volition by a cause, which is determined by another cause, and so on *ad infinitum*. The will and intellect are one and the same. We are partakers of the divine nature in proportion as we more and more understand God and conform our actions to His will. Our highest happiness consists in this conformity, by which alone the soul finds repose. Those greatly err from the true estimate of virtue who expect to be rewarded for it, as though virtue and the service of God were not our felicity itself and the highest liberty.

III—CONCERNING MENTAL AFFECTIONS

The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas alone; but the passions depend on those alone which are inadequate. The essence of the mind is composed of adequate and inadequate ideas.

Accidentally, anything may be the cause of joy, sorrow, or desire. We love or hate certain things not for any known cause, but merely from sympathy or antipathy. If we hate a thing, we seek to affirm concerning it everything that we think can affect it with sorrow, while we deny everything that we think can

affect it with joy. From this we see how easily a man may think too much of himself, and of the object which he loves, and, on the other hand, may think too little of what he hates.

When a man thinks too much of himself, this imagination is termed pride and is a species of delirium, because he dreams with his eyes open that he can do all those things to which he attains in imagination alone, regarding them thus as realities and rejoicing in them so long as he cannot imagine anything to exclude their existence and limit his power of action.

Joy is a man's passage from less to a greater perfection; sorrow is a man's passage from a greater to a less perfection. I say passage, for joy is not perfection itself. If a man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess it without the affection of joy—a truth the more vividly apparent from the affection of sorrow, which is the contrary of joy.

For, that sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection, but not in the less perfection itself, no one can deny, since in so far as a man partakes of any perfection he cannot be sad.

Nor can we say that sorrow consists in the passage to a less perfection, for privation is nothing. But the affection of sorrow is actual, and so can be nothing else than the passage to a lesser perfection—that is, the reality by which the power of acting is limited, or diminished. As for the definitions of cheerfulness, pleasurable excitement, melancholy or grief, I omit these, because they are related rather to the body than to the mind, and are merely different species of joy and sorrow.

Love is joy, with the accompanying idea of an external cause. Hatred is sorrow, with the accompanying idea of an external cause. Devotion is love towards an object which we admire and wonder at. Derision, is joy arising from the imagination that something we despise is present in the object we hate. Hope is a joy not constant, arising from the idea of something future or past, about the issue of which we are doubtful. Fear is sorrow not constant, arising in like manner.

Confidence is joy arising from the idea of a past or future object from which the cause for doubting has been removed. Despair is sorrow arising from a like cause. Confidence springs from hope, despair from fear. Pride is thinking too highly of ourselves from self-love. Despondency is thinking too little of ourselves through sorrow.

IV—CONCERNING HUMAN BONDAGE AND HUMAN LIBERTY

Good is that which is useful to us; evil that which impedes the possession of good. But the terms good and evil are not positive, but are only modes of thought by which we compare one thing with another. Thus, music is good to a melancholy mind, bad to a mourning mind, but neither bad nor good to a deaf man. We suffer because we form a part of nature. The power by which we preserve our being is the power of God, that is part of His essence. But man is subject to passions because he follows the order of nature.

An affection can only be overcome by a stronger affection. That which tends to conserve our existence we dominate good; that which hinders this conservation we style evil. Desire springing from the knowledge of good and evil can be restrained by desires originating in the affections by which we are agitated. Thus the effect of external causes on the mind may be far greater than that of the knowledge of good and evil. The desire springing from a knowledge of good and evil may be easily restrained by the desire of present objects. Opinion exercises a more potent influence than reason. Hence the saying of the poet, 'I approve the better, but follow the worse.'

Desire springing from joy preponderates over that springing from sorrow. Man is useful to man because two individuals of the same nature when in sympathy are stronger than one. Nothing could be so good for men as that all should so agree in everything as to form, as it were, a single body and mind, all seeking the good of all. Hence, men acting in accord with the dictates of reason, desire nothing for themselves but what they desire for all. This renders them just, faithful and honourable.

The knowledge of God is the supreme mental good, and to know God is the supreme mental virtue. For God is the supreme subject of the understanding, and therefore to know or understand God is the supreme virtue of the mind. But to us nothing can be either good or evil unless it has something in common with us. An object whose nature is absolutely foreign to our own cannot be either good or evil to us, for this reason, that we only call a thing good or evil when it is the cause of joy or sorrow; that is, when it increases or diminishes our power to act.

Nothing can be reckoned good except that which is in harmony with our nature, and nothing can be reckoned evil except what is contrary to our nature, but men cannot be said to agree in nature when they are subject to passions. We only act in harmony with the dictates of reason when we agree in nature with others. Men are most useful to each other who are mutually ruled by the laws of reason.

Yet men are seldom disposed to solitude, but answer generally to the familiar description of man as a social animal, for they know that the advantages preponderate over the disadvantages of social life. They find by experience that by mutual aid and co-operation they can the more easily secure what they need.

A man who seeks after virtue will desire others to do so, and this desire will increase in proportion to the increase of his knowledge of God. This is in accordance with reason, which is the operation of the mind according to the essence of the mind, that essence being knowledge, which involves the knowledge of God. The greater the knowledge of God involved in the essence of the mind, the greater will be the desire that others may seek after the same virtue which the man seeks for himself.

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

JOHN LOCKE

FIRST published in 1690, twenty editions of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding had appeared before 1700. Extending to some three hundred thousand words, seventeen years were spent on its preparation. The design of the work, Locke explains, is to inquire "into the origin, certainty and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent." Locke's resolute devotion to truth, his instant surrender to the proven fact, his distrust of the emotional, his tolerance, are conspicuous in the Essay.

I—THE NATURE OF SIMPLE IDEAS

'IDEA' being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is the mind can be, employed about in thinking. Let us, then, suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper void of all characters—without any ideas. Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? To this, I answer in one word—experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.

Let anyone examine his own thoughts and thoroughly search his understanding, and then let him tell me whether of all the original ideas he has there are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the observations of his mind considered as objects of his reflection.

Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended that there is no separation, no distance between them, yet it is plain the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed. For though the sight and touch often take in from the same object at the same time different ideas, yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses; the coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily, and each of them being in itself uncompounded contains nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception, in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.

When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare and unite them even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at will new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of any most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, nor to destroy those that are there. I would have anyone try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate, or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt; and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours and a deaf man true, distinct notions of sound.

THERE are some ideas which have admittance only through one sense which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus, light and colours come in only by the eye, all kinds of noises by the ear, the tastes and smells by the nose and palate. The most considerable of those belonging to the touch are heat, cold and solidity—which is the idea that belongs to the body, whereby we conceive it to fill space.

Simple ideas of divers senses are the ideas of space or extension, figure, rest and motion, for these make perceivable impressions on the eyes and touch, and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension, figure, motion and rest of bodies by seeing and feeling.

The mind, receiving the ideas mentioned in the foregoing from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself and observes its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things.

The two great and principal actions of the mind which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent that everyone that pleases may take notice of them in himself, are these two: perception or thinking, and volition or will. The power of thinking is called the understanding, and the power of volition is called the will. And these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated faculties. Modes of these simple ideas of reflection are remembrance, discerning, reasoning, judging, knowledge, faith.

It has, further, pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects and to the ideas which we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in several objects to several degrees, that those faculties which He has endowed us with might not remain wholly unemployed by us. Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that as to pursue this.

Existence and unity are two other ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without and every idea within. Power is another of those simple ideas which we receive from sensation and reflection; and, besides these, there is succession.

Nor let anyone think these too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the stars and cannot be confined by the limits of the world, that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of matter and makes excursions into that incomprehensible inane. Nor will it be so strange to think these few simple ideas

sufficient to employ the quickest thought or largest capacity if we consider how many words may be made out of the various composition of twenty-four letters; or if, going one step farther, we will but reflect on the variety of combinations that may be made with barely one of the above-mentioned ideas—viz. number, whose stock is inexhaustible. And what a large and immense field doth extension alone afford the mathematicians!

II—OF IDEA-PRODUCING QUALITIES

THE power to produce any idea in our mind I call quality of the subject wherein the power is. Qualities are, first, such as are utterly inseparable from the body in what state soever it be. These I call original or primary qualities, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us—viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.

Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities—i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture and motion of their insensible parts. These secondary qualities are colours, sounds, tastes, etc. From whence it is easy to draw this observation: that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, but the ideas produced in us by the secondary qualities have no resemblance in them at all.

If anyone will consider that the same fire that at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth does, at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of pain, let him bethink himself what reason he has to say that his idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire; and his idea of pain, which the same fire produced in him in the same way, is not in the fire. The particular bulk, number, figure and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them, whether anyone's senses perceive them or not; and, therefore, they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colours, tastes, odours and sounds vanish and are reduced to their causes—*i.e.* bulk, figure and motion of parts.

III—VARIOUS FACULTIES OF THE MIND

WHAT perception is everyone will know better by reflecting on what he does himself when he sees, hears, feels, tastes, smells or thinks, than by any discourse of mine.

We ought further to consider concerning perception, that the ideas we receive by sensation are often in grown people altered by the judgement without our taking any notice of it.

When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour—*e.g.* gold, alabaster or jet—the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle variously shadowed with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes.

But we, having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearances convex bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the difference of the sensible figures of bodies, the judgement presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes; so that from that which is truly a variety of shadow or colour collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and a uniform colour, when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane variously coloured, as is evident in painting.

Perception, then, is the first operation of our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge into our minds.

The next faculty of the mind whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge is that which I call retention, or the keeping of those simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done, first, by keeping the idea which is brought into it for some time actually in view, which is called contemplation. The other way of retention is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which after imprinting have disappeared, or have been, as it were, laid aside out of sight; and thus we do when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet, the object being removed. This is memory, the store-house of our ideas.

ANOTHER faculty we may take notice of in our minds is that of discerning and distinguishing between the several ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general. Unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge, even though the bodies that affect us were as busy about us as they are now, and though the mind were continually employed in thinking.

On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another depend the evidence and certainly of several even very general propositions which have passed for innate truths, because men, overlooking the true cause why those propositions find universal assent, impute it wholly to native uniform impressions; whereas it, in truth, depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same or to be different.

The comparing of ideas one with another is the operation of the mind upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas comprehended under relations. The next operation is composition, whereby the mind puts together several simple ideas and combines them into complex ones.

The use of words being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general, which is done by considering them as they are in the mind, and such appearances separate from all other existences and from the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas.

This is called abstraction, whereby ideas taken

from particular being become general representatives of all of the same kind. Thus, the same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that that appearance alone makes it a representative of all of that kind ; and having given it the name ' whiteness,' it by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever imagined or met with ; and thus universals, whether ideas or terms, are made.

As the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby, out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest the others are framed. And I believe we shall find, if we observe the originals of our notions, that even the most abstruse ideas, how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any operation of our minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself, by repeating and joining together ideas that it had either from objects of sense or from its own operations about them ; so that even those large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may and does attain. This may be shown in our ideas of space, time and infinity, and some others that seem the most remote from these originals.

IV—OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS

It is the actual receiving of ideas from without that gives us notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know that something does exist at that time without us which causes that idea in us, though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it. And this, though not so certain as our own intuitive knowledge, or as the deductions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds, yet deserves the name of knowledge.

It is plain that those perceptions are produced by exterior causes affecting our senses for the following reasons :

Because those that lack the physical organs of any sense never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds.

Because sometimes I find I cannot avoid having those ideas produced in my mind ; for as when my eyes are shut, or the windows fast, I can at pleasure recall to my mind the ideas of light or the sun which former sensations have lodged in my memory ; so I can at pleasure lay by that idea and take into my view that of a rose or taste of sugar. But if I turn my eyes at noon towards the sun, I cannot avoid the ideas which the light or sun produces in me. There is nobody who does not perceive the difference in himself contemplating the sun as he has an idea of it in his memory and actually looking upon it, of which two his perception is so distinct that few of his ideas are more distinguishable one from another ; and, therefore, he has certain knowledge that they are not both memory or the action of his mind and fancies only within him, but that actual seeing has a cause without.

Add to this that many of those ideas are produced with pain, which afterwards we remember without the least offence.

Lastly, our senses bear witness to the truth of each other's report concerning the existence of sensible things without us and around us.

Principles of Human Knowledge

GEORGE BERKELEY

GEORGE BERKELEY issued his first publication, two mathematical essays, in 1707, his Theory of Vision in 1709 and his Principles of Human Knowledge in 1710. This last work is one of the most notable of that sequence of metaphysical systems which, beginning with Descartes, constitute modern philosophy. Berkeley is regarded as the founder of the philosophy of idealism as opposed to the realism of Hobbes. In clear, almost Platonic style, he shows by an analysis of sense-perception that the external world is really dependent for its very existence on the spirit.

I—THE ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION

It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind ; or, lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight, touch and other senses, I receive various sensations ; and any group of sensations, frequently accompanying one another, comes to be known as one thing. Thus, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing—for instance, an apple.

But, besides this endless variety of objects of knowledge, there is also the ' mind,' ' spirit,' ' soul,' or ' myself,' which perceives them. Neither our thoughts nor imaginations, nor even the sensations which compose the objects of perception, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. It is impossible that objects should have any existence out of the minds for which they exist ; to conceive them as existing unperceived is a mere abstraction. Whence it follows that there is no other substance but spirit, or that which perceives.

Some, indeed, distinguish between ' primary ' and ' secondary ' qualities, and hold that the former, such as extension, figure, motion and solidity, have some existence outside of the

mind in an unthinking substance which they call 'matter.' But extension, figure and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and neither these ideas nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance.

The very notion of what is called 'matter' involves a contradiction within it. Not only primary and secondary qualities alike, but also 'great' and 'small,' 'swift' and 'slow,' 'extension,' 'number,' and even 'unity' itself, being all of them purely relative, exist only in the mind. The conception of 'material substance' has no meaning but that of 'being' in general.

Even if we were to give to the materialists their 'external bodies,' they are by their own confession no nearer to knowledge how our ideas are produced, since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible that it should imprint any idea on the mind.

It is evident that the production of ideas in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose corporeal substances to exist, since the rise of those ideas is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without the supposition of material existences. In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible that we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we should have the same reasons to think there were, that we have now.

We perceive a continual succession of ideas; some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is, therefore, some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, which produces and changes them. This cause must be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance. It remains, therefore, that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit.

A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being; as it perceives ideas it is called the 'understanding,' and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the 'will.' Such is the nature of spirit that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produces.

The ideas of sense are more strong, lively and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order and coherence, and are excited in a regular series, the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. The set rules or established methods, wherein the mind that we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the 'laws of nature.'

These we learn by experience, and so obtain a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life. In general, to obtain such or such ends such or such means are conducive; and all this we know, not by discovering any necessary connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the laws of nature.

And yet this constant uniform working, which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that governing spirit whose will constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him that it rather sends them wandering after second causes. For when we perceive certain ideas of sense constantly followed by other ideas, and we know that it is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be more absurd.

II—THE ROOTS OF SCEPTICISM

Several difficult and obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation hath been thrown away, are by our own principles entirely banished from philosophy. 'Whether corporeal substance can think,' 'whether matter be infinitely divisible,' 'how matter operates on spirit'—these and the like inquiries have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages. But since they depend on the existence of matter, they have no longer any place in our principles.

It follows, also, that human knowledge may be reduced to two heads—knowledge of ideas and knowledge of spirits. Our knowledge of the former hath been much obscured and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense, the one 'intelligible,' or in the mind, the other 'real,' and without the mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own, distinct from being perceived by spirits.

This is the very root of scepticism; for so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far 'real' as it was conformable to 'real things,' they could not be certain that they had any real knowledge at all.

So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know the nature of any real unthinking being, but it is impossible for us even to know that it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, and of everything they see or feel.

But all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words, and do not amuse ourselves with the terms 'absolute,' 'external,' 'exist,' and such like, signifying we know not what. I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I perceive by sense; the very existence of unthinking beings consists in their being perceived.

It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. The unthinking beings perceived by sense exist in those unextended, indivisible substances, or spirits, which act, think and perceive them; whereas philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance, which they call 'matter,' to which they attribute a natural subsistence distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the Creator.

As we have shown the doctrine of matter to have been the main support of scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of atheism and irreligion. All these monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on this supposed material substance that, when this

cornerstone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground.

On the same principle does not only fatalism but also idolatry depend in all its varying forms. Did men but consider that the sun, moon and stars, and every other object of the senses, are only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, they would never fall down and worship their own ideas, but rather address their homage to that Eternal Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things.

As in reading books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense rather than lay them out on grammatical remarks; so, in perusing the volume of nature, it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or showing how it follows from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, such as to recreate and exalt the mind, with a prospect of the beauty, order, extent and variety of natural things; hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom and beneficence of the Creator.

The reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an idea of them. But it is manifestly impossible that there should be any such idea. A spirit is the only substance wherein the unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea is manifestly absurd.

From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation have arisen many heterodox tenets and much scepticism about the nature of the soul. This opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct from their body, since they could not find that they had an idea of it.

But the spirit is a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea. What I am myself, that which I denote by the term 'I,' is what we mean by soul or spiritual substance; and we know other spirits by means of our own soul, which in that sense is an image or idea of them.

By the natural immortality of the soul we mean that it is not liable to be either broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. The soul itself is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended and is consequently incorruptible.

III—OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

THOUGH there be some things which convince us that human agents are concerned in producing them, yet it is evident to everyone that those things which are called the works of nature—that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us—are not produced by, nor dependent on, the wills of men. There is, therefore, some other spirit that causes them, since they cannot subsist themselves.

If we attentively consider the constant regularity, order and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts, together with the exact harmony, and correspondence of the whole—I say, if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the import of the attributes, one eternal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, who works all in all, and by whom all things consist.

Hence it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever, distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men, because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents.

It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, and, believing, obey His commands. But we need only open our eyes to see the sovereign Lord of all things with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. We do not see a man, if by 'man' is meant that which lives, moves, perceives and thinks as we do; but only such a collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. After the same manner we see God. Men are surrounded with such clear manifestations of Deity, yet are so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light.

The Social Contract

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU

PUBLISHED in 1726 at Amsterdam to escape French censorship, Rousseau's Social Contract is one of the most influential treatises on politics ever written. It is an endeavour to place all government on the consent, direct or implied, of the governed. Rousseau's ideal state is founded on man's universal desire for freedom, which can only be secured by a contract which each makes with all, and in which each surrenders his will to receive it back again as part of the whole. Logically, the Social Contract is full of gaping flaws, and as a political essay it is a tissue of fantastic arguments, based on unreal hypotheses, but it set men's minds on fire, and was the literary inspiration of one of the most tremendous events in history—the French Revolution.

I—THE TERMS OF THE COMPACT

MY object is to discover whether in civil polity there is any legitimate and definite canon of government, taking men as they are and laws as they might be. In this inquiry I shall uniformly try to reconcile that which is permitted by right with that which is prescribed by interest so as to avoid the clash of justice with utility.

Man is born free, and yet is everywhere in fetters. He is governed, obliged to obey laws. What is it that legitimises this subjection to government? I think I can solve the problem.

It is not merely a matter of force; force is only the power of the strongest and must yield when a greater strength arises; there is here no question of right, but simply of might. But social order is a sacred right that serves as a base to all others. This right, however, does not come from nature; it is founded upon conventions.

The explanation of social order is not to be found in the family tie, since when a child grows up it escapes from tutelage; the parent's right to exercise authority is only temporary. Nor can government be based on servitude. An individual man may sell his liberty to another for sustenance; but a nation cannot sell its liberty—it does not receive sustenance from its ruler but, on the contrary, sustains him. The gift is a civil act which presupposes a public deliberation. Before, then, we examine the act by which a people chooses a king, it would be well to examine the act by which a people becomes a people.

Let it be assumed that the obstacles which prejudice the conservation of man in the state of nature have prevailed by their resistance over the forces which each individual is able to employ to keep himself in that state. The primitive condition can then no longer exist; mankind must change it or perish.

The problem with which men are confronted in these circumstances may be stated as follows: 'To find a form of association that defends and protects with all the common force the person and property of each partner, and by which each partner, uniting himself with all the rest, nevertheless obeys only himself, and remains as free as heretofore.' To this problem the social contract affords a solution.

The essence of the pact is the total and unreserved alienation by each partner of all his rights to the community as a whole. No individual can retain any rights that are not possessed equally by all other individuals without the compact being thereby violated. Again, each partner, by yielding his rights to the community, yields them to no individual, and thus in his relations with individuals he regains all the rights he has sacrificed.

The compact, therefore, may be reduced to the following terms: 'Each of us places in common his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general will, and we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.'

By this act is created a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the society has voices, receiving from this same act its unity, its common 'I,' its life and its will. This body is the republic, called by its members the state when passive, the sovereign when active. The partners are collectively called the people; they are citizens, as participants in the sovereign authority, and subjects, as under obligations to the laws of the state.

By passing through the compact, from the state of nature to the civil state man substitutes justice for instinct in his conduct and gives to his actions a morality of which they were formerly devoid. What man loses by the contract is his natural liberty and an illimitable right to all that tempts him and that he can obtain; what he gains is civil liberty and a right of secure property in all that he possesses.

I shall conclude this chapter with a remark which should serve as a basis for the whole social system. It is that in place of destroying natural liberty, the fundamental pact substitutes a moral and legitimate equality for the natural physical inequality between men, and that, while men may be unequal in strength and talent, they are all made equal by convention and right.

II—THE SOVEREIGN AND THE LAWS

The first and most important consequence of the principles above established is that only the general will can direct the forces of the state towards the aim of its institution, which is the common good; for if the antagonism of particular interests has rendered necessary the establishment of political societies, it is the accord of these interests that has rendered such societies possible.

I maintain, then, that sovereignty, being the exercise of the general will, cannot be alienated and that the sovereign, which is simply a collective being, cannot be represented save by itself; it may transfer its power, but not its will.

For the same reason that sovereignty is inalienable it is indivisible. For the will is either general, or it is not. If it is general, it is, when declared, an act of the people and becomes law; if it is not general, it is, when declared, merely an act of a particular person or persons, not of the sovereign.

A law is an expression of the general will and must be general in its terms and import. The sovereign cannot legislate for part of the individuals composing a state, for if it did so the general will would enter into a particular relation with particular people, and that is contrary to its nature. The law may thus confer privileges, but must not name the persons to whom the privileges are to belong; it may establish a royal government, but must not nominate a king. Any function relating to an individual object does not appertain to the legislative power.

As a popular assembly is not always enlightened in its judgements—though the general will, when properly ascertained, must be right—the service of a wise legislator is necessary to draw up laws for the sovereign's approval.

The legislator, if he be truly wise, will not begin by writing down laws that are good in the abstract, but will first look about to see whether the people for whom he intends them is capable of upholding them. He must bear in mind many considerations—the situation of the country, the nature of the soil, the density of the population, the national history, occupations and aptitudes.

Among these considerations one of the most important is the area of the state. As nature has given limits to the stature of a normal man, beyond which she makes only giants or dwarfs, there are also limits beyond which a state is, in the one direction, too large to be well governed, and, in the other, too small to maintain itself.

There is in every body politic a maximum of force which cannot be exceeded, and from which the state often falls away by the process of enlarging itself. The further the social bond is extended, the slacker it becomes; and, in general, a small state is proportionately stronger than a large one.

It is true that a state must have a certain breadth of base for the sake of solidity and in order to resist violent shocks from without. But, on the other hand, administration becomes more troublesome with distance. It increases in burdensomeness, moreover, with the multiplication of degrees. Each town, district and province has its administration, for which the people must pay. Finally, overwhelming everything, is the remote central administration.

Again, the government in a large state has less vigour and swiftness than in a small one; the people have less affection for their chiefs, for their country and for each other—since they are, for the most part, strangers to each other. Uniform laws are not suitable for diverse provinces; yet diverse laws among people belonging to the same state breed weakness and confusion.

The greatest good of all, which should be the aim of every system of legislation, may on investigation be reduced to two main objects—*liberty* and *equality:* liberty, because all dependence of individuals on other individuals is so much force taken away from the body of the state; equality, because without it liberty cannot exist.

III—THE GOVERNMENT

EVERY free action has two causes which concur to produce it; one of them the will that determines upon the act, the other the power that performs it. In the political body one must distinguish between these two—the legislative power and the executive power. The executive power cannot belong to the sovereign, inasmuch as executive acts are particular acts, aimed at individuals, and therefore, as already explained, outside the sovereign's sphere. Public force, then, requires an agent to apply it according to the direction of the general will.

This is the government, erroneously confounded with the sovereign, of which it is only the minister. It is an intermediary body established between subjects and sovereign for their mutual correspondence, for the execution of the laws and the maintenance of civil and political liberty.

The magistrates who form the government may be numerous, or may be few; and, generally speaking, the fewer the magistrates the stronger the government. A magistrate has three wills—his personal will, his will as one of the governors and his will as a member of the sovereign. The last-named is the weakest, the first-named the most powerful.

If there is only one governor, the two stronger wills are concentrated in one man; with a few governors, they are concentrated in few men; when the government is in the hands of all the citizens, the second will be obliterated and the first widely distributed, and the government is consequently weak.

On the other hand, where there are many governors the government will be more readily kept in correspondence with the general will. The duty of the legislator is to hit the happy medium at which the government, while not failing in strength, is yet properly submissive to the sovereign.

The sovereign may, in the first place, entrust the government to the whole people or the greater part of them; this form is called democracy. Or it may be placed in the hands of a minority, in which case it is called aristocracy. Or it may be concentrated in the hands of a single magistrate from whom all the others derive their power; this is called monarchy.

It may be urged, on behalf of democracy, that those who make the laws know better than anybody how they should be interpreted and administered. But it is not right that the makers of the laws should execute them, nor that the main body of the people should turn its attention from general views to particular objects. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests on public affairs. A true democracy, in the vigorous sense of the term, never has existed, and never will. It is against nature that the many should govern and the few be governed. A people composed of gods would govern itself democratically.

THERE are three forms of aristocracy—natural, elective and hereditary. The first is only adapted to simple peoples; the third is the worst of all governments; the second is the best of all. By the elective method, probity, sagacity and experience afford guarantees that the community will be wisely governed.

The first defect of monarchy is that it is to the interest of the monarch to keep the people in a state of weakness and misery, so that they may be unable to resist his power. Another is that under a monarchy the posts of honour are occupied by bunglers and rascals who win their promotion by petty court intrigue. Again, an elective monarchy is a cause of disorder whenever a king dies; and a hereditary monarchy leaves the character of the king to chance, which generally goes astray.

Since the sovereign has no power except its legislative authority, it only acts by laws; and since the laws are simply the authentic acts of the general will, the sovereign cannot act save when the people are assembled. It is essential that there should be definitely fixed periodic assemblies of the people that cannot be abolished or delayed, so that on the appointed day the people will be legitimately convoked by the law.

BUT between the sovereign authority and arbitrary government there is sometimes introduced a middle power, of which I ought to speak. As soon as the public services ceases to be the main interest of the citizens, as soon as they prefer to serve their purses rather than themselves, the state is nearing its ruin. The weakening of patriotism, the activity of private interests, the immensity of states, conquests, and the abuse of government have led to the device of deputies or representatives of the people in the national assemblies. But sovereignty cannot be represented, even as it cannot be alienated; it consists essentially in the general will, and the will is not ascertainable by

representation; it is either itself, or something else; there is no middle course. A law not ratified by the people in person is no law at all. The English people believes itself free, but it greatly deceives itself; it is not so, except during the election of members of parliament. As soon as they are elected, it is enslaved.

How are we to conceive the act by which the government is instituted? The first process is the determination of the sovereign that the government shall assume such and such a form; this is the establishment of a law. The second process is the nomination by the people of those to whom the government is to be entrusted; this is not a law, but a function of government.

It is a logical sequence of the social contract that in the assemblies of the people the voice of the majority prevails. The only law requiring unanimity is the contract itself. But how can a man be free, and at the same time submit to laws to which he has not consented?

I reply that when a law is proposed in the popular assembly the question put is not precisely whether the citizens approve or disapprove of it, but whether it conforms or not to the general will. The minority, then, simply have it proved to them that they estimated the general will wrongly. Once it is declared, they are, as citizens, participants in it, and as subjects they must obey it.

Essays, Moral and Political

DAVID HUME

IN 1737 appeared Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, written from the standpoint of universal scepticism which was the basis of all his philosophy. This was shortly followed by Essays, Moral and Political, which, published in 1741–42, had a great success. In these Essays Hume brings to bear the results of his criticism upon the problems of current speculative discussion. The argument against miracles is still often discussed, and the work is well worthy of the author, whom many regard as the greatest thinker of his time. Hume's History of England (1754–62) enjoyed great fame, but owing to the author's prejudices and the inadequate material from which he worked is useless to the student.

I—DOUBTS CONCERNING THE UNDERSTANDING

ALL the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds—to wit, *relations of ideas* and *matters of fact*. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra and arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. 'That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the two sides' is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. 'That three times five is equal to the half of thirty' expresses a relation between these numbers.

Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality. 'That the sun will not rise to-morrow' is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmative that 'it will rise.' We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.

It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity to inquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence of matters of fact beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory. All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *cause* and *effect*. If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that evidence which assures us of matters of fact, we must inquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect.

I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings *a priori*, but arises entirely from experience.

To convince us that all the laws of nature, and all the operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience, the following reflections may perhaps suffice. Were any object presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect which will result from it, without consulting past observation, after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this operation? It must invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause by the most accurate examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and, consequently can never be discovered in it.

A stone or piece of metal raised into the air and left without any support immediately falls. But, to consider the matter *a priori*, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward rather than an upward or any other motion in the stone or metal?

IN a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, *a priori*, must be entirely arbitrary. And, even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary, since there are always

many other effects which to reason must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend to infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and experience.

Hence, we may discover the reason why no philosopher who is rational and modest has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power which produces any single effect in the universe.

I say, then, that even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are *not* founded on reasoning.

The bread which I formerly ate nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was at that time endued with such secret powers; but does it follow that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind, that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference which wants to be explained.

These two propositions are far from being the same: 'I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect,' and: 'I foresee that other objects, which are in appearance similar, will be attended with similar effects.' I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other; I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative. Of what nature is it, then? To say it is experimental is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities.

If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future, since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular, that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that for the future it will continue so.

In vain do you pretend to have learnt the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects. Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument, secures you against this supposition?

My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied on the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference.

All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not of reasoning. We have already observed that nature has established connexions among particular ideas, and that no sooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards it by a gentle and insensible movement. These principles of connexion or association we have reduced to three—namely, *resemblance*, *contiguity* and *causation*, which are the only bonds that unite our thoughts together and beget that regular train of reflection or discourse which, in a greater or less degree, takes place among mankind.

Now, here arises a question on which the solution of the present difficulty will depend. Does it happen in all these relations that when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than otherwise it would have been able to attain? This seems to be the case with that belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect.

And I shall add that it is conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of thought, and may be independent of the laboured deductions of the understanding.

II—ON MIRACLES

A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full *proof* of the future existence of that event.

In other cases he proceeds with more caution. He weighs the opposite experiments. He considers which side is supported by the greatest number of experiments; to that side he inclines with doubt and hesitation, and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call *probability*. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to over-balance the other and to produce a degree of evidence proportioned to the superiority.

When the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, there is a contest of two possible experiences, of which the one destroys the other as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains. The very same principle of experience which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact which they endeavour to establish, from which consideration there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.

But in order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose that the fact which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also that the testimony, considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force in proportion to that of its antagonist.

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable that all men must die; that lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or, in other words, a miracle, to prevent them?

Nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man seemingly in good health should die on a sudden, because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life, because that has never been observed in any age or country.

There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full *proof*, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof which is superior.

The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention) 'that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior.'

THERE surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person than those which were lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbé Paris, the famous Jansenist, with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf and sight to the blind, were everywhere talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But, what is more extraordinary, many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and distinction, in a learned age, and in the most eminent theatre that is now in the world.

Nor is this all; a relation of them was published and dispersed everywhere; nor were the Jesuits, though a learned body, supported by the civil magistrate and determined enemies to those opinions in whose favour the miracles were said to have been wrought, ever able distinctly to refute or detect them. Where shall we find such a number of circumstances agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation.

Suppose that all the historians who treat of England should agree that on January 1, 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court, as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the Parliament; and that, after being interred a month, she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed England for three years; I must confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. I should not doubt of her pretended death, and of those other public circumstances that followed it; I should only assert it to have been pretended, and that it neither was, nor possibly could be, real.

You would in vain object to me the difficulty and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence; the wisdom and solid judgement of that renowned queen; with the little or no advantage which she could reap from so poor an artifice. All this might astonish me; but I would still reply that the knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena that I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature.

OUR most holy religion is founded on *faith*, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure. To make this more evident, let us examine those miracles related in the Pentateuch, which we shall examine as the production of a mere human writer and historian. Here, then, we are first to consider a book, presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those fabulous accounts which every nation gives of its origin.

Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present; of our fall from that state; of the age of man extended to near a thousand years; of the destruction of the world by a deluge; of the arbitrary choice of one people as the favourites of Heaven, and that people the countrymen of the author; of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable. I desire anyone to lay his hand upon his heart and, after a serious consideration, declare whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous than the miracles it relates, which is, however, necessary to make it be received according to the measures of probability above established.

III—OF A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE AND OF A FUTURE STATE

I WAS lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves sceptical paradoxes. To my expression of the opinion that a wise magistrate can justly be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy such as those of Epicurus, which, denying a divine existence, and consequently a Providence and a future state, seem to loosen the ties of morality, he replied:

"If Epicurus had been accused before the people he could easily have defended his cause

and proved his principles of philosophy to be as salutary as those of his adversaries. And, if you please, I shall suppose myself Epicurus for a moment, and make you stand for the Athenian people."

"Very well; pray proceed upon these suppositions."

Epicurus: I come hither, O ye Athenians, to justify in your assembly what I maintained in my school, and I find myself impeached by furious antagonists instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate inquirers.

By my accusers it is acknowledged that the chief or sole argument for a divine existence (which I never questioned) is derived from the order of nature; where there appear such marks of intelligence and design that you think it extravagant to assign for its cause either chance or the blind and unguided force of matter. You allow that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes. From the order of the work you infer that there must have been project and forethought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point, you allow that your conclusion fails, and you pretend not to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify. These are your concessions. Please mark the consequences.

When we infer any particular cause from an effect we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities but what are sufficient to produce the effect. A body of ten ounces raised in a scale may serve as a proof that the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces, but never that it exceeds a hundred.

The same rule holds whether the cause assigned be brute, unconscious matter or a rational, intelligent being. If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect. Nor can we return from the cause and infer other effects from it beyond those by which alone it is known to us.

Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the existence, or order, of the universe, it follows that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence and benevolence which appears in their workmanship; but nothing farther can ever be proved except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of argument and reasoning. So far as the traces of any attributes at present appear, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The supposition of further attributes is mere hypothesis; much more the supposition that in distant regions of space, or periods of time, there has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of these attributes and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues.

We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to Jupiter, the cause, and then descend downwards to infer any new effect from that cause. The knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effect, they must be exactly adjusted to each other; and the one can never refer to anything farther.

I deny a Providence, you say, and Supreme Governor of the world, who guides the course of events and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and success in all their undertakings. But surely I deny not the course of events itself, which lies open to everyone's inquiry and examination. I acknowledge that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable reception from the world. I am sensible that, according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only source of tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious life, but am sensible that, to a well-disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. And what can you say more, for all your suppositions and reasonings?

The Sublime and Beautiful

EDMUND BURKE

IN the year 1756 Burke published his earliest serious work, the full title of which is A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. This essay very curiously anticipates a modern interpretation of the emotions which had been much developed in Germany and in America during recent years under the name of physiological psychology; by this system physical states are regarded as the causes of pleasurable and painful states of the mind. Burke's style and his thought alike, though undistinguished when this essay was written, became the most superb examples of majesty and beauty.

I—WHAT IS TASTE?

HOWEVER widely we may seem to differ from one another in our reasonings and in our pleasures, it is probable that the standard both of reason and taste is the same in all human creatures; for if that were not so, it would be impossible that the ordinary correspondence of life should be maintained.

It is generally acknowledged that with regard to truth and falsehood there are tests and standards which are allowed on all sides; and it is possible that the logic of taste, if I may use the expression, might, if sufficiently studied, afford us analogous standards with regard to the beautiful and the desirable. It would be absurd to lay down rules for caprice, and to set up as a legislator of whims and fancies, as we should be doing if there were no fixed principles of taste.

The term 'taste' is figurative and not very accurate, and is therefore liable to uncertainty and confusion; but I have no great opinion of a definition, which is the celebrated remedy for this disorder. By the word 'taste' I mean those

faculties of mind which are affected with, or form a judgement of, the works of imagination and the elegant arts. And my point is to find whether there are any principles of taste so common to all, so grounded and certain, as to supply the means of reasoning satisfactorily about them.

Our natural powers, which have to do with external objects, are the senses, the imagination and the judgement.

As for the senses, since their organs are nearly the same in all men, we must suppose that the manner of perceiving external objects is in all men the same, or very nearly the same. What appears light to one eye, appears light to another; what is sweet to one palate is sweet to another; and so on. Otherwise we should be abandoned to a scepticism which would make every sort of reasoning on every subject vain and frivolous.

Further, it must be allowed that every object excites identical pleasures and pains in all mankind. Thus, all concur in calling sweetness pleasant and bitterness unpleasant, except where the palate is vitiated by habit or by malady. Light is to all more pleasing than darkness, and summer more agreeable than winter.

Beside the senses, we possess imagination, to which belong wit, fancy, invention and the like; this faculty, though it cannot produce anything absolutely new, varies the disposition of the ideas received from the senses. It is the chief province of pleasure and pain, as it is the region of our fears, hopes and of all our passions. It is addicted to resemblances, and thus develops similitudes, metaphors and analogies, which appeal immediately to all men. The judgement, on the other hand, is concerned rather with differences; and what we call a difference of taste proceeds chiefly from a difference in respect of critical knowledge. Since imagination depends on the senses, there must be just as close an agreement in the imaginations as in the senses of men; and in so far as taste belongs to the imagination, its principle is the same in all.

But a real disagreement in matters of taste arises in the province of the judgement. Many works of imagination are not confined to the representation of sensible objects, nor to affecting the passions, but extend also to the manners, characters, actions and designs of men, and to their virtues and vices, and thus come within the province of judgement, which is improved by attention and by the habit of reasoning.

Horace sends us to the schools of philosophy and to the world for our instruction in these matters. Therefore, what is called taste is not a simple idea, but is made up partly of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, partly of the secondary pleasures of the imagination, and partly of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty. Lack of sensibility leads to want of taste; weakness in judgement constitutes wrong, or bad taste.

II—PLEASURE AND PAIN

But let us turn now to the problem of the origin of our ideas of the sublime and the beautiful. The first and simplest emotion is curiosity, or the desire for, or pleasure in, novelty. Children are always running after something new. This appetite is very sharp, but is easily satisfied; and some degree of novelty is a necessary element in every object of taste.

The objects designed to move our passions must therefore be in some measure new, but they must also be capable of exciting pain or pleasure. Now, pain and pleasure are simple ideas which are incapable of definition. Many think, unjustifiably, that pain arises necessarily from the removal of some pleasure, and pleasure from the cessation of some pain; but the human mind is for the most part in a state of indifference, from which it is carried occasionally into a state of pleasure or pain. There is a certain emotion, akin to pleasure, which arises on the cessation of pain. This relative pleasure I call 'delight,' and use that word in no other sense.

Most of the ideas which are capable of impressing the mind with pain or pleasure may be reduced to the principles of 'self-preservation' and of 'society.'

The passions which concern self-preservation turn mostly on pain or danger, and whatever is fitted in any way to excite the ideas of pain and danger, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime, and is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling.

Those passions, on the other hand, which belong to society, whether it be the society of the sexes or that more general society which we have with men, animals, and even with the inanimate world, have their origin in pleasures. The object of the love of the sexes is beauty, and beauty is the social quality which attaches us to other objects of our affection.

Among the various passions of society, sympathy, imitation and ambition are of the first importance. Of these, sympathy is the cause of our pleasure in tragedy, in the witnessing of which we are always aware that the distresses and catastrophes are fictitious. Imitation is the passion which forms our manners, our opinions, our lives, and is one of the strongest links of society. Ambition is a social passion, because it leads a man to distinguish himself before others.

III—ELEMENTS OF THE SUBLIME

The passion caused by the great and sublime in nature is astonishment, and astonishment is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. The mind is so entirely filled with its object that it cannot entertain any other, nor reason on that object which fills it. Astonishment is the effect of the sublime in its highest degree; its inferior effects are admiration, reverence, and respect. No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as terror; and whatever is terrible with regard to sight, is sublime.

It is impossible to look on anything dangerous as trifling or contemptible, so that even serpents are capable of raising ideas of the sublime. The sublimity of the ocean is due to the fact that it is an object of no little terror. How

closely allied are terror and sublimity we may judge from the Greek language, which has but one word for 'fear' and for 'wonder,' another for 'terrible' or 'respectable,' while a third means either 'to reverence' or 'to fear.'

To make anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary, for a great deal of apprehension vanishes when we are able to see the full extent of any danger. Night adds to our dread of ghosts; almost all the heathen temples were dark; and despotic governments, founded on fear, keep their ruler as much as may be from the public eye. Clearness, on the other hand, is not the same as beauty; it is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it affecting to the imagination.

Indeed, a great clearness is in some sort an enemy to all enthusiasm. Poetry is, therefore, superior to painting as a means of raising the passions, although the latter gives the clearest images. The fact is, that our ignorance of things causes all our admiration, and chiefly excites our passions. In great passages of Milton the mind is hurried out of itself by a crowd of grand and confused images, which affect because they are crowded and confused. The images of poetry are always obscure. To see a thing distinctly is to see its bounds, and cut it off from infinity. A clear idea is another name for a little idea.

SUBLIMITY includes, besides the idea of danger, the idea of power also. Pleasure follows the will, and we are generally affected with it by many things of a force inferior to our own; but pain is always inflicted by a power in some way superior. Strength, violence, pain and terror are therefore ideas which occupy the mind together. The sublimity of wild animals is due to their power; and the power of princes is not unmixed with terror, so that we address them as 'dread majesty.'

I know that some have said that we can contemplate the idea of God without terror or awe. If I may speak of this without impropriety, I will say that no conviction of the justice with which it is exercised, nor of the mercy with which it is tempered, can wholly remove the terror that naturally arises from a force which nothing can withstand. It has even been said that fear originated the idea of deity, and true it is that, before Christianity, there was very little said of the love of God.

ALL general privations are great, because they are all terrible—vacuity, darkness, solitude and silence. Again, vastness, or greatness of dimension, is a powerful cause of the sublime; and of the three measures of extension, length strikes us least, and height is less grand than depth. The effects of a rugged, broken surface are stronger than those of a polished one.

The last extreme of littleness is sublime also, because division, as well as addition, is infinite.

Infinity fills the mind with that sort of delightful horror which is the truest test of the sublime; and succession and uniformity of parts, which constitute the artificial infinite, give the effect of sublimity in architecture. But in regard to the sublime in building, greatness of dimension is also requisite, though designs which are vast only by their dimensions are always the sign of a common and low imagination. No work of art can be great but as it deceives.

Another kind of infinity also causes pleasure, as the young of animals are pleasant because they give the promise of something more, and unfinished sketches are often more pleasing than the completed work. Difficulty is the true source of greatness, as Stonehenge impresses the mind by the immense force necessary for such a work.

Magnificence, which involves a great profusion of things splendid or valuable in themselves, is sublime, and is exemplified in the starry heavens, whose apparent disorder augments their grandeur. The sublimity of magnificence is achieved by poets who use a dazzling richness and profusion of images.

After extension, colour is capable of raising ideas of greatness, and all colours depend upon light. The rays of the sun, or the flash of lightning, have an effect due to their great strength or celerity. But darkness is more sublime than light. Our great poet spoke of the Deity as 'encircled with the majesty of darkness,' an idea not only poetical, but philosophically just.

IV—ELEMENTS OF BEAUTY

BY beauty, as distinguished from the sublime, I mean that quality or those qualities in bodies by which they cause love, or some passion analogous to it. I also distinguish love, or the satisfaction which arises to the mind upon contemplating anything beautiful, from desire, which is an energy of the mind that hurries us on to the possession of certain objects.

In what does beauty consist? The usual answer to this question has been that it consists in certain proportions of parts; but I very much doubt whether it has anything at all to do with proportions. Proportion is the measure of relative quantity; but beauty has nothing to do with mensuration and, as a matter of fact, the parts of plants and animals which are found to be beautiful are not constantly formed upon certain measures.

Thus, flowers are of almost every sort of shape and arrangement; and though we find in them a regular figure and a methodical disposition of the leaves, yet in an oblique view, when this order is not apparent, the flower retains its beauty. The swan's long neck and short tail enter into a beautiful proportion, but so do the short neck and long tail of the peacock.

You may assign any proportions you please to every part of the human body, and I undertake that a painter shall observe them all, and yet produce, if he likes, a very ugly figure. The same painter shall considerably deviate from these proportions and yet produce a very beautiful figure.

This prejudice in favour of proportion has arisen from an impression that if deformity be removed, beauty must result. But deformity is opposed, not to beauty, but to the complete, common form; and beauty affects us as deviating from the common. The true opposite to beauty is ugliness, and between them is a sort of mediocrity, which has no effect upon the passions.

Neither is utility, or fitness, the cause of beauty. For then the wedge-like snout of the swine, with its little sunk eyes, so well adapted for digging and rooting, would be

extremely beautiful. There are few animals whose parts are better contrived, or who seem less beautiful, than a monkey. The stomach and the liver are incomparably well adapted for their purpose, yet are not beautiful. The effect of proportion and of fitness is to produce approbation, the acquiescence of the understanding, but not love.

Neither, again, is perfection the cause of beauty; for beauty, where it is highest, as in women, almost always carries with it the idea of weakness and imperfection. The qualities of mind which most engage our hearts are the softer virtues, and the chosen companions of our recreations are rarely persons of shining qualities.

What, then, are the real causes of beauty?

In the first place, beautiful objects are small. In most languages, objects of love are spoken of under diminutive epithets. We rarely say 'a great beautiful thing,' but often 'a great ugly thing.' There is a wide difference between admiration and love; and while the sublime has to do with great and terrible objects, the beautiful is found in small and pleasing things.

The next property constantly observable in objects of love is smoothness; I can recollect nothing beautiful that is not smooth. Smooth leaves in trees, smooth slopes in gardens, smooth streams in the landscape, smooth coats of birds and beasts, smooth skins in fine women, and smooth surfaces in ornamental furniture.

Beautiful bodies are never composed of angular parts, nor do their parts continue long in the same straight line. They vary their direction every moment and change under the eye by a continual deviation.

Further, an air of robustness and strength is very prejudicial to beauty; an appearance of delicacy, and even of fragility, is almost essential to it. This may be remarked alike in plants and in animals, and it is obvious in the case of the fair sex, whose timidity is a quality of mind analogous to it.

Of the colours of beautiful objects we note that they must not be dusky or muddy, but clean and fair; they must not be of the strongest kind, but mild in tone; or, if vivid, they must be so diversified that each abates the other, or be mixed with such gradations that it is impossible to fix the bounds of each.

The beautiful, in the sense of feeling, is in almost every respect similar to the beautiful in the sense of vision; for instance, softness, smoothness and a continually varying surface are the sources of pleasure in either case.

V—CAUSES OF BEAUTY

Beauty, indeed, presents a remarkable contrast with the sublime; they may sometimes occur together, but they are none the less opposite and contradictory. As for the causes of them, their ultimate cause can never be unravelled by any industry of ours, but we may distinguish certain proximate causes.

The sense of the sublime, then, has its source in an unnatural tension of the nerves, such as is produced both by fear and by pain, and may even be aroused in some degree by mimicking the facial and bodily expressions of fear and pain. Human emotions are very intimately associated with nervous and other physical changes, and the mood of terror may be regarded as an exercise of the finer parts of our bodily system, clearing them of a troublesome encumbrance and so becoming, incidentally, a cause of delight.

Vastness arouses the sense of the sublime by straining the nerves and muscles of the eye; and a similar physical explanation is suitable to the sublimity of the artificial infinite, which is produced, as we have seen, by a succession of similar visual objects. Darkness is terrible for the same reason; we know that as the light diminishes the pupil of the eye is enlarged by the retiring of the iris, and doubtless any great darkness exaggerates this change until it sets up a painful nervous tension.

In every one of its modifications the sense of the sublime has its nervous basis, due to changes which are in some degree painful, and an analogous nervous basis may be discovered for the sense of the beautiful.

For in the latter case, also, the body is affected. When we have before us objects of love and complacency the whole body is composed, and the hands fall idly to the sides; and all this is accompanied by an inward sense of languor. It is impossible not to conclude that beauty acts by relaxing the whole system. The easy gradations of line, and the soft tones of colour, which are proper to beauty, affect the sense by lulling it to repose.

A brief consideration must be devoted, in conclusion, to the effects of words with reference to these passions of the sublime and beautiful. It is commonly supposed that the power of words lies in their raising in the mind the ideas of those things for which the words stand. But this is certainly not true of such words as 'virtue,' 'honour,' and the like. Nobody, on hearing these sounds, conceives precise notions of the relations which they represent. Their effect is that of sounds, not of representations; but of sounds which have been habitually associated with certain effects on the mind.

A word may produce three effects on the hearer—the sound, the picture, and the affection of the soul; and words like 'honour' and 'liberty' produce the first and third of these, but not the second. Words like 'blue,' 'green,' 'cold,' and still more, words like 'horse,' 'man,' may produce all three of these effects, but their general effect does not arise from their forming pictures.

The power of poetic imagery depends on the affections of the soul produced immediately by the sounds of the words. Consider what is the source of the power in Milton's lines, where he describes the travels of the fallen angels through their dismal habitation.

> O'er many a dark and dreary vale
> They passed, and many a region dolorous;
> O'er many a frozen, many a fiery Alp;
> Rocks, caves, lakes, fens, bogs, dens, and shades of death,
> A universe of death.

The Wealth of Nations

ADAM SMITH

BORN at Kirkcaldy, Fifeshire, June 5, 1723, and educated there, at Glasgow University and at Balliol College, Oxford, in 1751 Adam Smith was appointed professor of logic in Glasgow University, and from 1752 to 1763 was professor of moral philosophy. In 1766 he retired to devote himself to the composition of a work embodying the principles he had arrived at during this period, and in 1776 it appeared under the title An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Adam Smith's reasonings have had vast influence, his powerful defence of Free Trade and his indictment of the East India Company having especially modified the history of this country.

I—LABOUR AND ITS PRODUCE

THE division of labour has been the chief cause of improvement in the productiveness of labour. For instance, the making of a single pin involves eighteen separate operations, which are entrusted to eighteen separate workmen; and the result is, that whereas one man working alone could make perhaps only twenty pins in a day, several men working together, on the principle of division of labour, can make several thousands of pins per man in one day. Division of labour, in a highly developed state of society, is carried into almost every practical art; and its great benefits depend upon the increase of dexterity in each workman, upon the saving of time otherwise lost in passing from one kind of work to another and, finally, upon the use of many labour-saving machines.

This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom which foresees and intends the opulence to which it gives rise; it is rather the gradual result of the propensity in human nature to barter and exchange one thing for another. The power of exchanging their respective produce makes it possible for one man to produce only bread, and for another to produce only clothing.

The extent to which the division of labour can be carried is, therefore, limited by the extent of the market. There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be carried on nowhere but in a great town—a porter, for example, cannot find employment and subsistence in a village. In the highlands of Scotland every farmer must be butcher, baker and brewer for his own family.

As water-carriage opens a more extensive market to every kind of industry than is afforded by land-carriage, it is on the sea-coast, and on the banks of navigable rivers, that industry begins to subdivide and improve itself, and it is not till long afterwards that these improvements extend to the inland parts. It was thus that the earliest civilized nations were grouped round the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea, and the extent and easiness of its inland navigation was probably the chief cause of the early improvement of Egypt.

As soon as the division of labour is well established, every man becomes in some measure a merchant and the society becomes a commercial society, and the continual process of exchange leads inevitably to the origin of money. In the absence of money, or a general medium of exchange, society would be restricted to the cumbersome method of barter. Every man, therefore, would early endeavour to keep by him, besides the produce of his own industry, a certain quantity of some commodity such as other people will be likely to take in exchange for the produce of their particular industries. Cattle, for example, have been widely used for this purpose in primitive societies, and Homer speaks of a suit of armour costing a hundred oxen.

But the durability of metals, as well as the facility with which they can be sub-divided, has led to their employment, in all countries, as the means of exchange; and in order to obviate the necessity of weighing portions of the metals at every purchase, as well as to prevent fraud, it has been found necessary to affix a public stamp upon certain quantities of the metals commonly used to purchase goods. The value of commodities thus comes to be expressed in terms of coinage.

But labour is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities; the value of any commodity to the person who possesses it is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or to command. What is bought with money or with goods is purchased by labour as much as what we require by the toil of our own body. Labour alone, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times, and in all places, be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price only. Equal quantities of labour will at distant times be purchased more nearly with equal quantities of corn—the subsistence of the labourer—than with equal quantities of gold, or of any other commodity.

Several elements enter into the price of commodities. In a nation of hunters, if it costs twice the labour to kill a beaver which it costs to kill a deer, one beaver will be worth two deer. But if the one kind of labour be more severe than the other, some allowance will naturally be made for this superior hardship; and thirdly, if one kind of labour requires an uncommon degree of dexterity and ingenuity, it will command a higher value than that which would be due to the time employed in it.

So far the whole produce of labour belongs to the labourer. But as soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons, some of them will employ it in setting to work industrious workmen, whom they will supply with materials and subsistence, in order to make a profit by the sale of their work. The profits of stock are not to be regarded

as the wages of a particular sort of labour, the labour of inspection and direction; for they are regulated altogether by the value of the stock employed, and are greater or smaller in proportion to the extent of this stock.

There is in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate both of wages and profit in every different employment of labour and stock; and this rate is regulated partly by the general circumstances of the society, its riches or poverty, and partly by the peculiar nature of each employment.

There is also in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate of rent, which is regulated, too, by the general circumstances of the society or neighbourhood in which the land is situated, and partly by the natural or improved fertility of the land. What we may call the natural price of any commodity depends upon these natural rates of wages, profit and rent at the place where it is produced. But its market price may vary from its natural price, and depends upon the proportion between the supply and the demand.

II—NATURE, ACCUMULATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF STOCK

When the stock which a man possesses is no more than sufficient to maintain him for a few days or weeks, he seldom thinks of deriving any revenue from it, but when he possesses enough to maintain him for months or years, he endeavours to derive a revenue from the greater part of it. The stock from which he derives revenue is called his capital.

There are two ways in which capital may be employed so as to yield a profit to its employer. First, it may be employed in raising manufacturing, or purchasing goods, and selling them again with a profit; this is circulating capital. Secondly, it may be employed in the improvement of land, or in the purchase of machines and instruments; and this capital, which yields a profit from objects which do not change masters, is called fixed capital.

The general stock of any country or society is the same as that of all its inhabitants or members and is, therefore, divided into three portions, each of which has a different function. The first is the portion which is reserved for immediate consumption, and so affords no revenue or profit. The second is the fixed capital, which consists of:

(*a*) All useful machines and instruments of trade which facilitate labour.

(*b*) All profitable buildings, which procure a revenue, not only to their owner, but also to the person who rents them, such as shops, warehouses, farmhouses, factories, etc.

(*c*) The improvements of land, and all that has been laid out in clearing, draining, enclosing, manuring and reducing it into the condition most proper for culture.

(*d*) The acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or members of the society; for the acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the learner during his training costs a real expense, which is a capital fixed in his person.

The third and last of the three portions into which the general stock of the society divides itself is the circulating capital, which affords a revenue only by changing masters. It includes;

(*a*) All the money by means of which all the other three are circulated and distributed to their proper consumers.

(*b*) All the stock of provisions which are in the possession of the butcher, farmer, corn merchant, etc. and from the sale of which they expect to derive a profit.

(*c*) All the materials, whether altogether rude, or more or less manufactured, for clothes, furniture and building, which are not yet made up into any of these shapes, but remain in the hands of the growers, manufacturers and merchants.

(*d*) All the work which is made up and completed, but is not yet disposed of to the proper consumers.

The substitution of paper in the place of gold and silver money replaces a very expensive instrument of commerce by one much less costly, and sometimes equally convenient. Circulation comes to be carried on by a new wheel, which costs less both to erect and to maintain than the old one.

III—THE PROGRESS OF OPULENCE IN DIFFERENT NATIONS

The greatest commerce of every civilized society is that carried on between the inhabitants of the town and those of the country. It consists in the exchange of rude for manufactured produce, either immediately, or by the intervention of money, or of some sort of paper which represents money. The country supplies the town with the means of subsistence and the materials for manufactures. The town repays this supply by sending back a part of the manufactured produce to the inhabitants of the country. The town, in which there neither is nor can be any reproduction of substances, may very properly be said to gain its whole subsistence from the country. And in how great a degree the country is benefited by the commerce of the town may be seen from a comparison of the cultivation of the lands in the neighbourhood of any considerable town with that of those which lie at some distance from it.

As subsistence is, in the nature of things, prior to convenience and luxury, so the rural industries, which procure the former, must be prior to the urban industries, which minister to the latter. The greater part of the capital of every growing society is therefore directed first to agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce.

But this natural order of things has, in all the modern states of Europe, been in many respects entirely inverted. The foreign commerce of some of their cities has given rise to their finer manufactures, and manufactures and foreign commerce together have given birth to the principal improvements of agriculture. The customs which their original government introduced, and which remained after that government was greatly altered, necessarily forced them into this unnatural and retrograde order.

In the ancient state of Europe, after the fall of the Roman Empire, agriculture was greatly discouraged by several causes. The rapine

and violence which the barbarians exercised against the ancient inhabitants interrupted the commerce between towns and the country; the towns were deserted and the country was left uncultivated. The western provinces of Europe sank into the lowest state of poverty and the land, which was mostly uncultivated, was engrossed by a few great proprietors.

These lands might, in the natural course of events, have been soon divided again, and broken into small parcels by succession or by alienation; but the law of primo-geniture hindered their division by succession, and the introduction of entails prevented their being divided by alienation. These hindrances to the division, and consequently to the cultivation, of the land were due to the fact that land was considered as the means not of subsistence merely, but of power and protection.

In the ancient state of Europe the occupiers of land were all tenants at will, and practically slaves. To these succeeded a kind of farmers known at present in France by the name of 'metayers,' whose produce was divided equally between the proprietor and the farmer, after setting aside what was judged necessary for keeping up the stock, which still belonged to the landlord. To these, in turn, succeeded farmers properly so called, who cultivated the land with their own stock, paying a fixed rent to the landlord and enjoying a certain degree of security of tenure. And every improvement in the position of the actual cultivation of the soil is attended by a corresponding improvement of the land and of its cultivation.

After the fall of the Roman Empire, the inhabitants of cities and towns were not more favoured than those of the country. The towns were inhabited chiefly by tradesmen and mechanics, who in those days were of servile, or nearly servile, condition. Yet the townsmen arrived at liberty and independence much earlier than the country population; their towns became 'free burghs,' and were erected into commonalties or corporations, with the privilege of having magistrates and a town council of their own, of making by-laws for their own government, and of building walls for their own defence. Order and good government, and the liberty and security of individuals, were thus established in cities at a time when the occupiers of land in the country were exposed to every sort of violence.

The increase and riches of commercial and manufacturing towns thenceforward contributed to the improvement and cultivation of the countries to which they belonged in three different ways. First, by affording a great and ready market for the rude produce of the country. Secondly, the wealth acquired by the inhabitants of cities was employed in purchasing uncultivated lands and in bringing them under cultivation; for merchants are ambitious of becoming country gentlemen, and, when they do so, are generally the best of all improvers. And, lastly, commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them as a logical consequence the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country.

IV—THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM

From the mistaken theory that wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver, there has arisen an erroneous and harmful system of political economy and of legislation in the supposed interests of manufacture, of commerce and of the wealth of nations. A rich country is supposed to be a country abounding in money; and all the nations of Europe have consequently studied, though to little purpose, every possible means of accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries. For example, they have at times forbidden, or hindered by heavy duties, the export of these metals. But all these attempts are vain, for, on the one hand, when the quantity of gold and silver imported into any country exceeds the effectual demand, no vigilance can prevent their exportation. The real inconvenience, which is commonly called 'scarcity of money,' is not a shortness in the medium of exchange, but is a weakening and diminution of credit, due to over-trading.

The principle of the 'commercial system' or 'mercantile system' is that wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver. It is an utterly untrue principle. But once it had been established in general belief that wealth consists in gold and silver, and that these metals can be brought into a country which has no mines only by the 'balance of trade'—that is to say, by exporting to a greater value than it imports—it necessarily became the great object of political economy to diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods for home consumption, and to increase as much as possible the exportation of the produce of domestic industry. Its great engines for enriching the country, therefore, were restraints upon importation and encouragements to exportation.

The restraints upon importation were of two kinds. First, restraints upon the importation of such foreign goods for home consumption as could be produced at home, from whatever country they were imported; and, secondly, restraints upon the importation of goods of almost all kinds from those particular countries with which the balance of trade was supposed to be disadvantageous. These restraints consisted sometimes in high duties, and sometimes in prohibitions.

Exportation was encouraged sometimes by drawbacks, sometimes by bounties, sometimes by advantageous treaties of commerce with sovereign states, and sometimes by the establishment of colonies in distant countries. The above two restraints, and these four encouragements to exportation, constitute the six principal means by which the commercial or mercantile system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and silver in any country by turning the balance of trade in its favour.

The entire system, in all its developments, is fallacious in theory and evil in its practical effect. It is not difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this whole mercantile system—not the consumers, whose interest has been entirely neglected, but the producers, and especially the merchants and manufacturers, whose interest has been so carefully attended to.

It remains to be said, also, that the 'agricultural system' which represents the produce of land as the sole source of the revenue and wealth of every country, and as therefore justifying a special protection of it, is as fallacious and as harmful as the other.

V—THE REVENUE OF THE SOVEREIGN OR COMMONWEALTH

The first duty of the sovereign—that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies—can be performed only by means of a military force. This may be effected either by obliging all the citizens of the military age, or a certain number of them, to join in some measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they may happen to carry on; or by maintaining a certain number of citizens in the constant practice of military exercises, thus rendering the soldier's occupation a special profession, distinct from all others. A militia is the less expensive, but a standing army is by far the more efficient defence; and its cost falls to be borne by the sovereign or the commonwealth.

The second duty of government is to protect every member of the society from the violence or injustice of other members; and for this purpose courts and magistrates of justice have to be maintained, and officers must be appointed to preserve the internal peace of the community. Another duty is to maintain the means of education, among which we may include not only the universities, but also the Church. The building and maintenance of roads, bridges, canals and other communications, which cannot be undertaken by private enterprise, must also be reckoned among the duties of the sovereign.

The cost of all these functions of sovereignty is defrayed by taxation; and the great principles of taxation are that the taxes should be proportioned to the means of those who have to pay them, and that the collection of every tax should be as inexpensive and as little irksome or vexatious to the public as possible.

The Critique of Pure Reason

IMMANUEL KANT

THIS epoch-making work was first published in 1781. It forms the first of a remarkable trilogy, its companion studies being The Critique of Practical Reason, 1788; and The Critique of the Power of Judgement, 1790. In Kant's view Pure Reason teaches that human knowledge is based on experience; but Practical Reason recognizes that there are *a priori* in the mind certain notions independent of experience and postulating the ideas of human liberty, God and immortality. Thus, while distinguishing the provinces of materialism and idealism, he attempted to find a bond of union between them.

I—KNOWLEDGE TRANSCENDENTAL: AESTHETIC

Experience is something of which we are conscious. It is the first result of our comprehension, but it is not the limit of our understanding, since it stimulates our faculty of reason, but does not satisfy its desire for knowledge.

While all our knowledge may begin with sensible impressions or experience there is an element in it which does not rise from this source, but transcends it. That knowledge is transcendental which is occupied not so much with mere outward objects as with our manner of knowing those objects, that is to say, with *a priori* concepts of them.

All our knowledge is either a *priori* or *a posteriori*. That is *a posteriori* knowledge which is derived from sensible experience as including sensible impressions or states; while *a priori* knowledge is that which is not thus gained, but consists of whatever is universal or necessary.

A complete Transcendental Philosophy would be a systematic exposition of all that is *a priori* in human knowledge, or of 'all the principles of pure reason.' But a Critique of Pure Reason cannot include all this. It can do little more than deal with the synthetic element or quality in *a priori* knowledge, as distinguished from the analytic elements.

We perceive objects through our sensibility which furnishes us, as our faculty of receptivity, with those intuitions that become translated into thought by means of the understanding. This is the origin of our conceptions, or ideas. I denominate as *matter* that which in a phenomenon corresponds to sensation; while I call *form* that quality of matter which presents it in a perceived order. Only matter is presented to our minds *a posteriori*; as to form, this must inevitably exist in the mind *a priori*, and therefore it can be considered apart from all sensation.

Pure representation, entirely apart from sensation, in a transcendental signification, forms the pure intuition of the mind, existing in it as a mere form of sensibility. 'Transcendental aesthetic' is the science of all the principles of sensibility. But transcendental logic is the science of the principles of pure thought. In studying the former we shall find that there are two pure forms of sensuous intuition, namely, space and time.

Are space and time actual entities? Or are they only relations of things? Space is simply the form of all the phenomena of external senses; that is, it is the subjective condition of the sensibility under which alone external intuition is possible. Thus the form of all phenomena may exist *a priori* in the soul as a pure intuition previous to all experience. So we can only speak of space and of extended objects from the standpoint of human reason. But when we have abstracted all the forms perceived by our sensibility, there remains a pure intuition which we call space. Therefore our discussion teaches us the objective validity of space with regard to all that can appear before us externally as an object; but equally the subjective ideality of space with regard to things if they are considered in themselves by our reason, that is, without taking into account the nature of our sensibility.

Time is not empirically conceived of; that is, it is not experimentally apprehended. Time is a necessary representation on which all intuitions are dependent, and the representation of time to the mind is thus given *a priori*. In it alone can phenomena be apprehended. These may vanish, but time cannot be put aside.

Time is not something existing by itself independently, but is the formal condition *a priori* of all phenomena. If we deduct our own peculiar sensibility, then the idea of time disappears indeed, because it is not inherent in any object, but only in the subject which perceives that object. Space and time are essential *a priori* ideas, and they are the necessary conditions of all particular perceptions. From the latter and their objects we can, in imagination without exception, abstract; from the former we cannot.

Space and time are therefore to be regarded as the necessary *a priori* pre-conditions of the possibility and reality of all phenomena. It is clear that 'transcendental aesthetic' can obtain only these two elements, space and time, because all other concepts belong to the senses and pre-suppose experience, and so imply something empirical. For example, the concept of motion pre-supposes something moving, but in space regarded alone there is nothing that moves; therefore, whatever moves must be recognized by experience, and is a purely empirical datum.

II—TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

Our knowledge is derived from two fundamental sources of the consciousness. The first is the faculty of receptivity of impressions; the second, the faculty of cognition of an object by means of these impressions or representations, this second power being sometimes styled spontaneity of concepts. By the first, an object is given to us; by the second it is thought of in the mind. Thus intuition and concepts constitute the elements of our entire knowledge, for neither intuition without concepts, nor concepts without intuition can yield any knowledge whatever. Hence arise two branches of science, 'aesthetic' and logic, the former being the science of the rules of sensibility; the latter, the science of the rules of understanding.

Logic can be treated in two directions; either as logic of the general use of the understanding, or of some particular use of it. The former includes the rules of thought, without which there can be no use of the understanding; but it has no regard to the objects to which the understanding is applied. This is elementary logic. But logic of the understanding in some particular use includes rules of correct thought in relation to special classes of objects; and this latter logic is generally taught in schools as preliminary to the study of sciences.

Thus, general logic takes no account of any of the contents of knowledge, but is limited simply to the consideration of the forms of thought. But we are constrained by anticipation to form an idea of a logical science which has to deal not only with pure thought, but also has to determine the origin, validity and extent of the knowledge to which intuitions relate, and this might be styled transcendental logic.

In 'transcendental aesthetic' we isolated the faculty of sensibility. So in transcendental logic we isolate the understanding, concentrating our consideration on that element of thought which has its source simply in the understanding. But transcendental logic must be divided into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic. The former is a logic of truth, and is intended to furnish a canon of criticism. When logic is used to judge not analytically, but to judge synthetically of objects in general, it is called transcendental dialectic, which serves as a protection against sophistical fallacy.

Analytic of Pure Concepts

The understanding may be defined as the faculty of judging. The function of thought in a judgement can come under four heads, each with three subdivisions.

1. Quantity of judgements: Universal, particular, singular.
2. Quality: Affirmative, negative, infinite.
3. Relation: Categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive.
4. Modality: Problematical, assertory, apodictic (above contradiction).

If we examine each of these forms of judgement we discover that in every one is involved some peculiar idea which is its essential characteristic. Thus, a singular judgement, in which the subject of discourse is a single object, involves obviously the special idea of oneness, or unity. A particular judgement, relating to several objects, implies the idea of plurality, and discriminates between the several objects. Now the whole list of these ideas will constitute the complete classification of the fundamental conceptions of the understanding, regarded as the faculty which judges, and these may be called categories.

1. Of Quantity: Unity, plurality, totality.
2. Of Quality: Reality, negation, limitation.
3. Of Relation: Substance and accident, cause and effect, action and reaction.
4. Of Modality: Possibility—impossibility, existence—non-existence, necessity—contingence.

These, then, are the fundamental, primary, or native conceptions of the understanding, which flow from, or constitute the mechanism of, its nature; are inseparable from its activity; and are hence for human thought, universal and necessary, or *a priori*. These categories are 'pure' conceptions of the understanding, inasmuch as they are independent of all that is contingent in sense.

Transcendental Dialectic

A distinction is usually made between what is immediately known and what is only inferred. In every syllogism is first a fundamental proposition; secondly, another deduced from it; and, thirdly, the consequence.

In the use of pure reason its concepts, or transcendental ideas, aim at unity of all conditions of thought. So all transcendental ideas may be arranged in three classes; the first containing the unity of the thinking subject; the second, the unity of the conditions of phenomena observed; the third, the unity of the objective conditions of thought.

This classification becomes clear if we note that the thinking subject is the object-matter of psychology; while the system of all phenomena (the world) is the object-matter of cosmology; and the Being of all Beings (God) is the object-matter of theology.

Hence we perceive that pure reason supplies three transcendental ideas, namely, the idea of a transcendental science of the soul (*psychologia rationalis*); of a transcendental science of the world (*cosmologia rationalis*); and, lastly, of a transcendental science of God (*theologia transcendentalis*). It is the glory of transcendental idealism that by it the mind ascends in the series of conditions till it reaches the unconditioned, that is, the principles. We thus progress from our knowledge of self to a knowledge of the world, and through it to a knowledge of the Supreme Being.

III—THE ANTINOMIES OF PURE REASON

Transcendental reason attempts to reconcile conflicting assertions. There are four of these antinomies, or conflicts.

First Antinomy. Thesis. The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited in regard to space. Proof. Were the world without a time-beginning we should have to ascribe a present limit to that which can have no limit, which is absurd. Again, were the world not limited in regard to space, it must be conceived as an infinite whole, yet it is impossible thus to conceive it.

Antithesis. The world has neither beginning in time, nor limit in space, but in both regards is infinite. Proof. The world must have existed from eternity, or it could never exist at all. If we imagine it had a beginning, we must imagine an anterior time when nothing was. But in such time the origin of anything is impossible. At no moment could any cause for such a beginning exist.

Second Antinomy. Thesis. Every composite substance in the world is composed of simple parts. This thesis seems scarcely to require proof. No one can deny that a composite substance consists of parts, and that these parts, if themselves composite, must consist of others less composite, till at length we come, by compulsion of thought, to the conception of the absolutely simple as that wherein the substantial consists.

Antithesis. No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing simple exists anywhere in the world. Proof. Each simple part implied in the thesis must be in space. But this condition is a positive disproof of their possibility. A simple substance would have to occupy a simple portion of space; but space has no simple parts. The supposition of such a part is the supposition, not of space, but of the negation of space. A simple substance, in existing and occupying any portion of space, must contain a real multiplicity of parts external to each other, *i.e.* it must contradict its own nature, which is absurd.

Third Antinomy. Thesis. The causality of natural law is insufficient for the explanation of all the phenomena of the universe. For this end another kind of causality must be assumed, whose attribute is freedom. Proof. All so-called natural causes are effects of preceding causes, forming a regressive series of indefinite extent, with no first beginning. So we never arrive at an adequate cause of any phenomenon. Yet natural law has for its central demand that nothing shall happen without such a cause.

Antithesis. All events in the universe occur under the exclusive operation of natural laws, and there is no such thing as freedom. Proof. The idea of a free cause is an absurdity. For it contradicts the very law of causation itself, which demands that every event shall be in orderly sequence with some preceding event. Now, free causation is such an event, being the active beginning of a series of phenomena. Yet the action of the supposed free cause must be imagined as independent of all connexion with any previous event. It is without law or reason, and would be the blind realization of confusion and lawlessness. Therefore transcendental freedom is a violation of the law of causation, and is in conflict with all experience. We must of necessity acquiesce in the explanation of all phenomena by the operation of natural law, and thus transcendental freedom must be pronounced a fallacy.

Fourth Antinomy. Thesis. Some form of absolutely necessary existence belongs to the world, whether as its part or as its cause. Proof. Phenomenal existence is serial, mutable, consistent. Every event is contingent upon a preceding condition. The conditioned presupposes, for its complete explanation, the unconditioned. The whole of past time, since it contains the whole of all past conditions, must of necessity contain the unconditioned or also 'absolutely necessary.'

Antithesis. There is no absolutely necessary existence, whether in the world as its part, or outside of it as its cause. Proof. Of unconditionally necessary existence within the world there can be none. The assumption of a first unconditioned link in the chain of cosmical conditions is self-contradictory. For such link or cause, being in time, must be subject to the law of all temporal existence, and so be determined—contrary to the original assumption—by another link or cause before it.

The supposition of an absolutely necessary cause of the world, existing without the world, also destroys itself. For, being outside the world, it is not in time. And yet, to act as a cause, it must be in time. This supposition is therefore absurd.

The theses in these four antinomies constitute the teaching of philosophical dogmatism. The antitheses constitute doctrines of philosophical empiricism.

IV—CRITICISM OF THE CHIEF ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

The ontological argument aims at asserting the possibility of conceiving the idea of an *ens realissimum*, of being possessed of all reality. But the idea of existence and the fact of existence are two very different things. Whatever I conceive, or sensibly imagine, I necessarily conceive as though it were existing. Though my pocket be empty, I may conceive it to contain a 'hundred thalers.' If I conceive them there, I can only conceive them as actually existing there. But, alas, the fact that I am under this necessity of so conceiving by no means carries with it a necessity that the coins should really be in my pocket. That can only be determined by experience.

The cosmological argument contends that if

anything exists, there must also exist an absolutely necessary being. Now, at least I myself exist. Hence there exists an absolutely necessary being. The argument coincides with that by which the thesis of the fourth antinomy is supposed. The objections to it are summed up in the proof of the antithesis of the fourth antinomy. As soon as we have recognized the true conception of causality, we have already transcended the sensible world.

The physico-theological or teleological argument is what is often styled the argument from design. It proceeds not from general, but particular experience. Nature discloses manifold signs of wise intention and harmonious order, and these are held to betoken a divine designer. This argument deserves always to be treated with respect. It is the oldest and clearest of all proofs, and best adapted to convince the reason of the mass of mankind. It animates us in our study of nature. And it were not only a cheerless, but an altogether vain task to attempt to detract from the persuasive authority of this proof. There is naught to urge against its rationality and its utility.

All arguments, however, to prove the existence of God must, in order to be theoretically valid, start from specifically and exclusively sensible or phenomenal data, must employ only the conceptions of pure physical science, and must end with demonstrating in sensible experience an object congruous with, or corresponding to, the idea of God. But this requirement cannot be met, for, scientifically speaking, the existence of an absolutely necessary God cannot be either proved or disproved. Hence room is left for faith in any moral proofs that may present themselves to us, apart from science. With this subject ethics, the science of practice or of practical reason, will have to deal.

The Critique of Practical Reason

IMMANUEL KANT

PUBLISHED in 1788, the Critique of Practical Reason forms the central focus of Kant's thinking. It stands midway between the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgement. Herein Kant figures as a vindicator of the truth of Christianity, approaching his proof by first establishing positive affirmations of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. It includes an argument concerning the *summum bonum* of life, the special aim being to demonstrate that man should not simply seek to be happy, but should, by absolute obedience to the moral law, seek to become worthy of that happiness which God can bestow.

I—ANALYTIC OF PRACTICAL REASON

PRACTICAL principles are propositions containing a general determination of the will. They are maxims, or subjective propositions, when expressing the will of an individual; objective, when they are valid expressions of the will of rational beings generally.

Practical principles which presuppose an object of desire are empirical, or experimental, and supply no practical laws. Reason, in the scope of a practical law, influences the will not by the medium of pleasure or pain. All rational beings necessarily wish for happiness, but they are not all agreed either as to the means to attain it, or as to the objects of their enjoyment of it. To discover any law which would bring all men into harmony is absolutely impossible.

One of the problems of practical reason is to find the law which can necessarily determine the will, assuming that the will is free. The solution of this problem is to be found in action according to the moral law. We should so act that the maxim of our will can always be valid as a principle of universal legislation. Experience shows how the moral consciousness determines freedom of the will.

Suppose that someone affirms of his inclination for sensual pleasure that he cannot possibly resist temptation to indulgence. If a gallows were erected at the place where he is tempted on which he should be hanged immediately after satiating his passions, would he not be able to control his inclination? We need not long doubt what would be his answer.

But ask him, if his sovereign commanded him to bear false witness against an honourable man, under penalty of death, whether he would hold it possible to conquer his love of life. He might not venture to say what he would choose, but he would certainly admit that it is possible to make choice. Thus, he judges that he can choose to do a thing because he is conscious of moral obligation, and he thus recognizes for himself a freedom of will of which, but for the moral law, he would never have been conscious.

We obtain the exact opposite of the principle of morality if we adopt the principle of personal private happiness as the determining motive of the will. This contradiction is not only logical, but also practical. For morality would be totally destroyed were not the voice of reason as clear and penetrating in relation to the will, even to the most ordinary men.

If one of your friends, after bearing false witness against you, attempted to justify his base conduct by enumerating the advantages which he had thus secured for himself and by declaring that thus he performed a true human duty, you would either laugh him to scorn or turn from him in horror. And yet, if a man acts for his own selfish ends, you have not the slightest objection to such behaviour.

Morality and Happiness

THE maxim of self love simply advises; the law of morality commands. There is a vast difference between what we are advised and what we are obliged to do. No practical laws can be based on the principle of happiness, even on that of universal happiness, for the knowledge of this happiness rests on merely empirical or experimental data, every man's ideas



THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS was born near Dorking, February 17, 1766, and, after having been educated by private tutors and at Cambridge, became a fellow of Jesus College. He soon turned to political economy, which was to be his life study. His theory on population was attacked on all hands. In 1805 he became professor of political economy at East India College, Hertfordshire. He died December 3, 1834. This portrait hangs in the National Portrait Gallery.



ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER was born at Danzig, February 22, 1788. At the age of seventeen he was placed in a merchant's office at Hamburg, but after his father's death took up classical studies. After some years at Göttingen and Berlin, he graduated at Jena in 1813. He passed the next winter at Weimar with Goethe, later travelled in Italy, and in 1820 became lecturer at Berlin University. He died at Frankfort-on-Main, September 21, 1860. This portrait is from the painting by Göbel.

AUGUSTE COMTE was born at Montpellier, January 19, 1798, and educated there and at the École Polytechnique in Paris. An appointment as examiner for the École Polytechnique provided him with the means of subsistence while engaged upon his first great work, the Course of Positive Philosophy, but he lost the appointment in 1842. In 1848 he founded the Positive Society. Comte died September 5, 1857.

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, one of the greatest of the English Romantic poets and a literary critic and philosopher, was born on October 21, 1772, at Ottery St. Mary, Devonshire. Educated at Christ's Hospital and at Jesus College, Cambridge, he left the university in 1794 before he had taken a degree. In 1797 began his memorable association with Wordsworth, which bore fruit, in the joint production, Lyrical Ballads, 1798. From this year until 1806 Coleridge spent much time in continental travel, and was beginning to succumb to opium-taking. In 1816 he went stay with Dr. Gillman, at Highgate, to combat the habit. Here he remained until his death on July 25, 1834. This portrait is from a painting by Washington Allston, A.R.A., in the National Portrait Gallery.

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL was born at Stuttgart, August 27, 1770, and educated at Tubingen. On leaving college he spent some years as a private tutor, and from 1801 to 1806 was tutor and lecturer at Jena. From 1808 to 1816 he was rector of the Academy at Nuremberg, and then was appointed professor of philosophy at Heidelberg. In 1818 he succeeded Fichte in the chair of philosophy at Berlin where he had a most distinguished career and gathered an influential school around him. Hegel died of cholera, November 14, 1831.



JOHN STUART MILL was born in London, May 20, 1806, and educated privately by his father and then in France, becoming extraordinarily proficient in logic, political economy, history, and mathematics. From 1820 to 1858 he was in the East India Office. In later years an advanced Radical, Mill was an ardent defender of the rights of the working classes and an advocate of women's suffrage. Mill died May 8, 1873.



HERBERT SPENCER, the philosopher of evolution, was born at Derby on April 27, 1820. At twenty-five he gave up his profession of railway engineering, and, a little later, became a sub-editor on The Economist. His first important work, Social Statics, was published in 1850. In 1860 he announced his System of Synthetic Philosophy, and this he completed in 1896, with The Principles of Sociology. At his death the press of the whole world admitted the loss of a philosopher whose range of observation was unparalleled. This portrait, by Burgess, hangs in the National Portrait Gallery, London.

of it being conditioned only on his individual opinion. Therefore, this principle of happiness cannot prescribe rules for all rational beings.

But the moral law demands prompt obedience from everyone, and thus even the most ordinary intelligence can discern what should be done. Everyone has power to comply with the dictates of morality, but even with regard to any single aim it is not easy to satisfy the vague precept of happiness. Nothing could be more absurd than a command that everyone should make himself happy, for one never commands anyone to do what he inevitably wishes to do. Finally, in the idea of our practical reason, there is something which accompanies the violation of a moral law—namely, its demerit, with the consciousness that punishment is a natural consequence. Therefore, punishment should be connected in the idea of practical reason with crime, by the principles of moral legislation.

Analysis of Principles

THE practical material principles of determination constituting the basis of morality may be thus classified.

1. SUBJECTIVE.—External : Education ; the civil constitution. Internal : Physical feeling ; moral feeling.

2. OBJECTIVE.—Internal : Perfection. External : Will of God.

The subjective elements are all experimental, or empirical, and cannot supply the universal principle of morality, though they are expounded in that sense by such writers as Montaigne, Mandeville, Epicurus and Hutcheson.

But the objective elements, as enunciated and expounded by Wolf and the Stoics, and by Crusius and other theological moralists, are founded on reason, for absolute perfection as a quality of things (that is, God Himself) can only be thought of by rational concepts.

The concept of perfection in a practical sense is the adequacy of a thing for various ends. As a human quality (and so internal) this is simply talent, and what completes it is skill. But supreme perfection in substance, that is, God Himself, and therefore external (considered practically), is the adequacy of this being for all purposes. All the principles above classified are material, and so can never furnish the supreme moral law. For even the Divine will can supply a motive in the human mind because of the expectation of happiness from it.

Therefore, the formal practical principle of the pure reason insists that the mere form of a universal legislation must constitute the ultimate determining principle of the will. Here is the only possible practical principle which is sufficient to furnish categorical imperatives, that is, practical laws which make action a duty.

It follows from this analytic that pure reason cannot be practical. It can determine the will independently of all merely experimental elements.

There is a remarkable contrast between the working of the pure speculative reason and that of the pure practical reason. In the former—as was shown in the treatise on that subject—a pure, sensible intuition of time and space made knowledge possible, though knowledge only of objects of the senses.

On the contrary, the moral law brings before us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any of the data of the world of sense. And the entire range of our theoretical use of reason indicates a pure world of understanding, which even positively determines it, and enables us to know something of it—namely, a law.

We must observe the distinction between the laws of a system of nature to which the will is subject, and of a system of nature which is subject to the will. In the former, the objects cause the ideas which determine the will ; in the latter, the objects are caused by the will. Hence, causality of the will has its determining principle exclusively in the faculty of pure reason, which may, therefore, also be called a pure practical reason.

The moral law is a law of the causality through freedom, and therefore of the possibility of a super-sensible system of nature. It determines the will by imposing on its maxim the condition of a universal legislative form, and thus it is able for the first time to impart practical reality to reason, which otherwise would continue to be transcendent when seeking to proceed speculatively with its ideas.

Thus the moral law induces a stupendous change. It changes the transcendent use of reason into the immanent use. And in result reason itself becomes, by its ideas, an efficient cause in the field of experience.

Hume and Scepticism

IT may be said of David Hume that he initiated the attack on pure reason. My own labours in the investigation of this subject were occasioned by his sceptical teaching. He argued that without experience it is impossible to know the difference between one thing and another ; that is, we can know *a priori*, and, therefore, the notion of a cause is fictitious and illusory, arising only from the habit of observing certain things associated with each in a succession of connexions.

On such principles we can never come to any conclusion as to causes and effects. We can never predict a consequence from any of the known attributes of things. We can never say of any event that it must *necessarily* have followed from another ; that is, that it must have had an antecedent cause. And we could never lay down a rule derived even from the greatest number of observations. Hence we must trust entirely to blind chance, abolishing all reason, and such a surrender establishes empiricism in an impregnable citadel.

Mathematics escaped Hume, because he considered that its propositions were analytical, proceeding from one determination to another, by reason of identity contained in each. But this is not really so, for, on the contrary, they are synthetical, the results depending ultimately on the assent of observers as witnesses to the universality of propositions.

My investigations led me to the conclusion that the objects with which we are familiar are by no means things in themselves, but are simply phenomena, connected in a certain way with experience. So that without contradiction they cannot be separated from that connexion. Only by that experience can they be recognized. I was able to prove the objective reality of the concept of cause in regard to objects of experience, and to demonstrate its origin from pure understanding, without experimental or empirical sources.

Thus, I first destroyed the source of scepticism, and then the resulting scepticism itself. And thus was subverted the thorough doubt as to

whatever theoretic reason claims to perceive, as well as the claim of Hume that the concept of causality involved something absolutely unthinkable.

Good and Evil

By a concept of practical reason, I understand the representation to the mind of an object as an effect possible to be produced through freedom. The only objects of practical reason are *good* and *evil*. For by 'good' we understand an object necessarily desired and by 'evil' one necessarily abhorred, reason actuating the mind in each case.

In the common use of language we uniformly distinguish between the 'good' and the 'pleasant,' the 'evil' and the 'unpleasant,' good and evil being judged by reason alone. The judgement on the relation of means to ends certainly belongs to reason. But 'good' or 'evil' always implies only a reference to the 'will,' as resolved by the law of reason, to make something its object.

Thus good and evil properly relate to actions, not to personal sensations. Hence, only the maxim of the will, and consequently the person himself, can be called good or evil, not the thing itself.

The Stoic was right, even though he might be laughed at, who during violent attacks of gout exclaimed, 'Pain, I will never admit that thou art an evil!' What he felt was indeed what we call a bad thing; but he had no reason to admit that any evil attached thereby to himself, for the pain did not in the least detract from his personal worth, but only from that of his condition. If a single lie had been on his conscience it would have humiliated his soul; but pain seemed only to elevate it, when he was not conscious of having deserved it as a punishment for any unjust deed.

The rule of judgement subject to the laws of pure practical reason is this: Ask yourself whether if the action you propose were to happen by a natural system of law, of which you were yourself a part, you could regard it as possible by your own will? In fact, everyone does decide by this rule whether actions are morally good or evil.

II—DIALECTIC OF PRACTICAL REASON

The Immortality of the Soul

Pure practical reason postulates the immortality of the soul, for reason in the pure and practical sense aims at the perfect good (*summum bonum*), and this perfect good is only possible on the supposition of the soul's immortality. It is the moral law which determines the will, and in his will the perfect harmony of the mind with the moral law is the supreme condition of the *summum bonum*.

The principle of the moral destination of our nature—that only by endless progress can we come into full harmony with the moral law—is of the greatest use, not only for fortifying the speculative reason, but also with respect to religion. In default of this, either the moral law is degraded from its holiness, being represented as indulging our convenience, or else men strain after an unattainable aim, hoping to gain absolute holiness of will, thus losing themselves in fanatical theosophic dreams utterly contradicting self-knowledge.

For a rational, but finite, being the only possibility is an endless progression from the lower to the higher degrees of perfection. The Infinite Being, to whom the time condition is nothing, sees in this endless succession the perfect harmony with the moral law.

The Existence of God

The pure practical reason must also postulate the existence of God as the necessary condition of the attainment of the *summum bonum*. As the perfect good can only be promoted by accordance of the will with the moral law, so also this *summum bonum* is possible only through the supremacy of an Infinite Being possessed of causality harmonising with morality. But the postulate of the highest derived good (sometimes denominated the best world) coincides with the postulate of a highest original good, or of the existence of God.

We now perceive why the Greeks could never solve their problem of the possibility of the *summum bonum*, because they made the freedom of the human will the only and all-sufficient ground of happiness, imagining there was no need for the existence of God for that end. Christianity alone affords an idea of the *summum bonum* which answers fully to the requirement of practical reason. That idea is the Kingdom of God.

The holiness which the Christian law requires makes essential an infinite progress. But just for that very reason it justifies in man the hope of endless existence. And it is only from an Infinite Supreme Being, morally perfect, holy, good and with an omnipotent will, that we can hope, by accord with His will, to attain the *summum bonum*, which the moral law enjoins on us as our duty to seek ever to attain.

The moral law does not enjoin on us to render ourselves happy, but instructs us how to become worthy of happiness. Morality must never be regarded as a doctrine of happiness, or direction how to become happy, its province being to inculcate the rational condition of happiness, not the means of attaining it. God's design in creating the world is not primarily the happiness of the rational beings in it, but the *summum bonum*, which super-adds another condition to that desire of human beings, namely, the condition of deserving such happiness. That is to say, the morality of rational beings is a condition which alone includes the rule by observing which they can hope to participate in happiness at the hand of an all-wise Creator.

The highest happiness can only be conceived as possible under conditions harmonising with the divine holiness. Thus they are right who make the glory of God the chief end of creation. For beyond all else that can be conceived, that glorifies God which is the most estimable thing in the whole world, honour for His command and obedience to His law, when to this is added His glorious design to crown so beauteous an order of things with happiness corresponding.

Conclusion

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder—the starry heavens above me, and the moral law within me. I need not search for them, and vaguely guess concerning them, as if they were veiled in darkness or hidden in the infinite altitude. I see them before

me, and link them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. The former begins from the spot I occupy in the outer world of sense, and enlarges my connexion with it to a boundless extent with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems.

The second begins with my invisible self, my personality, and places me in a truly infinite world traceable only by the understanding, with which I perceive I am in an universal and necessary connexion, as I am also thereby with all those visible worlds.

This view infinitely elevates my value as an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of the animal and even the whole material world, and reaching by destiny into the infinite.

But though admiration may stimulate inquiry, it cannot compensate for the want of it. The contemplation of the world, beginning with the most magnificent spectacle possible, ended in astrology; and morality, beginning with the noblest attribute of human nature, ended in superstition. But after reason was applied to careful examination of the phenomena of nature a clear and unchangeable insight was secured into the system of the world. We may entertain the hope of a like good result in treating of the moral capacities of our nature by the help of the moral judgement of reason.

Principles of Morals and Legislation

JEREMY BENTHAM

THIS work was published in 1789. It was primarily intended as the introductory volume of a work designed to cover the whole field of the principles of legislation—principles based on that doctrine of utility, or the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number,' which Bentham regarded as equally the basis of ethics. The purpose of the work is at once to insist on this fundamental basis of the principles of legislation, and to treat of law in a manner which should make it intelligible to the general public.

I—CALCULATION OF PLEASURES AND PAINS

MANKIND is governed by pain and pleasure. Utility is that property in anything which tends to produce happiness in the party concerned, whether an individual or a community. The principle of utility makes utility the criterion for approval or disapproval of every kind of action. An act which conforms to this principle is one which ought to be done, or is not one which ought not to be done; is right, or, at least, not wrong. There is no other criterion possible which cannot ultimately be reduced to the personal sentiment of the individual.

The sources or sanctions of pleasure and pain are four—the physical, in the ordinary course of nature; political, officially imposed; moral or popular, imposed by public opinion; and religion. Pains under the first head are calamities; under the other three are punishments. Under the first three heads they concern the present life only. The second, third and the fourth, as concerns this life, operate through the first; but the first operates independently of the others.

Pleasures and pains, then, are the instruments with which the legislator has to work; he must, therefore, be able to gauge their relative values. These depend primarily and simply on four things—intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness. Secondarily, on fecundity, the consequent probable multiplication of the like sensations; and purity, the improbability of consequent contrary sensations. Finally, on extent—the number of persons pleasurably or painfully affected. All these being weighed together, if the pleasurable tendency predominates, the act is good; if the painful, bad.

Pleasures and pains are either simple or complex—*i.e.*, resolvable into several simple pleasures, and may be enumerated; as those of the senses, of wealth, of piety, of benevolence, of malevolence, of association, of imagination. Different persons are sensible to the same pleasure in different degrees, and the sensibility of the individual varies under different circumstances. Circumstances affecting sensibility are various—such as health, strength, sex, age, education; they may be circumstances of the body, of the mind, of the inclinations. Their influence can be reckoned approximately, but should be taken into consideration so far as is practicable.

The legislator and the judge are concerned with the existing causes of pleasure and pain, but of pain rather than pleasure—the mischiefs which it is desired to prevent, and the punishments by which it is sought to prevent them—and for the due apportionment of the latter they should have before them the complete list of punishments and of circumstances affecting sensibility. By taking the two together—with one list or the other for basis, preferably the punishment list—a classification of appropriate penalties is attainable.

An analytical summary of the circumstances affecting sensibility will distinguish as secondary—*i.e.* as acting not immediately but mediately through the primary—sex, age, station in life, education, climate, religion. The others, all primary, are connate—viz. radical frame of mind and body—or adventitious. The adventitious are personal or exterior. The personal concern a man's disposition of body or mind, or his actions; exterior, the things or persons he is concerned with.

II—HUMAN ACTIONS ANALYSED

THE business of government is to promote the happiness of society by rewarding and punishing, especially by punishing acts tending to diminish happiness. An act demands punishment in proportion to its tendency to diminish happiness—*i.e.* as the sum of its consequences

does so. Only such consequences are referred to as influence the production of pain or pleasure. The intention, as involving other consequences, must also be taken into consideration. And the intention depends on the state of the will and of the understanding as to the circumstances—consciousness, unconsciousness, or false consciousness of them.

Hence with regard to each action we have to consider (1) the act itself, (2) the circumstances, (3) the intentionality, (4) the attendant consciousness, and also (5) the motive, and (6) the general disposition indicated.

Acts are positive and negative—*i.e.* of commission and omission, or forbearance; external or corporal, and internal or mental; transitive, affecting some body other than the agent's, or intransitive; transient or continued (mere repetition is not the same as habit). Circumstances are material when visibly related to the consequences in point of causality, directly or indirectly. They may be criminative, or exculpative, or aggravative, or evidential.

The intention may regard the act itself only, or its consequence also—for instance, you may touch a man intentionally and by doing so cause his death unintentionally. But you cannot intend the consequences—though you may desire them—without intending the action. The consequences may be intended directly or indirectly, and may or may not be the only thing intended. The intention is good or bad as the consequences intended are good or bad.

But these actually depend on the circumstances which are independent of the intention; here the important point is the man's consciousness of the circumstances, which are objects not of the will, but of the understanding. If he is conscious of the circumstances and of their materiality, the act is advised; if not, unadvised. Unadvisedness may be due either to heedlessness or to misapprehension.

And here we may remark that we may speak of a bad intention, though the motive was good, if the consequences intended were bad, and *vice versa*. In this sense also, the intention may be innocent—that is, not bad, without being positively good.

Of motives, we are concerned with practical motives only, not those which are purely speculative. These are either internal or external; either events *in esse*, or events in prospect. The immediate motive is an internal motive *in esse*—an awakened pleasure or pain at the prospect of pleasure or pain. All others are comparatively remote.

Now, since the motive is always primarily to produce some pleasure or prevent some pain, and since pleasure is identical with good and pain with evil, it follows that no motive is in itself bad. The motive is good if it tends to produce a balance of pleasure; bad, if a balance of pain. Thus any and every motive may produce actions good, indifferent, or bad. Hence, in cataloguing motives, we must employ only neutral terms, *i.e.* not such as are associated with goodness—as piety, honour—or with badness—as lust, avarice.

The motives, of course, correspond to the various pleasures as previously enumerated. They may be classified as good, bad, or indifferent according as their consequences are more commonly good, bad, or indifferent; but the dangers of such classification are obvious. In fact, we cannot affirm goodness, badness, or indifference of motive, except in the particular instance.

A better classification is into the social—including good will, love of reputation, desire of amity, religion; dissocial—displeasure; self-regarding—physical desire, pecuniary interest, love of power, self-preservation.

Of all these, the dictates of good will are the surest of coinciding with utility, since utility corresponds precisely to the widest and best-advised good will. Even here, however, there may be failure, since benevolence towards one group may clash with benevolence towards another. Next stands love of reputation, which is less secure, since it may lead to asceticism and to hypocrisy. Third comes the desire of amity, valuable as the sphere in which amity is sought is extended, but also liable to breed insincerity. Religion would stand first of all if we all had a correct perception of the divine goodness; but not when we conceive of God as malevolent or capricious; and, as a matter of fact, our conception of the Deity is controlled by our personal biases.

The self-regarding motives are, *ex hypothesi*, not so closely related to utility as the social motives, and the dissocial motives manifestly stand at the bottom of the scale. In respect to any particular action there may be a conflict of motives, some impelling towards it, others restraining from it; and any motive may come in conflict with any other motive.

It will be found hereafter that in the case of some offences the motive is material in the highest degree, and in others wholly immaterial; in some cases easy, and in others impossible to gauge.

III—THE PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT

Goodness or badness, then, cannot be predicated of the motive. What is good or bad in the man when actuated by one motive or another is his disposition, or permanent attitude of mind, which is good or bad as tending to produce effects beneficial to the community. It is to be considered in regard to its influence on (1) his own happiness; (2) other people's. The legislator is concerned with it so far as it is mischievous to others. A man is held to be of a mischievous disposition when it is presumed that he inclines to acts which appear to him mischievous. Here it is that 'intentionality' and 'consciousness' come in.

Where the tendency of the act is good and the motive is a social one, a good disposition is indicated; where the tendency is bad and the motive is self-regarding, a bad disposition is indicated. Otherwise, the indication of good or bad disposition may be very dubious or non-existent. Now, our problem is to measure the depravity of a man's disposition, which may be defined as the sum of his intentions. The causes of intentions are motives. The social motives may be called tutelary, as tending to restrain from mischievous intentions; but any motive may become tutelary on occasion. Love of ease, and desire of self-preservation, in the form of fear of punishment, are apt to be tutelary motives.

Now we can see that the strength of a temptation equals the sum of the impelling

motives, minus the sum of the tutelary motives. Hence, the more susceptible a man is to the standing tutelary motives, the less likely is he to yield to temptation; in other words, the less depraved is his disposition. Hence, given the strength of the temptation, the mischievousness of the disposition is as the apparent mischievousness of the act. Given the apparent mischievousness of the act, the less the temptation yielded to the greater the depravity of disposition; but the stronger the temptation, the less conclusive is the evidence of depravity. It follows that the penalty should be increased—*i.e.* the fear of punishment should be artificially intensified, in proportion as, apart from that fear, the temptation is stronger.

We now come to consequences. The mischief of the act is the sum of its mischievous consequences, primary and secondary. The primary mischief sub-divides into original, *i.e.* to the sufferer in the first instance; and derivative, to the definite persons who suffer as a direct consequence, whether through their interest, or merely through sympathy.

The secondary mischiefs, affecting not specific persons but the community, are actual danger, or alarm—the apprehension of pain. For the occurrence of the act points to the possibility of its repetition; weakening the influence both of the political and of the moral sanction. An act of which the primary consequences are mischievous may have secondary beneficial consequences which altogether outweigh the primary mischief—*e.g.* the legal punishment of crime. The circumstances influencing the secondary mischiefs of alarm and danger are the intentionality, the consciousness, the motive and the disposition; danger depending on the real, and alarm on the apparent, state of mind, though the real and the apparent coincide more commonly than not.

Between the completely intentional and completely unintentional act there are various stages, depending on the degree of consciousness, as explained above. The excellence of the motive does not obliterate the mischievousness of the act; nor *vice versa*; but the mischief may be aggravated by a bad motive, as pointing to greater likelihood of repetition.

Punishment, being primarily mischievous, is out of place when groundless, inefficacious, unprofitable, or needless. Punishment is inefficacious when it is *ex post facto*, or extra-legal, or secret; or in the case of irresponsible (including intoxicated) persons; and also so far as the intention of the act was incomplete, or where the act was actually or practically under compulsion. It is unprofitable when under ordinary circumstances the evils of the punishment outweigh those of the offence. It is needless when the end in view can be as well or better attained otherwise.

Now, the aim of the legislator is (1) to prevent mischief altogether; (2) to minimise the inclination to do mischief; (3) to make the prevention cheap. Hence (1) the punishment must outweigh the profit of the offence to the doer; (2) the greater the mischief, the greater the expense worth incurring to prevent it; (3) alternative offences which are not equally mischievous, as robbery and robbery with murder, must not be equally punished; (4) the punishment must not be excessive, and therefore should take into account the circumstances influencing sensibility; (5) so also must the weakness of the punishment due to its remoteness, and the impelling force of habit.

The properties of punishment necessary to its adjustment to a particular offence are these: (1) variability in point of quantity, so that it shall be neither excessive nor deficient; (2) equality, so that when applied in equal degree it shall cause equal pain—*e.g.* banishment may mean much to one man, little to another; (3) commensurability with other punishments; (4) characteristicalness, or appropriateness; (5) exemplarity—it must not seem less than it is in fact; (6) frugality—none of the pain it causes is to be wasted. Minor desirable qualities are (7) subserviency to reformation of character; (8) efficiency in disabling from mischief; (9) subserviency to compensation; (10) popularity, *i.e.* accordant to common approbation; (11) remissibility.

IV—DIVISION OF OFFENCES

An offence—a punishable act—is constituted such by the community; though it ought not to be an offence unless contrary to utility, it may be so. It is assumed to be a detrimental act; detrimental therefore to some person or persons, whether the offender himself or other assignable persons, or to persons not assignable.

Offences against assignable persons other than the offender form the first class; offences against individuals, or private offences, or private extra-regarding offences. The second class is formed by semi-public offences, *i.e.* not against assignable individuals, nor the community at large, but a separable group in the community, *e.g.* a class or a locality. The third class are those which are simply self-regarding; the fourth, against the community at large; the fifth, multiform or heterogeneous, comprising falsehood and breaches of trust.

The first class may be subdivided into offences against (1) the person, (2) reputation, (3) property, (4) condition—*i.e.* the serviceableness to the individual or other persons, (5) person and property together, (6) person and reputation.

The second, semi-public, class, being acts which endanger a portion of the community, are those operating through calamity, or of mere delinquency. The latter are subdivided on the same lines as private offences. So with the third or self-regarding class.

In class four, public offences fall under eleven divisions: (1) offences against external security—*i.e.* from foreign foes; (2) against justice—*i.e.* the execution of justice; (3) against the preventive branch of police; (4) against the public force—*i.e.* military control; (5) against increase of national felicity; (6) against public wealth—*i.e.* the exchequer; (7) against population; (8) against national wealth—*i.e.* enrichment of the population; (9) against sovereignty; (10) against religion; (11) against national interests in general.

In class five, falsehood comprises simple falsehoods, forgery, personation and perjury; again distributable like the private offences. In the case of trusts, there are two parties—the trustee and the beneficiary. Offences under this head cannot, for various reasons, be conveniently

referred to offences against property or condition, which also must be kept separate from each other. As regards the existence of a trust: as against the trustee, offences are (1) wrongful non-investment of trust, and wrongful interception of trust, where the trusteeship is to his benefit; or (2) where it is troublesome, wrongful imposition of trust. Both may similarly be offences against the beneficiary. As regards the exercise of the trust, we have negative breach of trust, positive breach of trust, abuse of trust, disturbance of trust, and bribery.

We may now distribute class one—offences against the individual—into *genera;* to do so with the other classes would be superfluous. Simple offences against the person are actions referring to his actual person, body or mind, or external objects affecting his happiness. These must take effect either through his will, or not. In the former case, either by constraint, or restraint, confinement, or banishment. In any case the effect will be mortal or not mortal; if not mortal, reparable or irreparable injury when corporal, sufferance when mental. So the list stands—simple and irreparable corporal injuries, simple injurious restraint or constraint, wrongful confinement or banishment, homicide or menacement, actual or apprehended mental injuries.

AGAINST reputation the *genera* of offences are (1) defamation, (2) vilification. Of offences against property, simple in their effects, whether by breach of trust or otherwise, the *genera* are: wrongful non-investment, interception, divestment, usurpation, investment of property; wrongful withholding of services, destruction, occupation, or detainment, embezzlement, theft, defraudment, extortion.

Of complex offences against person and reputation together: corporal insults, insulting menacement, seduction, and forcible seduction, simple lascivious injuries. Against person and property together: forcible interception, divestment, usurpation, investment, or destruction of property, forcible occupation of movables, forcible entry, forcible detainment of immovables robbery.

As to offences against condition: conditions are either domestic or civil; domestic relations are either purely natural, purely instituted, or mixed. Of the first, we are concerned only with the marital, parental and filial relations. Under the second head are the relations of master and servant, guardian and ward. In the case of master and servants, the headings of offences are much like those against property. Guardianship is required in the cases of infancy and insanity; again the list of offences is similar. The parental and filial relations, so far as they are affected by institutions, comprise those both of master and servant, and of guardian and ward; so that the offences are correspondent.

The relation of husband and wife also comprises those of master and guardian to servant and ward. But there are further certain reciprocal services which are the subject of the marital contract, by which polygamy and adultery are constituted offences in Christian countries, and also the refusal of conjugal rights.

FROM domestic conditions we pass to civil. Eliminating all those which can be brought under the categories of trusts and domestic conditions, there remain conditions constituted by beneficial powers over things, beneficial rights to things, rights to services, and by corresponding duties; and between these and property there is no clear line of demarcation, yet we can hit upon some such conditions as separable. Such are rank and profession which entail specific obligations and rights—these are not property but conditions; as distinguished from other exclusive rights bestowed by the law, concerned with saleable articles (*e.g.* copyright), which convey not conditions, but property. So, naturalisation conveys the conditions of a natural born subject.

Public offences are to be catalogued in a manner similar to private offences.

My object has been to combine intelligibility with precision; technical terms lack the former quality, popular terms the latter. Hence the plan of the foregoing analysis has been to take the logical whole constituted by the sum of possible offences, dissect it in as many directions as were necessary, and carry the process down to the point where each idea could be expressed in current phraseology. Thus it becomes equally applicable to the legal concerns of all countries or systems.

The advantages of this method are: it is convenient for the memory, gives room for general propositions, points out the reason of the law, and is applicable to the laws of all nations. Hence we are able to characterise the five classes of offences. Thus, of private offences, we note that they are primarily against assignable individuals, admit of compensation and retaliation, and so on; of semi-public offences, that they are not against assignable individuals and, with self-regarding offences, admit of neither compensation nor retaliation; a series of generalisations respecting each class can be added.

THE relation between penal jurisprudence and private ethics must be clarified. Both are concerned with the production of happiness. A man's private ethics are concerned with his duty to himself and to his neighbour; prudence, probity and beneficence. Those cases described as unmeet for punishment are all within the ethical, but outside the legislative, sphere, except the 'groundless' cases, which are outside both. The special field of private ethics is among the cases where punishment is 'unprofitable' or 'inefficacious,' notably those which are the concern of prudence. So with the rules of beneficence; but beneficence might well be made compulsory in a greater degree than it is. The special sphere of legislation, however, lies in the field of probity.

A work of jurisprudence is either expository of what the law is, or censorial, showing what it should be. It may relate to either local or universal jurisprudence; but if expository can hardly be more than local. It may be internal, or international; if internal, it may be national or provincial, historical or living; it may be divided into statutory and customary, into civil and penal or criminal.

Reflections on the Revolution in France

EDMUND BURKE

THIS treatise on the French Revolution, of which the full title is Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings of Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event in a Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a Gentleman in Paris, was published in 1790. It is perhaps the noblest expression in literature of all that is noble in Conservatism. As Burke had stood for a true liberty in America so he took his stand against a false liberty in Europe. But history has not justified him so completely in the latter case. Revolutionism was not only, nor chiefly, libertinism; and modern France has largely falsified his predictions.

I—THE MEANING OF FREEDOM

DEAR SIR,—You are pleased to call again, and with some earnestness, for my thoughts on the late proceedings in France. You will see, sir, that though I do most heartily wish that France may be animated by a spirit of rational liberty, it is my misfortune to entertain great doubts concerning several material points in your late transactions. I love a manly, moral, regulated liberty as well as anyone; but I cannot stand forward and give praise or blame to anything which relates to human actions and human concerns, on a simple view of the subject, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction.

I should, therefore, suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France until I was informed how it had been combined with government; with public force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with the solidity of property; with peace and order; with civil and social manners.

All these, in their way, are good things, too; and, without them, liberty is not a benefit while it lasts, and is not likely to continue long. The effect of liberty to individuals is that they may do what they please; we ought to see what it will please them to do before we risk congratulations. It appears to me as if I were in a great crisis, not of the affairs of France alone, but of all Europe, perhaps of more than Europe.

All circumstances taken together, the French Revolution is the most astonishing that has hitherto happened in the world. Everything seems out of nature in this chaos of levity and ferocity, and of all sorts of crimes jumbled together with all sorts of follies. In viewing this monstrous tragi-comic scene, the most opposite passions succeed, and sometimes mix with each other in the mind; alternate contempt and indignation; laughter and tears; scorn and horror.

From Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers and to be transmitted to our posterity.

Our political system is placed in a just symmetry with the order of the world; wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great, mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged, or young, but, in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation and progression. We have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood; binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest domesticities; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our hearths, our sepulchres and our altars. Always acting as if in the presence of canonised forefathers, the spirit of freedom, leading in itself to misrule and excess, is tempered with an awful gravity. All your sophisters cannot produce anything better adapted to preserve a manly freedom than the course that we have pursued, who have chosen our nature rather than our speculations for the great conservatories and magazines of our rights and privileges.

II—A LOST OPPORTUNITY

You might, if you pleased, have profited of our example, and have given to your recovered freedom a correspondent dignity. You possessed in some parts the walls, and, in all, the foundations, of a noble and venerable castle. You might have repaired those walls, you might have built on those old foundations. But you began ill, because you began by despising everything that belonged to you. Respecting your forefathers, you would have been taught to respect yourselves. By following wise examples you would have shamed despotism from the earth by showing that freedom is not only reconcilable, but auxiliary to law. You would have had a free constitution. You would have had a protected, satisfied, laborious and obedient people, taught to seek the happiness that is to be found by virtue in all conditions; in which consists the true moral equality of mankind, and not in that monstrous fiction which, by inspiring false ideas and vain expectations into men destined to travel in the obscure walk of laborious life, serves only to aggravate and embitter that real inequality which it never can remove; and which the order of civil life establishes as much for the benefit of those whom it must leave in an humble state as those whom it is able to exalt to a condition more splendid, but not more happy.

Compute your gains; see what is got by

those extravagant and presumptuous speculations which have taught your leaders to despise all their predecessors and all their contemporaries, and even to despise themselves, until the moment in which they became truly despicable. By following those false lights, France has bought undisguised calamities at a higher price than any nation has purchased the most unequivocal blessings. She has abandoned her interest that she might prostitute her virtue.

All other nations have begun the fabric of a new government, or the reformation of an old, by establishing, or by enforcing with greater exactness, some rites or other of religion. All other people have laid the foundations of civil freedom in severer manners and a system of a more austere and masculine morality. France, when she let loose the reins of regal authority, doubled the license of a ferocious dissoluteness in manners and of an insolent irreligion in opinions and practices; and has extended through all ranks of life, all the unhappy corruptions that usually were the disease of wealth and power. This is one of the new principles of equality in France.

France has utterly disgraced the tone of lenient counsel in the cabinets of princes, and has taught kings to tremble at what will hereafter be called the delusive plausibilities of moral politicians. Sovereigns will consider those who advise them to place an unlimited confidence in their people as subverters of their thrones. This alone is an irreparable calamity to you and to mankind.

The French have rebelled against a mild and lawful monarch with more fury, outrage and insult than ever any people has been known to rise against the most illegal usurper or the most sanguinary tyrant. Their resistance was made to concession; their revolt was from protection; their blow was aimed at a hand holding out graces, favours and immunities. They have found their punishment in their success. Laws overturned; tribunals subverted; industry without vigour; commerce expiring; the revenue unpaid, yet the people impoverished; a Church pillaged and a state unrelieved; everything human and divine sacrificed to the idol of public credit, and national bankruptcy the consequence.

III—THE MEN IN POWER

This unforced choice, this fond election of evil, would appear perfectly unaccountable if we did not consider the composition of the National Assembly. If we were to know nothing of this assembly but its title and function, no colours could paint to the imagination anything more venerable. But no artificial institution whatever can make the men of whom any system of authority is composed any other than God, and nature, and education and their habits of life have made them.

Capacities beyond these the people have not to give. Virtue and wisdom may be the objects of their choice; but their choice confers neither the one nor the other on those upon whom they lay their ordaining hands. They have not the engagement of nature, they have not the promise of revelation, for any such powers.

Judge, sir, of my surprise when I found that a very great proportion of the assembly was composed of practitioners in the law. It was composed, not of distinguished magistrates, not of leading advocates, not of renowned professors; the general composition was of obscure provincial advocates, of stewards of petty local jurisdictions, country attorneys, notaries and the whole train of the ministers of municipal litigation, the fomenters and conductors of the petty war of village vexation.

From the moment I read the list I saw distinctly, and very nearly as it happened, all that was to follow. Who could but conceive that men who are habitually meddling, daring, subtle, active, of litigious dispositions and unquiet minds, would easily fall back into their old condition of low and unprofitable chicane? Who could doubt but that, at any expense to the state, of which they understood nothing, they must pursue their private interests, which they understood but too well? It was inevitable; it was planted in the nature of things.

Other revolutions have been conducted by persons who, whilst they attempted changes in the commonwealth, sanctified their ambition by advancing the dignity of the people whose peace they troubled. Such was our Cromwell, one of the great bad men of the old stamp. Such were your whole race of Guises, Condés, Colignys and Richelieus. These men, among all their massacres, did not slay the *mind* in their country. A conscious dignity, a noble pride, a generous sense of glory and emulation, was not extinguished.

But your present confusion, like a palsy, has attacked the fountain of life itself. Every person in your country in a situation to be actuated by principles of honour is disgraced and degraded. Property is destroyed, and rational liberty has no existence. If this be your actual situation, as compared to the situation to which you were called, as it were by the voice of God and man, I cannot find it in my heart to congratulate you on the choice you have made, or the success which has attended your endeavours.

Far am I from denying in theory, full as far as my heart from withholding in practice, the *real* rights of man. Government is not made in virtue of natural rights, which may and do exist in total independence of it; and exist in much greater clearness, and in a much greater degree of abstract perfection; but their abstract perfection is their practical defect. Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants. Men have a right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom. Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. In this sense the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights.

But as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and circumstances, and admit of infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upon any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as to discuss them upon that principle. The moment you abate anything from the full rights of men, each to govern himself, and suffer any artificial, positive limitation upon those rights, from that moment the whole organization of government becomes a consideration of convenience. This it is which makes the con-

stitution of a state, and the due distribution of powers, a matter of the most delicate and complicated skill.

When I hear the simplicity of contrivance aimed at and boasted of in any new political constitutions, I am at no loss to decide that the artificers are grossly ignorant of their trade, or negligent of their duty. The pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes, and in proportion as they are metaphysically true they are morally and politically false. The rights of men are in a sort of *middle*, incapable of definition, but not impossible to be discerned. But this sort of people are so taken up with their theories about the rights of Man that they have totally forgotten his nature. Without opening one new avenue to the understanding, they have stopped up those that lead to the heart.

IV—THE DEATH OF CHIVALRY

As for the National Assembly, a majority, sometimes real, sometimes pretended, captive itself, compels a captive king to issue as royal edicts, at third hand, the polluted nonsense of their most licentious and giddy coffee-houses. It is notorious that all their measures are decided before they are debated. Amidst assassination, massacre and confiscation, perpetrated or meditated, they are forming plans for the good order of future society. Who is it that admires, and from the heart is attached to, national representative assemblies, but must turn with horror and disgust from such a profane burlesque and abominable perversion of that sacred institute? Miserable king, miserable assembly!

History, who exercises her awful censure over the proceedings of all sorts of sovereigns, will not forget how the king, and his queen, and their infant children, who once would have been the pride and hope of a great and generous people, were forced to abandon the sanctuary of the most splendid palace in the world, which they left polluted by massacre and strewn with mutilated carcases, and were made to taste, drop by drop, more than the bitterness of death. Is this a triumph to be consecrated at altars?

I rejoice to hear that the great lady, an object of that triumph, has borne that day—one is interested that beings made for suffering should suffer well—and that she bears the whole weight of her accumulated wrongs with a serene patience, in a manner suited to her rank and race; that she feels with the dignity of a Roman matron; that in the last extremity she will save herself from the last disgrace; and that, if she must fall, she will fall by no ignoble hand. It is now sixteen years since I saw the Queen of France, then the dauphiness, at Versailles, and surely never lighted on this orb a more delightful vision. I saw her glittering like the morning star, full of life, and splendour and joy. Oh, what a revolution!

Little did I dream that I should have lived to see such disasters fallen upon her in a nation of gallant men, in a nation of men of honour, and of cavaliers. I thought ten thousand swords must have leapt from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her with insult. But the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists and calculators has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever. Never, never more shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom. It is gone, that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil by losing all its grossness.

If the King and Queen of France and their children were to fall into our hands by the chance of war, they would be treated with another sort of triumphal entry into London. We formerly have had a king of France in that situation; you have read how he was received in England. Four hundred years have gone over us; but I believe we are not materially changed since that period. We have not lost the generosity and dignity of thinking of the fourteenth century; nor as yet have we subtilised ourselves into savages.

We have not been drawn and trussed, in order that we may be filled with chaff and rags and paltry shreds of paper about the rights of man. We have hearts of flesh and blood beating in our bosoms. We fear God; we look up with awe to kings, with affection to parliaments, with duty to magistrates, with reverence to priests, and with respect to nobility.

Why? Because when such ideas are brought before our minds, it is natural to be so affected; because all other feelings are false and spurious, and tend to corrupt our minds, to vitiate our primary morals, to render us unfit for rational liberty; and by teaching us a servile insolence, to be our low sport for a few holidays, to make us perfectly fit for, and justly deserving of, slavery through the whole course of our lives.

V—PRINCIPLES OF STATESMANSHIP

One of the first principles on which the commonwealth and the laws are consecrated is lest the temporary possessors and life-renters in it should act as if they were the entire masters, hazarding to leave to those who come after them a ruin instead of an habitation. By this unprincipled facility of changing the state as often and in as many ways as there are floating fancies or fashions, the whole continuity of the commonwealth would be broken. Men would become little better than the flies in summer.

First of all, the science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intellect, which, with all its defects, redundances and errors, is the collected reason of ages, combining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns, would be no longer studied. No certain laws, establishing invariable grounds of hope and fear, would keep the actions of men in a certain course. No principles would be early worked into the habits. Who would ensure a tender and delicate sense of honour, to beat almost with the first pulses of the heart,

when no man could know what would be the test of honour in a nation continually varying the standard of its coin ?

To avoid, therefore, the evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand times worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice, we have consecrated the state, that no man should approach to look into its defects or corruptions but with due caution ; that he should never dream of beginning its reformation by its subversion ; that he should approach to the faults of the state as to the wounds of a father, with pious awe and trembling solicitude. Society is indeed a contract. But it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature.

It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible worlds, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place.

THESE, my dear sir, are, were and, I think, long will be, the sentiments of not the least learned and reflecting part of this kingdom. They conceive that He Who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue willed also the necessary means of its perfection. He willed, therefore, the state—He willed its connexion with the source and original archetype of all perfection. They who are convinced of His will, which is the law of laws, and the sovereign of sovereigns, cannot think it reprehensible that this, our corporate fealty and homage, that this our recognition of a signiory paramount—I had almost said this oblation of the state itself—as a worthy offering on the high altar of universal praise, should be performed with modest splendour and unassuming state. For those purposes they think some part of the wealth of the country is as usefully employed as it can be in fomenting the luxury of individuals.

It is on some such principles that the majority of the people of England, far from thinking a religious national establishment unlawful, hardly think it lawful to be without one. The commons of Great Britain, in the national emergencies, will never seek their resource from the confiscation of the estates of the Church and poor. Sacrilege and proscription are not among the ways and means of our committee of supply. There is not one public man in this kingdom, of any party or description, who does not reprobate the dishonest, perfidious and cruel confiscation which the National Assembly have been compelled to make of that property which it was their first duty to protect.

But to what end should we discuss all these things ? How shall we discuss the limitations of royal power ? Your king is in prison. Why speculate on the measure and standard of liberty ? I doubt very much indeed whether France is at all ripe for liberty on any standard. Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is ordained in the constitution of things that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters.

The Rights of Man

THOMAS PAINE

ALTHOUGH long considered a violent revolutionary, Tom Paine may more accurately be described as an idealistic radical. When he was a member of the French convention his support was given to the Girondins, and his two treatises on the Rights of Man (1790 and 1792) contain vigorous assertions of democratic principles rather than blatantly proletarian doctrines. They were written to answer the Whig rhetoric of Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France. These works of Paine express and attempt to justify, earnestly, sincerely and vigorously the ideals that inspired the French Revolution. The clearness and strength of the language made Paine's treatises the gospel of the English radicals, whose indifferent education did not allow them to appreciate the flowery sophistries of Burke's more intellectual work.

I—NATURAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS

AMONG the incivilities by which nations or individuals provoke or irritate each other, Mr. Burke's pamphlet on the French Revolution is an extraordinary instance. There is scarcely an epithet of abuse to be found in the English language with which he has not loaded the French nation and the National Assembly. Considered as an attempt at political argument, his work is a pathless wilderness of rhapsodies, in which he asserts whatever he pleases, without offering evidence or reasons for so doing.

With his usual outrage, he abuses the Declaration of the Rights of Man published by the National Assembly as the basis of the French Constitution. But does he mean to deny that *man* has any rights ? If he does, then he must mean that there are no such things as rights anywhere ; for who is there in the world but man ? But if Mr. Burke means to admit that man has rights, the question then will be : What are those rights, and how came man by them originally ?

The error of those who reason by precedents drawn from antiquity respecting the rights of man is that they do not go far enough into antiquity ; they stop in some of the intermediate stages and produce what was then done as a rule for the present day.

Mr. Burke, for example, would have the

English nation submit themselves to their monarchs for ever, because an English parliament did make such a submission to William and Mary, not only on behalf of the people then living, but on behalf of their heirs and posterities—as if any parliament had the right of binding and controlling posterity, or of commanding for ever how the world should be governed.

If antiquity is to be authority, a thousand such authorities may be produced successively contradicting each other; but if we proceed on, we shall at last come out right; we shall come to the time when man came from the hand of his Maker. What was he then? Man! Man was his high and only title, and a higher cannot be given him.

All histories of creation agree in establishing one point, the unity of man, by which I mean that men are all of one degree, and that all men are born equal, and with equal natural rights. Those natural rights are the foundation of all their civil rights.

A few words will explain this. Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind are the rights of the mind, and also those rights of acting as an individual for his own happiness which are not injurious to the natural rights of others. Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection.

It follows, then, that the power produced from the aggregate of natural rights, imperfect in power in the individual, cannot be applied to invade the natural rights which are retained in the individual, and in which the power to execute is as perfect as the right itself.

Let us now apply these principles to governments. These may all be comprehended under three heads. First, superstition; secondly, power; thirdly, the common interests of society and the common rights of man.

When a set of artful men pretended to hold intercourse with the Deity, as familiarly as they now march up the back stairs in European courts, the world was completely under the government of superstition. This sort of government lasted as long as this sort of superstition lasted.

After these, a race of conquerors arose whose government, like that of William the Conqueror, was founded in power. Governments thus established last as long as the power to support them lasts; but, that they might avail themselves of every engine in their favour, they united fraud to force, and set up an idol which they called 'Divine Right,' and which twisted itself afterwards into an idol of another shape called 'Church and State.' The key of St. Peter and the key of the treasury became quartered on one another, and the wondering cheated multitude worshipped the invention.

We have now to review the governments which arise out of society. If we trace government to its origin, we discover that governments must have arisen either *out* of the people or *over* the people. In those which have arisen out of the people, the individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, have entered into a compact with each other to produce a government; and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise.

This compact is the constitution, and a constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. Wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form, there is none. A constitution is a thing antecedent to government, and a government is only its creature. The constitution of a country is not the act of its government, but of the people constituting its government.

Can, then, Mr. Burke produce the English constitution? He cannot, for no such thing exists, nor ever did exist. The English government is one of those which arose out of a conquest, and not out of society, and consequently it arose over the people; and though it has been much modified since the time of William the Conqueror, the country has never yet regenerated itself, and is therefore without a constitution.

II—FRANCE AND ENGLAND COMPARED

I now proceed to draw some comparisons between the French constitution and the governmental usages in England.

The French constitution says that every man who pays a tax of sixty sous per annum (2s. 6d. English) is an elector. What will Mr. Burke place against this? Can anything be more limited, and at the same time more capricious, than the qualifications of electors are in England?

The French constitution says that the National Assembly shall be elected every two years. What will Mr. Burke place against this? Why, that the nation has no right at all in the case, and that the government is perfectly arbitrary with respect to this point.

The French constitution says that the right of war and peace is in the nation. Where else should it reside but in those who are to pay the expense? In England this right is said to reside in a metaphor shown at the Tower for sixpence or a shilling a head.

It may with reason be said that in the manner the English nation is represented it signifies not where the right resides, whether in the crown or in the parliament. War is the common harvest of all those who participate in the division and expenditure of public money in all countries. In reviewing the history of the English government, an impartial bystander would declare that taxes were not raised to carry on wars, but that wars were raised to carry on taxes.

The French constitution says, 'There shall be no titles'; and, of consequence, 'nobility' is done away, and the peer is exalted unto man.

Titles are but nicknames, and every nickname is a title. The thing is perfectly harmless in itself, but it marks a sort of foppery in the human character which degrades it. If no mischief had annexed itself to the folly of titles, they would not have been worth a serious and formal destruction. Let us examine the grounds upon which the French constitution has resolved against having a house of peers.

Because, in the first place, aristocracy is kept up by family tyranny and injustice, due to the unnatural and iniquitous law of primogeniture.

Secondly, because the idea of hereditary legislators is as inconsistent as that of hereditary judges or hereditary juries; and as absurd as an hereditary mathematician, or an hereditary wise man; and as ridiculous as an hereditary poet-laureate.

Thirdly, because a body of men, holding themselves accountable to nobody, ought not to be trusted by anybody.

Fourthly, because it is continuing the uncivilized principle of government founded on conquest, and the base idea of man having property in man and governing him by personal right.

The French constitution hath abolished or renounced toleration and intolerance also, and hath established universal right of conscience. Toleration is not the opposite of intolerance, but is the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding liberty of conscience, and the other of granting it. Who art thou, vain dust and ashes! by whatever name thou art called, whether a king, a bishop, a church, a state, or a parliament, or anything else, that obtrudest thine insignificance between the soul of man and its Maker? Mind thine own concerns. If he believes not as thou believest, it is a proof that thou believest not as he believes and there is no earthly power can determine between you.

THE opinions of men with respect to government are changing fast in all countries. The revolutions of America and France have thrown a beam of light over the world, which reaches into men. Ignorance is of a peculiar nature; once dispelled, it is impossible to reestablish it. It is not originally a thing of itself, but is only the absence of knowledge; and though man may be kept ignorant, he cannot be made ignorant.

When we survey the wretched condition of man under the monarchical and hereditary systems of government, dragged from his home by one power, or driven by another, and impoverished by taxes more than by enemies, it becomes evident that these systems are bad and that a general revolution in the principle and construction of governments is necessary.

And it is not difficult to perceive, from the enlightened state of mankind, that hereditary governments are verging to their decline, and that revolutions on the broad basis of national sovereignty and government by representation are making their way in Europe; it would be wisdom to anticipate their approach and produce revolutions by reason and accommodation rather than commit them to the issue of convulsions.

III—THE OLD AND NEW SYSTEMS

THE danger to which the success of revolutions is most exposed is in attempting them before the principles on which they proceed, and the advantages to result from them, are sufficiently understood. Almost everything appertaining to the circumstances of a nation has been absorbed and confounded under the general and mysterious word 'government.' It may, therefore, be of use in this day of revolutions to discriminate between those things which are the effect of government and those which are not.

A great part of that order which reigns among mankind is not the effect of government. It has its origin in the principles of society and the natural constitution of man. The mutual dependence and reciprocal interest which man has upon man, and all parts of civilized community upon each other, create that chain of connexion which holds it together.

The more perfect civilization is, the less occasion has it for government, because the more does it regulate its own affairs and govern itself. All the great laws of society are laws of nature. They are followed and obeyed because it is the interest of the parties to do so, and not on account of any formal laws their governments may impose. But how often is the natural propensity to society disturbed or destroyed by the operations of government!

It is impossible that such governments as have hitherto existed in the world would have commenced by any other means than a total violation of every principle, sacred and moral. The obscurity in which the origin of all the present old governments is buried implies the iniquity and disgrace with which they began.

Government on the old system is an assumption of power for the aggrandisement of itself; on the new, a delegation of power for the common benefit of society. The one now called the old is hereditary, either in whole or in part, and the new is entirely representative. It rejects all hereditary government: first as being an imposition on mankind; secondly, as inadequate to the purposes for which government is necessary.

All hereditary government is in its nature tyranny. To inherit a government is to inherit the people, as if they were flocks and herds. Kings succeed each other, not as rationals, but as animals. It signifies not what their mental or moral characters are. Monarchical government appears under all the various characters of childhood, decrepitude, dotage; a thing at nurse, in leading-strings, or on crutches. In short, we cannot conceive a more ridiculous figure of government than hereditary succession.

The representative system takes society and civilization for its basis; nature, reason and experience for its guide. The original simple democracy was society governing itself without the aid of secondary means. By ingrafting representation upon democracy we arrive at a system of government capable of embracing and confederating all the various interests and every extent of territory and population; and with advantages as much superior to hereditary government as the republic of letters is to hereditary literature.

CONSIDERING government in the only light in which it should be considered, that of a National Association, it ought to be so constructed as not to be disordered by any accident happening among the parts, and, therefore, no extraordinary power should be lodged in the hands of any individual. Monarchy would not have continued so many ages in the world had it not been for the abuses it protects. It is the master-fraud, which shelters all others. By admitting a participation of the spoil, it makes itself friends; and when it ceases to do this it will cease to be the idol of courtiers.

One of the greatest improvements that have

been made for the perpetual security and progress of constitutional liberty is the provision which the new constitutions make for occasionally revising, altering and amending them. The best constitutions that could now be devised may be far short of that excellence which a few years may afford. There is a morning of reason rising upon man on the subject of governments that has not appeared before.

IV—THE REFORM OF ENGLAND

As it is necessary to include England in the prospect of general reformation, it is proper to inquire into the defects of its government. It is only by each nation reforming its own that the whole can be improved and the full benefit of reformation enjoyed.

When in countries that are called civilized we see age going to the workhouse and youth to the gallows something must be wrong in the system of government. Why is it that scarcely any are executed but the poor? The fact is a proof, among other things, of a wretchedness in their condition. Bred up without morals, and cast upon the world without a prospect, they are the exposed sacrifice of voice and legal barbarity.

The first defect of English government I shall mention is the evil of those Gothic institutions, the corporation towns. As one of the houses of the English parliament is, in a great measure, made up of elections from these corporations, its vices are but a continuation of the vices of its origin.

I proceed in the next place to the aristocracy. The house of peers is simply a combination of persons in one common interest. No better reason can be given why a house of legislation should be composed entirely of men whose occupation consists in letting landed property than why it should be composed of brewers, of bakers, or any other separate class of men. What right has the landed interest to a distinct representation from the general interest of the nation?

I proceed to what is called the crown. It signifies a nominal office of a million sterling a year, the business of which consists in receiving the money. Whether the person be wise or foolish, sane or insane, a native or a foreigner, matters not.

I shall now turn to the matter of lessening the burden of taxes. The amount of taxation now levied may be taken in round numbers at £17,000,000, nine millions of which are appropriated to the payment of interest on the national debt, and eight to the current annual expenses.

All circumstances taken together, arising from the French Revolution, from the approaching harmony of the two nations, the abolition of court intrigue on both sides, and the progress of knowledge in the science of governing, the annual expenditure might be put back to one million and a half for navy, army and expenses of government.

Taking one million and a half as a sufficient peace establishment for all the honest purposes of government, there will remain a surplus of upwards of six millions out of the present current expenses. How is this surplus to be disposed of?

The first step would be to abolish the poor rates entirely, and in lieu thereof to make a remission of taxes to the poor of double the amount of the present poor rates—*viz.*, four millions annually out of the surplus taxes. This money could be distributed so as to provide £4 annually per head for the support of children of poor families, and to provide also for the cost of education of over a million children; to give annuities of £10 each for the aged poor over sixty, and of £6 each for the poor over fifty; to give donations of £1 each on occasions of births in poor families and marriages of the poor; to make allowances for funeral expenses of persons travelling for work and dying at a distance from their friends; and to furnish employment for the casual poor of the metropolis where modes of relief are necessary that are not required in the country.

Never did so great an opportunity offer itself to England, and to all Europe, as is produced by the two revolutions of America and France. By the former freedom as a national champion in the western world, and by the latter in Europe. When another nation shall join France, despotism and bad government will scarcely dare to appear. The present age will hereafter merit to be called the Age of Reason, and the present generation will appear to the future as the Adam of a new world.

The Age of Reason

THOMAS PAINE

In 1792 proceedings were taken against Thomas Paine as the author of seditious libel contained in his Rights of Man and, being convicted, he fled to France where he was elected a member of the National Convention. In 1793 he fell foul of Robespierre and while expecting arrest he wrote the first part of The Age of Reason, which was published in 1794. During his confinement in the Luxembourg he wrote a second part, which was published in 1795, and in 1801 he added a third part containing amplifications of contentions previously made at a time when he had no Bible to consult. The whole work constitutes an attack on revealed religion from the point of view of the eighteenth century deists.

I—REVEALED RELIGION

It has been my intention, for several years past, to publish my thoughts upon religion. As several of my colleagues, and others of my fellow-citizens of France, have given me the example of making their voluntary and individual profession of faith, I also will make mine; and I do this with all that sincerity and frankness with which the mind of man communicates with itself.

I believe in one God, and no more; and I hope for happiness beyond this life.

I believe in the equality of man, and I believe that religious duties consist in doing justice, loving mercy and endeavouring to make our fellow-creatures happy.

I do not believe in the creed professed by the Jewish Church, by the Roman Church, by the Greek Church, by the Turkish Church, by the Protestant Church, nor by any church that I know of. My own mind is my own church.

All national institutions of churches appear to me no other than human inventions set up to terrify and enslave mankind, and monopolise power and profit.

Each of those Churches shows certain books which they call 'revelation' or the word of God. The Jews say that the word of God was given by God to Moses face to face; the Christians say that their word of God came by divine inspiration; and the Turks say their word of God (the Koran) was brought by an angel from heaven. Each of these Churches accuses the other of unbelief; and, for my own part, I disbelieve them all.

As it is necessary to affix right ideas to the words, I will, before I proceed further into the subject, offer some observations on the word 'revelation.' Revelation, when applied to religion, means something communicated immediately from God to man.

No one will deny or dispute the power of the Almighty to make such a communication if He pleases. But admitting, for the sake of a case, that something has been revealed to a certain person, and not revealed to any other person, it is a revelation to that person only.

When he tells it to a second person, a second to a third, a third to a fourth, and so on, it ceases to be a revelation to all those persons. It is a revelation to the first person only, an heresay to every other; and consequently they are not obliged to believe it, for they have only the word of the first person that it was made to him.

That which is revelation to me exists in something which no human mind can invent, no human hand can counterfeit or alter.

The word of God is the creation we behold; and this word of God revealeth to man all that is necessary for him to know of his Creator.

Do we want to contemplate His power? We see it in the immensity of His creation.

Do we want to contemplate His wisdom? We see it in the unchangeable order by which the incomprehensible whole is governed.

Do we want to contemplate His munificence? We see it in the abundance with which He fills the earth.

Do we want to contemplate His mercy? We see it in His not withholding that abundance even from the unthankful.

Do we want to contemplate His will, so far as it respects man? The goodness He shows to all is a lesson for our conduct to each other.

In fine, do we want to know what God is? Search not the book called the Scripture, which any human hand might make, but the Scripture called the Creation.

II—THEOLOGY AND RELIGION

As to the Christian system of faith, it appears to me as a compound made up chiefly of manism with but little deism, and as near to atheism as twilight is to darkness.

That which is now called natural philosophy, embracing the whole circle of sciences, of which astronomy occupies the chief place, is the study of the works of God, and of the power and wisdom of God in His works, and is the true theology.

As to the theology that is now studied in its place, it is the study of human opinions and of human fancies concerning God. It is not the study of God Himself in the works that He has made, but in the works of writings that man has made; and it is not among the least of the mischiefs that the Christian system has done to the world that it has abandoned the original and beautiful system of theology, like a beautiful innocent, to distress and reproach, to make room for the hag of superstition.

The prejudice of unfounded belief often degenerates into the prejudices of custom, and becomes at last rank hypocrisy. When men from custom, or fashion, or any worldly motive, profess or pretend to believe what they do not believe, nor can give any reason for believing, they unship the helm of their morality and, being no longer honest in their own minds, they feel no moral difficulty in being unjust to others. It is from the influence of this vice, hypocrisy, that we see so many church and meeting-going professors and pretenders to religion so full of tricks and deceit in their dealings, and so loose in the performance of their engagements that they are not to be trusted further than the laws of the country will bind them.

One set of preachers make salvation to consist in believing. They tell their congregations that if they believe in Christ their sins shall be forgiven. This, in the first place, is an encouragement to sin; in the next place, the doctrine these men preach cannot be true.

Another set of preachers tell their congregations that God predestined and selected from all eternity a certain number to be saved, and a certain number to be damned eternally. If this were true, the day of judgement is past; their preaching is in vain, and they had better work at some useful calling for their livelihood.

Nothing that is here said can apply, even with the most distant disrespect, to the real character of Jesus Christ. He was a virtuous and an amiable man. The morality that He preached and practised was of the most benevolent kind, and, though similar systems of morality had been preached by Confucius and by some of the Greek philosophers many years before, by the Quakers since, and by many good men in all ages, it has not been exceeded by any.

III—THE BIBLE

If we permit ourselves to conceive right ideas of things, we must necessarily affix the idea, not only of unchangeableness, but of the utter impossibility of any change taking place, by any means of accident whatever, in that which we would honour with the name of the word

of God; and therefore the word of God cannot exist in any written or human language.

The continually progressive change to which the meaning of words is subject, the want of a universal language, which renders translation necessary, the errors to which translations are again subject, the mistakes of copyists and printers, together with the possibility of wilful alteration, are of themselves evidences that human language, whether in speech or in print, cannot be the vehicle of the word of God. The word of God exists in something else.

It has been the practice of all Christian commentators on the Bible, and of all Christian priests and preachers, to impose the Bible on the world as a mass of truth, and as the word of God; they have disputed and wrangled, and have anathematised each other about the supposable meaning of particular parts and passages therein; one has said and insisted that such a passage meant such a thing; another, that it meant directly the contrary; and a third, that it meant neither the one nor the other, but something different from both; and this they have called understanding the Bible.

I, therefore, pass on to an examination of the Books called the Old and the New Testament. The case historically appears to be as follows.

When the Church mythologists established their system, they collected all the writings they could find and managed them as they pleased. It is a matter altogether of uncertainty to us whether such of the writings as now appear under the name of the Old and the New Testament are in the same state in which these collectors say they found them; or whether they added, altered, abridged, or dressed them up.

Be this as it may, they decided by *vote* which of the books out of the collection they had made should be the word of God, and which should not. They rejected several; they voted others to be doubtful, such as the books called the Apocrypha; and those books which had a majority of votes they voted to be the word of God. Had they voted otherwise, all the people since, calling themselves Christians, had believed otherwise; for the belief of the one comes from the vote of the other. Who the people were that did all this we know nothing of; save that they called themselves by the general name of the Church.

There are matters in the Bible, said to be done by the express command of God, that are as shocking to humanity and to every idea we have of moral justice as anything done by Robespierre, by Carrier, by Joseph le Bon, in France; by the English government in the East Indies; or by any other assassin in modern times. Are we sure that the Creator of man commissioned these things to be done? Are we sure that the books that tell us so were written by His authority? To read the Bible without horror we must undo everything that is tender, sympathising and benevolent in the heart of man. Speaking for myself, if I had no other evidence that the Bible is fabulous than the sacrifice I must make to believe it to be true, that alone would be sufficient to determine my choice.

But it can be shown by internal evidence that the Bible is not entitled to credit as the word of God. It can readily be proved that the first five books of the Bible, attributed to Moses, were not written by him nor in his time, but several hundred years afterwards. Moses could not have described his own death, nor mentioned that he was buried in a valley in the land of Moab. Similarly, the book of Joshua was not written by Joshua; it is manifest that Joshua could not write that Israel served the Lord not only in his days, but in the days of the elders that over-lived him. The book of Judges is anonymous on the face of it. The books of Samuel were not written by Samuel, for they relate many things that did not happen till after his death.

The history in the two books of Kings, which is little more than a history of assassinations, treachery and war, sometimes contradicts itself; and several of the most extraordinary matters related in Kings are not mentioned in the companion books of Chronicles. The book of Job has no internal evidence of being a Hebrew book; it appears to have been translated from another language.

I now go on to the book called the New Testament. Had it been the object of Jesus Christ to establish a new religion, He would undoubtedly have written the system Himself, or procured it to be written in His lifetime. But there is no publication extant authenticated with His name. All the books called the New Testament were written after His death. He was a Jew by birth and profession, and He was the son of God in like manner that every other person is; for the Creator is the Father of all.

The first four books—Matthew, Mark, Luke and John—are altogether anecdotal. They relate events after they had taken place; and in several instances they relate the same event differently. Revelation, therefore, is out of the question with respect to these books. The presumption, moreover, is that they were written by other persons than those whose names they bear.

The book of Acts of the Apostles belongs also to the anecdotal part. All the rest of the New Testament, except the book of enigmas called the Revelation, is a collection of letters under the name of epistles, and the forgery of letters under the name of epistles. One thing, however, is certain, which is that out of the matters contained in these books, together with the assistance of some old stories, the Church has set up a system of religion very contradictory to the character of the Person whose name it bears. It has set up a religion of pomp and reverence in pretended imitation of a Person whose life was humility and poverty.

IV—MYSTERY, MIRACLE AND PROPHECY

I proceed to speak of the three principal means that have been employed in all ages and perhaps in all countries to impose upon mankind.

These three means are mystery, miracle and prophecy. The two first are incompatible with religion, and the third ought always to be suspected. With respect to mystery, everything we behold is, in one sense, a mystery to us. Our own existence is a mystery, the whole vegetable world is a mystery. We know not how it is that the seed we sow unfolds and multiplies

itself. The fact, however, as distinct from the operating cause, is not a mystery, because we see it; and we know also the means we are to use, which is no other than putting the seed in the ground. We know, therefore, as much as is necessary for us to know; and that part of the operation that we do not know, and which if we did, we could not perform, the Creator takes upon Himself and performs it for us.

But though every created thing is in this sense a mystery, the word mystery cannot be applied to moral truth, any more than obscurity can be applied to light. The God in whom we believe is a God of moral truth, and not of mystery. Mystery is the antagonist of truth. It is a fog of human invention that obscures truth, and represents it in distortion.

Religion, therefore, being the belief of a God, and the practice of moral truth, cannot have connexion with mystery. The belief of a God, so far from having anything of mystery in it, is of all beliefs the most easy, because it arises to us out of necessity. And the practice of moral truth, or, in other words, a practical imitation of the goodness of God, is no other than our acting towards each other as He acts benignly towards all.

When men, whether from policy or pious fraud, set up systems of religion incompatible with the word or works of God in the creation, they were under the necessity of inventing or adopting a word that should serve as a bar to all inquiries and speculations. The word 'mystery' answered this purpose, and thus religion, which in itself is without mystery, has been corrupted into a fog of mysteries.

As mystery answered all general purposes, 'miracle' followed as an occasional auxiliary. Of all the modes of evidence that ever were invented to obtain belief for any system, or opinion to which the name of religion has been given, that of miracles is the most inconsistent. For, in the first place, whenever recourse is had to miracles, for the purpose of procuring belief, it implies a lameness or weakness in the doctrine that is preached. And, in the second place, it is degrading the Almighty into the character of a showman, playing tricks to amuse and make the people stare and wonder. It is also the most equivocal sort of evidence that can be set up; for the belief is not to depend upon the thing called a miracle, but upon the credit of the reporter who says that he saw it; and therefore the thing, were it true, would have no better chance of being believed than if it were a lie.

As mystery and miracle took charge of the past and the present, prophecy took charge of the future, and rounded the tenses of faith. The original meaning of the words 'prophet' and 'prophesying' has been changed; the Old Testament prophets were simply poets and musicians. It is owing to this change in the meaning of the words that the flights and metaphors of the Jewish poets, and phrases and expressions now rendered obscure by our not being acquainted with the local circumstances to which they applied at the time they were used, have been erected into prophecies, and made to bend to explanations at the will and conceits of sectaries, expounders and commentators. Everything unintelligible was prophetical.

V—DEISM

From the time I was capable of conceiving an idea, and acting upon it by reflection, I either doubted the truth of the Christian system or thought it to be a strange affair. It seems as if parents of the Christian profession were ashamed to tell their children anything about the principles of their religion. They sometimes instruct them in morals, and talk to them of the goodness of what they call Providence. But the Christian story of what they call God the Father putting His Son to death, or employing people to do it—for that is the plain language of the story—cannot be told by a parent to a child; and to tell him it was done to make mankind happier and better is making the story still worse; and to tell him that all this is a mystery is only making an excuse for its incredibility.

How different is this from the pure and simple profession of deism! The true deist has but one Deity, and his religion consists in contemplating the power, wisdom and benignity of the Deity in His works, and in endeavouring to imitate Him in everything moral, scientific and mechanical.

The religion that approaches the nearest of all others to true deism, in the moral and benign part thereof, is that professed by the Quakers; but they have contracted themselves too much by leaving the works of God out of their system. Though I reverence their philanthrophy, I cannot help smiling at the conceit that, if the taste of the Quaker could have been consulted at the creation, what a silent and drab-coloured creation it would have been! Not a flower would have blossomed, not a bird been permitted to sing.

Quitting these reflections, I proceed to other matters. Our ideas, not only of the almightiness of the Creator, but of His wisdom and His beneficence, become enlarged as we contemplate the extent and structure of the universe. The solitary idea of a solitary world rolling or at rest in the immense ocean of space gives place to the cheerful idea of a society of worlds, so happily contrived as to administer, even by their own motion, instruction to man. We see our own earth filled with abundance, but we forget to consider how much of that abundance is owing to the scientific knowledge the vast machinery of the universe has unfolded.

But what are we to think of the Christian system of faith that forms itself upon the idea of only one world? Alas! what is this to the mighty ocean of space and the almighty power of the Creator? From whence, then, could arise the solitary and strange conceit that the Almighty, who had millions of worlds equally dependent on His protection, should quit the care of all the rest and come to die in our world because they say one man and one woman had eaten an apple?

It has been by rejecting the evidence that the word, or works, of God in the creation affords to our senses, and the action of our reason upon that evidence, that so many wild and whimsical systems of faith, and of religion, have been fabricated and set up. There may be many systems of religion that so far from being morally bad are in many respects morally

good; but there can be but one that is true, and that one necessarily must, as it ever will, be in all things consistent with the ever-existing word of God that we behold in His works.

I shall close by giving a summary of the deistic belief.

First, that the creation we behold is the real word of God, in which we cannot be deceived. It proclaims His power, it demonstrates His wisdom, it manifests His goodness and beneficence.

Secondly, that the moral duty of man consists in imitating the moral goodness and beneficence of God manifested in the creation towards all His creatures. That seeing, as we daily do, the goodness of God to all men, it is an example calling upon all men to practise the same towards each other, and consequently that everything of persecution and revenge between man and man, and everything of cruelty to animals, is a violation of moral duty.

It is certain that, in one point, all nations of the earth and all religions agree. All believe in a God. The things in which they disagree are the redundancies annexed to that belief; and, therefore, if ever a universal religion should prevail, it will not be in believing anything new, but in getting rid of redundancies and believing as man believed at first. But in the meantime let every man follow, as he has a right to do, the religion and the worship he prefers.

On the Principle of Population

THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS

ONE of the most persistently misrepresented doctrines, Malthus's central theory is nothing less moral than that young persons should postpone marriage until they have the means of supporting a family. The reading of this great essay independently suggested, first to Darwin and later to Alfred Russel Wallace, the idea of natural selection as a necessary consequence of that struggle for life so splendidly demonstrated by Malthus in the case of mankind. The treatise whose title was An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society, was first published anonymously in 1798.

I—GENERAL SURVEY OF THE CHECKS TO POPULATION

SINCE population is capable of doubling itself at least once in every twenty-five years, and since the supply of food can increase in only arithmetical ratio, it naturally follows that increase of population must always be checked by lack of food. But, except in cases of famine, this check is never operative, and the chief checks to increase of population are found to be moral restraint, vice and misery.

In spite of these checks, which are always more or less in operation, there is a constant tendency for the population to increase beyond the means of subsistence. Such increase is followed by lowered wages, dearer food and thus a lowered marriage-rate and birth-rate; and the lowered wages, in turn, induce more agricultural enterprise, and thus means of subsistence become more abundant again.

More abundant and cheaper food in turn, promotes marriage and increases the population, until again there is a shortage of food: and this oscillation, though irregular, will always be found, and there will be always a tendency for the population to oscillate around the food limit.

Even among savages, where the degradation of women, infanticide, vice, famine, war and disease are active instruments of decimation, it will be found that the average population, generally speaking, presses hard against the limits of the average food.

Among modern pastoral nations the principal checks which keep the population down to the level of the means of subsistence are: restraint from inability to obtain a wife, vicious habits with respect to women, epidemics, war, famine and the diseases arising from extreme poverty.

In modern Europe we find similar preventive and positive checks, in varying proportions, to undue increase of population. In England and Scotland the preventive check to population prevails in a considerable degree.

A man of liberal education, with an income only just sufficient to enable him to associate in the rank of gentlemen, must feel absolutely certain that if he marry and have a family he shall be obliged to give up all his former connexions. The woman whom a man of education would naturally choose is one brought up in similar refined surroundings. Can a man easily consent to place the object of his affections on a lower social plane? Two or three steps of descent in society, particularly at this round of the ladder, where education ends and ignorance begins, will not be considered by the generality of people as a chimerical, but a real evil. If society be desirable, it surely must be free, equal and reciprocal society, where benefits are conferred as well as received, and not such as the dependent finds with his patron, or the poor with the rich.

Such considerations certainly prevent many of the better classes from early marriage. Others, possessed of weaker judgement or stronger passion, disregard these considerations; and it would be hard indeed if the gratification of virtuous love did not sometimes more than counterbalance its attendant evils. But those who marry in the face of such considerations too frequently justify the forebodings of the prudent.

The sons of tradesmen and farmers are exhorted not to marry till they have a sufficient sure income to support a family, and often accordingly postpone marriage till they are far advanced in life. The labourer who earns eighteenpence or two shillings a day, as a single man, will hesitate to divide that pittance among four or five, seeing the risks such poverty involves. The servants who live in the families of the rich have yet stronger inducements to

forgo matrimony. They live in comparative comfort and luxury, which as married men they could not enjoy.

The prolific power of nature is very far from being called fully into action in Great Britain. And yet, when we contemplate the insufficiency of the price of labour to maintain a large family, and the amount of mortality which arises directly and indirectly from poverty, and add to this the crowds of children prematurely cut off in large towns, we shall be compelled to acknowledge that, if the number born annually were not greatly thinned by this premature mortality, the funds for the maintenance of labour must increase with much greater rapidity than they have ever hitherto done in order to find work and food for the additional numbers that would then grow up to manhood.

Those, therefore, who live single, or marry late, do not by such conduct contribute in any degree to diminish the actual population, but merely to diminish the proportion of premature mortality, which would otherwise be excessive; and consequently, from this point of view, do not seem to deserve any very severe reprobation or punishment.

It has been usual to consider a great proportion of births as the surest sign of a vigorous and flourishing state. But this is erroneous. Only after great mortality, or under very special social conditions, is a large proportion of births a favourable symptom. In the average state of a well-peopled territory there cannot be a worse sign than a large proportion of births, nor a better sign than a small proportion. A small proportion of births is a decided proof of a very small mortality, since the supply always equals the demand for population. In despotic, miserable, or naturally unhealthy countries, the proportion of births to the whole population will generally be found very great.

In Scotland emigration is a potent cause of depopulation; but any thinning out from this cause is quickly neutralised by an increased proportion of births.

In Ireland the details of population fluctuations are little known; but the cheapness of potatoes and the ignorance and depressed, indifferent state of the people, have encouraged marriage to such a degree that the population is pushed much beyond the resources of the country and the consequence, naturally, is that the lower classes of the people are in the most impoverished and miserable state. The checks to the population are, of course, chiefly of the positive kind, and arise from the diseases caused by squalid poverty. To these positive checks have of late years been added the vice and misery of civil war and of martial law.

II—POPULATION AND THE SUBSISTENCE LEVEL

That the checks which have been mentioned are the immediate causes of the slow increase of population, and that these checks result principally from an insufficiency of subsistence will be evident from the comparatively rapid increase which has invariably taken place whenever, by some sudden enlargement in the means of subsistence, these checks have been in any considerable degree removed. Plenty of rich land to be had for little or nothing is so powerful a cause of population as generally to overcome all obstacles. The abundance of cheap and profitable land obtained by the colonists in English North America resulted in a rapid increase of population almost without parallel in history. Such an increase does not occur in Britain, and the reason to be assigned is want of food. Want of food is certainly the most efficient of the three immediate checks to population. Population soon increases after war and disease and convulsions of nature, because the food supply is more adequate for the diminished numbers; but where food is deficient no increase of population can occur.

Since the world began, the causes of population and depopulation have been probably as constant as any of the laws of nature with which we are acquainted.

The passion between the sexes has appeared in every age to be so nearly the same that it may always be considered in algebraic language as a given quantity. The great law of necessity, which prevents population from increasing in any country beyond the food which it can either produce or acquire, is a law so obvious and evident to our understandings that we cannot doubt it.

The different modes which nature takes to repress a redundant population do not, indeed, appear to us so certain and regular; but though we cannot always predict the mode, we may with certainty predict the fact. If the proportion of the births to the deaths for a few years indicates an increase of numbers much beyond the proportional increased or acquired food of the country, we may be perfectly certain that, unless an emigration takes place, the deaths will shortly exceed the births, and that the increase which has been observed for a few years cannot be the real average increase of the population of the country.

If there were no other depopulating causes, and if the preventive check did not operate very strongly, every country would, without doubt, be subject to periodical plagues and famines.

The only true criterion of a real and permanent increase in the population of any country is the increase of the means of subsistence, and even this criterion is subject to some slight variations.

Other circumstances being the same, it may be affirmed that countries are populous according to the quantity of human food which they produce or can acquire; and happy according to the liberality with which this food is divided, or the quantity which a day's labour will purchase. This happiness does not depend either upon their being thinly or fully inhabited, upon their poverty or their riches, their youth or age, but on the proportion which the population and the food bear to each other.

In modern Europe the positive checks to population prevail less, and the preventive checks more, than in past times and in the more uncivilized parts of the world, since wars, plagues, acute diseases and famines have become less frequent.

With regard to the preventive checks to population, though it must be acknowledged that the preventive check of moral restraint

does not, at present, largely prevail, yet it is becoming more prevalent, and if we consider only the general term, which implies principally a delay of marriage from prudential considerations, it may be considered as the most potent of the checks which in modern Europe keep down the population to the level of the means of subsistence.

III—REMEDIES OTHER THAN MORAL FOR OVER-POPULATION

All systems of equality which have been proposed are bound to fail, because the motive to the preventive check of moral restraint is destroyed by equality and community of goods. As all would be equal and in similar circumstances, there would be no reason why one person should think himself obliged to practise the duty of restraint more than another. And how could a man be compelled to such restraint? The operation of this natural check of moral restraint depends exclusively upon the existence of the laws of property and succession; and, in a state of equality and community of property could only be replaced by some artificial regulation of a very different stamp, and a much more unnatural character.

No scheme of equality, then, can overcome the population difficulty: emigration is only a palliative and poor-law relief only a nostrum which eventually aggravates the evils of over-population.

The poor laws of England tend to depress the general condition of the poor in two ways. Their first obnoxious tendency is to increase population without increasing the food for its support. A poor man may marry with little or no prospect of being able to support a family without parish assistance. The poor laws may be said, therefore, to create the poor which they maintain, and as the provisions must be distributed to the greater numbers in smaller proportions, the labours of those who are not supported by parish assistance will purchase a smaller quantity of provisions than before and consequently more of them will require assistance. Secondly, the quantity of provisions consumed in workhouses by the least worthy members of the community diminishes the food of the more worthy members, who are thus driven to obtain relief.

Fortunately for England, a spirit of independence still remains among the peasantry. The poor laws, though calculated to eradicate this spirit, have only partially succeeded. Hard as it may appear in individual instances, dependent poverty ought to be deemed disgraceful. Such a stigma seems necessary to promote the general happiness of mankind. If men be induced to marry from the mere prospect of parish provision, they are not only unjustly tempted to bring unhappiness and dependence upon themselves and their children, but they are tempted unwittingly to injure all in the same class as themselves.

Further, the poor laws discourage frugality and diminish the power and the will of the common people to save, and they live from hand to mouth without thought of the future. A man who might not be deterred from going to the ale-house by the knowledge that his death or sickness might throw his family upon the parish, might fear to waste his earnings if the only provision for it were casual charity.

The mass of unhappiness among common people must be diminished when one of the strongest checks to idleness and dissipation is thus removed; and when institutions which render dependent poverty so lessen the disgrace which should be attached to it. I feel persuaded that if the poor laws had never existed in this country, though there might have been a few more instances of very severe distress, the aggregate mass of happiness among the common people would have been much greater than it is at present. In view of all these facts I do not propose a law to prevent the poor from marrying, but I propose a very gradual abolition of the poor laws.

By means of an extending commerce a country may be able to purchase an increasing quantity of food and to support an increasing population; but extension of commerce cannot continue indefinitely; it must be checked by competition and other economic interference; and as soon as funds for the maintenance of labour become stationary, or begin to decline, there will be no means of obtaining food for an increasing population.

It is the union of the agricultural and commercial systems, and not either of them taken separately, that is calculated to produce the greatest national prosperity. A country with an extensive and rich territory, the cultivation of which is stimulated by improvements in agriculture, manufactures and foreign commerce, has such various and abundant resources that it is extremely difficult to say when they will reach their limits. There are, however, limits to the capital population of a country—limits which they must ultimately reach and cannot pass.

To secure a more abundant and, at the same time, a steadier supply of grain, a system of corn laws has been recommended, the object of which is to discourage, by duties or prohibitions, the importation of foreign corn and to encourage by bounties the exportation of corn of home growth.

Laws which prohibit the importation of foreign grain, though by no means unobjectionable, are not open to the same objections as bounties and must be allowed to be adequate to the object they have in view, the maintenance of an independent supply. Moreover, it is obviously possible, by restrictions upon the importation of foreign corn, to maintain a balance between the agricultural and commercial classes.

The question is not a question of the efficiency or inefficiency of the measure proposed, but of its policy or impolicy. In certain cases there can be no doubt of the impolicy of attempting to maintain an unnatural balance between the agricultural and commercial classes; but in other cases the impolicy is by no means so clear. Restrictions upon the importation of foreign corn in a country which has great landed resources tend not only to spread every commercial and manufacturing advantage possessed, whether permanent or temporary, on the soil, but tend also to prevent those great oscillations in the progress of agriculture and commerce which are seldom unattended with evil.

As it appears that in the actual state of every society which has come within our view the natural progress of population has been constantly and powerfully checked, and as it seems evident that no improved form of government, no plans of emigration, no direction of natural industry can prevent the continued action of a great check to population in some form or other, it follows that we must submit to it as an inevitable law of nature, and the only inquiry that remains is how it may take place with the least possible prejudice to the virtue and happiness of human society.

All the immediate checks to population which have been observed to prevail in the same and different countries seem to be resolved into moral restraint, vice and misery; and if our choice be confined to those three, we cannot long hesitate in our decision. It seems certain that moral restraint is the only virtuous and satisfactory mode of escape from the evils of over-population. Without such moral restraint, and if it were the custom to marry at the age of puberty, no virtue, however great, could rescue society from a most wretched and desperate state of want, with its innumerable concomitant diseases and famines.

Prudential restraint, if it were generally adopted, would soon raise the price of labour by narrowing its supply, and those practising it would save money and acquire habits of sobriety, industry and economy such as should ensure happy married life. Further postponement of marriage would give both sexes a better opportunity to choose life-partners wisely and well; and the passion, instead of being extinguished by the experience engendered by early sensuality, would burn the more brightly because repressed for a time and attained as the prize of industry and virtue and as the reward of a genuine attachment.

Moral restraint in this matter is a Christian duty. There are, perhaps, few actions that tend so directly to diminish the general happiness as to marry without being in possession of the means of supporting children. He who commits this act clearly offends against the will of God, for he violates his duty to his neighbours and also to himself, and listens to the voice of passion rather than fulfils the higher obligations of his duty. If he cannot support his children they must starve; and if he marry in the face of a fair probability that he shall not be able to support his children, he is guilty of all the evils which he thus brings upon himself, his wife and his offspring.

When the wages of labour are barely sufficient to support two children, a man marries and has five or six, and finds himself in distress. He blames the low price of labour. He blames the parish and the rich and social institutions but he never blames himself. He may wish he had never married; but it never enters into his head that he has done anything wrong. Indeed, the converse is the case, for he has always been told that to raise up children for his king and country is a very meritorious and patriotic act.

The common people must be taught that they themselves in such a case are to blame and that no one has power to help them if they act thus contrary to the will of God. Those who wish to help the poor must try to raise the relative proportion between the price of labour and the price of provisions, instead of encouraging the poor to marry and overstock the labour market. A market overstocked with labour and an ample remuneration to each labourer are objects perfectly incompatible.

It is not enough, however, to abolish all the positive institutions which encourage population, but we must endeavour at the same time to correct the prevailing opinions which have the same effect. The public must be made to understand that they have no *right* to assistance and that it is the duty of man not only to propagate his species but to propagate virtue and happiness.

Our private charity must also be discriminate. If we insist that a man shall eat even if he do not work, and that his family shall be supported even if he marry without prospect of supporting a family, we merely encourage worthless poverty. We must not put a premium on idleness and reckless marriages, and we must on no account do anything which tends to remove that inequality of circumstances which ought always to exist between the single man and the man with a family.

The Vocation of Man

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE

About 1790 Fichte came under the influence of Immanuel Kant, whose philosophy inspired in him a reverential enthusiasm, and in 1792 he published his Essay Towards a Critique of All Revelation. As professor of philosophy at Jena, his success was complete owing to his rare powers as a lecturer, proof of which is contained in his addresses, published under the title The Vocation of the Scholar. While at Jena he produced a series of works which placed him in the very front rank of German thinkers, the most important being The Foundation of the Whole Theory of Science (1795). The most notable of his later publications was The Vocation of Man (1800), which for beauty of style, richness of content, and elevation of thought has been ranked with the Meditations of Descartes.

I—'I WILL KNOW!'

At last, then, I may hope that I am tolerably well acquainted with the world that surrounds me. In the unanimous declaration of my senses, in unfailing experience alone, have I placed my trust. Therefore am I now as well assured of the accuracy of this part of my knowledge as of my own existence.

But what, then, am I, and what is the aim

and end of my being? The question is superfluous. It is long since I have been made well acquainted with the various phenomena of being, and it would take much time to recapitulate all that I have learnt concerning them. But how could I persuade myself that I really possessed this knowledge? I know merely what others profess to know, and all that I can really be assured of is that I have heard them speak so and so upon these things.

I have attributed to others an interest in the highest affairs of humanity and earnestness and accuracy which I by no means discover in myself. I have regarded them as indescribably superior to me. How much have I undervalued myself!

It shall be no longer thus. From this moment I will enter on my rights, on the dignity to which I have a claim. Let all that is foreign to my own mind be renounced! I will examine for myself I will *know*.

I am surrounded by objects which I am compelled to regard as wholes, subsisting for themselves, and separately from each other. I behold plants, trees and animals, and I ascribe to each individual certain signs and attributes by which I distinguish it from others. Every object has its appointed number of attributes, neither more nor less. Every object possesses its properties in an appointed degree, which it neither exceeds nor falls short of. Everything that is, is definite, determined; is some one thing, and is not something else.

Not that I am unable to conceive an object hovering between opposite limitations. I am certainly able to do this, for half of my thoughts consist of such. I think of a tree in general, for my thought is undetermined, and does not represent any particular tree, but a tree in general, which has no real existence, for whatever really exists has its appointed number of attributes, and each of those in its appointed measure.

Nature, however, hastens on through her everlasting transformations, and while I am speaking of the present moment it is gone and all is changed. Why, then, and from what cause, does nature, amid infinite possible varieties of conditions, assume precisely some, and not others? Why do the things in which we look *become* so?

Nature follows undeviating laws. I find myself in a close chain of phenomena, in which every link depends on that which has preceded it. I see a flower that has sprung out of the earth, and I conclude that a formative power exists in nature. A flower, and precisely this flower, could exist in this place only so far as all circumstances united to make it possible.

I am compelled to assume a peculiar original power in nature, and precisely a flower producing power, for another power of nature, under the same circumstances, might have produced something entirely different.

When I contemplate all things as one whole, I perceive one nature, one force; when I regard them as individuals, many forces, which develop themselves according to their inward laws and pass through all the forms of which they are capable; and all the objects in nature are but those forces under certain limitations.

Every manifestation of every individual power of nature is connected with all the other powers, for nature is one connected whole. Its manifestations, therefore, are strictly necessary, and the logical conclusion at which I arrive is that it is absolutely impossible that anything should be other than what it is.

II—DOUBT IN RELATION TO NATURE

I MYSELF, with all that I call mine, am but a link in this chain of rigid natural necessity. I have not come into existence by my own power. I have been called into being by a power out of myself. And what should this be but the universal power of nature, of which I form a part? It was impossible that instead of me another should have arisen; it is impossible that at any moment of my existence I should be other than what I am.

Thought is assuredly a far higher and more subtle operation of nature than the formation of a plant or the motion of an animal. I cannot explain how the power of nature can produce thought, but can I better explain its operation in the production of a plant, in the motion of an animal? Thought exists in nature, as well as the creative power which gives birth to the plant. To attempt to deduce thought from any mere organization of matter, however, is an extravagance into which I shall not easily fall. There is in nature an original thinking power, as well as an original plant-creating power.

This form, this motion, this thought, this duration of all essential qualities amidst many non-essential changes belong to me as to a being of my species. But the *man-forming* power in nature has manifested itself, at the time of my production, under manifold conditions and circumstances. By these conditions and circumstances it was determined that *I* should become. I am that which I am because no other was possible, and all that I am and shall be, I am and shall be of necessity.

I do, indeed, feel an inward consciousness of independence; of having on many occasions in my life exerted a free agency. But this is perfectly reconcilable with the principles I have laid down. I am myself not the man-forming power of nature, but only one of its manifestations. This manifestation, however, is certainly the production of an original and independent force, and must appear as such in my consciousness. For this reason do I appear to myself as a free agent in those occurrences of my life in which the independent force falling to my share manifests itself without hindrance; but as subject to constraint when, by any combination of circumstances, I cannot do what I might otherwise be capable of doing.

BESTOW consciousness on a tree, and let it grow freely, and it will be aware of no limits to its existence in being only a tree and a tree of a certain species. But let unfavourable weather, insufficient nutrition, or other causes, hinder its growth, and it will feel itself confined, restrained, because an impulse of its nature cannot be satisfied. Bind its free and waving branches to a wall, force foreign branches on it by the process of grafting, and it will feel itself constrained.

In my immediate consciousness I appear to myself as free; by meditation on the whole of nature I discover that freedom, a free agency, is impossible for me; the former must be subordinate to the latter, for it is only to be explained through it.

III—KNOWLEDGE IS NOT ALL

Sorrow and anxiety corroded my heart. I cursed the day which recalled me to an existence in whose truth and significance I could no longer trust. I awakened in the night from unquiet dreams, but I sought in vain for a ray of spiritual light that might lead me out of the labyrinth of doubt in which I had become entangled.

Once, at the hour of midnight, a wondrous spirit appeared to pass before me, and to address me.

"Poor Mortal!" I heard it say. "Thou heapest error upon error, and fanciest thyself wise. Take courage to be truly wise. I bring thee new revelations. Listen! Thou wilt admit that the objects round thee really have an existence out of thyself? Dost thou see thy sight, and feel thy touch, or has thou a higher sense, by which thou perceivest the affections of thy organs of sense?"

I replied that I had not, but that I knew immediately and absolutely what I saw and felt.

Then said the spirit, "Therefore, thou canst not know anything without knowing that thou knowest it. Remember that in all perception thou perceivest only thine own state of being. But knowledge of the qualities and attributes of objects outside of thy self can be obtained merely through thy consciousness of the various conditions of thine own being. By calling things red, blue, sweet, or bitter, thou dost really mean only that thou art affected in a certain manner by them."

I assented, saying, "I perceive that transposition of what is in me to something out of myself is very strange, though, nevertheless, I cannot refrain from it. My sensations are in myself and not in the object, for I am myself and not the object. But sensation is always definite. We never merely see, hear, or feel; but always see colour; feel cold, warm, rough, smooth; hear sound."

But the spirit said, "Thy hand is a surface. How dost thou attain consciousness of thy hand at all? That thy hand should appear to thee as a surface is just as inexplicable as the idea of a surface in general. The truth is that there is something interior in thee which thou hast not perceived by any sense. All thy perceptions of qualities in outward things are only certain affections of thine own organs of sense. Thou art obliged to speak of something beyond the senses and not perceptible to them. That is to say, by the idea of causality thou art enabled to add to a knowledge which thou hast, another which thou hast not.

"Thou hast therefore an organ or faculty, that of consciousness, by which thou perceivest these affections. In fact, thy real knowledge, that of thy sensations and affections, is to thee like an imperfect knowledge, which requires to be completed by another."

Then said I, "I do, indeed, add to the consciousness of sensation, which is simultaneous with that of existence, another which I do not find in myself; and as by this I double and complete my real consciousness, I may be said to perform a mental act. But of the mental act which, according to thy assertion, I perform in the representation of an object out of myself, I am not conscious at all."

And the spirit replied, "An act of the mind of which we are conscious, as such, is called freedom. An act without consciousness of action is called spontaneity. This act of mind is called thought; and it is said that thought is a spontaneous act, to distinguish it from sensation, in which the mind is merely receptive and passive. But thou knowest that for the sensation that arises in thy mind concerning any object there must be a cause. How knowest thou, and how can it be proved, that thy sensation must have a cause? Thou knowest it not mediately, but immediately. Thou hast it absolutely in thyself; for the representation of an object, according to the law of causality, is simultaneous with the sensation. It appears, then, that all thy knowledge is merely a knowledge of thyself, that thy consciousness never proceeds beyond thyself, and that what thou hast regarded as a consciousness of the real existence of the object is no more than a consciousness of thine own representation or conception of an object, produced according to an inward law of thought, and necessarily coexisting with thy sensation. But, now, what art thou?"

I answered, "To answer that question in the most general manner, I must say I am I, myself. I can only make myself understood by opposition. And external existence—a thing—is something out of me, the intelligent being cognisant of it. Of what I am, I know no more than what I am."

Then exclaimed the spirit, "Short-sighted mortal! Thou hast sought to know, and thou hast chosen a wrong path. Thou hast sought knowledge where no knowledge can reach. I found thee in this state of mind, and I wished to free thee from thy false knowledge. Thou wouldst know thy own knowledge. Thou seekest, as I well know, something real and permanent beyond mere appearances. But in vain dost thou seek this through knowledge. Hast thou no other organ by which to apprehend it? Thou hast such an organ; let it be thy care to awaken and vivify it, and thou wilt attain the most perfect tranquillity."

IV—THROUGH FAITH WE FULFIL DESTINY

Terrible spirit, thy words have crushed me. But thou hast referred me to myself, and what were I, could anything out of myself irrecoverably cast me down? How is it that my heart revolts at a system against which my understanding can object nothing? It is that I require something beyond these mere mental images and conceptions.

And what, then, is this something lying beyond all conception towards which I look with such ardent longing? Not merely to know, but, according to thy knowledge, to *do*, is the destiny of man.

Now I know the organ by which to apprehend this reality, and probably all other. It is not knowledge, for knowledge can only demonstrate itself; every knowledge supposes some higher knowledge on which it is founded, and of this ascent there is no end. It is Faith, that voluntary reposing on the views naturally presenting themselves to us, because through these views only can we fulfil our destiny. It is no

knowledge, but a resolution of the will to admit this knowledge. This same inward voice opens to my spiritual vision a prospect into another and a better world than that which is sensually present to me; it makes me aspire after this better world, live in it, and in it alone find satisfaction and tranquillity.

It is the destiny of our race to become united in one great body, thoroughly connected in all its parts, and possessed of similar culture. Nature, and even the passions and vices of man, have from the beginning tended towards this end.

The present is the beginning of our existence. The future life will be its continuation, and our station there we must earn for ourselves. This then, is my true nature, my whole sublime destination. The Infinite Will unites me with Himself, and with all finite beings such as myself. All that happens in God's world happens for the best; but what in that world is germ, what blossom, what fruit, I know not.

The World as Will and Idea

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

SCHOPENHAUER'S magnificent work, The World as Will and Idea (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung), published in 1819, is not only a masterly exposition of philosophy, but a comprehensive record of Schopenhauer's own views on mankind. The keynote of his philosophy is that the sole essential reality in the universe is the will, and that all visible and tangible phenomena are merely subjective representations of that 'will which is the only thing-in-itself' that actually exists. The defect of his system is its tendency to a sombre pessimism. An enlarged edition appeared in 1844. The chief of Schopenhauer's other works are On the Will in Nature (1836), The Main Problems of Ethics (1841), and Parerga and Paralipomena (1851).

I—THE WORLD AS IDEA

'THE world is my idea' is a truth valid for every living creature, though only man can consciously contemplate it. In doing so he attains philosophical wisdom. No truth is more absolutely certain than that all that exists for knowledge, and, therefore, this whole world, is only object in relation to subject, perception of a perceiver—in a word, idea. The world is idea.

This truth is by no means new. It lay by implication in the reflections of Descartes; but Berkeley first distinctly enunciated it, while Kant erred by ignoring it. So ancient is it that it was the fundamental principle of the Indian Vedanta, as Sir William Jones points out. In one aspect, the world is idea; in the other aspect the world is will.

That which knows all things and is known by none is the subject; and for this subject all exists. But the world as idea consists of two essential and inseparable halves. One half is the object, whose form consists of time and space, and, through these, of multiplicity; but the other half is the subject, lying not in space and time, for it subsists whole and undivided in every reflecting being.

Thus, any single individual endowed with the faculty of perception of the object constitutes the whole world of idea as completely as the millions in existence; but let this single individual vanish, and the whole world as idea would disappear. Each of these halves possesses meaning and existence only in and through the other, appearing with and vanishing with it. Where the object begins the subject ends.

One of Kant's great merits is that he discovered that the essential and universal forms of all objects—space, time, causality—lie *a priori* in our consciousness, for they may be discovered and fully known from a consideration of the subject, without any knowledge of the object.

Ideas of perception are distinct from abstract ideas. The former comprehend the whole world of experience; the latter are concepts, and are possessed by man alone amongst all creatures on earth; and the capacity for these, distinguishing him from the lower animals, is called reason.

Much vain controversy has arisen concerning the reality of the external universe, owing to the fallacious notion that, because perception arises through the knowledge of causality, the relation of subject and object is that of cause and effect. For this relation only subsists between objects—that is, between the immediate object—and objects known indirectly. The object always presupposes the subject, and so there can be between these two no relation of reason and consequent.

Therefore, the controversy between realistic dogmatism and doctrinal scepticism is foolish. The former seems to separate object and idea as cause and effect, whereas these two are really one—the latter supposes that in the idea we have only the effect, never the cause, and never know the real being, but merely its action. The correction of both these fallacies is the same—that object and idea are identical.

The greatest value of knowledge is that it can be communicated and retained. This makes it inestimably important for practice. Rational or abstract knowledge is that knowledge which is peculiar to the reason as distinguished from the understanding. The use of reason is that it substitutes abstract concepts for ideas of perception, and adopts them as the guide of action.

The many-sided view of life which man, as distinguished from the lower animals, possesses through reason makes him stand to them as the captain, equipped with chart, compass and quadrant, and with a knowledge of navigation, stands to the ignorant sailors under his command.

Man lives two lives. Besides his life in the concrete is his life in the abstract. In the former he struggles, suffers and dies as do the mere animal creatures. But in the abstract he quietly reflects on the plan of the universe as does a captain of a ship on the chart. He becomes in this abstract life of calm reasoning a deliberate observer of those elements which previously moved and agitated his emotions. Withdrawing into this serene contemplation, he is like an actor who has played a lively part on the stage and then withdraws and, as one of the audience, quietly looks on at other actors who are energetically performing.

II—THE WORLD AS WILL

We are compelled to further inquiry, because we cannot be satisfied with knowing that we have ideas, and that these are associated with certain laws, the general expression of which is the principle of sufficient reason. We wish to know the significance of our ideas. We ask whether this world is nothing more than a mere idea, not worthy of our notice if it is to pass by us like an empty dream or an airy vision, or whether it is something more substantial.

We can surely never arrive at the nature of things from without. No matter how assiduous our researches may be, we can never reach anything beyond images and names. We resemble a man going round a castle seeking vainly for an entrance, and sometimes sketching the façades. And yet this is the method followed by all philosophers before me.

The truth about man is that he is not a pure knowing subject, not a winged cherub without a material body, contemplating the world from without. For he is himself rooted in that world. That is to say, he finds himself in the world as an *individual* whose knowledge, which is the essential basis of the whole world as idea, is yet ever communicated through the medium of the body, whose sensations are the starting-point of the understanding of that world. His body is for him an idea like every other idea, an object among objects. He only knows its actions as he knows the changes in all other objects, and but for one aid to his understanding of himself he would find this idea and object as strange and incomprehensible as all others.

That aid is *will*, which alone furnishes the key to the riddle of himself, solves the problem of his own existence and reveals to him the inner structure and significance of his being, his action and his movements.

The body is the immediate object of will; it may be called the *objectivity of will*. Every true act of will is also instantly a visible act of the body, and every impression on the body is also at once an impression on the will. When it is opposed to the will it is called pain, and when consonant with the will, pleasure.

The essential identity of body and will is shown by the fact that every violent movement of the will—that is to say, every emotion—directly agitates the body and interferes with its vital functions. So we may legitimately say: My body is the objectivity of my will.

It is simply owing to this special relation to one body that the knowing subject is an individual. Our knowing, being bound to individuality, necessitates that each of us can only be one, and yet each of us can know all. Hence arises the need for philosophy. The double knowledge which each of us possesses of his own body is the key to the nature of every phenomenon in the world. Nothing is either known to us or thinkable by us except will and idea. If we examine the reality of the body and its actions, we discover nothing beyond the fact that it is an idea, except the will. With this double discovery reality is exhausted.

III—THE WORLD AS IDEA—SECOND ASPECT

We have looked at the world as idea, object for a subject, and next at the world as will. All students of Plato know that the different grades of objectification of will which are manifested in countless individuals, and exist as their unrealized types or as the eternal forms of things, are the Platonic ideas. Thus, these various grades are related to individual things as their eternal forms or prototypes.

Thus, the world in which we live is in its whole nature through and through *will*, and at the same time through and through *idea*. This idea always presupposes a form, object and subject. If we take away this form and ask what then remains, the answer must be that this can be nothing but *will*, which, properly speaking, is the *thing-in-itself*.

Every human being discovers that he himself is this will, and that the world exists only for him and does so in relation to his consciousness. Thus each human being is himself in a double aspect the whole world, the microcosm. And that which he realizes as his own real being exhausts the being of the whole world, the macrocosm. So, like man, the world is through and through *will*, and through and through *idea*.

Plato would say that an animal has no true being, but merely an apparent being, a constant becoming. The only true being is the idea, which embodies itself in that animal. That is to say, the idea of the animal alone has true being and is the object of real knowledge. Kant, with his theory of 'the thing-in-itself' as the only reality, would say that the animal is only a phenomenon in time, space and causality, which are conditions of our perception, not the thing-in-itself. So the individual as we see it at this particular moment will pass away, without any possibility of our knowing the thing-in-itself, for the knowledge of that is beyond our faculties.

Thus do these two greatest philosophers of the West differ. The thing-in-itself must, according to Kant, be free from all forms associated with knowing. On the contrary, the Platonic idea is necessarily object, something known and thus different from the thing-in-itself, which cannot be apprehended. Yet Kant and Plato tend to agree, because the thing-in-itself is, after all, that which lays aside all the subordinate forms of phenomena, and has retained the first and most universal form, that of the idea in general, the form of being object for a subject. Plato attributes actual being only to the ideas, and concedes only an illusive, dream-like existence to things in space and time, the real world for the individual.

IV—THE WORLD AS WILL—SECOND ASPECT

The last and most serious part of our consideration relates to human action. Human nature tends to relate everything else to action. The world as idea is the perfect mirror of the will, in which it recognizes itself in graduating scales of distinctness and completeness. The highest degree of this consciousness is man, whose nature only completely expresses itself in the whole connected series of his actions.

Will is the thing-in-itself, the essence of the world. Life is only the mirror of the will. Life accompanies the will as the shadow the body. If will exists, so will life. So long as we are actuated by the will to live, we need have no fear of ceasing to live, even in the presence of death. True, we see the individual born and passing away; but the individual is merely phenomenal. Neither the will, nor the subject of cognition, is at all affected by birth or death.

It is not the individual, but only the species, that nature cares for. She provides for the species with boundless prodigality through the incalculable profusion of seed and the great strength of fructification. She is ever ready to let the individual fall when it has served its end of perpetuating the species. Thus does nature artlessly express the great truth that only the ideas, not the individuals, have actual reality and are complete objectivity of the will.

Man is nature itself, but nature is only the objectified will to live. So the man who has comprehended this point of view may well console himself when contemplating death for himself or his friends by turning his eyes to the immortal life of nature, which he himself is. And thus we see that birth and death both really belong to life, and that they take part in that constant mutation of matter which is consistent with the permanence of the species, notwithstanding the transitoriness of the individual.

V—THE WILL AS RELATED TO TIME

Above all we must not forget that the form of the phenomenon of the will, the form of life in reality, is really only the *present*, not the future nor the past. No man ever lived in the past, no man will live in the future. The present is the sole form of life in sure possession. The present exists always, together with its content.

Now all object is the will so far as it has become idea, and the subject is the necessary correlative of the object. But real objects are in the present only. So nothing but conceptions and fancies are included in the past, while the present is the essential form of the phenomenon of the will, and inseparable from it. The present alone is perpetual and immovable. The fountain and support of it is the will to live, or the thing-in-itself, which we are.

Life is certain to the will, and the present is certain to life. Time is like a perpetually revolving globe. The hemisphere which is sinking is like the past, that which is rising is like the future, while the indivisible point at the top is like a motionless present. Or, time is like a running river, and the present is a rock on which it breaks but which it cannot remove with itself. As life is assured to the will, so is the present the single real form of life.

Therefore we are not concerned to investigate the past antecedent to life, nor to speculate on the future subsequent to death. We should simply seek to know the present, that being the sole form in which the will manifests itself. Therefore, if we are satisfied with life as it is, we may confidently regard it as endless and banish the fear of death as illusive. Our spirit is of a totally indestructible nature, and its energy endures from eternity to eternity.

The problem of the freedom of the will is solved by the considerations which have thus been outlined. Since the will is not phenomenon, is not idea or object, but thing-in-itself, is not determined as a consequent through any reason, and knows no necessity, therefore it is *free*. But the person is never free, although he is the phenomenon of a free will, for this indisputable reason, that he is already the determined phenomenon of the free volition of this will, and is constrained to embody the direction of that volition in a multiplicity of actions.

Aids to Reflection

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE

THIS famous book, of which the full title is Aids to Reflection in the Formation of a Manly Character on the Several Grounds of Prudence, Morality and Religion, was published in 1825. It consists chiefly of comments on selected passages, especially from the writings of Archbishop Leighton. Coleridge's comments have a special value from his learning and sagacity and from his abandonment of the Unitarian principles in which he was originally trained and adoption of sounder doctrines, and this book represents the mature thoughts of the profoundest thinker of his day.

I—INTRODUCTORY APHORISMS

It is the most useful prerogative of genius to rescue truths from the neglect caused by the very circumstance of their universal admission. Truths, of all others the most awful and interesting, are too often considered as so true that they lose the power of truth, and lie bedridden in the dormitory of the soul.

There is one sure way of giving freshness and importance to the most commonplace maxims—that of *reflecting* on them in direct reference to our own state and conduct, to our own past and future being. A reflecting mind, says an ancient writer, is the spring and source of every good thing. As a man

without forethought scarce deserves the name of man, so forethought without reflection is but a metaphorical phrase for the instinct of a beast.

In order to learn, we must attend; in order to profit by what we have learnt, we must think. He only thinks who reflects.

To assign a feeling and a determination of their will as a satisfactory reason for embracing or rejecting an opinion is the habit of many educated people; to me, this seems little less irrational than to apply the nose to a picture and to decide on its genuineness by the sense of smell.

In attention we keep the mind passive; in thought we rouse it into activity.

An hour of solitude passed in sincere and earnest prayer, or the conflict with and conquest over a single passion or 'subtle bosom sin,' will teach us more of thought, will more effectually awaken the faculty and form the habit of reflection, than a year's study in the schools without them.

Never yet did there exist a full faith in the Divine Word which did not expand the intellect, while it purified the heart; which did not multiply the aims and objects of the understanding, while it fixed and simplified those of the desires and passions. 'Give me understanding,' says David, 'and I shall observe Thy laws with my whole heart.'

It is worthy of especial observation that the Scriptures are distinguished from all other writings pretending to inspiration by the strong and frequent recommendations of knowledge and a spirit of inquiry. The word 'rational' has been strongly abused of late times. This must not, however, disincline us to the weighty consideration that thoughtfulness and a desire to rest all our convictions on grounds of right reasoning are inseparable from the character of a Christian. He who begins by loving Christianity better than truth will proceed by loving his own sect and church better than Christianity, and end in loving himself best of all.

II—REFLECTIONS RESPECTING MORALITY

Sensibility, that is a constitutional quickness of sympathy with pain and pleasure, is not to be confounded with the moral principle. Sensibility is not even a sure pledge of a good heart. How many are prompted to remove those evils alone which by hideous spectacle or clamorous outcry are present to their senses and disturb their selfish enjoyments? Provided the dunghill is not before their parlour window, they are well contented to know that it exists, and perhaps is the hotbed on which their own luxuries are reared. Sensibility is not necessarily benevolence.

All the evil of the materialists is inconsiderable beside the mischief effected and occasioned by the sentimental philosophy of Sterne and his numerous imitators. The vilest appetites and the most remorseless inconstancy towards their objects, acquired the titles of the 'heart,' 'the irresistible feelings,' 'the too-tender sensibility'; and if the frosts of prudence, the icy chain of human law, thawed and vanished at the genial warmth of human nature, who could help it? It was an amiable weakness!

At this time the profanation of the word 'love' rose to its height; the muse of science condescended to seek admission at the saloons of fashion and frivolity, rouged like a harlot and with the harlot's wanton leer. I know not how the annals of guilt could be better forced into the service of virtue than by such a comment on the present paragraph as would be afforded by sentimental correspondence produced in courts of justice, fairly translated into the true meaning of the words and the actual object and purpose of the infamous writers.

Do you in good earnest aim at dignity of character? I conjure you, turn away from those who live in the twilight between vice and virtue. Are not reason, discrimination, law and deliberate choice the distinguishing characters of humanity? Can anything manly proceed from those who for law and light would substitute shapeless feelings, sentiments, impulses, which, as far as they differ from the vital workings in the brute animals, owe the difference to their former connexion with the proper virtues of humanity?

Remember that love itself, in its highest earthly bearing, as the ground of the marriage union, becomes love by an inward fiat of the will, by a completing and sealing act of moral election, and lays claim to permanence only under the form of duty.

All things strive to ascend, and ascend in the striving. While you labour for anything below your proper humanity, you seek a happy life in the region of death.

Unless above himself he can
Erect himself, how mean a thing is man!

III—PRUDENTIAL APHORISMS

With respect to any final aim or end, the greater part of mankind live at hazard. They have no certain harbour in view, nor direct their course by any fixed star. But to him that knoweth not the port to which he is bound, no wind can be favourable; neither can he who has not determined at what mark to shoot, direct his arrow aright.

It is not, however, the less true that there is a proper object to aim at; and if this object be meant by the term happiness, the perfection of which consists in the exclusion of all hap [*i.e.* chance], I assert that there is such a thing as *summum bonum*, or ultimate good. What this is, the Bible alone shows certainly, and points out the way. 'In Cicero and Plato' says Augustine, 'I meet with many things acutely said, and things that excite a certain warmth of emotion, but in none of them do I find these words, "Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest!"'

In the works of Christian and pagan moralists it is declared that virtue is the only happiness of this life. You cannot become better but you will become happier; you cannot become worse without an increase of misery. Few men are so reprobate as not to have some lucid moments, and in such moments few can stand up unshaken

against the appeal of their own experience. What have been the wages of sin? What has the devil done for you?

Though prudence in itself is neither virtue nor holiness, yet without prudence neither virtue nor holiness can exist.

Art thou under the tyranny of sin, a slave to vicious habits, at enmity with God, a fugitive from thy own conscience? Oh, how idle the disputes whether the listening to the dictates of prudence from self-interested motives be virtue, when the *not* listening is guilt, misery, madness and despair! The most Christian-like pity thou canst show is to take pity on thy own soul. The best service thou canst render is to show mercy to thyself.

IV—APHORISMS ON SPIRITUAL RELIGION

If there be aught spiritual in man, the will must be such. If there be a will, there must be spirituality in man.

There is more in man than can be rationally referred to the life of nature and the mechanism of organization. He has a will not included in his mechanism; the will is, in an especial sense, the spiritual part of our humanity.

I assume a something, the proof of which no man can *give* to another, yet every man may find for himself. If any man say that he cannot find it, I am bound to disbelieve him. I cannot do otherwise without unsettling the foundations of my own moral nature. If he will not find it, he excommunicates himself, forfeits his personal rights, and becomes a thing—*i.e.* one who may be used against his will and without regard to his interest.

If the materialist use the words 'right' and 'obligation,' he does it deceptively, and means only compulsion and power. To overthrow faith in aught higher than nature and physical necessity is the very purpose of his argument. But he cannot be ignorant that the best and greatest of men have devoted their lives to enforce the contrary; and there is not a language in which he could argue for ten minutes in support of his scheme without sliding into phrases that imply the contrary.

The Christian grounds his philosophy on assertions which have nothing in them of theory or hypothesis; they are in immediate reference to three ultimate facts—namely, the reality of the law of conscience; the existence of a responsible will as the subject of the law; and lastly, the existence of evil—of evil essentially such, not by accident of circumstances, not derived from physical consequences, nor from any cause out of itself. The first is a fact of consciousness, the second a fact of reason necessarily concluded from the first, and the third a fact of history interpreted by both.

I maintain that a will conceived separately from intelligence is a nonentity, and that a will the state of which does in no sense originate in its own act is a contradiction. It might be an instinct, an impulse, and, if accompanied with consciousness, a desire; but a will it could not be.

I deem it impious and absurd to hold that the Creator would have given us the faculty of reason, or that the Redeemer would in so many varied forms of argument and persuasion have appealed to it, if it had been useless or impotent. I believe that the imperfect human understanding can be effectually exerted only in subordination to, and in a dependent alliance with, the means and aidances supplied by the supreme reason.

Christianity is not a theory, or a speculation, but a life. Not a philosophy of life, but life, and a living process. It has been eighteen hundred years in existence.

The practical inquirer has his foot on the rock when he knows that whoever needs not a Redeemer is more than human. Remove from him the difficulties that perplex his belief in a crucified Saviour, convince him of the reality of sin, and then satisfy him as to the fact historically, and as to the truth spiritually, of a redemption therefrom by Christ. Do this for him, and there is little fear that he will let either logical quirks or metaphysical puzzles contravene the plain dictate of his common-sense, that the Sinless One that redeemed mankind from sin must have been more than man, and that He who brought light and immortality into the world could not in His own nature have been an inheritor of death and darkness.

A moral evil is an evil that has its origin in a will. An evil common to all must have a ground common to all. Now, this evil ground cannot originate in the Divine will; it must be referred to the will of man. This evil ground we call original sin.

The article on original sin is binding on the Christian only as showing the antecedent ground and occasion of Christianity, which is the edifice raised on this ground. The two great moments of the Christian religion a reoriginal sin and redemption; *that* the ground, *this* the superstructure of our faith. Christianity and redemption are equivalent terms.

The agent and personal cause of the redemption of mankind is—the co-eternal word and only begotten Son of the living God. The causation act is—a spiritual mystery, 'that passeth all understanding.' The effect caused is—the being born anew, in the spirit to Christ.

Now, albeit the causative act is a transcendant mystery, the fact, or actual truth, of it having been assured to us by revelation, it is not impossible, by steadfast meditation on the idea and supernatural character of a personal will, for a mind spiritually disciplined to satisfy itself that the redemptive act supposes an agent who can at once act on the will as an exciting cause, and in the will as the condition of its potential, and the ground of its actual being.

The frequent, not to say ordinary, disproportion between moral worth and wordly prosperity has at all times led the observant and reflecting few to a nicer consideration of the current belief, whether instinctive or traditional. By forcing the soul in upon herself, this enigma of saint and sage, from Job, David and Solomon to Claudian and Boëthius, this perplexing disparity of success and desert, has been the occasion of a steadier and more distinct consciousness, of a something in man, different in kind, which distinguishes and contradistinguishes him from animals—at the same time that it has brought into closer view an enigma of yet harder solution—the fact, I mean,

of a contradiction in the human being, of which no traces are observable elsewhere in animated or inanimate nature.

A struggle of jarring impulses; a mysterious division between the injunctions of the mind and the elections of the will; and the utter incommensurateness and the unsatisfying qualities of the things around us, that yet are the only objects which our senses discover or our appetites require us to pursue; these facts suggest that the riddle of fortune and circumstance is but a form of the riddle of man, and that the solution of both problems lies in the acknowledgement that the soul of man, as the subject of mind and will, possesses a principle of permanence and is destined to endure.

Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its own evidence—remembering only the express declaration of Christ himself, 'No man cometh to Me, unless the Father leadeth him.'

Christ's awful recalling of the drowsed soul from the dreams and phantom world of sensuality to actual reality—how has it been evaded! His word, that was spirit! His mysteries, which even the apostles must wait for the parable in order to comprehend! These spiritual things, which can only be spiritually discerned, were—say some—mere metaphors! Figures of speech! Oriental hyperboles! 'All this means only morality!' Ah! how far nearer the truth to say that morality means all this

A Course of Positive Philosophy

AUGUSTE COMTE

COMTE was a man who felt it desirable in a philosopher that he should practise what he called 'hygiène cérébrale,' a method of keeping the mind healthy for its particular task by cutting himself off from all life that did not concern that work. The Positive Philosophy was his first great work, and in it he propounds his theory that all institutions are based upon the ideas of men which are formed in three successive stages—theology, metaphysics and finally from the positive. His next work was the System of Positive Polity for which the previous book had prepared the way.

I—POSITIVE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES

ON studying the development of human intelligence, it is found that it passes through three stages: (1) The theological, (2) the metaphysical, (3) the scientific or positive. In the theological stage it seeks to account for the world by super-natural beings. In the metaphysical stage it seeks an explanation in abstract forces. In the scientific, or positive, stage it applies itself to the study of the relation of phenomena to each other.

Different sciences have passed through these stages at different rates. Astronomy reached the positive stage first, then terrestrial physics, then chemistry, then physiology, while sociology has not even yet reached it. To put social phenomena upon a positive basis is the main object of this work; its secondary object is to show that all branches of knowledge spring from the same trunk. An integration of the sciences on a positive basis should lead to the discovery of the laws which rule the intellect in the investigation of facts, should regenerate science and reorganize society. At present the theological, the metaphysical and the positive conflict, and cause intellectual confusion.

The first step to be taken in forming a positive philosophy is to classify the sciences. The first great division we notice in natural phenomena is the division into inorganic and organic phenomena. Under the inorganic we may include the sciences astronomy, physics, chemistry; and under the organic we include the sciences physiology and sociology. These five sciences, astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology and sociology, we may consider the five fundamental sciences.

This classification follows the order of the development of the sciences, and indicates their social relation and relative perfection. In order to reach effective knowledge, the sciences must be studied in the order named; sociology cannot be understood without knowledge of the anterior sciences.

Behind and before all these sciences, however, lies the great science of mathematics—the most powerful instrument the mind can employ in the investigation of natural law—and the science of mathematics must be divided into abstract mathematics or the calculus, and concrete mathematics embracing general geometry and rational mechanics. We have thus really six great sciences.

MATHEMATICS. Mathematics may be defined briefly as the indirect measurement of magnitudes and the determination of magnitudes by each other. It is the business of concrete mathematics to discover the *equations* of phenomena; it is the business of abstract mathematics to educe results from the equations. Thus concrete mathematics discovers by actual experiment the acceleration which takes place per second in a falling body, and abstract mathematics educes results from the equations so discovered, and obtains unknown quantities from known.

ASTRONOMY. Astronomy may be defined as the science by which we discover the laws of the geometrical and mechanical phenomena presented by heavenly bodies. To discover these laws we can use only our sense of sight and our reasoning power, and reasoning bears a greater proportion to observation here than in any other science. Sight alone would never teach us the figure of the earth or the path of a planet, and only by the measurement of angles and computation of times can we discover astronomical laws. The observation of these invariable laws frees man from servitude to the

theological and metaphysical conceptions of the universe.

PHYSICS. Physics may be defined briefly as the study of the laws which regulate the general properties of bodies regarded *en masse*, their molecules remaining unaltered and usually in a state of aggregation. In the observations of physics all the senses are employed, and mathematical analysis and experiment assist observation. In the phenomena of astronomy human intervention was impossible; in the phenomena of physics man begins to modify natural phenomena.

Physics includes the subdivisions statics, dynamics, thermology, acoustics, optics and electrology. Physics is still handicapped by metaphysical conceptions of the primary causes of phenomena.

CHEMISTRY. Chemistry may be briefly defined as the study of the laws of the phenomena of composition and decomposition, which result from the molecular and specific mutual action of different substances, natural or artificial. In the observations of chemistry the senses are still more employed, and experiment is of still more utility. Even in chemistry metaphysical conceptions linger.

PHYSIOLOGY. Physiology may be defined as the study of the laws of organic dynamics in relation to structure and environment. Placed in a given environment, a definite organism must always act in a definite way, and physiology investigates the reciprocal relations between organism, environment and function.

In physiology observation and experiment are of the greatest value, and apparatus of all kinds is used to assist both observation and experiment. Physiology is most closely connected with chemistry, since all the phenomena of life are associated with compositions and decompositions of a chemical character.

II—SOCIAL PHYSICS

To place social physics on a scientific basis is a task of great difficulty, since social theories are still perverted by theological and metaphysical doctrines. All I can hope to do is to point out general principles which may serve to correct the intellectual anarchy which is the cause of the moral and political anarchy of the present day. I propose to state first how the institution of a science of social physics bears upon the principal needs and grievances of society, so that men worthy of the name of statesmen may realize that such labours are of real utility.

So far, positive philosophy has worked timidly and tentatively, and has not been bold and broad and general enough to cope with intellectual anarchy in social questions; but it is necessary now that it play a more dominant part in life, and lead society out of the turmoil in which it has tossed for three centuries.

At present, society is distracted by two conflicting influences, which may be called the theological polity and the metaphysical polity.

The theological polity at one time exercised a beneficent influence on society; but for three centuries past its influence has been essentially retrograde, and has gradually, but radically, decayed. The causes of its decline are various; but the chief present-day antagonist to the theological polity is the scientific spirit, and this spirit can now never be repressed.

The metaphysical polity is progressive, but progressive mainly in a negative way. So far, it has made for progress; but it has made for progress chiefly by removing impediments to progress, by destroying the theological conceptions which retarded the development of human intelligence and human society. Though dangerous and revolutionary, it has been necessary; for much required to be demolished to permit permanent reconstruction.

The metaphysical polity was required to combat the theological; but now it has served its destructive purpose, and tends to become obstructive, for, having destroyed the old, it will not permit the new. Its chief dogma has always been liberty of conscience with the liberty of press and speech which that implies; but liberty of conscience really means little more than absence of intellectual regulation; and even as liberty of conscience is out of the question in astronomy and chemistry, so it is out of the question in social physics.

Liberty of conscience and inquiry can only be temporary and transitional, and must be followed by positive decision on the part of those qualified to decide. It cannot be held that every man is competent to form opinions in social and political questions; it cannot be maintained that intellects of weak capacity can judge obscure and complex questions, and that all opinions are equally valuable. All society is based on faith in the opinion of others and in reciprocal confidence.

The second dogma of the metaphysical polity is equality, and, like the other dogma, it must be considered the temporary expression of a temporary need. It is indeed a corollary of the dogma of liberty of conscience; for to assume liberty of conscience without equality of intelligence would be to stultify the assumption. Having achieved its purpose, it also became an obstacle in the path of progress. Equality sufficient to permit a man to use his faculties aright is allowed by all; but men cannot be made equal physically, and much less can they be made equal intellectually and morally.

The dogma of liberty of conscience and equality resulted naturally in a third dogma, the sovereignty of the people. This also was provisionally useful, in that it permitted a series of political experiments; but it is in essence revolutionary, condemning the superior to be ruled by the inferior.

A fourth dogma, the dogma of national independence, has also been serviceable in separating the nations in preparation for a new union.

The metaphysical polity fails utterly in constructive capacity. During the first French Revolution it successfully destroyed the old social system; but its attempts to reorganize society were retrogressive. Instead of catholicism it proposed polytheism, and in the name of virtue and simplicity it condemned industry and art. Even science was condemned as aristocracy of knowledge. Nor can these blunders be considered accidental; they were inherent in the polity. It is evident that a polity that admits the need for a theological

foundation, and yet destroys the foundations of theology must end in intellectual anarchy.

Satisfied with neither the theological nor the metaphysical polities, society has wavered between them, and the one tendency has served chiefly to counteract the other. Out of these oscillations a third school of political opinion, which we may call the 'stationary school,' has arisen.

This school would fix society in a contradictory position between retrogression and progress, such as is seen in the parliamentary monarchy of England. This is a last phase of the metaphysical polity, and is only a kind of *placebo*.

The result of all this is to produce a most unfortunate position. The theological polity would revert to old, worn-out principles; the metaphysical polity has no definite principles at all; and the stationary school merely offers temporary compromises. Everywhere there is intellectual anarchy, and in Protestant countries the disorder is increased by sectarian discord. So complex are all social questions that few are able to see them steadily and see them whole, and where individual opinion is unhampered, individual prejudice and individual ignorance must be rampant.

Intellectual anarchy and unsettled convictions, moreover, tend to political corruption. If there are no convictions and no principles to which to appeal, appeal must be made to self-interest or to fear.

A growing tendency to take a short-sighted and material view of political questions is also a disturbing sign of the times. This is due to the fact that when, three centuries ago, spiritual power was abolished, all social questions were given over to men occupied with practical affairs and influenced chiefly by material considerations.

Material views of political questions not only impede progress, but are also dangerous to order, for the view that disorders have a material cause leads to constant interference with institutions and with property. Granted there are abuses in connexion both with property and institutions, what is required is not material changes but general moral and intellectual reform.

An inadequate and material view of social physics naturally favours mediocrity, attracts political charlatans, while the most eminent minds devote their attention to science.

The theological and metaphysical philosophies having failed, what remains? Nothing remains but the positive philosophy, which is the only agent able to reorganize society. The positive philosophy will regard social phenomena as it regards other phenomena, and will apply to the renovation of society the same scientific spirit found effective in other departments of human knowledge. It will bring to politics the conception of natural laws, and deal with delicate social questions on impartial scientific principles. It will show that certain wrongs are inevitable, and others curable; and that it is as foolish to try to cure the incurable in social as in biological and chemical matters. A spirit of this kind will encourage reform and yet obviate vain attempts to redress necessary evils.

It will thus make for intellectual order. It will likewise make for progress and for true liberty by substituting genuine convictions founded on scientific principles for constitutional artifices and the laws of arbitrary wills; it will reconcile the antagonism of class interests by moral and scientific considerations. Revolutionary outbursts there still will be, but they will merely clear the ground for positive reconstruction on a moral and intellectual basis.

III—SOCIAL STATICS

THERE can be no doubt that society originated in social instincts, and was not merely the result of utilitarian considerations. Indeed, the social state could manifest its ability only when well developed, and in the early ages of humanity the advantages to the individual of association would not be obvious.

What, then, are the human instincts and requirements which give society its fundamental characters? In the first place it must be noted that in man the intellectual is subordinate to the affective. In most men the intellectual faculties are easily fatigued, and require a strong and constant stimulus to keep them at work. In the majority of cases the stimulus is derived from the needs of organic life; but in more highly endowed individuals the incitement may proceed from higher affective impulses. This subordination of the intellectual to the affective faculties is beneficent in that it gives a permanent end and aim to the intellectual activity.

In the second place it must be noted that the personal affections are stronger than the social affections, and that personal affections give aim and direction to our social actions. This is necessary, for all ideas of public good must be inferred from ideas of private advantage, and if it were possible to repress our personal affections, our social affections, deprived of necessary inspiration and direction, would become vague and ineffective. In the precept that bids us love our neighbours as ourselves the personal instinct is suggested as the pattern for the social. The only thing to be regretted is that the personal affections are apt to over-ride, instead of stimulating, the social affections.

Increase of intelligence must mean greater capacity for social affection, because of the discipline it imposes on the personal affections; and for the same reason increase of the social instinct is favourable to intelligence. To strengthen this reciprocal action of the intellect and the social affections is the first task of universal morals. And the double opposition between man's moral and material need of intellectual toil and his dislike of it, and again between man's moral and material need of the social affections and the subjection of these to his personal instincts, discloses the scientific germ of the struggle which we shall have to review between the conservative and the reforming spirit; the first of which is animated by purely personal instincts, and the other by the spontaneous combination of intellectual activity with the various social instincts.

Society, however, cannot be regarded as composed of individuals. The true social unit is the *family*; it is essentially on the plan of the family that society is constructed. In a family the social and the personal instincts are blended

and reconciled; in a family, too, the principle of subordination and mutual co-operation is exemplified. The domestic is the basis of all social life. The modern tendency, therefore, to attack the institution of the family is an alarming symptom of social disorganization.

The sociological basis of the family depends on subordination of sexes and of ages.

MARRIAGE at once satisfies, disciplines and harmonises the strongest and most disorderly instinct of our animal nature; and though it may be attacked by the revolutionary spirit because of its theological implications, yet the institution is based on true principles and must survive. No doubt marriage has been modified, but to modify is not to overthrow, and its fundamental principle remains intact.

The fundamental principle of the institution of marriage is the natural subordination of the woman—a principle which has reappeared under all forms of marriage. Biology teaches that radical differences, physical and moral, distinguish the sexes, and sociology will prove that the much-advertised equality of sexes is a fiction, and that equality of the sexes would be incompatible with all social existence. Each sex has special functions it must perform in the family, and the necessary subordination of one sex is in no wise injurious, since the happiness of every being depends on the wise development of its proper nature. Our social system depends on intellectual activity under affective stimulus, and in power of mental labour the woman is incontestably inferior to the man, either because her mental powers are weaker, or because her lively moral and physical sensibility is unfavourable to mental concentration.

Besides the bond of marriage, which holds together society, there is the bond between parents and children. Here again we find the principle of subordination in force, and even as we find wild revolutionaries who challenge the principle of subordination in women, so there are some who would challenge the same principle in the case of children. Fortunately, popular good sense and the primary instincts resist such absurdities.

The spontaneous subordination in the human family is the best model for society. On the one hand, we see obedience and due subordination allied to gratitude, and unassociated with shame; and, on the other hand, we see absolute authority combined with affection and geniality. There are those who would take children from their parents' care, and hand them over to society, and there are those who would prevent the transmission of property from parents to children; but such extravagances need not be examined here.

Coming now to the consideration of society as constructed out of the family units, we see unity of aim associated with diversity of functions. It is a marvellous spectacle to see how in a society the individuals pursuing each their own end yet unconsciously co-operate; and this co-operation is the mainspring of society. In the family, co-operation is much less marked; for the family is founded chiefly on affection, and in affection finds its justification, quite apart from co-operation towards any end. In society the instinct of co-operation preponderates and the instinct of affection plays only a secondary part. There are exceptional men in whom the affective side of the social instinct is dominant; but such men in most cases give their affection to the race at large simply from lack of domestic sympathy.

THE principle of co-operation, spontaneous or concerted, is the basis of society, and the object of society must ever be to find the right place for its individual members in its great co-operative scheme. There is, however, a danger of exaggerated specialism; it concentrates the attention of individuals on small parts of the social machine, and thus narrows their sense of the social community, and produces an indifference to the larger interests of humanity. It is lamentable to find an artisan spending his life making pin-heads, and it is equally lamentable to find a man with mind employing his mind only in the solution of equations.

To guard against such social and intellectual disintegration must be the duty of government. It must foster the feeling of interconnexion between individuals; and such a bond of feeling must be intellectual and moral rather than material, and will always imply subordination. The social instinct of man spontaneously produces government, and there is a much stronger instinct of obedience in man than is commonly supposed. Who has not felt it good to resign the responsibility of conduct to wise and trustworthy guidance? Even in revolutionary times the people feel the need of preponderant authority, and political subordination is as inevitable as it is indispensable.

IV—SOCIAL DYNAMICS

HUMAN progress consists essentially in the evolution of the moral and intellectual qualities proper to man. Various circumstances facilitate and retard this progress. Most of the occupations of civilization which deal with material things relieve man from material cares and discomforts, and permit him to use his higher faculties.

Death, too, may be considered a promoter of human progress. Youth is essentially progressive, age essentially conservative and opposed to progress, and death it is that prevents old age from too seriously impeding the progress of the world. If life were ten times as long progress would be greatly retarded.

On the other hand, death interferes with continuity of work, and by interrupting a man's work often delays its fruition. It is probable that if life were twice or thrice as long progress would be more rapid.

Human progress is directed by the reason, and the history of the progress of society is largely the history of the human mind in its progress through its three stages—the theological, metaphysical and positive. The necessity of these stages can be shown.

At first man knows nothing but himself, and it was inevitable that he should explain things as produced by a being like himself. The theological philosophy gave a basis for observation by its hypotheses that phenomena were products of actions like human acts, and that all bodies had life like human life, and that there was an invisible world with invisible agents.

These hypotheses were not only intellectually necessary; they were also morally necessary, for they gave man confidence to act, and hope that he could modify anything unsatisfactory in the universe by appeals to its maker. Not only did the theological philosophy sustain man's courage, and kindle his hope and increase his sense of power, but it gave an intellectual unanimity of great social and political value; and, producing a special speculative class, made the first effective division between things of matter and things of mind.

Still, the theological philosophy was obviously only temporary. Indeed, at all times there had been glimmerings of positive belief, for at all times the simplest phenomena had been considered subject to natural laws, and all had been compelled to act in everyday affairs on the assumption of the invariability of natural law. The positive philosophy, therefore, was inevitable from the first.

Between the theological and positive philosophy naturally and necessarily has intervened the metaphysical, which has substituted entities for a deity. This philosophy has never had the social power or the consistency of the theological philosophy; its entities have been mere abstractions. It has and has had such political power simply because so elusive.

All the three philosophies I have mentioned may exist in the same mind at the same time with regard to various sciences. The same mind may have a theological conception of one science, a metaphysical of another and a positive of yet another; but the trend is towards the positive.

Material progress has gone through similar stages. The primitive tendency of mankind was to a military life; the present tendency is towards industrial life. Meantime, we are in the transitional stage between the two, for we have defensive instead of offensive military organization, which is becoming more and more subordinate to industrial production.

The military stage corresponded with the theological stage, belonged to the same *règime* had common antipathies and sympathies as well as general interests, and could not have worked without the aid of theological convictions to give blind confidence in military superiors. The industrial stage corresponds with the positive stage; it is akin in spirit, in origin and in destination. The transitional stage, again, corresponds with the metaphysical stage. Only on these three dualisms which I have established can a sound historical philosophy be based.

The Philosophy of Religion

G. W. F. HEGEL

DURING the thirteen years that Hegel held the chair of philosophy at Berlin he devoted the whole of his intellectual energy to his lectures. The rugged and uneven construction of much of his published work is to be explained by the fact that many of his books are editorial compilations from the notes of his students. This applies particularly to his Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of History, and History of Philosophy. These defects in form detract somewhat from the value of the lectures as scientific treatises, but they have some compensating advantages, for, as Dr. Edward Caird remarked, 'their very artlessness gives them something of the same stimulating and suggestive power which is attained by the consummate art of the Platonic dialogues.' The Philosophy of Religion was published at Berlin in 1832

I—THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION

THE object of religion is the same as that of philosophy; it is the eternal verity itself in its objective existence; it is God. Nothing but God and the unfolding of God. Philosophy is not the wisdom of the world, but the knowledge of things which are not of this world. It is not the knowledge of external mass, of empirical life and existence, but of the eternal, of the nature of God, and of all which flows from His nature. For this nature ought to manifest and develop itself. Consequently, philosophy in unfolding religion merely unfolds itself, and in unfolding itself it unfolds religion.

In so far as philosophy is occupied with the eternal truth, the truth which is in and for itself; in so far as it is occupied with this as thinking spirit, rather than in an arbitrary fashion and in view of a particular interest, philosophy has the same sphere of activity as has religion. And if the religious consciousness aspires to abolish all that is peculiar to itself and to be absorbed in its object, the philosophic spirit likewise plunges with the same energy into its object and renounces all particularity.

Religion and philosophy are thus at one in having one and the same object. Philosophy, in fact, also is the adoration of God, it is religion; for, seeing that God is its object, it involves the same renunciation of every opinion and every thought that is arbitrary and subjective. Philosophy is, in consequence, identical with religion. Only it is religion in a peculiar manner, and this it is which distinguishes it from religion commonly so called. So philosophy and religion are both religion, and that which distinguishes one from the other is no more than the characteristic mode in which respectively they consider their object, God.

Here is the difficulty of understanding how philosophy can make but one with religion, a difficulty which has even been mistaken for impossibility. Thence also arise the fears which philosophy inspires in theology and the hostile attitudes which they assume towards each other. What brings about this attitude is, on the side of theology, that for her philosophy does nothing but corrupt, pull down and profane the content of religion, and that she understands God in a totally different manner from that after which religion understands Him.



Elliott & Fry

FREDERICK WILLIAM HENRY MYERS was born February 6, 1843, at Keswick, and educated at Cheltenham College and at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he had a distinguished academic career and in 1865 was appointed classical lecturer. In 1872 he became an inspector of schools and also engaged in literature, publishing some admirable verse and essays. Becoming interested in spiritualistic phenomena he founded the Society for Psychical Research in 1882 in association with Henry Sidgwick, Richard Hodgson, Edmund Gurney and F. Podmore. Myers died at Rome, January 17, 1901. Before his death he agreed to make every effort to communicate with his friends of the Psychical Research Society from beyond the grave, and it is claimed that messages have been received.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE was born at Röcken, Germany, October 15, 1844, and was educated at Schulpforta, Bonn and Leipzig. One of the most outstanding figures in modern Europe, he was also a personality ever shadowed by tragedy. Scholarship of no common order procured him a professorship at Basel when no more than twenty-four, and long and painful illness compelled him to relinquish it ten years after. During the decade 1879-1889 the more important of his works appeared, but it was not till 1890, when insanity, so long threatening, had definitely closed his career, that the essay of Georg Brandes brought the books and their author into the light. Nietzsche lingered twelve years after his madness was certified, dying in 1900 at the age of 56.



MAX SIMON NORDAU was born at Budapest, July 29, 1849. He studied medicine in Budapest, taking his doctor's degree in 1873, after which he spent some six years in travelling all over Europe. On his return he practised for a short time in Budapest, and in 1880 settled in Paris where in addition to his professional work he took up the study of art, literature and sociology, besides becoming an industrious writer, producing novels, dramas and works of travel, criticism and philosophy. He also took a prominent part in the Zionist movement. Nordau died January 22, 1923.



GALILEO GALILEI, famous as an astronomer and as an experimental physicist, was born at Pisa, February 18, 1564. His talents were most multifarious and remarkable; but his mathematical and mechanical genius was dominant from the first. As a child he constructed toys, and as a man he discovered the isochronicity of the pendulum and invented a hydrostatic balance, later establishing the Copernican doctrine of planet movements. Summoned to Rome on the publication of his Dialogue of the Two Greatest Systems of the World he was obliged to recant this doctrine. He died January 8, 1642.



GEORGES LOUIS LECLERC, COMTE DE BUFFON, was born at Montbard, Côte-d'Or, Burgundy, September 7, 1707. He read law at the Jesuit College, Dijon, and after travelling in Italy and England devoted himself to the study of science. In 1739 he was appointed director of the King's Garden and Museum in Paris, and spent the rest of his life in the production of his monumental work on Natural History. He was elected to the French Academy in 1752, and was also a fellow of the Royal Society of London and member of nearly all the learned societies in Europe. He died in Paris, April 16, 1788.



WILLIAM HARVEY, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, was born at Folkestone, of a German stock, April 1, 1578. He was first educated at King's School, Canterbury, and, after graduating from Caius College, Cambridge, studied at Padua, where he had the famous anatomist, Fabricius of Aquapendente, for his master. In 1615 he was elected Lumleian lecturer at the College of Physicians, and three years later became physician extraordinary to James I, receiving the same honour from Charles I in 1632. Apart from his treatise on the heart his Exercitationes de Generatione Animalium was his only other work of prime importance. He died in London, June 13, 1657.



SIR ISAAC NEWTON (1642-1727) is acknowledged to rank among the greatest geniuses of all time. Before he passed the age of twenty-five he had propounded the binomial theorem, found the method of fluxions, originated his theory of gravitation and begun his optical discoveries. The evolution of the calculus was one of the great intellectual achievements of his day. He invented a reflecting telescope, microscope, and sextant, and from these investigations proceeded to a theory of physical optics. His work on mechanics and gravitation profoundly affected the ideas of man about the universe. This portrait is from the painting by John Vanderbank in the National Portrait Gallery.

It is the same opposition which long ago among the Greeks caused a free and democratic people like the Athenians to burn books and to condemn Socrates. In our own day, however, this opposition is considered a thing which it is natural to admit—more natural indeed than the other opinion concerning the unity of religion and philosophy.

Diverse religions offer us, it is true, only too often the most bizarre and monstrous representations of the divine essence. But we must not confine ourselves to a superficial consideration and consequent rejection of these representations and the religious practices which follow upon them as being engendered by superstition, by error, or by imposture, or even by a simple piety, and so neglect their essential value. There is need to discover in these representations and in these practices their relation with truth.

II—GOD THE UNIVERSAL

For us, who have a religion, God is a familiar being, a substantial truth existing in our subjective consciousness. But, scientifically considered, God is a general and abstract term. The philosophy of religion it is which develops and grasps the divine nature and which teaches us what God is. God is a familiar idea, but an idea which has still to be scientifically developed.

The result of philosophic examination is that God is the absolute truth, the universal in and for itself, embracing all things and in which all things subsist. And in regard to this assertion, we may appeal in the first place to the religious consciousness, and to its conviction that God is the absolute truth whence all things proceed, whither they all return, upon which all things depend and in respect of which nothing can possess a true and absolute independence.

The heart may very well be full of this representation of God, but science is not built up of what is in the heart. The object of science is that which has arisen to the level of consciousness, and of thinking consciousness; in other words, which has attained the form of thought.

In so much as He is the universal, God is, for us, in relation to development, Being enclosed in itself, Being at unity with itself. When we say God is Being enclosed in itself, we enunciate a proposition which is bound to a development which we await. But this envelopment of God in Himself which we have called His universality we must not conceive, relatively to God Himself and His content, as an abstract universality, outside of which, and as opposed to which, the particular has an independent existence.

So we must consider this universal as an absolutely concrete universal. This sense of fullness is the sense in which God is one, and there is but one God—that is to say, God is not one merely by contrast with other gods, but because it is He that is the One, that is, God.

The things which are, the developments of the worlds of nature and of mind, show a multiplicity of forms and an infinite variety of existences. But whatever may be their difference of degree, of force, of content, these things have no true independence; their being is consequent and, so to speak, contingent. When we predicate being of particular things, it is not of absolute Being that we speak—Being of and from itself; that is, God—but a borrowed being, a semblance of being.

God is His universality—that is, this universal Being which has no limit, no bounds, no particularity—is a Being which subsists absolutely, and which subsists alone; all else which subsists has its root in this unity, and by this alone subsists. In thus representing to ourselves this first content we may say that God is absolute substance, the only veritable reality. For not everything which has a reality has a reality of its own, or subsists by itself. God is the only absolute reality, and thereby the absolute substance.

If we stop at this abstract thought we have Spinozism, for in Spinozism subjectivity is not yet differentiated from substantiality, from substance as such. But in the pre-supposition just made there is also this thought—God is spirit, absolute and eternal; spirit which comes not forth from itself in differentiation. This ideality, this subjectivity of spirit, which is transparency, ideality excluding all particular determination, is precisely the universal, pure relation to self, Being which remains absolutely within itself.

If we halt at substance, we fail to grasp this Universal under its concrete form. In its concrete determination spirit always preserves its unity, this unity of its reality which we call substance. But one should add that this substantiality, the unity of the absolute reality with itself, is but the foundation, but a moment in the determination of God as spirit. Hence, principally, arises the reproach which is directed against philosophy—to wit, that philosophy, to be consistent with itself, is necessarily Spinozism, and consequently atheism and fatalism. But at the beginning we have not yet determinations distinguished one from another as aye and nay. We have the one but not the other.

Consequently, what we have here is, to start with, content under the form of substance. Even when we say, 'God,' 'spirit,' we have only words, indeterminate representations. The essential point is to know what has been produced in the consciousness. And that is, first, the simple, the abstract. Here, in this first simple determination, we have God only under the form of universality. Only we do not halt at this moment.

Nevertheless, this content remains the foundation of all further developments, for in these developments God comes not forth from His unity. When God creates the world—to use the expression of every day—there comes not into existence an evil, a contrary, existing in itself independently of God.

III—GOD EXISTS FOR THOUGHT

This Beginning is an object for us or a content in us. We possess this object. Immediately the question arises, Who are we? We, I, spirit—here also is a complex being, a multiplied being. I have perceptions; I see, I hear, etc. Seeing, hearing; all this is I. Consequently, the precise sense of this question is, Which among these determinations is it in

accordance with which this content exists for our minds? Idea, will, imagination, feeling—which is the seat, the proper domain of this content, of this object?

If we accept the common answers to this question, God will abide in us as the object of faith, of feeling, of representation, of knowledge.

We shall have to examine more closely later on in a special fashion with respect to this point, these forms, faculties, aspects of ourselves. In this place we shall not seek a reply to this question; nor shall we say, basing our answer on experience and observation, that God is in our feeling, etc. But, to begin with, we will confine ourselves to what we have actually before us, to this One, concrete Being.

If we take this One, and ask for what power, for what activity of our mind does this One, this absolutely universal Being, exist, we cannot but name the one activity of mind which corresponds to it as constituting its proper natural domain. This activity, which corresponds to the universal, is thought.

Thought is the field in which this content moves; it is the energising of the universal, or the universal in the reality of its activity. Or, if we say that thought embraces the universal, that for which the universal is will still be thought.

This universal which can be produced by thought, and which is for thought, may be a quite abstract universal. In this sense it is the unlimited, the infinite, the being without bounds, without particular determination. This universal, negative to begin with, has its seat not elsewhere than in thought.

To think of God is to rise above the things of sense, exterior and individual, above simple feeling into the region of pure being; being at unity with itself—that is to say, into the pure region of the universal. And this region is thought.

Such is the substratum for this content considered on the subjective side. Here the content is that Being in which is no difference, no schism; Being which abides in itself, the universal; and thought is the form for which this universal is.

Thus we have a difference between thought and the universal which we have called God. It is a difference which in the first place belongs only to our reflection, and is by no means to be found in the content on its own account. There is the result to which philosophy comes—a result already comprised in religion as under the form of faith—to wit, that God is the sole veritable reality, the Being without which no other reality would exist.

In the unity of this reality, in this cloudless shining, the reality and the distinction which we call thinking-being have as yet no place.

What we have before us is this absolute unity. This content we cannot yet call religion, because to religion belongs subjective spirit, consciousness. Thought is the seat of this universal, but this seat is absorbed in this being which is one, eternal, in and for itself.

This universal constitutes the beginning and the point of departure, but only as unity which so abides. It is not a mere substratum whence differences are born; rather, all differences are included in this universal. No more is it an abstract and inert universal, but the absolute principle of all activity, the matrix, the infinite source whence all things proceed, whither all things return, and in which they are eternally preserved.

Thus the universal is never separated from this ethereal element, from this unity with itself, this concentration within itself.

IV—WHAT IS EVIL?

As the universal, God could not find Himself faced by a contrary whereof the reality should pretend to rise above the phantasmal level. For this pure unity and this perfect transparency matter is nothing impenetrable, and spirit, the ego, is not so independent as to possess a true, individual substantiality.

There has been a tendency to label this idea pantheism. It would be more exact to call it the conception of substantiality. God is first determined as substance only. The absolute subject, spirit, is also substance; but it is determined rather as subject. This is the difference generally ignored by those who assert that speculative philosophy is pantheism. As usual, they miss the essential point and disparage philosophy by falsifying it.

Pantheism is commonly taken to mean that God is all things—the whole, the universe, the collection of all existences, of things finite and infinitely diverse. From which notion the charge is brought against philosophy that it teaches that all things are God; that is to say, that God is, not the universal which is in and for itself, but the infinite multiplicity of individual things in their empirical and immediate existence.

If you say God is all that is here, this paper, etc., you have indeed committed yourself to the pantheism with which philosophy is reproached; that is, the whole is understood as equivalent to all individual things. But there is also the genus, which is equally the universal, yet is wholly different from this totality in which the universal is but the collection of individual things, and the basis, the content, is constituted by these things themselves. To say that there has ever been a religion which has taught this pantheism is to say what is absolutely untrue. It has never entered any man's mind that everything is God; that is to say, that God is things in their individual and contingent existence. Far less has philosophy ever taught this doctrine.

Spinozism itself, as such, as well as Oriental pantheism, contains this doctrine: that the divine in all things is no more than that which is universal in their content, their essence; and in such sense that this essence is conceived of as a determinate essence.

When Brahma says, 'In the metal I am the brightness of its shining; among the rivers I am the Ganges; I am the life of all that lives,' he thereby suppresses the individual. He says not, 'I am the metal, the rivers, the individual things of various kinds as such, nor in the fashion of their immediate existence.'

Here, at this stage, what is expressed is no longer pantheism; but rather that of the essence in individual things.

In the living being are time and space. But

in this individual being it is only the changeless element that is made to stand out. 'The life of being that lives' is in this latter sphere of life the unlimited, the universal. But if it be said 'God is all things,' here we understand individuality with all its limitations, its finity, its passing existence. This notion of pantheism arises out of the conception of unity, not as spiritual unity, but abstract unity; and then, when the idea takes its religious form, where only the substance, the One, is possessed of true reality, there is a tendency to forget that it is precisely in presence of this unity that individual and finite things are effaced, and to continue to place these in a material fashion side by side with this unity. They will not admit the teaching of the Eleatics, who, when they say 'There is only One,' add expressly that non-entity is not. All that is finite would be limitation, a negation of the One, but non-entity, the boundary, term, limit, and that which is limited, exist not at all.

Spinozism has been accused of atheism. But Spinozism does not teach that God is the world, that He is *all things*. Things have indeed a phenomenal existence—that is, an existence as appearances. We speak of our existence, and our life is indeed comprised in this existence, but to speak philosophically the world has no reality, it has no existence. Individual things are finite things to which no reality can be attributed; it may be said of them that they have no existence.

Spinozism—this is the accusation directed against it—involves by way of consequence that, if all things make but one, good and evil make but one; there is no difference between them; and thereby all religion is destroyed. In themselves, it is said there is no difference between good and evil; consequently it is a matter of indifference whether one be righteous or wicked.

It may be granted that in themselves—that is, in God, who is the sole veritable reality—the difference between good and evil disappears. In God is no evil. But the difference between good and evil can exist only on condition that God is the evil. But it cannot be allowed that evil is an affirmative thing, and that this affirmation is in God. God is good, and nothing else than good; the distinction between good and evil is not present in this unity, in this substance, and comes into existence only with differentiation.

God is unity abiding absolutely in itself. In the substance there is no differentiation. The distinction of good and evil begins with the distinction of God from the world, and particularly from man. It is the fundamental principle of Spinozism with regard to this distinction of God and the world that man must have no other end than God. The love of God, therefore, it is that Spinozism marks out for man as the law to be followed in order to bring about the healing of this breach.

And it is the loftiest morality that teaches that evil has no existence and that man is not bound to permit the substantial existence of this distinction, this negation. Yet it is possible for him to desire to maintain the difference and even to push it to the point of sheer opposition to God. In this case man is evil. But he may annul this distinction and place his true existence in God alone and in his aspiration towards Him; in this case he is good.

In Spinozism there is indeed the difference between good and evil, opposition between God and man; but side by side with it we have also the principle that evil is to be deemed a non-entity. In God as God, in God as substance, there is no distinction. It is for man that the distinction exists, as also for him exists the distinction of good and evil.

V—THE DETERMINATION OF UNITY

The superficial method of appraising philosophy is exemplified also in those who assert that it is a 'system of identity.' It is perfectly true that substance is this unity at one with itself, but spirit no less is this self-identity. Ultimately, all is identity, unity with itself. But when they speak of the philosophy of identity they have in view abstract identity or unity in general; and they neglect the essential point, to wit, the determination of this unity in itself; in other words, they omit to consider whether this unity is determined as substance or as spirit. Philosophy from beginning to end is nothing else than the study of determinations of unity.

In the sphere of the Notion many unities are comprised. The combination of water and earth is a unity, but this unity is mixture. If we bring together a base and an acid, we have as the result a crystal; also water; but water which cannot be discerned and which gives no trace of humidity. Here the unity of the water and of this matter is a unity different from the mixture of water and earth. The essential point is the difference of these determinations. The unity of God is always unity, but what is of primary importance is to know the modes and forms of the determination of this unity.

Manifestation, development, determination do not go on to infinity, nor yet do they stop accidentally. But in the course of its true development the Notion completes its course by a return upon itself, whereby it has attained the reality adequate to it. So it is that the manifestation is infinite in nature, that the content is adequate to the Notion of spirit, and that the phenomenal world exists, like spirit, in and for itself.

In religion, the Notion of religion has become its own object. Spirit which is in and for itself has now no longer in its development individual forms and determinations, it knows itself no longer as spirit in such determinability or such a limited moment; but it has triumphed over these limitations and this finiteness, and is for itself that which also it is in itself. This cognisance in which spirit is for itself what it is in itself constitutes the in-and-for of spirit which is in possession of knowledge, the perfect and absolute religion, in which is revealed what spirit is, what God is. That is the Christian religion.

Sartor Resartus

THOMAS CARLYLE

WHILE, during 1833–4, Sartor Resartus was appearing in Fraser's Magazine, the publisher declared that it was meeting with unqualified disapproval. Later generations have more justly gauged its worth, and it is now the most popular of Carlyle's works. It is largely autobiographical, and was begun just after the author's marriage to Jane Baillie Welsh, while the two great spirits were fighting poverty at Craigenputtock. There is much here that proves why Carlyle became one of the most influential writers of his century.

I—THE PHILOSOPHY OF CLOTHES

CONSIDERING our present advanced state of culture, and how the torch of science has now been brandished and borne about, with more or less effect, for five thousand years and upwards, it is surprising that hitherto little or nothing of a fundamental character, whether in the way of philosophy or history, has been written on the subject of clothes. Every other tissue has been dissected, but the vestural tissue of woollen or other cloth, which man's soul wears as its outmost wrappage, has been overlooked. All speculation has tacitly figured man as a clothed animal, whereas he is by nature a naked animal and only in certain circumstances, by purpose and device, masks himself in clothes.

But here, as in so many other cases, learned, indefatigable, deep-thinking Germany comes to our aid. The editor of these sheets has lately received a new book from Professor Teufelsdröckh, of Weissnichtwo, treating expressly of Clothes, their Origin and Influence (1831). This extensive volume, a very sea of thought, discloses to us not only a new branch of philosophy, but also the strange personal character of Professor Teufelsdröckh.

When we knew him at Weissnichtwo, Professor Teufelsdröckh lived a still and self-contained life, devoted to the higher philosophies and to a certain speculative radicalism. The last words that he spoke in our hearing were to propose a toast in the coffee-house—'The cause of the poor, in heaven's name and the devil's.' But we looked for nothing moral from him, still less anything didactico-religious.

Brave Teufelsdröckh, who could tell what lurked in thee? In thine eyes, deep under thy shaggy brows, and looking out so still and dreamy, have we not noticed gleams of an ethereal or else a diabolic fire? Our friend's title was that of Professor of Things in General, but he never delivered any course. We used to sit with him in his attic, overlooking the town; he would contemplate that wasp-nest or bee-hive spread out below him, and utter the strangest thoughts 'That living flood, pouring through these streets, is coming from eternity, going onward to eternity. These are apparitions. What else?' Thus he lived and meditated, with Heuschrecke for his Boswell.

'As Montesquieu wrote a Spirit of Laws, observes our professor, 'so could I write a Spirit of Clothes, for neither in tailoring nor in legislating does man proceed by mere accident, but the hand is ever guided by the mysterious operations of the mind.' And so he deals with Paradise and fig-leaves, and proceeds to view the costumes of all mankind, in all countries, in all times.

The first purpose of clothes, he imagines, was not warmth or decency, but ornament.

'Yet what have they not become? Increased security and pleasurable heat soon followed; divine shame or modesty, as yet a stranger to the anthropophagous bosom, arose there mysteriously under clothes, a mystic shrine for the holy in man. Clothes gave us individuality, distinctions, social polity; clothes have made men of us; they are threatening to make clothes-screens of us.'

Teufelsdröckh dwells chiefly on the seams, tatters and unsightly wrong-side of clothes, but he has also a superlative transcendentalism. To him, man is a soul, a spirit and divine apparition, whose flesh and senses are but a garment He deals much in the feeling of wonder, insisting that wonder is the only reasonable temper for the denizen of our planet. 'Wonder,' he says, 'is the basis of worship,' and that progress of science, which is to destroy wonder and substitute mensuration and numeration, finds small favour with him. 'Clothes, despicable as we think them, are unspeakably significant.'

II—BIOGRAPHY OF DIOGENES TEUFELSDRÖCKH

So far as we can gather from the disordered papers which have been placed in our hands, the genesis of Diogenes Teufelsdröckh is obscure. We see nothing but an exodus out of invisibility into visibility. In the village of Entepfuhl we find a childless couple, verging on old age. Andreas Futteral, who has been a grenadier sergeant under Frederick the Great, is now cultivating a little orchard.

To him and Gretchen his wife there entered one evening a stranger of reverend aspect, who deposited a silk-covered basket, saying, "Good people, here is an invaluable loan; take all heed thereof; with high recompense, or else with heavy penalty, will it one day be required back."

Therein they found, as soon as he had departed, a little infant in the softest sleep. Our philosopher tells us that this story, told him in his twelfth year, produced a quite indelible impression. Who was his unknown father, whom he was never able to meet?

We receive glimpses of his childhood, school-days and university life, and then meet with him in that difficulty, common to young men, of 'getting under way.'

'Not what I have,' he says, 'but what I do, is my kingdom; and we should grope throughout our lives from one expectation and disappointment to another were we not saved by one thing—our hunger.'

He had thrown up his legal profession, and found himself without landmark of outward guidance; whereby his previous want of decided belief, or inward guidance, is frightfully aggravated. So he sets out over an unknown sea; but a certain Calypso Island at the very outset falsifies his whole reckoning.

'Nowhere,' he says, 'does Heaven so immediately reveal itself to the young man as in the young maiden.' The feeling of our young forlorn towards the queens of this earth was, and indeed is, altogether unspeakable. A visible divinity dwelt in them; to our young friend all women were holy, were heavenly. And if, on a soul so circumstanced, some actual air-maiden should cast kind eyes, saying thereby, "Thou, too, mayest love and be loved,"—good Heaven, what an all-consuming fire were probably kindled!

Such a fire of romance did actually burst forth in Herr Diogenes. We know not who 'Blumine' was, nor how they met. She was young, hazel-eyed, beautiful, high-born and of high spirit, but unhappily dependent and insolvent, living perhaps on the bounty of moneyed relatives.

To our friend the hours seemed moments; holy was he and happy; the words from those sweetest lips came over him like dew on thirsty grass. At parting, the Blumine's hand was in his; in the balmy twilight, with the kind stars above them, he spoke something of meeting again, which was not contradicted; he pressed gently those soft, small fingers, and it seemed as if they were not hastily, not angrily withdrawn.

Poor Teufelsdröckh, it is clear to demonstration thou art smit! Flame-clad, thou art scaling the upper Heaven, and verging towards insanity, for prize of a high-souled brunette, as if the earth held but one and not several of these!

One morning, he found his morning-star all dimmed and dusky-red; doomsday had dawned; they were to meet no more! Their lips were joined for the first time and the last, and Teufelsdröckh was made immortal by a kiss. And then—thick curtains of night rushed over his soul, and he fell, through the ruins as of a shivered universe, towards the abyss.

He quietly lifts his pilgrim-staff, and begins a perambulation and circumambulation of the terraqueous globe. We find him in Paris, in Vienna, in Tartary, in the Sahara, flying with hunger always parallel to him and a whole infernal chase in his rear. He traverses mountains and valleys with aimless speed, writing with footprints his sorrows, that his spirit may free herself, and he become a man. Vain truly is the hope of your swiftest runner to escape from his own shadow! We behold him, through these dim years, in a state of crisis, of transition; his aimless pilgrimings are but a mad fermentation, wherefrom, the fiercer it is, the clearer product will one day evolve itself.

Man has no other possession but hope; this world of his is emphatically the 'Place of Hope'; yet our professor, for the present, is quite shut out from hope. As he wanders wearisomely through this world he has now lost all tidings of another and higher.

'Doubt,' says he, 'had darkened into unbelief.' It is all a grim desert, this once fair world of his; and no pillar of cloud by day, and no pillar of fire by night, any longer guides the pilgrim.

'Invisible yet impenetrable walls, as of enchantment, divided me from all living; was there, in the wide world, any true bosom I could press trustfully to mine? O Heaven, no there was none! To me the universe was all void of life, of purpose, of volition, even of hostility; it was one huge, dead, immeasurable steam-engine, rolling on, in its dead indifference, to grind me limb from limb. O, the vast, gloomy, solitary Golgotha, and mill of death!

'Full of such humour, and perhaps the miserablest man in the whole French capital or suburbs, was I, one sultry dog-day, after much perambulation, toiling along the dirty little Rue Saint Thomas de l'Enfer, among civic rubbish enough, in a close atmosphere and over pavements hot as Nebuchadnezzar's furnace; whereby doubtless my spirits were a little cheered; when, all at once, there rose a thought in me, and I asked myself, "What *art* thou afraid of? Wherefore, like a coward, dost thou forever pip and whimper, and go cowering and trembling? Despicable biped! what is the sum-total of the worst that lies before thee? Death? Well, death; and say the pangs of Tophet, too, and all that the devil and man may, will, or can do against thee! Hast thou not a heart; canst thou not suffer whatever it be; and, as a child of freedom, though outcast, trample Tophet itself under thy feet, while it consumes thee? Let it come, then; I will meet it and defy it!" And, as I so thought, there rushed like a stream of fire over my whole soul; and I shook base fear away from me for ever. Ever from that time, the temper of my misery was changed; not fear or whining sorrow was it, but indignation and grim fire-eyed defiance.

'Thus had the *Everlasting No* pealed authoritatively through all the recesses of my being, of my *Me*; and then was it that my whole *Me* stood up, in native God-created majesty, and recorded its protest. The Everlasting No had said, "Behold, thou are fatherless, outcast, and the universe is mine, the devil's;" to which my whole *Me* now made answer, "I am not thine, but free, and for ever hate thee!"

'It is from this hour that I incline to date my spiritual new-birth, or Baphometic Fire-baptism; perhaps I directly thereupon began to be a man.'

Our wanderer's unrest was for a time but increased. 'Indignation and defiance are not the most peaceable inmates;' yet it was no longer a quite hopeless unrest. He looked away from his own sorrows, over the many-coloured world, and few periods of his life were richer in spiritual culture than this. He had reached the Centre of Indifference wherein he had accepted his own nothingness.

'I renounced utterly; I would hope no more and fear no more. To die or to live was to me alike insignificant. Here, then, as I lay in that Centre of Indifference, cast by benignant upper influence into a healing sleep, the heavy dreams rolled gradually away, and I awoke to a new heaven and a new earth. I saw that man can do without happiness and instead thereof find blessedness. Love not pleasure; love God. This is the *Everlasting Yea* wherein all contradiction is solved; wherein whoso walks and works, it is well with him. In this poor, miserable, hampered, despicable Actual, wherein thou even now standest, here or nowhere is thy Ideal; work it out therefrom; and working, believe, live, be free! Produce! produce! Work while it is called to-day.'

III—THE VOLUME ON CLOTHES

In so capricious a work as this of the professor's, our course cannot be straightforward, but only leap by leap, noting significant indications here and there.

Thus, 'perhaps the most remarkable incident in modern history,' he says, 'is George Fox's making to himself a suit of leather, when, desiring meditation and devout prayer to God, he took to the woods, chose the hollow of a tree for his lodging and wild berries for his food, and for clothes stitched himself one perennial suit of leather. Then was there in broad Europe one free man, and Fox was he!'

Under the title Church-Clothes, by which Teufelsdröckh signifies the forms, the vestures, under which men have at various periods embodied and represented for themselves the religious principle, he says, 'These are unspeakably the most important of all the vestures and garnitures of human existence. Church-clothes are first spun and woven by society; outward religion originates by society; society becomes possible by religion.'

Of 'symbols,' as means of concealment and yet of revelation, thus uniting in themselves the efficacies at once of speech and of silence, our professor writes: 'In the symbol proper there is ever, more or less distinctly and directly, some embodiment and revelation of the Infinite; the Infinite is made to blend itself with the finite; to stand visible and, as it were, attainable there. Of this sort are all true works of art; in them, if thou know a work of art from a daub of artifice, wilt thou discern eternity looking through time; the God-like rendered visible. But nobler than all in this kind are the lives of heroic God-inspired men, for what other work of art is so divine?'

As for Helotage, or that lot of the poor wherein no ray of heavenly nor even of earthly knowledge visits him, Teufelsdröckh says, 'That there should one man die ignorant who had capacity for knowledge, this I call a tragedy, were it to happen more than twenty times in the minute."

Of mankind in general the professor says: 'In vain thou deniest it, thou art my brother. Wondrous truly are the bonds that unite us one and all; whether by the soft binding of love, or the iron chaining of necessity, as we would like to choose it. Yes truly, if nature is one and a living indivisible whole, much more is mankind, the image that reflects and creates nature, without which nature were not. As palpable life streams in that wondrous individual mankind, among so many life-streams that are not palpable flow on those main currents of what we call opinion, as preserved in institutions, polities, churches, above all in books. Beautiful it is to understand and know that a thought did never yet die; that as thou, the originator thereof, hast gathered it and created it from the whole past, so thou wilt transmit it to the whole future. It is thus that the heroic past, the seeing eye of the first times, still feels and sees in us of the latest; that the wise man stands ever encompassed and spiritually embraced by a cloud of witnesses and brothers; and there is a living, literal communion of saints, wide as the world itself and as the history of the world.'

In another place, our professor meditates upon the awful procession of mankind. 'Like a God-created, fire-breathing spirit-host, we emerge from the inane; haste stormfully across the astonished earth; then plunge again into the inane. But whence?—O Heaven, whither? Sense knows not; Faith knows not: only that it is through mystery to mystery; from God to God.

> 'We are such stuff
> As dreams are made on, and our little life
> Is rounded with a sleep!'

A System of Logic

JOHN STUART MILL

THE year 1843 marked the publication of John Stuart Mill's A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. The book was an instant success. Comte's influence upon John Stuart Mill is betrayed in much of A System of Logic; Mill, however, takes pains to state that his theory of inductive reasoning was the result of his own independent investigation. The fact that John Stuart Mill's great work in the development of opinion had the deepest effect on the thinking world is unquestionable.

I—NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS

Logic is not the science of belief, but the science of proof, or evidence; and its province must be restricted to that portion of our knowledge which consists of inferences from truths previously known, whether those antecedent data be general propositions or particular observations and perceptions. It includes the subservient operations of naming, definition and classification.

A proposition may be defined as 'discourse in which something is affirmed or denied of something.' Every proposition consists of three parts—subject, predicate and copula. The predicate is the name denoting that which is affirmed or denied. The subject is the name denoting the person or thing of which something is affirmed or denied. The copula is the sign denoting that there is affirmation or denial.

Thus in the proposition 'the earth is round,' the predicate is the word 'round,' which denotes the quality affirmed or 'predicted'; the subject is the words 'the earth,' of which the quality is predicted; and the copula is the word 'is,' which is a mark of affirmation.

Every act of belief supposes two *nameable things*; every proposition consists of two names, and affirms or denies one of these names or the other.

Propositions may be affirmative, *e.g.* 'Caesar is dead,' or negative, *e.g.* 'Caesar is not dead.' They may be universal, *e.g.* '*All* men are mortal,' or particular, *e.g.* '*Some* men are mortal, or indefinite, *e.g.* '*Man* is mortal,' or singular, *e.g.* '*Caesar* is mortal.'

When we further examine the general nature of the assertions of propositions, we find that in every proposition is either existence, co-existence, sequence, causation, or resemblance. This five-fold division is an exhaustive classification of matters of fact; of all things that can be believed or tendered for belief, of all questions that can be propounded and all answers that can be returned to them.

A distinction must be drawn between what may be called real and verbal propositions, between such propositions as predicate of the subject more than its name connotes, and such propositions as merely express what is connoted by the significance of the subject name. Thus, 'Man is a rational being' is a verbal proposition; while 'Man is liable to malaria' is a real proposition.

A definition is a proposition declaratory of the meaning of a name, and the meaning of a name is its connotation. The meaning of the word may be expressed by replacing it by two or more words which together cover the same connotation, and a perfect definition declares all the facts which a name signifies. A proposition which defines a name by one of its accidents is 'a description,' not a definition.

II—RATIOCINATION

THERE are two main types of reasoning: Induction—inference of a proposition from propositions less general; and Ratiocination, or Syllogism—inference of a proposition from propositions equally general or more general. All valid ratiocination may be arranged in certain forms or figures known as syllogisms. A syllogism consists of three propositions, namely, the proposition to be proved, the 'conclusion,' and two other propositions which prove it—the premises. There must be three, and only three terms—the subject and predicate of the conclusion, called respectively the *minor* and *major* terms, and another called the 'middle term,' which must not occur in both premises.

If we analyse the process involved in every syllogism we find that it is based on two principles. The first, which is the principle of affirmative syllogisms, is that things which co-exist with the same thing, co-exist with one another. The second, which is the principle of negative syllogisms, is that a thing that co-exists with another thing with which a third thing does not co-exist, is not co-existent with that third thing.

We have now to inquire whether the syllogistic process, that of reasoning from general to particulars, is or is not a process of inference. When we say:

All men are mortal;
The king is a man;
Therefore, the king is mortal,

do the premises prove the conclusion, is there any real inference? It is evident that if the proposition '*all* men are mortal' be true the king must be included in the assertion, and therefore the syllogistic process is superfluous. Regarded correctly, the inference is made in the major premise. We know nothing about *all* men; but from the observation of *many* men we *infer* that *all* men are mortal.

General propositions, therefore, are merely registers of inferences made and short formulae for making more; and the conclusion is not an inference drawn *from* the formula but an inference drawn according to the formula. The major premise expresses individual cases. The minor premise is the place of comparison.

A, B, C, my father and my forefathers, and an indefinite number of other persons were mortal. The king resembles all these persons in the attributes connoted by the word man. Therefore, he further resembles them in the attribute mortality.

We thus obtain a universal type of the reasoning process. Certain individuals have a given attribute; an individual or individuals resemble the former in certain other attributes; therefore they resemble them also in the given attribute.

Where the resemblances necessary for inference are obvious to the senses, as in the king's resemblance to mortal persons, no difficult deductive process is necessary; but in many cases the required resemblances can only be indirectly established by a train of inductive and deductive processes.

Thus, suppose the syllogism to be 'All arsenic is poisonous.' In this case probably the minor premise would itself require to be established by a syllogistic process thus: Whatever substance gives certain chemical tests is arsenic; this substance gives these tests; therefore this substance is arsenic. Here, therefore, we have two syllogisms, and the major term of each is an induction. In the deductive sciences the processes of induction and deduction are numerous and complicated. It must be noted that even the most deductive sciences start from inductions, and that even the axioms of mathematics are inductions from the evidence of our senses.

III—INDUCTION

INDUCTION is the operation of the mind by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. The mere summing up of details in a single proposition is not induction, but colligation; induction always involves inference from the known to the unknown, from facts observed to facts unobserved.

The fundamental principle of induction is the proposition that the course of nature is uniform. The test of any induction is its consistency with inductions which have been found invariable in experience. If an induction conflicts with stronger inductions it must give way. It is the part of the logic of induction to find certain and universal inductions, and to use them as criteria.

At the root of the whole theory of induction is the notion of *physical* cause. To certain phenomena, certain phenomena always do, and, as we believe, always will, succeed. The

invariable antecedent is termed the 'cause,' the invariable consequent, the 'effect.' Upon the universality of this truth depends the possibility of reducing the inductive process to rules.

Invariable sequence, however, seldom subsists between a consequent and one single antecedent; the consequent usually follows from the concurrence of several antecedents. In such a case it is usual to style the cause that antecedent which came last into existence, or whose share in the matter is the most conspicuous, or whose share in the matter is most easily prevented or encouraged. But the real cause is the whole of the antecedents, the whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realized, the consequent invariably follows. Yet even invariable sequence is not synonymous with causation. The sequence, besides being invariable, must be *unconditional*.

We may define, therefore, the cause of a phenomenon to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, upon which it is invariably and *unconditionally* consequent. To distinguish conditionally uniform sequences from those unconditionally uniform is part of the problem of induction. All phenomena have unconditional antecedents, and these antecedents have prior antecedents, and so on, till we come to one primeval cause or a conjunction of several—the so-called permanent causes.

In the analysis of sequences into conditional and unconditional, the first operation is to ascertain and distinguish antecedents and consequents. The next step is to trace the connexion between antecedents and consequents, and this we can do only by a consideration of some of the antecedents or consequents under other conditions; we must either *find* an instance in nature suited to our purposes, or by an artifical arrangement of circumstances *make* one. When we make an artificial arrangement, we are said to *experiment;* and experimentation has great advantages over observation in that it often enables us to obtain innumerable combinations of circumstances which are not to be found in nature.

There are four experimental principles, or canons, on which causation may be established or partly proven:

First Canon. If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon. This is sometimes known as the method of agreement.

Second Canon. If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, and that one occurring only in the former, the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect or the cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon. This is sometimes known as the method of difference

Third Canon. If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ is the effect or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon.

Fourth Canon. Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.

To these four canons may be added a fifth, the method of concomitant variations. Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation. The difficulty of discovering causation is greatly increased by the fact that in many cases there are plurality of causes and intermixture of effects.

Certain effects may be produced by diverse causes; thus heat may be produced by the sun and by friction. How can such causes be found? Here, the first canon fails, for causes, A B C and A D E, both producing effect *a*, might have A, and only A, in common, and yet not A, but B and D might be the cause of *a*. Only by an exhaustive analysis of antecedents and a multiplication of instances can plural causes be disproved by the method of agreement. It is necessary in most cases, and best in all cases, to use the method of difference, which is at once decisive, for if two instances, B C and A B C, are found, and the latter gives rise to *a*, and the former does not, it is at once evident that A is the cause of *a*.

Many effects are compounded, are the product of several causes. Such a compound may be quite a new product incomparable with its causes, or it may be simply composed of the effect of its several causes.

A compound of the first kind is seen in the chemical products of chemical substances. Thus hydrogen and oxygen may produce a new product, a new bundle of effects known as water. How are the causes in such cases to be unravelled? In most cases such compound effects can be unravelled by experiment, for such compounds can usually be made to reproduce their causes. Thus, water under certain circumstances may be made to reproduce its causes, oxygen and hydrogen. Complex mental effects, however, do not lend themselves to this simple mode of analysis, and we can only discover their causes by the slow process of studying the simple feelings themselves, and ascertaining synthetically, by an examination of their possible combinations, what they are capable of eventually producing.

A compound of the second kind, produced by the interplay of the regular effects of multiple causes, is always difficult to analyse, since the effects become mixed and mingled, and oppose or augment each other. Here we must fall back on the deductive method, which is the chief method by which we acquire knowledge of the conditions and laws of occurrence of the most complex phenomena.

It consists of three operations: firstly, direct induction; secondly, ratiocination; and, thirdly verification. In the first place, the consequents or laws of individual causes must be ascertained; in the second place the effect of various combinations of such causes must be estimated, and causes selected adequate to produce in combination the compound effect in question; and, in the third place, the causes so selected must be shown to produce the effect, unless frustrated by other known causes.



JEAN BAPTISTE DE MONET, CHEVALIER DE LAMARCK, was born at Bazentin, in Picardy, August 1, 1744. On his father's death he enlisted at the age of sixteen, and served with distinction in the Seven Years' War. An accident stopped his military career and he took up the study of medicine and botany. In 1788 he received a botanical appointment at the Jardin du Roi, which he held until 1793, when, on the reorganization of the Natural History Museum of Paris, he was presented to the chair of invertebrate zoology. In his later years he suffered from impaired sight, which resulted in total blindness, but he continued his zoological work until his death, on December 18, 1829.

ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT was born in Berlin, September 14, 1769, and died May 6, 1859. In 1788 he came to know Forster, a companion of Captain Cook, and geological excursions with him were the occasion of his first publication, a book on the nature of basalt. His administration of mines in the principalities of Bayreuth and Anspach furnished materials for a treatise on fossil flora; and in 1827 he gave to the world his Voyage to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent, which embodies the results of investigations in South America. But his great interest was the accomplishment of the description of the universe, which he achieved in Cosmos (1845 to 1848).

GEORGES CUVIER was born at Montbéliard, August 24, 1769, and educated at Stuttgart Academy. In 1789 he went to Paris, where he became successively assistant professor of comparative anatomy in the Jardin des Plantes and professor of natural history in the Panthéon and Collège de France. In 1814 he was appointed president of the Council of Public Instruction. In 1819 he became minister of the interior to Louis XVIII and chancellor of Paris University, and he was created a peer in 1831 by Louis Philippe. Cuvier died May 13, 1832.

HUMPHRY DAVY was born at Penzance, December 17, 1778, and educated there and at Truro. Apprenticed to a surgeon, he developed a taste for chemical research, and in 1798 was appointed laboratory superintendent of the Pneumatic Institute at Clifton. While there he discovered nitrous oxide, or laughing gas. In 1801 he was appointed director of the chemical laboratory at the Royal Institution, London, and in 1802 was made its first professor of chemistry. Davy was knighted in 1812, was created a baronet in 1818 and in 1820 became president of the Royal Society. He died at Geneva, May 29, 1829.



SIR JOHN FREDERICK WILLIAM HERSCHEL, only child—and, as an astronomer, almost the only rival—of Sir Frederick William Herschel, astronomer to King George III, was born at Slough, March 7, 1792. He was educated privately until he entered St. John's College, Cambridge, whence in 1813 he graduated as senior wrangler and first Smith's prizeman. His subsequent decision to take up law was altered at his father's suggestion. His work at Cape Town, where he established an observatory to survey the southern hemisphere, occupied four years and he returned to England in 1838 to become president of the Royal Society and of the Royal Astronomical Society. He died May 11, 1871, at Collingwood, Kent.



SIR CHARLES LYELL, the famous geologist, was born at Kinnordy, Forfarshire, November 14, 1797. From his boyhood he was deeply interested in natural history, particularly at first, in entomology; but it was at Oxford that his interests definitely assumed a scientific bent and the passion for geological study awoke. In 1821 he took his M.A. degree, and by this time he was an active member of the Geological and Linnaean Societies of London. In 1828 he set off with Sir Roderick Murchison on a tour of Europe, gathering material for his Principles of Geology. Lyell died February 2, 1875. Among his many notable works The Elements of Geology (1838) and Travels in North America (1845) are important. This portrait, by Lowes Dickinson, is in the National Portrait Gallery



CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN was born at Shrewsbury, February 12, 1809, of a family distinguished on both sides in literature, science and art. In 1825 he went to Edinburgh to study medicine, but left in 1828 to read for the Church, at Cambridge University. Abandoning this in favour of natural science, he joined H.M.S. Beagle in 1831 on the five years' voyage which he describes in the introduction to his masterpiece. His return to London marked the beginning of exhaustive research, the chief results of which form the matter of The Origin of Species. It was his misfortune to live and die in ignorance of his contemporary, Mendel's, great discoveries in variation. Darwin died April 19, 1882, and was buried in Westminster Abbey.

MICHAEL FARADAY was the son of a Yorkshire blacksmith and was born in London, September 22, 1791. After serving an apprenticeship with a bookbinder he became, at the age of twenty, assistant to Sir Humphry Davy, whose Royal Institution lectures he had attended; and it was at the Royal Institution, as Fullerian professor, that he worked for the rest of his laborious life, which closed August 25, 1867. Faraday stands at the head of scientific observers of the 19th century, and his discoveries have left their indelible mark on the progress of mankind. To him must be given the credit for the solid foundation of electrical science as it is known today. This portrait, by Thomas Phillips, R.A., is in the National Portrait Gallery.

IV—FALLACIES

There are five distinguishable classes of fallacy.

Fallacies of simple inspection, or *a priori* fallacies, are due to mistaking the idea of a thing for the reality of the thing itself, subjective facts for objective, laws of the percipient mind for laws of the perceived object. A large proportion of the erroneous thinking which exists in the world arises from the assumption that the same order must obtain among the objects in nature which obtains among our ideas of them; that if we always think of two things together, the two ideas must always exist together—that if one thing makes us think of another as preceding or following it, that other must precede it or follow it in actual fact. And conversely, that when we cannot conceive two things together they cannot exist together. Instances of these errors are legion. For instance, it was long held that the Antipodes was impossible because our ideas had difficulty in conceiving persons with their heads in the same direction as our feet.

Observation may lead to fallacies either through non-observation or through mal-observation. Mal-observation always arises from mistaking inference for perception. Perception and inference always go together; but it is necessary to discriminate between parts played by each. The Copernican theory was opposed by many because they thought they *saw* the sun move; whereas they did not actually see the sun move, but inferred its motion from certain appearances.

Fallacies of generalisation are very numerous, and are due to fundamental misconceptions of the legitimate mode of drawing conclusions from observation and experiment.

A common fallacy of generalisation is that due to induction which proceeds *per enumerationem simplicem* [' by simple enumeration '], without real comparison of instances, without even ascertainment of the material circumstances in any given instance, and without any attempt to establish causal connexion. The common fallacy of *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* [' after this, therefore on account of this '] is of this nature.

Another fallacy of generalisation may be called the fallacy of false analogies. An argument from the analogy takes the following form. An object has a property B; another object is found to resemble this object in property A; and, therefore, it probably resembles it in property B. The argument has little value unless there is a real connexion between properties A and B; and if there be a real connexion the argument is no longer a mere argument from analogy.

In some cases an analogy is brought to support an inference when the resemblance fails at the really important point, and an argument of this nature is properly a fallacy of false analogies. For instance, paternal government in a family works well, therefore it is argued that a despotic government in a state will work well; but the success of paternal government depends on the affection of the parent for his children and on the superior wisdom of age; and neither the paternal affection nor the superior wisdom is likely to exist in a political despot.

Metaphors are obviously a kind of analogy and, consequently, must be used for purposes of inference with the greatest caution. The main purpose of a metaphor is to make a proposition clear and vivid, not to prove it.

It remains to be said that the most fertile source of fallacies of generalisation is bad classification, grouping together things which have no common properties, or none permitting any important general propositions to be made with respect to the class.

Among the fallacies of ratiocination are to be ranked all cases of vicious syllogism laid down in books. These generally resolve themselves into having more than three terms to the syllogism, either avowedly or in the covert mode of an undistributed middle term, or an illicit process of one of the two extremes.

A common and dangerous fallacy of this class is committed when, in the premises, a proposition is asserted with a qualification, and the qualification lost sight of in the conclusion; or, oftener, when a limitation or condition, though not asserted, is necessary to the truth of the proposition, but is forgotten when that proposition comes to be used as a premise.

Many of these fallacies are due to ambiguity of terms and to the use of terms as synonyms which are not really synonymous. Words used in several senses contribute to the confusion. Another type of this class of fallacy is known as *petitio principii* [' begging the question '] with its variety, ' reasoning in a circle.' This fallacy consists in the employment of a premise to prove a proposition upon which the premise itself depends. As a rule the fallacy is disguised by variations in language, so that the same thing is called by different names. Thus ' Opium produces sleep because it is a *soporific.*'

None of the modes of assuming what should be proved are more frequent than what are termed by Bentham ' question-begging appellatives '; names which beg the question under the guise of stating it. The most patent are those which have a laudatory or vituperative character, *e.g.* materialist, socialist, imperialist.

Still another fallacy of confusion, known as *ignoratio elenchi*, consists in mistaking the conclusion which is to be proved, or in intentionally proving an irrelevant conclusion. Thus, a man might endeavour to prove the bellicosity of Germany by an estimate of the guns made by Krupp, or an unphilosophical critic might endeavour to disprove Berkeley's idealism by breaking a window.

Principles of Political Economy

JOHN STUART MILL

IN Mill's Principles of Political Economy, with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, the author aimed at producing a treatise that might replace Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, which he pronounced 'in many parts obsolete and in all imperfect.' Mill's work is built upon foundations laid by Ricardo and Malthus, and although it failed of being 'a modern Adam Smith,' it is still indispensable for the study of the subject. Throughout it manifests a belief in the possibility of great social improvement to be achieved upon individualistic lines. The work was published early in 1848.

I—THE PRODUCTION OF WEALTH

IN every department of human affairs, practice long precedes science. The conception, accordingly, of political economy as a branch of science is extremely modern; but the subject with which its inquiries are conversant—wealth—has, in all ages, constituted one of the chief practical interests of mankind. Everyone has a notion, sufficiently correct for common purposes, of what is meant by 'wealth.' Money, being the instrument of an important public and private purpose, is rightly regarded as wealth; but everything else which serves any human purpose, and which nature does not supply gratuitously, is wealth also. Wealth may be defined as all useful or agreeable things which possess exchangeable value.

The production of wealth—the extraction of the instruments of human subsistence and enjoyment from the materials of the globe—is evidently not an arbitrary thing. It has its necessary conditions.

The requisites of production are two—labour and appropriate natural objects. Labour is either bodily or mental. Of the other requisite it is to be remarked that the objects supplied by nature are, except in a few unimportant cases, only instrumental to human wants after having been transformed by human exertion.

Nature does more, however, than supply materials; she also supplies powers. Of natural powers, some are practically unlimited, others limited in quantity, and much of the economy of society depends on the limited quantity in which some of the most important natural agents exist, and more particularly land. As soon as there is not so much of a natural agent to be had as would be used if it could be obtained for the asking, the ownership or use of it acquires an exchangeable value.

Where there is more land wanted for cultivation than a place possesses of a certain quality and advantages of situation, land of that quality and situation may be sold, or let for rent.

Labour employed on external nature in modes subservient to production is employed either directly, or indirectly, in previous, or concomitant, operations designed to facilitate, perhaps essential to the possibilities of, the actual production. One of the modes in which labour is employed indirectly requires particular notice—namely, when it is employed in producing subsistence to maintain the labourers while they are engaged in the production. This previous employment of labour is an indispensable condition to every productive operation. In order to raise any product there are needed labour, tools, and materials and food to feed the labourers. But the tools and materials can be remunerated only from the product when obtained. The food, on the contrary, is intrinsically useful, and the labour expended in producing it, and recompensed by it, needs not to be remunerated over again from the produce of the subsequent labour which it has fed.

The claim to remuneration founded on the possession of food is remuneration for abstinence, not for labour. If a person has a store of food, he has it in his power to consume it himself in idleness. If, instead, he gives it to productive labourers to support them during their work, he can claim a remuneration from the produce. He will, in fact, expect his advance of food to come back to him with an increase, called, in the language of business, a profit.

Thus, there is necessary to productive operations, besides labour and natural agents, a stock, previously accumulated, of the products of labour. This accumulated stock is termed capital. Capital is frequently supposed to be synonymous with money, but money can afford no assistance to production. To do this it must be exchanged for other things capable of contributing to production.

What capital does for production is to afford the shelter, tools and materials which the work requires, and to feed and otherwise maintain the labourers during the process. Whatever things are destined for this use are capital. That industry is limited by capital is self-evident. There can be no more industry than is supplied with materials to work upon and food to eat. Nevertheless, it is often forgotten that the people of a country are maintained and have their wants supplied, not by the produce of present labour, but of past, and it long continued to be believed that laws and governments, without creating capital, could create industry.

ALL capital is the result of saving. Somebody must have produced it, and forborne to consume it, or it is the result of an excess of production over consumption. Although saved, and the result of saving, it is nevertheless consumed—exchanged partly for tools which are worn out by use, partly for materials destroyed in the using, and by consumption of the ultimate product; and, finally, paid in wages to productive labourers, who consume it for their daily wants. The greater part, in value, of the wealth now existing in England has been produced by human hands within the last twelve months. A very small proportion, indeed, was in existence ten years ago. The land is almost the only thing that subsists. Capital is kept in existence, not by preservation, but by perpetual reproduction.

II—THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH

The laws and conditions of the production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary about them. It is not so with the distribution of wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely.

Among the different modes of distributing the produce of land and labour which have been adopted, attention is first claimed by the primary institution on which the economical arrangements of society have always rested—private property.

The institution of property consists in the recognition, in each person, of a right to the exclusive disposal of the fruits of their own labour and abstinence, and implies the right of the possessor of the fruits of previous labour to what has been produced by others by the co-operation between present labour and those fruits of past labour—that is, the freedom of acquiring by contract.

We now proceed to the hypothesis of a three-fold division of the produce, among labourers, capitalists and landlords, beginning with the subject of wages.

Wages depend mainly upon the demand and supply of labour, or, roughly, on the proportion between population and capital. It is a common saying that wages are high when trade is good. Capital which was lying idle is brought into complete efficiency, and wages, in the particular occupation concerned, rise. But this is only a temporary fluctuation, and nothing can permanently alter *general* wages, except an increase or diminution of capital itself compared with the quantity of labour offering itself to be hired.

Again, high prices can only raise wages if the producers and dealers, receiving more, are induced to add to their capital, or, at least, to their purchases of labour. But high prices of this sort can only benefit one class of labourers at the expense of others, since all other people, by paying those high prices, have their purchasing power reduced by an equal degree.

Another common opinion, which is only partially true, is that wages vary with the price of food, rising when it rises and falling when it falls. In times of scarcity, people generally compete more violently for employment and lower the labour market against themselves. But dearness or cheapness of food, when of a permanent character, may affect wages. If food grows permanently dearer without a rise of wages, a greater number of children will prematurely die, and thus wages will ultimately be higher; but only because the number of people will be smaller than if food had remained cheap. Certain rare circumstances excepted, high wages imply restraints on population.

As the wages of the labourer are the remuneration of labour, so the profits of the capitalist are properly the remuneration of abstinence. They are what he gains by forbearing to consume his capital for his own uses and allowing it to be consumed by productive labourers for their uses. Of these gains, however, a part only is properly an equivalent for the use of the capital itself—namely, so much as a solvent person would be willing to pay for the loan of it. This, as everybody knows, is called interest. What a person expects to gain who superintends the employment of his own capital is more than this. The surplus is partly compensation for risk and partly remuneration for time and labour.

The requisites of production being labour, capital and natural agents, the only person besides the labourer and the capitalist whose consent is necessary to production is he who possesses exclusive power over some natural agent. The land is the principal natural agent capable of being so appropriated, and the consideration paid for its use is called rent.

It is at once evident that rent is the effect of a monopoly. If all the land of the country belonged to one person he could fix the rent at his pleasure. The whole people would be dependent on his will for the necessaries of life. But even when monopolised—in the sense of being limited in quantity—land will command a price only if it exists in less quantity than the demand, and no land ever pays rent unless, in point of fertility and situation, it belongs to those superior kinds which exist in less quantity than the demand.

Any land yields just so much more than the ordinary profits of stock, or capital, as it yields more than what is returned by the worst land in cultivation. The surplus is what is paid as rent to the landlord. The standard of rent, therefore, is the excess of the produce of any land beyond what would be returned to the same capital if employed on the worst land in cultivation, or, generally, in the least advantageous circumstances.

III—EXCHANGE AND VALUE

Of the two great departments of political economy, the production of wealth and its distribution, value has to do with the latter alone. The conditions and laws of production would be unaltered if the arrangements of society did not depend on, or admit of, exchange.

Value always means in political economy value in exchange, the command which its possession gives over purchasable commodities in general; whereas, by the price of a thing is meant its value in money.

That a thing may have value in exchange two conditions are necessary. It must be of some use—that is, it must conduce to some purpose; and, secondly, there must be some difficulty in its attainment. This difficulty is of three kinds. It may consist in an absolute limitation of supply, as in the case of wines which can be grown only in peculiar circumstances of soil, climate and exposure; in the labour and expense requisite to produce the commodity; or, thirdly, the limitation of the quantity which can be produced at a given cost, to which class agricultural produce belongs, increased production beyond a certain limit entailing increased cost.

When the production of a commodity is the effect of labour and expenditure, there is a minimum value, which is the essential condition of its permanent production, and must be sufficient to repay the cost of production and, besides, the ordinary expectation of profit. This may be called the *necessary* value. When the commodity can be made in indefinite

quantity, this necessary value is also the maximum which the producers can expect, If it is such that it brings a rate of profit higher than is customary, capital rushes in to share in this extra gain and, by increasing the supply, reduces the value. Accordingly, by the operation of supply and demand the values of things are made to conform in the long run to the cost of production.

The introduction of money does not interfere with the operation of any of the laws of value. Things which by barter would exchange for one another will, if sold for money, sell for an equal amount of it, and so will exchange for one another still, though the process of exchanging them will consist of two operations instead of one. Money is a commodity, and its value is determined like that of other commodities, temporarily by demand and supply and permanently by cost of production.

Credit, as a substitute for money, is but a transfer of capital from hand to hand, generally from persons unable to employ it to hands more competent to employ it efficiently in production. Credit is not a productive power in itself, though without it existing productive powers could not be brought into complete employment.

In international trade we find that the law that permanent value is proportioned to cost of production does not hold good between commodities produced in distant places as it does in those produced in adjacent places.

Between distant places, and especially between different countries, profits may continue different, because persons do not usually remove themselves or their capital to a distant place without a very strong motive. If capital removed to remote parts of the world as readily, and for as small an inducement, as it moves to another quarter of the same town, profits would be equivalent all over the world, and all things would be produced in the places where the same labour and capital would produce them in greatest quantity and of best quality. This tendency may even now be observed; capital is becoming more and more cosmopolitan.

It is not a difference in the *absolute* cost of production which determines the interchange between distant places, but a difference in the *comparative* cost. We may often, by trading with foreigners, obtain their commodities at a smaller expense of labour and capital than they cost to the foreigners themselves. The bargain is advantageous to the foreigner because the commodity which he receives in exchange, though it has cost us less would probably have cost him more.

The value of a commodity brought from a distant place does not depend on the cost of production in the place from whence it comes, but on the cost of its acquisition in the place of receipt; which in the case of an imported article means the cost of production of the thing which is exported to pay for it. In other words, the values of foreign commodities depend on the terms of international exchange, which, in turn, depend on supply and demand.

It may be established that when two countries trade together in two commodities the exchange value of these commodities relatively to each other will adjust itself to the inclinations and circumstances of the consumers on both sides in such manner that the quantities required by each country of the articles which it imports from its neighbour shall be exactly sufficient to pay for one another, a law which holds of any number of commodities.

IV—ON THE INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT

One of the most disputed questions in political science and in practical statesmanship relates to the proper limits of the functions and agency of governments. It may be agreed that they fall into two classes—functions which are either inseparable from the idea of government or are exercised habitually by all governments; and those respecting which it has been considered questionable whether governments should exercise them or not. The former may be termed the *necessary* the latter the *optional*, functions of government.

It may readily be shown that the admitted functions of government embrace a much wider field than can easily be included within the ring-fence of any restrictive definition, and that it is hardly possible to find any ground of justification common to them all, except the comprehensive one of general expediency; nor to limit the interference of government by any universal rule, save the simple and vague one that it should never be admitted but when the case of expediency is strong.

A most important consideration in viewing the economical effects arising from performance of necessary government functions is the means adopted by government to raise the revenue which is the condition of their existence.

The qualities desirable in a system of taxation have been embodied by Adam Smith in four maxims or principles, which may be said to have become classical.

(1) The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities—that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.

(2) The tax which each individual has to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. A great deal of inequality is not nearly so great an evil as a small degree of uncertainty.

(3) Every tax ought to be levied at the time or in the manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very convenient to him.

(4) Every tax ought to be so contrived as to take out and keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury.

Taxes on commodities may be considered in the following way. Suppose that a commodity is capable of being made by two different processes. It is the interest of the community that of the two methods producers should adopt that which produces the best article at the lowest price. Suppose, however, that a tax is laid on one of the processes, and no tax at all, or one of lesser amount, on the other. If the tax falls, as it is, of course, intended to do, upon the process which the producers would have

adopted, it creates an artificial motive for preferring the untaxed process, though the inferior of the two. If, therefore, it has any effect at all, it causes the commodity to be produced of worse quality, or at a greater expense of labour; it causes so much of the labour of the community to be wasted, and the capital employed in supporting and remunerating the labour to be expended as uselessly as if it were spent in hiring men to dig holes and fill them up again. The loss falls on the consumers; though the capital of the country is also eventually diminished by the diminution of their means of saving and, in some degree, of their inducements to save.

Taxes on foreign trade are of two kinds: taxes on imports and on exports. On the first aspect of the matter it would seem that both these taxes are paid by the consumers of the commodity. The true state of the case, however, is much more complicated.

By taxing exports we may draw into our coffers, at the expense of foreigners, not only the whole tax, but more than the tax; in other cases we shall gain exactly the tax; in others less than the tax.

If the imposition of the tax does not diminish the demand it will leave the trade exactly as it was before. We shall import as much and export as much; the whole of the tax will be paid out of our own pockets.

But the imposition of a tax almost always diminishes the demand, more or less. It may, therefore, be laid down as a principle that a tax on imported commodities, when it really operates as a tax, and not as a prohibition, either total or partial, almost always falls in part upon the foreigners who consume our goods. It is not, however, on the person from whom we buy, but on those who buy from us, that a portion of our custom duties spontaneously falls. It is the foreign consumer of our exported commodities who is obliged to pay a higher price for them because we maintain revenue duties on foreign goods.

We now reach the consideration of the grounds and limits of the principle of *laisser-faire*, or non-interference by government.

Whatever theory we adopt respecting the foundation of the social union, there is a circle round every human being which no government ought to be permitted to overstep; there is a part of the life of every person of years of discretion within which the individuality of that person ought to reign uncontrolled either by any other individual or by the public collectively. Scarcely any degree of utility short of absolute necessity will justify prohibitory regulation, unless it can also be made to recommend itself to the general conscience.

A general objection to government agency is that every increase of the functions devolving on the government is an increase of its power both in the form of authority and, still more, in the indirect form of influence. Though a better organization of governments would greatly diminish the force of the objection to the mere multiplication of their duties, it would still remain true that the great majority of things are worse done by the intervention of government than they would be done by the individuals most interested in the matter if left to themselves.

Letting alone, in short, should be the practice; every departure from it, unless required by some great good, is an evil.

On Liberty

JOHN STUART MILL

MILL'S essay On Liberty appeared in 1859, eleven years after the publication of his Principles of Political Economy and in the year after the death of his wife, in collaboration with whom it was thought out and partly written. The treatise goes naturally with that on Utilitarianism. Perhaps the primary problem of politics in all ages has been the reconciliation of individual and social interests, and in an age when legislation is ever tending to become more socialistic, Mill's view has a most interesting relevancy to modern social movements.

I—LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION

PROTECTION against popular government is as indispensable as protection against political despotism. The people may desire to oppress a part of their number, and precautions are needed against this as against any other abuse of power. So much will be readily granted by most, and yet no attempt has been made to find the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control.

The object of this essay is to assert the simple principle that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection—that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others, either by his action or inaction. The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

This principle requires, firstly, liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological—the liberty even of publishing and expressing opinions. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, so long as we do not harm our fellow-creatures. Thirdly, the principle requires liberty of combination among individuals for any purpose not involving harm to others, provided the persons are of full age and not forced or deceived.

The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Mankind gains more by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.

Coercion in matters of thought and discussion must always be illegitimate. If all mankind save one were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing the solitary individual than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of opinion is that it is robbing the whole human race, present and future—those who dissent from the opinion even more than those who hold it. For if the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; and, if wrong, they lose the clear and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error.

All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility and, as all history teaches, neither communities nor individuals are infallible. Men cannot be too often reminded of the condemnation of Socrates and of Christ, and of the persecution of the Christians by the noble-minded Marcus Aurelius.

Enemies of religious freedom maintain that persecution is a good thing, for even though it makes mistakes, it will root out error while it cannot extirpate truth. But history shows that even if truth cannot be finally extirpated, it may at least be put back centuries.

We no longer put heretics to death; but we punish heresies with a social stigma almost as effective, since it may debar men from earning their bread. Social intolerance does not actually eradicate heresies, but it induces men to hide unpopular opinions. The result is that new and heretical opinions smoulder in the narrow circles of thinking and studious persons who originate them, and never light up the general affairs of mankind with either a true or a deceptive light.

The price paid for intellectual pacification is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human race. Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects too timid to follow out any bold, independent train of thought lest it might be considered irreligious or immoral? No one can be a great thinker who does not follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead. In a general atmosphere of mental slavery a few great thinkers may survive but in such an atmosphere there never has been, and never will be, an intellectually active people; and all progress in the human mind and in human institutions may be traced to periods of mental emancipation.

Even if an opinion be indubitably true and undoubtingly believed, it will be a dead dogma, and not a living truth, if it be not fully, frequently and fearlessly discussed. If the cultivation of the understanding consists of one thing more than another, it is surely in learning the grounds of one's own opinions, and these can only be fully learnt by facing the arguments that favour the oppposite opinions. He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. Unless he knows the difficulties which his truth has to encounter and conquer, he knows little of the force of his truth. Not only are the grounds of an opinion unformed or forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the very meaning of the opinion.

When the mind is not compelled to exercise its powers on the questions which its belief presents to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all of the belief except the formularies, until it almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being. In such cases a creed merely stands sentinel at the entrance of the mind and heart to keep them empty, as is so often seen in the case of the Christian creed as at present professed.

So far we have considered only two possibilities —that the received opinion may be false and some other opinion consequently true, or that, the received opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear apprehension and feeling of the truth.

But there is a commoner case still, when conflicting doctrines share the truth, and when the heretical doctrine completes the orthodox. Every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of the truth which the common opinion omits ought to be considered precious with whatever amount of error and confusion it may be conjoined.

In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace that a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary factors in a healthy political life. Unless opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to co-operation and to competition, to sociability and to individuality, to liberty and to discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of practical life are expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due. Truth is usually reached only by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners.

It may be objected, 'But some received principles, especially on the highest and most vital subjects are more than half-truths.' This objection is not sound. Even the Christian morality is incomplete and one-sided, and unless ideas and feelings not sanctioned by it had contributed to the formation of European life and character, human affairs would have been in a worse condition than they are.

II—INDIVIDUALITY AS AN ELEMENT OF WELL-BEING

We have seen that opinions should be freely formed and freely expressed. How about actions? If a man refrains from molesting others in what concerns them and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgement in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free prove also that he should be allowed to carry his opinions into action. As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so it is useful that there should be different experiments of living, that free scope should be given to varieties of character short of injury to others, and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically. It is desirable, in short,

that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. When traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.

No one's idea of excellence in conduct is that people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another. On the other hand, it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if experience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence or of conduct is preferable to another. No one denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth as to know and benefit by the results of human experience. But it is the privilege of a mature man to use and interpret experience in his own way. He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He, on the other hand, who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties—reasoning, foresight, activity, discrimination, resolution, self-control. We wish not automatons, but living originating men and women.

Nevertheless it may be maintained that strong desires and passions are a peril and a snare. Yet it is desires and impulses which constitute character, and one with no desires and impulses of his own has no more character than a steam-engine. An energetic character implies strong, spontaneous impulses under the control of a strong will; and such characters are desirable, since the danger which threatens modern society is not excess but deficiency of personal impulses and preferences.

Everyone nowadays asks: What is usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances, or (worse still), what is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine? The consequence is that through failure to follow their own nature, they have no nature to follow; their human capacities are withered and starved, and are incapable of any strong pleasures or opinions properly their own.

It is not by pruning away the individual but by cultivating it wisely that human beings become valuable to themselves and to others, and that human life becomes rich, diversified and interesting. Individua lity is equivalent to development, and in proportion to the latitude given to individuality an age becomes noteworthy or the reverse.

Unfortunately, the general tendency of things is to render mediocrity the ascendant power. At present, individuals are lost in the crowd, and it is almost a triviality to say that public opinion now rules the world. And public opinion is the opinion of collective mediocrity and is expressed by mediocre men. The initiation of all wise and noble opinions must come from individuals, and the individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought is necessary to correct the tendency that makes mankind acquiesce in customary opinions.

III—LIMITS TO THE AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY OVER THE INDIVIDUAL

WHERE, then, does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality and how much to society?

To individuality should belong that part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society.

Society, in return for the protection it affords its members, and as a condition of its existence, demands, first, that its members respect the rights of one another; and, secondly, that each person bear his share of the labours and sacrifices incurred in defending society or its members. Further, society may punish acts of an individual hurtful to others, even if not a violation of rights, by the force of public opinion.

But in all cases where a person's conduct affects or need only affect himself, society may not interfere. Society may help individuals in their personal affairs, but neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to any human creature that he may not use his own life, so far as it concerns himself, as he pleases. He himself is the final judge of his own concerns, and the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavourable judgement of others are the only ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which affects his own good, but which does not affect the interest of others.

But how, it may be asked, can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members?

I fully confess that the mischief which a person does to himself may seriously affect those nearly connected with him, and even society at large. But such contingent and indirect injury should be endured by society for the sake of the greater good of human freedom, and because any attempt at coercion in private conduct will merely produce rebellion on the part of the individual coerced. Moreover, when society interferes with purely personal conduct, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong places, as the pages of history and the records of legislation abundantly demonstrate.

Closely connected with the question of the limitations of the authority of society over the individual is the question of government participation in industrial and other enterprises generally undertaken by individuals.

There are three main objections to the interference of the state in such matters. In the first place, the matter may be better managed by individuals than by the government. In the second place, though individuals may not do it so well as government might, yet it is desirable that they should do it, as a means of their own mental education. In the third place, it is undesirable to add to the power of the government. If roads, railways, banks, insurance offices, great joint-stock companies, universities, public charities, municipal corporations and local boards were all in the government service, and if the employees in these looked to the government for promotion, not all the freedom of the Press and the popular constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name. And, for various reasons, the better qualified the heads and hands of the government officials, the more detrimental would the rule of the government be. Such a

government would inevitably degenerate into a pedantocracy monopolising all the occupations which form and cultivate the faculties required for the government of mankind.

To find the best compromise between individuals and the state is one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of government. It is, in a great measure, a question of detail, in which many and various considerations must be kept in view and no absolute rule can be laid down. But I believe that the ideal to be kept in view may be conveyed in these words: the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible centralisation of information, and the diffusion of it from the centre.

First Principles

HERBERT SPENCER

IN 1860 Herbert Spencer issued the prospectus of his Synthetic Philosophy, and in 1896 he completed, with the third volume of the Principles of Sociology, this heroic attempt at a synthesis of all scientific knowledge. First Principles, the initial volume of the series, appeared in 1862. Its thesis is that, while metaphysical questions are ultimately insoluble, they compel the recognition of an inscrutable power beyond all phenomena; secondly, it formulates and illustrates the law and philosophy of evolution.

I—THE UNKNOWABLE AND ABSOLUTE

IN all commonly accepted beliefs there is an underlying verity. Even beliefs that seem contradictory are in fundamental harmony, and though science and religion may seem in opposition, they really only express opposite sides of the same fact, and their views may be reconciled.

When we analyse different religious views of the origin and nature of the universe, we find that all religions, howsoever opposed in their overt doctrines, are perfectly at one in the conviction that the universe is a mystery; and we find, too, that all religions fail to solve the mystery.

When, again, we examine such ultimate scientific ideas as space and time, we find that they all are representative of realities that cannot be comprehended. The explanation of that which is explicable merely shows the unknowable and the inexplicable behind.

On the basis of this deepest, widest and most certain of all facts—that the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable—a reconciliation between science and religion is possible. To understand fully how real is the reconciliation thus reached it will be needful to look at the respective attitudes which religion and science have all along maintained towards this belief in the Unknowable and Absolute.

Religion has always, amid its many errors and corruptions, maintained the supreme verity that all things are manifestations of a power that transcends our knowledge. This has been the most vital and most truly religious element of religion, and its errors and defects in doctrine and practice have been due to disloyalty to this fundamental verity.

And this disloyalty science has always opposed; for the progress of science is of necessity a progress to causes that are more and more abstract and less and less conceivable; and, indeed, the most abstract conception to which science is ever slowly approaching is one that merges into the inconceivable and unthinkable And so the beliefs which science has forced upon religion have been essentially more religious than those which they supplanted. Only when science has rested content with superficial solutions has it been in conflict with true religion.

Some maintain that though the ultimate cause of things is unknowable, yet we must endow it with definite attributes, and this is a legitimate enough course, provided that we understand that the idea we thus create is merely a symbol utterly without resemblance to that for which it stands. For certainly most men will refuse an indefinite and shadowy belief, and will demand definite formal conceptions. Having always embodied the ultimate cause so far as was needful to its mental realization, they must necessarily resent the substitution of an ultimate cause which cannot be mentally realized at all.

To cultivate the widest spirit of tolerance, let three cardinal principles be borne in mind.

1. That there is a fundamental verity under all forms of religion, however degraded.

2. That the concrete elements in which each creed embodies this truth are relatively good.

3. That varying beliefs are necessary parts of the constituted order of things, and are severally fitted to the societies in which they are indigenous.

These principles do not imply that the current theology should be passively accepted. Though existing religious ideas and institutions have an average adaptation to the characters of the people who live under them, yet as the characters change, the ideas and institutions require remodelling. It is requisite that free play should be given to conservative thought and action; it is equally requisite that progressive thought and action should also have free play, for without the agency of both there cannot be the continual readaptations necessary to orderly progress.

II—THE DATA OF PHILOSOPHY

AS with religious beliefs so with the varied beliefs respecting the nature of philosophy. After the elimination of their discordant elements there remains, as a common element, the conception of philosophy as 'knowledge of the highest degree of generality.' As each widest generalisation of science comprehends and consolidates those narrower ones of its own

division, so the generalisations of philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalisations of science. Knowledge of the lowest kind is *un-unified* knowledge; science is *partially unified* knowledge; and philosophy is *completely unified* knowledge. The purpose of philosophy is the integration of knowledge.

What is the datum, or rather, the data, which philosophy requires? It is that congruities and incongruities exist and are cognizable by us. The permanence of a consciousness of likeness or difference is our ultimate warrant for asserting the existence of likeness or difference. Knowledge is the grouping of the like and the unlike, and its unification must specify the antithesis between two ultimate classes of experiences. What are these?

Setting out from the conclusion that all things known to us are the manifestations of the Unknowable, we find these manifestations are divisible into two classes—the *vivid* and the *faint*. The former, occurring under the conditions of perception, are originals. The latter, occurring under those of reflection, memory, imagination, or ideation, are copies.

This division is equivalent to that between *object* and *subject*, between *self* and *not-self*. The power which manifests itself in the faint series we call the *ego*, while that in the *vivid* we call the *non-ego*. This ultimate primordial division of self from not-self is a cumulative result of persistent consciousness of likenesses and unlikenesses among manifestations.

The data of philosophy accordingly are: (*a*) an unknowable power; (*b*) the existence of knowable likenesses and unlikenesses among the manifestations of that power; (*c*) a resulting segregation of the manifestations into those of subject and object.

All the ultimate scientific ideas—space, time, matter, motion, force—are derivatives from experience of force, and force is the ultimate of ultimates, the unknowable. By the indestructibility of matter we really mean the indestructibility of the *force* with which matter affects us. As we become conscious of matter only through the resistance it opposes to our muscular energy, so do we become conscious of the permanence of matter only through the permanence of this resistance—of this *force* either as immediately or as mediately proved to us.

Persistence of force cannot be proved, for it must be assumed in every experiment or observation by which it is proposed to prove it. And what is the force of which we predicate persistence? It is that absolute force of which we are indefinitely conscious as the necessary correlate of the force we know. Thus we come once more to that ultimate truth in which religion and science are reconciled—to the continued existence of an unknowable as the necessary correlative of the knowable.

From the ultimate universal truth that force persists can be deduced the truth that the relations among forces persist.

Given charges of powder, alike in quantity and quality, fired from barrels of the same structure, and propelling bullets of equal weights, sizes and forms, similarly rammed down, no difference can be imagined among the results. And that which here holds good between antecedents and consequents that are comparatively simple, must hold, however involved the antecedents and the consequents may be.

Those modes of the unknowable which we call motion, light, heat, chemical affinity, etc., are alike transformable into each other, and into those modes of the unknowable, which we distinguish as sensation, emotion, thought, these in their turns being directly or indirectly retransformable into the original shapes. How this metamorphosis takes place remains an unfathomable mystery.

III—EVOLUTION SCIENTIFICALLY DEFINED

An entire history of anything must include its appearance out of the imperceptible and its disappearance into the imperceptible, for our theory of things is imperfect so long as any portion of their sensible existences is unexplained.

The entire series of changes is comprehended in this: Loss of motion and consequent integration, eventually followed by gain of motion and consequent disintegration.

Everywhere, and to the last, the change at any moment going on forms a part of one or other of the two processes. While the general history of every aggregate is definable as a change from a diffused imperceptible state, to a concentrated perceptible state, and again to a diffused imperceptible state, every detail of the history is definable as part of either the one change or the other.

These processes, everywhere in antagonism, are evolution and dissolution. We shall everywhere mean by the latter the absorption of motion and disintegration of matter; and by the former, the process which is always an integration of matter and dissipation of motion.

Everywhere evolution, as defined, is at work; it is exemplified in the integration of the earth from a nebula, in the integration of plants and animals from the elements of their food, in the integration of the social organism and of language.

Evolution, then, is a change from a less coherent to a more coherent form, consequent on the dissipation of motion and integration of matter. But, simultaneously with integration of the whole, there is differentiation and integration of parts in the whole. This is the second aspect of evolution. We have here to regard existences of all orders as showing progressive differentiation.

The advance from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous is well seen in man. Man, as an individual, develops from the less to the more heterogeneous, and man, as a species, has been made more heterogeneous by the multiplication and differentiation of human races.

On passing to humanity, as socially embodied, the general law is richly exemplified. The development of literature, science, architecture, the drama and dress, all alike show that from the remotest past an essential trait of evolution has been the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous.

Hence, as we now understand it, evolution is definable as a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity accompanying the dissipation of motion and integration of matter.

But even this generalisation does not express the whole truth. At the same time that evolution is a change from homogeneous to

heterogeneous it is a change from the indefinite to the definite. Illustrations of this change, which is a secondary phenomenon, are found everywhere, from the solar system to the industrial and aesthetic arts.

To complete our conception of evolution, we have to contemplate, through the cosmos, the metamorphoses of retained motion that accompany the metamorphoses of component matter. When we investigate this question, we find that the rhythmical actions going on in the aggregate differentiate and integrate, *pari passu*, with differentiation and integration of structure. During the evolution of the solar system, the confused, indeterminate motions of the nebula become definite and heterogeneous. During the evolution of organisms, their functions become more multiform and distinct. And in societies the movements and functions produced by the confluence of individual actions increase in number, multiformity, complexity and precision.

Our formula, therefore, requires an additional clause, and will take this final form. Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.

IV—GENERAL CAUSES OF EVOLUTION AND CHANGE

THE instability of the homogeneous—illustrated by such facts as that red-hot matter, however evenly heated, soon ceases to be so, and that a pair of scales, perfectly balanced, will not remain so—is obviously consequent on the fact that the several parts of any homogeneous aggregation are necessarily exposed to different forces and are of necessity differently modified, and is a corollary for the persistence of force. The relations of outside and inside, and of comparative nearness to neighbouring sources of influence, imply the reception of influences that are unlike in quantity or quality, or both, and it follows that unlike changes will be produced in the parts thus dissimilarly acted upon.

To the conclusion that the changes with which evolution *commences* are thus necessitated, remains to be added the conclusion that these changes must *continue*. The absolutely homogeneous must lose its equilibrium, and the relatively homogeneous must lapse into the relatively less homogeneous. That which is true of any total mass is true of the parts into which it segregates. The uniformity of each such part must as inevitably be lost in multiformity as was that of the original whole, and for like reasons.

A further cause of increasing complexity has to be added. Action and reaction being equal and opposite, it follows that, in differentiating the parts on which it falls in unlike ways, the incident force must itself be correspondingly differentiated. Thus, when one body is struck against another, there may be, besides the mechanical result, sound, air currents, fracture, incandescence and chemical combination. An incident force decomposed by the reactions of a body into a group of unlike forces, a uniform force thus reduced to a multiform force, becomes the cause of a secondary increase of multiformity in the body which decomposes it. The multiplication of effects must proceed in geometrical progression. Each stage of evolution must initiate a higher stage. These conclusions are not only to be established inductively, but they are deducible from the deepest of all truths. The multiplication of effects is a corollary from the persistence of force.

Thus far no reason has been assigned why there should not ordinarily arise a vague chaotic heterogeneity in place of that orderly heterogeneity displayed in evolution. It still remains to find out the cause of that local integration which accompanies local differentiation—that gradually completed segregation of like units into a group, distinctly separated from neighbouring groups which are severally made up of other kinds of units.

Segregation depends on the principle that different units acted on by the same force must be differently moved, and that similar units must be differently moved by different forces. There is also the complementary truth that mixed forces are segregated by the reaction of uniform matters, just as mixed matters are segregated by the action of uniform forces. The general principle may be deduced from the persistence of force. For the abstract propositions involved amount to this—that in the actions and reactions of force and matter an unlikeness in either of the factors necessitates an unlikeness in the effects and that, in the absence of unlikeness in either of the factors, the effects must be alike.

That universal coexistence of antagonist forces which necessitates the universality of rhythm, and the decomposition of every force into divergent forces, at the same time necessitates the ultimate establishment of a balance. The evolution of every aggregate must go on until a moving equilibrium, or *equilibrium mobile*, is established, since an excess of force which the aggregate possesses in any direction must eventually be expended in overcoming resistances to change in that direction, leaving behind only those movements which compensate each other, and so forming a moving equilibrium.

FROM the highest point of view, all terrestrial changes are incidents in the course of cosmic equilibration. For, of the incessant alterations which the crust and atmosphere of the earth undergo, those which are not due to the still progressing motion of the earth's substance towards its centre of gravity are due to the still progressing motion of the sun's substance towards its centre of gravity, the continuance of which integrations is a continuance of that transformation of sensible motion into insensible motion which ends in equilibration.

Every living body exhibits in a four-fold form the process of equilibration; from moment to moment in the balancing of mechanical forces; from hour to hour in the balancing of functions; from year to year in the changes of state that compensate changes of condition; and, finally, in the complete arrest of vital movements at death. Every species of plant and animal is perpetually undergoing a rhythmical variation in number: now, from abundance of food and absence of enemies, rising above its average; and then, by a consequent scarcity of food, and

abundance of enemies, being depressed below its average. Amid these oscillations lies that average of the species at which its expansive tendency is in equilibrium with the surrounding repressive tendencies.

In society the same equilibrating process is going on, and equilibrium will be reached when the individual has no desires but those which may be satisfied without transgressing his proper sphere of action, while society imposes no restraints save those which the individual voluntarily respects.

The persistence of force and the establishment of equilibria lead to the inferences that there is a gradual advance towards harmony between man's mental nature and his environment, and that evolution can end only in the achievement of the greatest perfection and the most complete happiness.

When an aggregate has reached that equilibrium in which its changes end, it thereafter remains subject to all actions in its environment which may increase the quantity of motion it contains, and are sure, slowly or suddenly, to give its parts such excess of motion as will cause disintegration.

It may be suggested that the evolution will end in universal and eternal equilibrium. But this is not so. Motion, as well as matter, being fixed in quantity, it would seem that the change in the distribution of matter which motion effects coming to a limit in whichever direction it is carried, the indestructible motion thereupon necessitates a reverse distribution. Apparently, the universally coexistent forces of attraction and repulsion which, as we have seen, necessitate rhythm in all minor changes throughout the universe, also necessitate rhythm in the totality of its changes—produce now an immeasurable period during which the predominance of attractive forces causes universal concentration, and then an immeasurable period during which the predominance of repulsive forces causes universal diffusion—alternate eras of evolution and dissolution. And thus there is suggested the conception of a past during which there have been successive evolutions—like the evolution which is now going on—and a future during which other such evolutions may go on—ever the same in principle but never the same in result.

Thus we are led to the conclusion that the entire process of things, as displayed in the aggregate of the visible universe, is analogous to the entire process of things as displayed in the smallest aggregates.

Utilitarianism

JOHN STUART MILL

AS a system of ethics setting up as a rule of conduct the best interests either of the individual or of the community, Utilitarianism had its beginnings in the Hedonist schools of the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, and until the eighteenth century its aim was held to be the acquisition of pleasure. The scientific system was first formulated by Jeremy Bentham, who declared the greatest happiness of the greatest number to be the object to be aimed at. Mill introduced the view that certain pleasures possess an intrinsic value which renders them superior to others. He was not the founder of Utilitarianism, but invented the name and did much to formulate, define and defend its tenets. His essay on Utilitarianism was published in 1863.

I—THE MEANING OF UTILITARIANISM

THE creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, and wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.

Such a theory excites in many minds inveterate dislike; they designate as only worthy of swine the doctrine that life has no other aim and end than pleasure.

But there are other pleasures than the pleasures of swine; human beings have faculties other than the animal appetites, and it is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize that some *kinds* of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. If I am asked what pleasures are more desirable and more valuable, I fall back on the verdict of experience. If, of two pleasures, one be invariably preferred by all those capable of enjoying both, that one is the more desirable.

Few human beings would resign human for bestial pleasures; no person would prefer stupidity to intelligence, or selfishness and baseness to feeling and conscience. A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is probably more liable to pain than one of inferior type, yet he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. Whoever supposes this preference involves a sacrifice of happiness confounds happiness and satisfaction. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pig thinks otherwise, it is because they have no experience of the better part.

It may be objected that many who are capable of both higher and lower pleasures sometimes choose the lower; but this is not really choice, it is infirmity of character. It may be questioned whether anyone who has remained susceptible to two classes of pleasures ever knowingly calmly preferred the lower, though many in all ages have broken down in an attempt to combine high and low.

On a question which is the more desirable of two pleasures, or of two ways of living, the judgement of those who know both must be admitted final, for there is no other tribunal. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgement of the experienced? When, then, the duly experienced declare that pleasures derived

from the higher faculties are preferable in kind to those of which animal nature is susceptible, there is none to gainsay.

According to the greatest happiness principle, the ultimate end with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable, is an existence as exempt as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments both in quantity and quality. The test of quality, again, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, must be the preference felt by those with experience and best able to compare. This, being the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality, which may accordingly be defined as the rules for human conduct which will, so far as possible, secure to mankind and to the sentient creation such an existence as we have described.

Certain critics bring forward the objection that happiness is impossible. But moderate happiness is not impossible. The main constituents of happiness seem to be two—tranquillity and excitement. With tranquillity many find that they can be content with little excitement, and with much excitement many can reconcile themselves to considerable pain.

When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot find life unhappy, it usually is because they lack altruism or are deficient in mental cultivation. Those who cherish a fellow-feeling for others will always retain a pleasurable interest in life; and a cultivated mind finds inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it—nature, art, poetry, history, the past, present and future of mankind.

Nor need any lack the private and public affections and the degree of mental culture requisite for happiness. Everyone in a free, well-governed country with a moderate amount of moral and intellectual capacity is capable of happiness, provided he escape indigence, disease and the sorrows inflicted by death and by the faults of others. Poverty and disease, moreover, are conquerable, and every intelligent and generous mind will find happiness in playing a part in their conquest.

Only in a very imperfect world can self-sacrifice serve the happiness of others, yet in this imperfect world I confess that self-sacrifice is the highest virtue. The utilitarian morality does recognize that self-sacrifice for the good of others is good, for the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agents' own happiness, but the happiness of all. The agent must be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbours as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.

It is often affirmed that utilitarians look too much at the effects of actions and too little at the moral qualities that produce them; but this error is not inherent in utilitarianism, it is merely a necessary consequence of the difficulty of seeing the motives at the back of conduct.

Utilitarianism is sometimes called godless. This criticism need not be discussed, since whatever aid religion, natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation is quite open to the utilitarian. It is also sometimes objected that it is the gospel of expediency; but the expedient, as conceived by utilitarianism, is certainly not opposed to the right.

Again, it is objected that there is not time previous to action to calculate the effects of conduct on the general happiness. The answer is that there has been ample time, namely, the whole past experience of the race. During all time mankind have been learning the tendencies of actions. The ordinary rules of morality indicate such tendencies; and others can be gradually formulated.

Finally, it is said that utilitarianism gives scope for casuistry, and that a utilitarian, when tempted, will see more utility in the breach of a rule than in its observance. But every creed allows the operation of *personal equation*, and no creed can prevent self-deception and dishonest casuistry.

II—THE ULTIMATE SANCTION OF UTILITARIANISM

WHAT is the ultimate sanction of the principle of utility? Whence does it derive its binding force? Why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies elsewhere, why may I not prefer that?

The principle of utility has, or might have, all the external and internal sanctions, which belong to any other system of morals. As external sanctions it has the hope of the favour and the fear of the displeasure of our fellow-creatures, or of the Ruler of the Universe, together with the sympathy and affection we feel for our fellow-creatures, and the love and awe we feel towards Him, inclining us to do His will. As internal and ultimate sanction it has the pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility, and this sanction is strengthened by collateral associations derived from sympathy, from love, from fear, from religious feelings, etc.

The ultimate sanction, therefore, of utilitarianism is the conscientious and social feelings of mankind. The foundation of utilitarian morality is the social instinct of mankind; and if this instinct were developed by religion, by education, by example, I think that no one would need to feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction of the happiness morality. The social feeling is in most individuals much weaker than the selfish feeling, and may be wanting altogether; but to those who have it, it possesses all the characters of a natural feeling, and makes the mind work with and not against the outward motives to care for others afforded by what I have called the external sanctions.

Of what sort of proof is the principle of utility susceptible? The sole evidence that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it, and people do actually desire happiness. But people desire other things besides happiness; they desire virtue, for instance, and hence the opponents of utilitarianism maintain that there are other ends of human action besides happiness, and that happiness is not the standard of conduct. To this utilitarianism replies that there is no original desire for virtue save through its conduciveness to pleasure and especially through its protection from pain.

But through the association thus formed it may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such

with as much intensity as any other good; and with this difference between it and the love of money, of power, or of fame, that all of these may render the individual noxious to the other members of the society to which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him so much a blessing to them as the cultivation of the disinterested love of virtue. And, consequently, the utilitarian standard, while it tolerates and approves those other acquired desires up to a certain point, enjoins the cultivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest strength possible, as being, above all things, important to the general happiness.

It results, then, from the preceding considerations that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Those who desire virtue for its own sake desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain; or for both reasons together. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so. Briefly, nothing is a good to human beings but in so far as it is either pleasurable or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain.

III—JUSTICE AND UTILITY

The idea of justice supposes two things—a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind and intended for their good. The other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule. There is involved in addition, the conception of some definite person who suffers by the infringement, whose rights are violated by it. And the sentiment of justice appears to me to be the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those with whom one sympathises, widened so as to include all persons by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy and the human conception of intelligent self-interest. From the latter elements the feeling derives its morality; from the former its peculiar impressiveness and energy of self-assertion.

When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law or by that of education and opinion. To have a right is to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of.

If I am asked *why* it ought, I can give no other reason than general utility. If that expression does not seem to convey a sufficient feeling of the strength of the obligation, nor to account for the peculiar energy of the feeling, it is because there goes to the composition of the sentiment, not a rational only, but also an animal element—the thirst for retaliation; and this thirst derives its intensity, as well as its moral justification, from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility concerned.

The utility concerned is security, and on it depends the whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment; since nothing but the gratification of the instant would be of any worth to us if we could be deprived of everything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves. The feelings concerned are indeed so powerful, and we count so positively on finding a responsive feeling in others (all being alike interested), that *ought* and *should* grow into *must*, and recognized indispensability becomes a moral necessity.

If the preceding analysis, or something resembling it, be not the correct account of the notion of justice; if justice be totally independent of utility and be a standard *per se*, which the mind can recognize by simple introspection of itself, it is hard to understand why that internal oracle is so ambiguous, and why so many things appear either just or unjust according to the light in which they are regarded.

Is, then, the difference between the just and the expedient merely imaginary? By no means. While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility, I account the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality, since it concerns the essentials of human well-being more nearly than any other rule for the guidance of life. The moral rules known collectively as justice, which forbid mankind to hurt one another or interfere with one another's freedom, are more vital to human beings than maxims which merely point out the best way of managing some department of human affairs. And the same powerful motives which command the observance of these primary moralities enjoin the punishment of those who violate them; and as impulses of self-defence, of defence of others, and of vengeance are all called forth against such persons, retribution becomes closely connected with the sentiment of justice.

Justice is involved in the very meaning of utility or the greatest happiness principle. That principle is a mere form of words unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's. All persons are deemed to have a *right* to equality of treatment except when some recognized social expediency requires the reverse, and all social inequalities which are inexpedient are unjust.

The considerations which have now been adduced resolve, I conceive, the only real difficulty in the utilitarian theory of morals. It has always been evident that all cases of justice are also cases of expediency. The difference is in the peculiar sentiment which attaches to the former, and if this difference has been sufficiently accounted for, if there is no necessity to assume for it any peculiarity of origin, if it is simply the natural feeling of resentment moralised by being made of co-extensive with the demands of social good; and if this feeling not only does, but ought to, exist in all classes of the cases to which the idea of justice corresponds, that idea no longer presents itself as a stumbling-block to the utilitarian ethics. Justice remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are vastly more important, and therefore more absolute and imperative, than any others are as a class; and which therefore ought to be, and naturally are, guarded by a sentiment distinguished by the definite nature of its commands and by the stern character of its sanctions.

The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe

W. E. H. LECKY

IN January, 1865, Lecky established himself in the front rank of contemporary authors by the publication of his History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe. In 1863 he had published an essay on The Declining Sense of the Miraculous, and this formed the first two chapters of the later work. The book is a combination of history and philosophy, displaying wide reading and great power of thought and generalisation. Its central idea is the development of reason and the decay of superstition as a power in human society. This evolution is traced not only in religion, but also in politics and industry.

I—THE DECLINING SENSE OF THE MIRACULOUS

THE opinions and ideas which we find prevalent in one period of history are found to have ceased to be prevalent, or not to have attained prevalence, in later or earlier periods. This change is due only in lesser degree to the actual argument by which old opinions are attacked or upon which the new opinions rest; mainly they are the result of a change of attitude towards the questions involved. The rise of rationalism, which begins to become marked towards the close of the seventeenth century, is the development of such a mental attitude. Rationalism may be for our purposes defined as the predisposition to attribute all kinds of phenomenon to natural rather than to miraculous causes. It is the application of a different criterion of probability. Its causes and influence are the subject of this enquiry.

An educated man at the present time receives an account of a miracle taking place in his own day, as a rule, with a derisive incredulity which dispenses with evidence; because no amount of evidence will outweigh his predisposition to disbelief. He either repudiates the honesty of the witness or takes it as certain that he has somehow been deceived. Three hundred years ago, a miraculous account was universally accepted as perfectly credible, probable and ordinary. The clergy, legislators of every country, judges of the keenest acumen, had no doubts about the sin of witchcraft, its prevalence and the necessity for punishing it with the utmost severity. Hardly a voice was raised in question; one judge boasted that he had himself sent witches to the stake at the rate of fifty a year. Torquemada and Luther were equally emphatic and equally ruthless. More than two centuries later, Wesley protested that to deny witchcraft was to deny the Bible. To-day, no educated person believes in it; but the change has not been brought about by the accumulation of fresh evidence; the evidence has always been the same in kind, but we have learnt, as our ancestors had not, to look upon it as virtually valueless.

The fact is that if we regard witchcraft as *per se* probable, the evidence supporting it is overwhelming; if we regard it as *per se* extremely improbable, the evidence goes for nothing. In the ancient and in the medieval world, the 'miraculous'—the persistently recurrent intervention of supernatural agencies in the natural course of events — was almost universally accepted as indisputable.

Magic is human commerce with supernatural agencies. Witchcraft and sorcery are the commerce between human agents and the malignant supernatural agencies of which they are in effect the instruments. The ancient world did not dwell upon positively malignant agencies; the magician who held commerce with the supernatural was not particularly associated with malignity, and only occasionally and in slight degree acquired the character of the medieval sorcerer or witch. Witchcraft developed with the development of the idea of the Devil and his subordinate fiends—the powers *ex hypothesi* maligant enemies of God and man. When everyone believed that Satan and his satellites were, in the most literal sense of the words, constantly going about 'seeking whom they might devour,' evidence of these operations was accepted without demur—and likewise, evidence against their suspected human agents. The Middle Ages took the truth of witchcraft for granted. The Church affirmed it, and when the Reformation came, the appeal to the Bible endorsed it.

The predisposition to seek or to assume a supernatural explanation of any event which seems out of the common fades as the natural causes of such events become by degrees generally obvious. The supernatural is primarily sought for to account for that which is at first sight not to be naturally accounted for. The progress of science from the sixteenth century onwards accounted naturally for so much that had been regarded as supernatural, that the presumption in favour of natural explanations became the common presumption, and the predisposition to supernaturalism no longer entered into everyday life.

The belief in witchcraft grew with the victory of the Church over Paganism. The terrorism of the orthodox doctrine exercised an enormous influence on the popular imagination; exclusive salvation for baptized Christians was coupled with eternal torture in the literal flames of hell for the infinitely larger number of the race. And to this was joined the terror of the hosts of evil spirits always seeking to draw the unwary into the way of destruction. All the gods and goddesses of all the pantheons in whom pagans placed their trust were absorbed into the demonic battalions. Possession by devils and the casting out of devils were readily believed to be everyday facts. The secret perpetuation of old pagan customs which had not been

adapted by the Church was treated as commerce with the powers of evil. But it was not till the unrest of the twelfth century began to give birth to new heresies that the Church gave way to a new spirit of persecution, and there was evolved in the popular mind a sort of panic which turned not so much against heresiarchs as against the Arch Enemy's suspected human agents, the so-called witches; which reached its climax in the two centuries immediately preceding and following the Reformation. It was only the habit of accepting natural explanations of phenomena which grew up in the seventeenth century that deprived supernaturalism, and therefore witchcraft, of its standing ground—the habit of preferring, as the more probable, a supernatural to a natural but not immediately obvious explanation.

Witchcraft is the expression of a general acceptance of the miraculous when regarded as the work of malign or diabolic agencies. Belief in it faded, as the readiness of belief in the miraculous generally faded, with the growing sense that natural phenomena, however unexpected, are always attributable to natural causes. The field of the inexplicable being reduced till inexplicable phenomena could only be looked upon as highly abnormal, instead of perfectly normal, the inexplicable phenomena were themselves called in question, till they were reduced to those of the type which the Church held to be essential evidences of her tenets. Protestantism, on controversial rather than rationalistic grounds, very soon rejected the miracles which were cited in support of Rome, while adhering to Bible miracles; though it is difficult to escape the fact that the nature of the *evidence* in both cases is essentially the same. The reconciliation with rationalism has to be found in the view that Divine interposition in human affairs is not inherently improbable, since it is not to be regarded as a contravention of natural laws but as in accord with that Law of which natural laws form a part, the law under which we daily and hourly see Will exercising control over Matter, directing it to its own ends.

II—RATIONALISTIC DEVELOPMENTS

The earliest stage of religions is presumed to be that of fetishism, the worship of portions of matter animate or inanimate. At the next stage the idea of divinity is separated from matter, but man conceives the divine spirits anthropomorphically, assigns to them human qualities, and pictures them to himself and others in human likeness. When the virtue of the deity is attributed, in the spirit of fetishism, to the image, we have idolatry. Art develops in relation to religious ideas; the earliest Christian art, in the catacombs, has no suggestion of idolatry; the Deity is presented only, and very rarely, in the person of Christ. In the early medieval stage, the demand for a feminine as well as a masculine conception of the deity introduces the presentation of the Virgin—but not yet of God the Father; and the fetishist treatment of particular images comes into being—in spite of the Iconoclasts in the Eastern Church and of the denunciations of St. Agobard of Lyons in the ninth century. Mahomedanism stands alone in its refusal to countenance idolatry in practice as well as in theory. In the medieval Church, the worship of relics and of particular images was in effect encouraged.

The art which is the pursuit of beauty developed in Ancient Greece and in Renaissance Italy when it ceased in fact if not in form to have religion for its motive. The Gothic architecture which had been the most perfect expression of the sense of beauty permeated by the most profound religious sentiment was displaced by that of which St. Peter's is the supreme type, devoid altogether of religious sentiment; as were Michaelangelo's 'religious' frescoes and statues. The secularisation of art marked the new rationalising spirit which severed it altogether from fetishism and from anthropomorphism. For in the earliest stages, religion had treated beauty, sensuous beauty, as a dangerous snare of the Devil; and the more definitely beauty became the object pursued, the more definitely were the ways of art and of religion parted.

The general movement of rationalism has been most profoundly influenced by the progress of physical science. The doctrine of the inspiration of the Bible might be applied to its allegorical interpretation, a process which was indeed carried to amazing lengths; but it was also applied to the complete repression of all scientific enquiry which could be contravened by any phrase in the Bible as the ultimate indisputable authority; so that to believe, for instance, in the existence of the antipodes, was tantamount to heresy. No scientific facts outside the range of the ancient Hebrew writers *could* be true; whatever they took for granted *must* be true; a postulate that was in itself a prohibition upon the progress of science, which in medieval times was possible only under Islam.

Superior knowledge excited only terror and suspicion. If it was shown in speculation it was heresy, if in the study of nature it was sorcery. The magnificent work of Roger Bacon brought upon him only imprisonment and persecution. The astronomical discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo, followed at the close of the seventeeth century by Newton and Descartes, destroyed the old conception of Man as the centre of the universe; the Church could no longer prohibit the progress of the scientific spirit, and the work was completed by the advance of chemistry and, in the nineteenth century, of geology; the first emphasising the natural as against the supernatural explanation of phenomena and the second the infinite age of the universe to which Bibical chronology assigned an existence of six thousand years.

The new attitude reacted upon Biblical criticism, forcing it to bring the interpretation of scripture into conformity with the affirmations of science, as a subject regarding which the knowledge of the Hebrews was not inspired but merely represented the assumptions current in their time, the actual record of events being naturally coloured by those assumptions.

A corresponding change arises in the field of moral development. Right and wrong are absolute and unchanging, but the realization of right and wrong in particular departments is a matter of growth. The attitude towards veracity takes on new aspects with the advance of civilization; the sentiment of humanity in one age tolerates with no sort of reprobation

what a later age has learnt to condemn without qualification. The religious doctrines or dogmas which clash with the developed moral perceptions are driven from the field, even as those which clash with developed scientific knowledge. The strength of Christianity lies in the fact that every moral advance only reveals more completely the moral perfection of its ideal, prosecuted in the teaching and in the person of its Founder.

III—PERSECUTION

The moral sentiment upon which the religion of ancient Greece and Rome centred was the sense, the pride, of virtue, claiming merit for itself. That of Christianity was the sense of sin, the absence of merit in the creature; 'we are all unprofitable servants'; resting in medieval Christianity, upon the doctrine of the Fall of Adam and the birth into sin of all his descendants, the consequent necessity for the Atonement, and the exclusion from salvation of all who had not been released from the transmitted guilt of Adam by membership of the Church. The doctrine of exclusive salvation is directly responsible for the theory of persecution for religious opinions, because the right opinion was held to be necessary to salvation; insomuch that the unbaptized infant was doomed to an eternity of agony on account of Adam's sin five or six thousand years before its birth. Luther and Calvin were as emphatic on the subject as Rome. The great pagans were damned beside the unbaptized infants. Zwingli and Socinus in the Reformation era were alone in asserting conscience, not dogmatic belief, as the arbiter; the pioneers of the rationalism which transferred to reason the functions which had been assumed by authority. It was between the time of Bacon and Locke that Chillingworth, for the first time in England, taught the absolute innocence of honest error, and that the writ *De Heretico Comburendo* was expunged from the Statute Book.

It is a common error to suppose that opinion cannot be greatly repressed or even entirely suppressed by penal measures. Where opinion has survived and proved victorious over severe persecution, the fact has generally been due to other issues which were involved; and religious persecution has often been in effect successful. Most often, persecution has been defeated by a change in the atmosphere of thought which has weakened and finally ended the persecution itself. Nor, in many cases, have the persecuted refrained from persecution when the power has passed into their hands. The doctrine of exclusive salvation inevitably brings about persecution in order that souls may be saved though bodies perish through the repression of false doctrine. The earliest Christian persecutors found their warrant in the Levitical code which treated idolatry not as an error but as a crime. Arians and Catholics persecuted pagans and each other with equal zeal; and the doctrine of persecution received its most emphatic impulse from St. Augustine. In his eyes, heresy was the greatest of crimes. The ascetic doctrine of contempt and more than contempt for the body hardened men's hearts to physical suffering. The authority claimed for the Church was in many respects applied as a humanising and civilizing influence; but uncompromisingly it crushed all freedom of thought and of enquiry and was ultimately responsible for inflicting an enormous amount of bloodshed and suffering in the name of religion.

Though Protestantism was based on the assertion of the right and duty of exercising private judgement, it was nevertheless for long permeated with the same conception of the guilt of error and the same doctrine of exclusive salvation which were in fact inconsistent with its underlying principle, of which toleration was the necessary corollary; but it was only in the course of two centuries that the underlying principle prevailed over the established habit of thought. In France, the scepticism of Montaigne as a man of the world, of Descartes as a philosopher, and of Bayle as a scholar, had the greatest influence, in the three several fields which they touched, in developing this rationalist attitude; and most of all it was the scepticism of Voltaire, when the way had been thus prepared, that exposed the fundamental irrationalism of persecution. In England the idea of toleration was not derived from the sceptics; the most powerful indictment of intolerance was the Areopagitica of the Puritan Milton, and the spirit of toleration breathes in the Liberty of Prophesying by Jeremy Taylor; while it was bound up with the teaching of Chillingworth and the latitudinarian school in the Anglican Church, severely as they were condemned by other schools—a tribute to the greater flexibility of Protestantism.

IV—THE SECULARISATION OF POLITICS

In this branch of our subject, we shall observe first how theological interests, at one time dominant, ceased to be a main object of political combinations, and, secondly, how the basis of authority became secularised. Two moral influences have chiefly controlled the history of mankind, patriotism and religion. In the ancient world patriotism was supreme, religion but secondary, except in the case of the Hebrews, among whom the two were identified. With the establishment of Christianity, religious fervour displaced patriotic fervour, and the Church dominated politics; most conspicuously in the crusading era, which was also the era of the great Popes. Christendom battled wholeheartedly against Islam, and the Church could enforce the Truce of God. But with the improving organization of the civil governments and the weakening of ecclesiastical prestige, the business of administration passed out of the hands of the Churchmen, the governments ceased to fear the Church; and the new wars of religion which arose with the Reformation, unlike the Crusades, were diverted, complicated and dominated by political and national aspirations. After the Thirty Years War, religious differences could never again be the primary factor in political combinations.

The development of political feeling and the political habit of thought compels the severance of politics from theology. In the Middle Ages, politics were dominated by theology. When

this was the case, religion taught emphatically that while it might be right to disobey, it was mortal sin to resist and rebel against constituted authority. Rebellion was justified only when it was in obedience to the Church, as a higher authority than the temporal monarch, acting in the protection of morals and the repression of heresy. But the Church in its own contest with the temporal power, as well as in certain aspects of Christian teaching, was antagonistic to brute tyranny, and sympathetic towards the oppressed. While the Reformation by the appeal to private judgement encouraged the challenging of authority in politics as well as in theology, the most emphatic apologists of tyrannicide were among the Jesuits. But in countries where the Churchmen found their own interests bound up with the monarchy—as in Catholic France and Protestant England—the Church ranged itself on the side of Divine Right; while, where a protestantism that had its rise among the people gained sway it was inevitably also a political protestantism, democratic in character, tending to claim the ultimate authority not for the crown but for the people, and finding the sanction of a limited monarchy in the fiction of a social contract.

In England, the creators of political liberty as well as of religious toleration were not the religious free-thinkers—Hobbes, Bolingbroke, Hume, were all very positively on the side of the crown—but mainly the Puritans, English or Scotch, or men of a definitely religious cast of mind, concluding with Locke; both came out of or were fostered by Protestantism. In Catholic France we have seen that the champions of religious toleration against persecution were the sceptics; because the rigid insistence upon dogma sanctioned persecution in the Catholic country, whereas the diversities of protestantism, resting on the tenets of private judgement, could not be ultimately reconciled with persecution. French protestantism did, in fact, produce such works as Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, which asserted the elective basis of monarchy. But on the Continent generally, it was from the classics that the apostles of liberty drew their inspiration, a source scarcely reconcilable either with Puritanism or with Catholicism, being wholly dissociated from religion. And the development of the doctrines of liberty may be directly traced to the formation of a middle class by the increase of wealth, to the spreading of knowledge through the printing-press as well as its advance, to the weapons which deprived the privileged classes of their military superiority, and, finally, to the development of the science of political economy.

V—THE INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF RATIONALISM

The ancient civilizations were anti-industrial, resting upon the practice of slavery, and consequently emphasising the indignity of labour. A certain humanitarianism which developed in the early Empire, and the conquests of barbarians among whom slavery had never developed, did something towards reducing its worst aspects; but it was Christianity that by slow degrees did away with it altogether by the thirteenth century, though serfdom survived. The Church fostered the spirit of charity, the spirit of self-sacrifice and the sense of Christian equality, and actual manual labour derived a novel dignity from the practices of the monks themselves. But it was the impulse to seek at once wealth by commerce and political liberty, in the larger towns, that created industrial organization; and here industrialism and clericalism parted company, though at the outset they seemed likely to work in concert.

For industrialism and commerce required to hire money, and the Church forbade usury, the receiving of any 'consideration' for the loan of money. For long the Jews, outside the pale of the Church's prohibition, were the only moneylenders, till the commercial towns of Lombardy and Germany took their place—for the simple reason that to borrow was necessary, and to lend without an equivalent for the usage was not business. Yet the Church continued to denounce the practice as in the nature of robbery and as condemned by authority.

Commerce again was incompatible with the barriers which the Church interposed between the faithful and the heretics or infidels; since it required association and mutual confidence. It learnt to ignore these barriers; and the first to profit thereby were the Jews. Industrial development suffered its most severe checks in Spain from the intolerance which expelled Jews and Moors and in France from the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Commerce, in short, could not be reconciled with the theological spirit.

The Hanseatic League gave a solid force to commerce: it was glorified by Venice and Florence. At the same time the revival of classical learning was renewing the long lost influence of pre-Christian ideas; the pursuit of natural science and of speculative notions among the Moors, repressed by the Church in Europe, was nevertheless penetrating the finer intellects. On the one side this effected the revival of that most potent agency of art, the drama, which the Church had long practically crushed out of existence. A desire for intellectual amusements challenged the more barbarous forms of sport; and these things were a direct product of increasing material wealth. The brief favour they won from such a Pope as Leo was countered by the Popes of the Reformation era and their successors, and by Puritanism; and while religion denounced the actor, the leaders of rationalism defended his art.

Catholic Spain in the sixteenth century might have captured and held without dispute the industrial and commercial supremacy of the world; she flung it away by her religious intolerance, her preference for gold-mines above industry and her restrictions upon commerce; and it passed to the protestant Dutch and English, whose religious zeal did not conflict with their business instincts; nor did religion affect the commercial issues, except in this instance.

The development of the science of political economy in the eighteenth century drove out of the field the almost universal doctrine of the past that manufacture is a branch of industry inferior to and less honourable than agriculture. It made the acquisition of wealth a direct incentive to effort; by the development of commerce it increased intercommunication; and above all it disproved the old belief that one country can prosper commercially only at the

expense of another, demonstrating that the prosperity of each is to the advantage of all. The opposite habit of mind is so deeply ingrained that men even while they acknowledge the truth of the axiom will act in the directly contrary spirit, just as Protestants continued to persecute; but similarly the right habit of mind will become general, establishing the sense that a war of rivalry is to no one's advantage, the conquerer suffering more than he can possibly gain; and though the day be distant, enlightened self-interest, the strongest of motives with large masses of men, will also be the strongest of motives towards peace.

Thus Spake Zarathustra

FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE'S father, pastor at Röcken, near Leipzig, was of noble Polish extraction, and it was the son's boast that there was nothing German about him, although his mother and paternal grandmother were of that nationality. He disliked the 'Imperial' German intensely—which perhaps explains why the professors of the Fatherland were for the most part so antagonistic to him. Uncompromising revolt against his civilized environment was the characteristic trait in Nietzsche's literary life. His repudiation of the Christian faith and moral code showed him to be a notable 'free-thinker'; he was the apostle of the 'master morality' which urges the 'superman' to annihilate ruthlessly the weak in spirit.

IT is indispensable, I think, before one can profitably approach and hope even dimly to comprehend Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzche's most important work, Thus Spake Zarathustra, the extraordinary book with which his name must always be chiefly associated, that his other productions, with the criticisms and the commentaries thereon, shall be carefully studied. And even more essential is it to a right understanding of this strangest, obscurest and, therefore, most elusive of philosophers, that the reader shall study the life of Nietzche himself closely, and thus get to know what manner of man he was, and how it came about that his attitude towards his fellow man, his outlook on life, should have been what they were.

Much help in this direction may be obtained from Frau Förster-Nietzsche's very valuable Life of her distinguished brother; from his own Human, All-too-Human, which he describes as a book for Free Spirits; and from the autobiographical Ecce Homo, the last prose work from Nietzsche's pen, constituting a general summing-up of his character as a man, his purpose as a reformer, and his achievement in the realm of thought.

Nietzsche had many unattractive names for himself. He was Anti-Christ, he was the first Immoralist, he was a Dionysian, he was an Annihilator—and all this, maybe, because he was in the first place, a Great Sufferer. For years he suffered acutely and almost continuously from eye and brain troubles. Two hundred days out of every three hundred and sixty-five were, he declares, pure pain for a long period; and he was only forty-five when complete insanity overtook him in 1888, twelve years before his death. That he was in earnest there can be no doubt whatever.

Nothing easier, of course, than to sum him up—after the manner of certain of his contemporary critics, including not a few of his own countrymen—as insane all the time, or to dub his philosophy madness in the making. That was a trouble-saving and therefore a tempting method to those who had not the patience, perhaps not the ability, even to attempt to understand him. As Mr. Anthony M. Ludovici, one of Nietzsche's most accomplished translators and commentators, has pointed out, Georg Brandes and Taine and Strindberg all took the author of Zarathustra seriously; and they, surely, as artists, were better qualified to judge him than, say, the University dons, his chief detractors.

Probably it is not far from the truth to conclude that Nietzsche was endowed with too much brain—too much, at any rate, to work satisfactorily in unison with a nature so extraordinary sensitive and highly-strung. This gifted student who, at twenty-four, found himself Professor of Classical Philology at Basel University, had soon to pay the tragic penalty of his precocity; ten years later his health broke down, and he was forced to retire, a pensioner, while still on the hither side of middle life.

One of the chapters in Ecce Homo is headed: Why I Am So Wise; another Why I Am So Clever. It was, I should suppose, the vanity which seemed to be revealed in these provocative titles that more than all else aroused the ire of some of the duller opponents of Nietzche's writings. But let us listen to him a little as he talks of himself and his family, and shows 'how one becomes what one is':

> It required no effort on my part to be 'a good European,' for by the very nature of my origin I was allowed an outlook beyond the mere local, national and limited horizons. At the same time, I am perhaps more German than modern Germans—mere Imperial Germans—can hope to be. (The typical modern German was Nietzsche's constant bête noire.)
>
> My ancestors were Polish noblemen, and it is owing to them that I have so much race instinct in my blood. My mother, Franziska Oehler, and my paternal grandmother, Erdmuthe Krause, who lived in Weimar and was in contact with Goethe's circle, were very German. . . .
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> The whole of my 'Zarathustra' is a dithyramb in honour of solitude, or, if I have been understood, in honour of purity. Not, thank Heaven, in honour of 'pure foolery.' (Alluding to Wagner's 'pure fool' in Parsifal: the musician having earlier been his hero, one of his Supermen!)
>
> Of actual religious difficulties I have no experience. I have never known what it is to feel sinful. A 'prick of conscience,' of which I have no experience, must be a sort of 'evil eye.' I am quite unacquainted with atheism as a result, and still less as an event in my life: in me it is inborn, instinctive. I am too inquisitive, too incredulous, too high-spirited to be

satisfied with such a palpably clumsy solution of things. God is really no more than a coarse and rude prohibition of us thinkers. Ye shall not think! . . .

I believe only in French culture, and do not even take the German kind into consideration. Chiefly I love a few old French books. I can think of no century in history in which a netful of more inquisitive and at the same time more subtle psychologists could be drawn up than in the Paris of to-day—Paul Bourget, Pierre Loti, Gyp, Meilhac, Anatole France, Jules Lemaître, and a genuine Latin of whom I am particularly fond, Guy de Maupassant. Between ourselves, I prefer this generation to its masters—all corrupted by German philosophy. Stendhal is quite beyond price, with his psychologist's eye. He robbed me of the best atheistic joke—one *I* might have made: 'God's only excuse is that He does not exist.'

Some of these utterances, taken separately, do Nietzsche much less than justice: insolences at the expense of the Divinity, which naturally catch the eye, form but a minute portion of the writings embodying his philosophy, and they are noteworthy chiefly because they reveal his general attitude towards all convention, all authority, whether sacred or secular.

When this over-developed consciousness of his first began to work it displayed to its impatient owner the fact that he—who had already elected to think for himself—was faced, nay, surrounded, by all sorts of conditions which the bulk of his fellows, the enormous majority of mankind, were content to accept ready-made, without protest, without criticism. The edifice known as civilization was complete, for better for worse. But here was one who would take nothing for granted, neither religious creed nor ideal, nor social doctrine or convention; this clear, cold brain must needs investigate for itself, before accepting anything, from highest to lowest, as satisfactory, or even tolerable. The young thinker aimed at building men, for he had constructive ideas. But before one can build one must demolish, must clear the ground, sweep away the rubbish—and most of the things that he beheld came, in his opinion, under this last category. Hear him again:

I am in no way a bogey-man or moral monster. On the contrary, I am the very opposite in nature to the kind of man that has hitherto been honoured as virtuous—I am a disciple of the philosopher Dionysius, and I would prefer to be even a satyr than a saint. . . . The very last thing I should promise to accomplish would be to 'improve' mankind. I do not set up any new idols ('idols' is the name I give to all ideals). To overthrow idols is much more like my business.

In proportion as an ideal world has been falsely assumed, reality has been robbed of its value, its meaning and its truthfulness. . . . Hitherto the *lie* of the ideal has been the curse of reality; by means of it the very source of mankind's instincts has become mendacious and false; so much so that those values have come to be worshipped which are the exact *opposite* of those which would ensure man's prosperity, his future, and his great right to a future. . . .

Error (the belief in the ideal) is not blindness; error is cowardice. Every conquest, every step forward in knowledge, is the outcome of courage, of hardness, of cleanliness, towards one's self.

And the very man who thus despises idols (or ideals) was the inventor of that idol (or ideal) known as the Superman! However, he is nothing if not courageous. 'I attack only things that are triumphant,' he declares; 'only things against which I stand alone, without allies, compromising no one but myself.'

The idea of the Superman, by the way, occurred to Nietzsche long before Zarathustra was composed. In the early 70's he wrote: 'How can we praise and glorify a nation as a whole? Even among the Greeks it was the *individuals* that counted. . . . All that proceeds from power is good; all that springs from weakness is bad.' Hence, in this philosopher's eyes, Christianity is bad because it exalts the softer, humaner attributes of man ("the meek shall inherit the earth," etc.). Christianity changed the values of the deified modes of life and thought in Greece and Rome; now another change of Christian values is needed.

But it is time, after all this introduction to get to the book itself. Zarathustra is simply the original spelling of Zoroaster, the great Persian or Median teacher, founder of the religion of the Magi, embodied in the Zend Avesta, which to this day is used by Parsees as their bible. The whole of the book occupied Nietzsche less than a year. He wrote it, as it were, in short, sharp spasms, each of ten days' duration, in Rome, in Genoa and in Nice. The fundamental idea of the work—the Eternal Recurrence—was first conceived, he tells us, in the month of August 1881. 'I made a note of the idea on a sheet of paper, with the postscript: "Six thousand feet beyond man and time."' The thought struck me that day as I wandered through the woods beside the lake of Silvaplana, halting near Surlei, under a huge rock that towered aloft like a pyramid—the essential condition of its production was a second birth within me of the art of hearing—and a sudden and decisive change in my taste in music had occurred two months before. The whole of Zarathustra might perhaps be classified under the rubric of music.' During that walk by Silvaplana and other walks Nietzsche says he was 'waylaid' by Zarathustra.

In her preface Frau Förster-Nietzsche says the book is the history of her brother's most individual experiences—of his friendships, ideals, raptures, bitterest disappointments and sorrows . . . . He had the figure of Zarathustra in his mind from his earliest youth. He once told her that even as a child he had dreamt of him. At different times he would call this haunter of his dreams by different names; 'but in the end,' he said, 'I had to do a Persian the honour of identifying himself with this creation of my fancy. Persians were the first to take a broad and comprehensive view of history.'

'Zarathustra,' she continues, 'was written when Friedrich was beginning to rally after many years of steadily declining health, and it is to this first gush of the recovery of his once splendid bodily condition that we owe it. He often used to speak of the ecstatic mood in which he wrote it; how in his walks over hill and dale the ideas would crowd into his mind, and how he would jot them down hastily in a notebook.' Here is Nietzsche's own description of how the words came to him:

Has anyone at the end of this nineteenth century any distinct notion of what poets of a stronger age understood by the word inspiration? If not, I will describe it. If one had the smallest vestige of superstition in one it would hardly be possible to set aside completely the idea that one is the mere

incarnation, mouthpiece, or medium of an almighty power. One hears—one does not seek; one takes—one does not ask who gives: a thought suddenly flashes up like lightning; it comes of necessity, unhesitatingly—I have never had any choice in the matter. There is an ecstasy such that the immense strain of it is sometimes relaxed by a flood of tears. It actually seems, to use one of Zarathustra's own phrases, as if 'all things came unto me and would fain be similes.'

Zarathustra was more truthful than any other thinker. In his teaching alone do we meet with truthfulness upheld as the highest virtue, *i.e.* the reverse of the *cowardice* of the idealist who flees from reality—the overcoming of morality through itself—through truthfulness; the overcoming of the moralist through his opposite—*through me* that is what the name Zarathustra means in my mouth.

Nietzsche's contention was that in morality there are no absolute values, 'good' or 'evil'; everything is relative; that which is good for the lion or the eagle is bad for their prey, the antelope or the lamb; the butterfly pretending to be a leaf, is acting a lie; but it is good for the butterfly thus to preserve its life. Concepts of good and evil are therefore, in their origin, merely a means to an end—expedients for acquiring power. Nietzsche attacks Christian moral values as low—merely an expedient for protecting a certain type of man. Conflicting moral codes have been no more than the conflicting weapons of different classes of men, for in mankind there is continual war between the powerful, the noble, the strong and the well constituted on the one side, and the impotent, the mean and the ill constituted on the other. The war is a war of moral principles . . .

Thus Spake Zarathustra begins with a Prologue, simply and nobly constructed. It opens as follows:

When Zarathustra was thirty years old, he left his home and the lake of his home, and went into the mountains. There he enjoyed his spirit and his solitude, and for ten years did not weary of it. But at last his heart changed and, rising one morning with the rosy dawn, he went before the sun and spake thus unto it:

Thou great star! What would be thy happiness if thou hadst not those for whom thou shinest!

For ten years hast thou climbed hither unto my cave; thou wouldst have wearied of thy light and of the journey, had it not been for me, my eagle and my serpent.

But we awaited thee every morning, took from thee thine overflow, and blessed thee for it.

Lo! I am weary of my wisdom, like the bee that hath gathered too much honey; I need hands outstretched to take it.

I would fain bestow and distribute, until the wise have once more become joyous in their folly and far from happy in their riches.

Therefore must I descend into the deep, as thou doest in the evening, when thou goest behind the sea and givest light also to the nether world, thou exuberant star!

He asks the Sun to bless his enterprise, and goes down the mountain alone. To a holy man whom he encounters in the forest Zarathustra explains his mission: "I am bringing gifts unto men," he tells him. The saint laughs. "Go not to men, but stay in the forest!" he says. "Go rather to the beasts. Why not be like me—a bear among bears, a bird among birds? I make hymns and sing them; and in making hymns I laugh and weep and mumble: thus do I praise God. But what dost thou bring us as a gift?"

Zarathustra answers: "What should I have to give thee! Let me rather hurry hence, lest I take aught away from thee!" And so they parted.

When Zarathustra was alone he said: "Could it be possible! This old saint in the forest hath not yet heard of it, that *God is dead!*"

In a town near the forest Zarathustra speaks to the people in the market place:

'I teach you the *Superman*. Man is something that is to be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass man?

'All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and ye want to be the ebb of that great tide, and would rather go back to the beast than surpass man?

'What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing of shame. And just the same shall man be to the Superman.

'Ye have made your way from the worm to man, and much within you is still worm. Once were ye apes, and even yet man is more of an ape than any of the apes.

'Even the wisest among you is only a disharmony and hybrid of plant and phantom.

'Lo, I teach you the Superman! The Superman is the meaning of the earth. I conjure you, brethren, *remain true to the earth*, and believe not those who speak unto you of super-earthly hopes! Poisoners are they; despisers of life are they: so away with them!'

Much more spake Zarathustra to the people, but they all laughed at him, and called on a rope-dancer, who was in the market place, to begin his performance. Zarathustra resumed his discourse, but soon his hearers wearied of him, and would listen to him no more.

Then a light dawned upon Zarathustra: 'Not to the people am I to speak, but to companions.'

In other words, he finds the mob not enlightened enough to understand him; in future he will address himself to the elect—the thinkers, the sceptics. Nietzsche, indeed, ever had in view an aristocratic arrangement of society. He would have us rear an ideal race, finer, both physically and mentally, than any that had preceded it. 'With these preachers of equality,' he exclaims, 'will I not be mixed up and confounded, for thus speaketh justice to me: "Men are not equal!"'

There follow immediately, the right audience having been found, parabolic Discourses, eighty in number, and on a great variety of life's problems. Mr. Ludovici supplies valuable notes on many of them, especially such as are entirely allegorical; and truly most of these pages cry aloud for elucidation. Certain short passages of these fine Discourses may be quoted, as typical of this extraordinary thinker and his method of expression.

He talks of 'Old and Young Women':

Two different things wanteth the true man: danger and diversion. Therefore wanteth he woman, as the most dangerous plaything.

Too sweet fruits—these the warrior liketh not. Therefore liketh he woman;—bitter is even the sweetest woman.

Better than man doth woman understand children; but man is more childish than woman.

In the true man there is a child hidden; it wanteth to play. Up then, ye women, and discover the child in man.

Then answered me the old woman: 'Many fine things hath Zarathustra said. Strange! Zarathustra knoweth little about woman, and yet he is

right about them. And now accept a little truth by way of thanks! I am old enough for it!'

'Give me, woman, thy little truth!' said I. And thus spake the old woman:

'Thou goest to women? Forget not thy whip!'

There is generally a touch of irony in Nietzsche's references to women, but it would be altogether a delusion to suppose him inimical to the absurdly-styled 'weaker sex.' It is against the modern tendency to sex equality, sex similarity that he raises his voice. He would have woman become ever more womanly and man ever more manly: by attempting to masculinise women we run the risk of feminising men, to the jeopardy of the people's future.

Elsewhere Nietzsche exhorts his disciples not to follow him blindly, but to become independent thinkers, and to find themselves 'before they learn anything more from him.' There is indeed much to admire in these admirable Discourses, which if one only takes the trouble to study them, impress one with a sense of their author's sincerity, his learning, his wit, his style, ay, and his humour—a quality generally denied him by his dry-as-dust opponents. One has but to read The Vision and the Enigma! and The Old and New Tables to realize that here is something like inspiration, to feel convinced that in these pages are the outlines of a philosophy of life which, perfected, might well provide an antidote to the futilities and extravagances of present day democracy. In any case, Thus Spake Zarathustra is a book that will amply reward the seeker after truth; for in it he will find abundant matter for serious consideration.

Nietzsche somewhat spoilt his case at times by a rash use of wild and whirling words sounding impious to orthodox ears; but in reality his irreligious phrases are more often than not uttered in nothing but a 'Pickwickian sense.' One leaves him with the conviction that he was not an iconoclast of the sort who destroys wantonly, or out of resentment and revenge—the anarchists and new revolutionaries—but rather one who destroys to build better, and thus becomes a creator. And when you know him, he is by no means dull, as might be feared. 'Learn, I pray you, to laugh—all good things laugh!' is the word on which I will leave him And the intelligent will laugh at, not with, the Philosopher.

Principles of Ethics

HERBERT SPENCER

AS early as 1842 Spencer indicated what he conceived to be certain general principles of right and wrong in political conduct, and from that time onwards his ultimate purpose was to find a scientific basis for the principles of right and wrong in conduct at large. He felt this to be an undertaking of pressing urgency, and this purpose was carried into effect with the Principles of Ethics, the first part of which was published in 1879 under the title of The Data of Ethics, and the concluding parts in 1893, the entire work having thus occupied Spencer's attention for a period of fifty years.

I—THE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT

WHAT constitutes advance in the evolution of conduct as we trace it up from the lowest types of living creatures to the highest? It is the more numerous and better adjustment of acts to ends; for this not only furthers prolongation of life, but it also furthers increased amount of life. We must also recognize those adjustments which have for their final purpose the life of the species. It is an error to suppose, however, that either of these kinds of conduct can assume its highest form without its highest form being assumed by a third kind of conduct yet to be named. For beyond so behaving that each achieves his end without preventing others from achieving their ends, the members of a society may give mutual help in the achievement of ends, and thus their conduct may assume a yet higher phase of evolution.

The conduct to which we apply the name 'good' is the relatively more evolved conduct, and 'bad' is the name we apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved. We regard as good the conduct furthering self-preservation, and as bad the conduct tending to self-destruction. Parental conduct is called good or bad as it increases or decreases the power of perpetuating the species by fostering progeny. And the form of conduct is most emphatically termed good which is such that life may be completed in each and in his offspring, not only without preventing completion of it in others, but with furtherance of it in others. Conduct called good rises to the conduct conceived as best when it simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring and in fellow-men.

Analysis of the standards of the different moral schools shows that every one of them, whether perfection of nature is the assigned proper end of life, or virtuousness of action, or rectitude of motive, derives its authority from this postulate as its ultimate standard, that life is good or bad according as it does or does not bring a surplus of agreeable feeling. The implication common to their antagonist views is that conduct should conduce to preservation of the individual, of the family and of the society, only supposing that life brings more happiness than misery.

Let us consider them separately.

Perfection is synonymous with goodness in its highest degree, and hence to define good conduct in terms of perfection is to define good conduct in terms of itself.

Pass we now to the views of those moralists who make virtuousness of action the standard. If virtue is primordial and independent, no reason can be given why there should be any correspondence between virtuous conduct and conduct that is pleasure-giving in its total

effects on self, on others, or on both ; and if there is not a necessary correspondence, it is conceivable that the conduct classed as virtuous should be pain-giving in its total effects. Which is impossible ; for examination will show that the conception of virtue cannot be separated from the conception of happiness-producing conduct.

II—HAPPINESS AND BLESSEDNESS

It is curious to see how views of life and conduct which originated with those who propitiated deified ancestors by self-tortures enter even still into the ethical theories of many persons who have years since cast away the theology of the past, and suppose themselves to be no longer influenced by it.

In the writings of one who rejects dogmatic Christianity together with the Hebrew cult which preceded it, a career of conquest costing tens of thousands of lives is narrated with a sympathy comparable to the rejoicing which the Hebrew traditions show us over destruction of enemies in the name of God. Along with the worship of the strong man, along with this yearning for a form of society in which the supremacy of the few is unrestrained, and the virtue of the many consists in obedience to them, we naturally find repudiation of the ethical theory which takes the greatest happiness as the end of conduct.

We not unnaturally find this utilitarian philosophy designated by the contemptuous title of ' pig-philosophy.' And then, serving to show what comprehension there has been of the philosophy so nicknamed, we are told that not happiness but blessedness must be the end. Obviously, the implication is that blessedness is not a kind of happiness. And this implication at once suggests the question—What mode of feeling is it ? If it is a state of consciousness at all, it is necessarily one of three states—painful, indifferent, or pleasurable. Does it leave the possessor at the zero point of sentiency ? Then it leaves him just as he would be if he had not got it. Does it not leave him at zero point ? Then it must leave him above zero or below zero.

Each of these possibilities may be conceived under two forms. That to which the term ' blessedness ' is applied may be a particular state of consciousness—one among the many states that occur, and on this supposition we have to recognize it as a pleasurable state, an indifferent state, or a painful state. Otherwise blessedness is a word not applicable to a particular state of consciousness, but characterises the aggregate of its states ; and in this case the average of the aggregate is to be conceived as one in which the pleasurable predominates, or one in which the painful predominates, or one in which pleasures and pains exactly cancel one another.

What, now, shall we say of one who is for the time being blessed in performing a work of mercy ? Is his mental state pleasurable ? If so, blessedness is a particular form of happiness. Is the state indifferent or painful ? In that case the blessed man is so devoid of sympathy that relieving another from pain either leaves him wholly unmoved, or gives him an unpleasant emotion. So that if blessedness is a particular mode of consciousness temporarily existing as a concomitant of each kind of beneficent action, those who deny that it is a pleasure, or constituent of happiness, confess themselves either not pleased by the welfare of others, or displeased by it.

Otherwise understood, blessedness must refer to the totality of feelings experienced during the life of one who occupies himself with the actions the word connotes. This also presents the three possibilities—surplus of pleasure, surplus of pains, equality of the two. If the pleasurable states are in excess, then the blessed life can be distinguished from any other pleasurable life only by the relative amount or the quality of its pleasures ; it is a life which makes happiness of a certain kind and degree its end ; and the assumption that blessedness is not a form of happiness lapses. If the blessed life is one in which the pleasures and pains received balance one another, or if it is one in which the pleasures are outbalanced by the pains, then the blessed life has the character which the pessimist alleges of life at large. Annihilation is best, he will argue ; since if an average that is indifferent is the outcome of the blessed life, annihilation at once achieves it. And if a surplus of suffering is the outcome of this highest kind of life called blessed, still more should life in general be ended.

In conclusion, we may say that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name — gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception.

III—EGOISM VERSUS ALTRUISM

That egoism precedes altruism in order of imperativeness is evident. For the acts which make continued life possible must, on the average, be more peremptory than all those other acts which life makes possible, including the acts which benefit others.

Turning from life as existing to life as evolving, we are equally shown this. Sentient beings have progressed from low to high types, under the law that the superior shall profit by their superiority, and the inferior shall suffer from their inferiority. Which is to say that egoistic claims must take precedence of altruistic claims. Conformity to this law has been, and is still, needful, not only for the continuance of life, but for the increase of happiness ; since the superior are those having faculties better adjusted to the requirements—faculties, therefore, which bring in their exercise greater pleasure and less pain.

If we define altruism as being all action which, in the normal course of things, benefits others instead of benefiting self, then from the dawn of life altruism has been no less essential than egoism ; for such defect of altruistic acts as causes death of offspring, or inadequate development of them, involves disappearance from future generations of the nature that is not altruistic enough, so decreasing the average egoism. In short, every species is continually purifying itself from the unduly egoistic individuals ; while there are being lost to it the

unduly altruistic individuals. Let us consider the several ways in which, under social conditions, personal welfare depends on the regard for the welfare of others.

Fullness of egoistic satisfaction in the associated state, depending primarily on maintenance of the normal relations between efforts expended and benefits obtained, which underlies all life, implies an altrusim which prompts equitable conduct and prompts the enforcing of equity. The egoistic satisfaction of each depends in large measure on such altruistic actions as are implied, first, in being just ; secondly, in seeing justice done to others ; and thirdly, in improving the agencies by which justice is administered.

But the identification of personal advantage with the advantage of fellow-citizens is much wider than this. Whatever conduces to their vigour concerns him : for it diminishes the cost of everything he buys. Whatever conduces to their freedom from disease concerns him ; for it diminishes his own liability to disease. Whatever raises their intelligence concerns him ; for inconveniences are daily entailed upon him by others' ignorance or folly. Whatever raises their moral characters concerns him ; for at every turn he suffers from the average unconscientiousness.

Much more directly do his egoistic satisfactions depend on those altruistic activities which enlist the sympathies of others. By alienating those around, selfishness loses the unbought aid they can render, shuts out a wide range of social enjoyments, and fails to receive those exaltations of pleasure and mitigations of pain which come from men's fellow-feeling with those they like. Undue egoism defeats itself by bringing on an incapacity for happiness. Purely egoistic gratifications are rendered less keen by satiety even in the earlier part of life, and almost disappear in the later ; the less satiating gratifications of altruism are missed throughout life, and especially in the latter part, when they largely replace egoistic gratifications ; and there is a lack of susceptibility to aesthetic pleasures of the higher orders.

This dependence of egoism upon altruism ranges beyond the limits of each society and tends ever towards universality. That within each society it becomes greater as social evolution —implying increase of mutual evolution— implying increase of mutual dependence— progresses, needs not be shown ; and it is a corollary that as fast as the dependence of societies on one another is increased by commercial intercourse, the internal welfare of each becomes a matter of concern to the others.

Though altruism of a social kind, lacking certain elements of parental altruism, can never attain the same level, yet it may be expected to attain a level at which it would be like altruism in spontaneity—a level such that ministration to others' happiness would become a daily need. General altruism, in its developed form, must inevitably resist individual excesses of altruism. Three spheres would ultimately remain for altruism. The first, which must, to the last, continue large in extent, is that which family life affords. The other two are pursuit of social welfare, and the opportunities afforded by accidents, diseases and misfortunes.

IV—ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS

A GREAT part of the perplexities in ethical speculation arises from neglect of the distinction between the absolutely right and the relatively right. And many further perplexities are due to the assumption that it can in some way be decided in every case which of two courses is morally obligatory.

Consider the relation of a healthy mother to a healthy infant. Between the two there exists a mutual dependence which is a source of pleasure to both. Consequently, the act of yielding to the child its natural food is of the kind we call absolutely right. In contrast, the wearisomeness of productive labour as ordinarily pursued renders it so far wrong ; but then far greater suffering would result both to the labourer and his family, and therefore far greater wrong would be done, were this wearisomeness not borne. The act is relatively right. Further, in many cases, there is no absolutely right course, but only courses of which it is not possible to say which is the least wrong.

To make the ideal man serve as a standard of normal conduct, he has to be defined in terms of the conditions which his nature fulfils. We must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state. On the evolution hypothesis the two presuppose one another ; and only when they coexist can there exist that ideal conduct which absolute ethics have to formulate, and which relative ethics have to take, as the standard by which to estimate divergences from right or degrees of wrong.

The formula of justice is ' Every man is free to do what he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.'

Admitting that the establishment of an ethically complete right of property is beset with difficulties like those which beset the establishment of an ethically complete right to the use of the earth, we are, nevertheless, shown by a survey of the facts which existing primitive societies present, and the facts traceable in the early histories of civilized societies, that the right of property is originally deducible from the law of equal freedom ; and it ceases to be so deducible only when the other corollaries from the law have been disregarded. Many in our days are seeking to over-ride this right. They do not see the suspension of the natural discipline by which every kind of creature is kept fit for the activities demanded by the conditions of life, which inevitably bring about unfitness for life, and either prompt or slow disappearance.

A product of mental labour may as truly be considered property as a product of manual labour.

Complete ownership of anything implies power to make over the ownership to another ; since a partial or entire interdict implies partial or entire ownership by the authority issuing the interdict, and therefore limits or over-rides the ownership.

Government is instrumental to the maintenance of rights—here in great measure, there in small measure ; but in whatever measure, it is merely instrumental, and whatever it has in it which may be called right, must be so called only in virtue of its efficiency in maintaining rights. Recognizing the truth that

societies evolve, we cannot rationally assume the unity of their nature. A body politic which has to operate on other such bodies is fundamentally unlike one which has to operate only on component units.

When a society is endangered bodily by other societies, its required coercive constitution is one which, far though it may be from the absolutely right, is yet relatively right. The required constitution of the fully developed industrial type is quite different. At first sight it seems that it should be one in which each citizen has an equal share of power with his fellows. But this is not a legitimate corollary, because men will, on the average, be swayed by their interests, or apparent interests. Hence the industrial type of society in which equity is fully realized must be one in which there is not a representation of individuals, but of interests.

The truth we have to recognize is that, with humanity as it now exists, the possession of what are called equal political rights will not ensure the maintenance of equal rights properly so called.

The immediate enfranchisement of women is urged on the ground that women must have the suffrage because otherwise they cannot get from men their just claims. This is practically to contend that men will concede the suffrage knowing that with it they concede these claims, but will not concede the claims by themselves.

The love of the helpless, which may serve as a general description of the parental instinct, stronger in women than in men, and swaying their conduct outside the family as well as inside more than it sways the conduct of men, must in a still greater degree than in man prompt public actions which are unduly regardful of the inferior as compared with the superior. The present tendency of both sexes is to contemplate citizens as having claims in proportion to their needs—their needs being habitually proportional to their merits; and this tendency, stronger in women than in men, must, if it operates politically, cause a more general fostering of the worse at the expense of the better. Instead of the maintenance of the rights, which is but a systematic enforcement of the principle that each should receive the good and evil results of his own conduct, there would come greater and more numerous breaches of them than at present.

V—STATE DUTIES AND THE FUTURE

FATHERHOOD implies ownership of the means by which children and dependents are supported. In developed nations the governing agent does not now support those over whom it exercises authority; but, contrariwise, they support the agent. Hence, that theory of the functions of the state which is based on the assumed parellelism between parent and child and government and people is false. The conception of state duties that was fit for Greek societies is supposed by many to be fit for modern societies.

It is thought that a political ethics belonging to a system of compulsory co-operation applies also to a system of voluntary co-operation. If we now ask what is the theory appropriate to societies organized on the principle of voluntary co-operation, it is that, beyond maintaining justice, the state can do nothing without transgressing justice.

Doubtless, most persons will read with astonishment this denial of unrestricted state power, and this assertion that it commits an offence when it exceeds the prescribed limits.

Just as among those who uphold the 'sacred duty of blood revenge' the injunction to forgive injuries is unlikely to meet with ready acceptance, so it is not to be expected that among party politicians, eagerly competing with one another to gain votes by promising state aids of countless kinds, any attention will be paid to a doctrine of state duties which excludes the great mass of their favourite schemes. It must be asserted, however, that their schemes are at variance with the fundamental principle of a harmonious social life.

When the pressure of population has been rendered small—proximately by prudential restraints, and ultimately by decreases of fertility—and when long-range rifles, big guns, dynamite shells and other implements for wholesale slaughter are to be found only in museums, sympathy will probably increase to a degree which we can now hardly conceive. For the process of evolution must inevitably favour all changes of nature which increase life and augment happiness, especially such changes as do this at small cost.

Natures which by the help of a more developed language of emotion, vocal and facial, are enabled to enter so fully into others' pleasurable feelings that they can add these to their own, must be natures capable of a beatitude far greater than is now possible. In such natures a large part of the mental life must result from participation in the mental life of others.

Thus, along with increasing re-adaptation, altruism will become less and less the assuager of suffering, and more and more the exalter of happiness.

As time goes on, there will be more and more of those whose unselfish aim will be the further evolution of humanity. The highest ambition of the beneficent will be to have a share in 'the making of man.'

Degeneration

MAX SIMON NORDAU

MAX NORDAU first achieved world-wide notoriety in 1893 when he published Entartung—Degeneration. There is undoubtedly a considerable amount of force in his application of the theory of physical degeneration to the intellectual side of civilized man, and a large admixture of truth in his contention that confused aesthetic theory, mysticism in thought and so-called realism in art are indicative of the vain, spasmodic struggling of an effete civilization. Yet Nordau was not a pessimist, maintaining as he did that the degeneration of the time was only temporary. A translation of Degeneration is published by Messrs. William Heinemann, Ltd., by whose permission this outline is included here.

I—THE DUSK OF THE NATIONS

THE old Northern faith contained the gloomy doctrine of the Dusk of the Gods. In our days there has arisen in more highly developed minds a vague fear of a Dusk of the Nations, in which mankind, with all its institutions and creations, is perishing in the midst of a dying world. One epoch of history is unmistakably in its decline, and another is announcing its approach. Meanwhile the terrors of an interregnum prevail; the people, robbed of its leaders, does not know where to turn; the strong men work their will; false prophets arise, and power is divided among those whose rod is heavy because their time is short.

Men look with longing for whatever new things are at hand, without presage when they will come, or what they will be. Some hope in this chaos of thought that art will yield revelations of the order that is to come out of this disorder. What shall we believe in? Where shall we seek for goodness and beauty and wisdom?

Such are the cries of the people, and wherever a cheap-jack sets up a booth and pretends to give an answer, and wherever a fool or a knave begins to prophesy in verse or prose, or professes to have found some new method in art, a multitude gathers around him and tries to find in his work some meaning to be divined and interpreted.

It is true that the great majority of the middle and lower classes is not decadent, though the spirit of the times is agitating the nations to their lowest depths and awakening even in the most rudimentary human being a feeling of stir and upheaval. It is only a very small minority which honestly finds pleasure in the new tendencies, and proclaims them, with genuine conviction, as sound, sure guides for the future and pledges of pleasure and moral benefit. But as a little oil is able to extend over a large tract of the sea, this minority has the gift of extending itself over the whole surface of society.

The manifest stages of decadence in modern art must be patent to everybody. The Philistine, however, regards them as a passing affectation, and the literary critic, being unable to see their real meaning, talks in a lofty way of 'the richer vibrations of the refined nervous system of the present day.' But a physician, especially if he be a student of mental maladies, recognizes in the tendencies of contemporary art and poetry the symptoms of two diseases, degeneracy and hysteria, of which the minor stages are found in nervous debility.

It must not be supposed that degeneration is synonymous with absence of talent. A degenerate may be a genius. He can attain to a high degree of intellectual power, though from a moral point of view his existence is completely deranged. Every man of genius is no more a lunatic than every lunatic is a man of genius. Still, there are many cases in which the higher degenerates have some exceptional mental gift, which has been developed at the cost of other faculties, wholly or partially atrophied.

It is this which enables a man of science to distinguish between a sane genius and the most highly gifted degenerate. Take from the former the special faculties that make him a genius, and there will still remain a capable, intelligent and moral man. But let the same method be tried in the case of a degenerate, and there will remain only a criminal or a madman. Imagine a Schopenhauer who had written no astounding books, and we should have before us only a repulsive monster, whose morals would exclude him from good society and whose fixed ideas of persecution would point him out as a candidate for a madhouse.

I am sorry to say that I do not share Lombroso's opinion that highly gifted degenerates are an active force in the progress of mankind. They do, alas! often exercise a deep influence, but their influence is always baneful. Their conceptions are never of a high order, for they are incapable of great thoughts and prolific ideas.

This fact is in peculiar contrast to the excessive development of their powers of imagination. If they are painters, their predominant attribute will be the colour sense; they will be decorative. If they are poets, they will be rich in rhyme and brilliant in style, but barren of thought. Such are the qualities of the most gifted of those men who are proclaimed by their followers as the guides to the promised land of the future. The multitude who admire these men and delight in their extravagances, suffer, as a rule, from hysteria or nervous debility.

II—THE PRE-RAPHAELITES

The Anglo-Saxon race is by nature healthy and strong-minded. But owing to the development of English industry, Englishmen have had to work harder than other races and live more under artificial conditions. Hence the state of degeneration and exhaustion which we now observe in all civilized countries showed itself sooner in England than elsewhere.

In consequence, however, of the character of the English mind, the emotional factor of degeneration and exhaustion assumed in England a religious colouring. The Oxford movement was followed by spiritualism, and in the world of art the religious enthusiasm of the degenerate and hysterical sect of Englishmen found its expression in pre-Raphaelitism.

The most notable of the pre-Raphaelites was Dante Gabriel Rossetti. He is the most instructive example of the often-quoted assertion of Balzac of the determining influence of a name on the development and destiny of its bearer.

Rossetti's whole poetical feeling was rooted in Dante. In The Divine Comedy, however, there is nothing of the mixture of transcendentalism and sensuality, of shadowy ideation and senseless combinations of incompatible ideas, which we find in the poems of Rossetti. This is because Dante was a mystic from ignorance, not from the weak-mindedness of degeneration. All his ideas were clear, homogeneous and free from internal contradictions. He built up his Hell, his Purgatory, his Paradise, on the science of his times, and he followed the realities of the world with the keenly penetrating eyes of an observer.

Rossetti's poems are not based upon the scientific knowledge of his time, but upon a mass of undeveloped germs of ideas in constant mutual strife. He was incapable of the attention necessary to see and understand real things and, feeling this weakness, he persuaded himself that he did not wish to do what in fact he could not do.

Reference must be made to some of the peculiarities of Rossetti's verses, because they are characteristic of the brainwork of weak, degenerate minds. The first thing that strikes us is his love of refrains. The refrain is an excellent means in poetry for revealing the state of a soul under the influence of a strong emotion. But there is nothing natural and intelligible about Rossetti's refrains. They have no relation to the emotion or action expressed by the poem, but possess the character of an obsession which the patient cannot suppress, though he recognizes that it has no rational connexion with the intellectual content of his consciousness. Many of Rossetti's poems consist of the stringing together of wholly disconnected words, and to mystic readers these absurdities seem naturally to have the deepest meaning.

Besides Dante Gabriel Rossetti, it has been customary to include Swinburne and Morris among the pre-Raphaelite poets, but the similarity between these two and the head of the school is remote. William Morris is intellectually far more healthy than Rossetti or Swinburne. His affectation consists in medievalism, and his emotional activity made him an adherent of a vague socialism founded on love and pity for his fellow-men, which, however, sounds rather odd when it is expressed affectedly in the language of the old ballads.

Swinburne, on the other hand, is undoubtedly a higher degenerate. He is not so emotional as Rossetti, but he stands on a much higher mental plane. His thought is false and frequently delirious, but he has thoughts, and they are clear and connected. He is mystical, but his mysticism partakes more of the depraved and criminal than of the paradisiacal and divine. Like all degenerates, he is extraordinarily susceptible to suggestion; consciously or unconsciously, he has imitated all the strongly marked poetic geniuses that have come under his notice. He is an echo of Rossetti and Baudelaire, as he is of Gautier and Victor Hugo, and in his poems it is possible to trace the course of his reading.

The pre-Raphaelites have for twenty years exercised a great influence on the rising generation of English poets. If the whole of English poetry is not to-day unmitigatedly pre-Raphaelite, this is due to the fortunate accident that with the pre-Raphaelites so sound a poet as Tennyson lived and worked. Pre-Raphaelitism in its further development degenerated in England into 'aestheticism' and in France into 'symbolism.'

III—WAGNERISM

Wagnerism is the German contribution to modern mysticism, and it far outweighs all that the other nations have supplied to that movement. For Germany is powerful in everything, and the magnitude of its elementary force manifests itself crushingly in its degenerate as well as in its ennobling efforts.

Richard Wagner is the greatest degenerate of the age. The stigmata of this morbid condition are united in him in their most complete and most luxuriant development. He displays in the general constitution of his mind the persecution mania, megalomania and mysticism; in his instincts, vague philanthropy, anarchism, a craving for revolt and contradiction; in his writings all the signs of graphomania—incoherence, fugitive ideation and a tendency to idiotic punning; and, as the groundwork of his nature, the characteristic emotionalism of a kind at once erotic and religiously enthusiastic.

The dramas of Wagner give us a deep insight into the world of ideas of an erotically emotional, degenerate nature. They reveal the alternating mental conditions of a most reckless licentiousness, of a revolt of moral sentiment against the tyranny of appetite, of the ruin of the higher man and his despairing repentance.

Like all the degenerates, Wagner is wholly sterile as a poet, although he has written a long series of dramatic works. The creative force capable of reproducing the spectacle of universal normal life is denied him. He has recourse to his own mystico-erotic emotions for the emotional content of his pieces, and the external incidents forming their skeletons are merely the reminiscences of books which have made an impression on him. That which passes before our eyes in Wagner's operas is not life, but spectres, witches' sabbaths, or dreams.

Wagner has swaggered about the art work

of the future, and his partisans have hailed him as the artist of the future. He the artist of the future! He is the bleating echo of the far-away past. His path leads back to deserts long since abandoned by all life. Wagner is the last mushroom on the dunghill of romanticism. This 'modern' is the degraded heir of a Tieck, of a La Motte-Fouqué—nay, more, sad to say, of a Johann Friedrich Kind. The home of his intellect is the Dresden evening paper. He derives his subsistance from the legacy of medieval poems, and dies of starvation when the remittance from the thirteenth century fails to arrive.

All the crotchets in Wagner's musical theories find their explanation in his clear consciousness of his incompetency. He was led to his theory of unending melody, for instance, by his limited capacity for the invention of finite—that is to say, real—melodies. His weakness in melodic creation has struck all impartial musicians.

In youth his power in this direction was more abundant, and he succeeded in creating in The Flying Dutchman, Tannhauser, and Lohengrin some superb airs. With increasing age this faculty of his became more and more impoverished, and in proportion as the torrent of melodic invention dried up in him, he insisted with greater obstinacy and asperity on his theory of unending melody.

Wagner was incapable of distinguishing the individual personages of his operas by a purely musical characterisation, and therefore he invented the *leit-motif*. Experiencing a great difficulty in creating true melodies, he set up the postulate of the unending melody.

This pretended musician of the future is an out-and-out musician of the distant past. His *leit-motif*, in which music is debased to a conventional phonetic symbol, is atavism; his unending melody is atavism, leading back to the fixed form of the vague recitative of savages; atavism, too, is his subordination of highly differentiated instrumental music to music-drama, which mixes music and poetry, and allows neither of the two art forms to attain to independence.

Wagner's mighty influence on his contemporaries is to be explained neither by his capacities as author or musician, nor by any of his personal qualities, but by the peculiarities of the nervous temperament of the people of the present age, It was not until he had long passed his fiftieth year that he began to know the intoxication of universal fame; and in the last decade of his life he was installed among the demi-gods. It had come to this, that the world had in the interval become ripe for him—and for the madhouse. He had the good fortune to endure until the general degeneration and hysteria were sufficiently advanced to supply a rich soil for his theories and his art.

Although the hysteria of the age is not so widespread in Germany as it is in France and England, yet during the last quarter of a century it has continued to gain ground there. Germany was longer protected from it than the other civilized nations of the west of Europe by the smaller development of her large industries and by the comparative absence of her large cities. In the last generation, however. both of these gifts have been abundantly accorded her, and two great wars have done whatever else was wanted to make the nervous system of her people susceptible to the pernicious influences of the city and the factory system.

Wagnerism is now the most widely diffused aberration of the present time, and the most momentous. By it posterity will be able to measure the whole breadth and depth of the degeneration and hysteria of the present age.

IV—THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

TOWARDS the end of the nineteenth century the mental disorder affecting modern society began to manifest itself in three chief forms—mysticism, ego-mania and pseudo-realism.

Pre-Raphaelitism, Wagnerism and Tolstoyism were varieties of mysticism, which is an expression of an inaptitude for attention, for clear thought and for the control of the emotions, and has for its cause the weakness of the higher cerebral centres.

Ibsenism and Nietzschism were varieties of ego-mania, which is an effect of faulty transmission by the sensory nerves, of obtuseness in the centres of perception, aberration of instincts from a craving for strong impressions, and of a morbid predominance of organic sensations over representative consciousness.

Zolaism was an example of false realism, and this proceeded from confused aesthetic theories, and was characterised by pessimism and an irresistible tendency to vulgar and licentious modes of expression.

In all these three forms we detect the same ultimate elements—namely, a brain incapable of healthy work owing to exhaustion.

Hysteria and degeneration have, of course, always existed. But in former days they used to appear but rarely, and they were of no importance in the life of the whole community. It was the vast fatigue felt by the men of the last generation, whose strength was overtaxed by the multitude of discoveries and innovations that burst abruptly upon them, which created so favourable a condition for the spread of those maladies that they became a danger to civilization.

We stand now in the midst of a severe mental epidemic; of a sort of black death of degeneration and hysteria; and it is natural that we should ask anxiously on all sides, 'What is to come next?' It is possible that the disease may not as yet have attained its culminating point. If it should become more violent, then certain phenomena which at present are only observed among the inmates of lunatic asylums would pass into the daily habitual condition of whole classes of the population.

Will it come to this? Well, no, I think not. And this for a reason which scarcely permits of an objection; because humanity has not yet reached the term of its evolution; because the over-exertion of two or three generations cannot yet have exhausted all its vital powers.

The human race is still young, and a moment of over-exertion is not fatal for youth; it can recover itself. But the degenerates must succumb. They can neither adapt themselves to the condition of nature and civilization, nor maintain themselves in the struggle for existence against the healthy.

The latter—and the vast masses of the people still include unnumbered millions of them—will easily adapt themselves to the conditions which new inventions have created in humanity. No doubt, they will at first become rather bewildered and fatigued. But little by little they will recover themselves, and their descendants will grow accustomed to the rapid progress which mankind must make, and their slow respiration and their quieter pulsations of heart will prove that it no longer costs them any effort to keep the pace that has been set for them.

The end of the twentieth century, therefore, will probably see a generation to whom it will not be injurious to read a dozen square yards of newspaper daily, to be constantly called to the telephone, to be thinking simultaneously of the five continents of the world, to live half their time in a railway carriage or in a flying-machine, and to satisfy the demands of a circle of a thousand acquaintances, associates and friends.

In the meantime it is the sacred duty of all moral and healthy men to take part in the work of protecting and saving those who are not already too deeply diseased. Only by each individual doing his duty will it be possible to dam up the invading malady. It is not seemly simply to shrug the shoulders and smile contemptuously. While easy-going persons console themselves by saying, 'No rational creature takes this idiotcy seriously,' madness and crime are doing their work and poisoning a whole generation. Society must defend itself.

Whoever believes with me that society is the natural organic form of humanity, in which alone it can exist, prosper and continue to develop to its higher destinies; whoever regard civilization as a good thing, having value and worthy of being defended, must mercilessly help in destroying the anti-social vermin.

It is time for medical specialists to come forward. Let them speak to the mass of cultivated persons and enlighten them in popular works and in popular lectures on the leading facts in mental therapeutics. Let our specialists reveal to the public the mental derangement of degenerate authors and artists, and teach them that the works now in fashion are only written and painted delirium.

Such is the treatment of the disease of the age which I hold to be efficacious. Characterisation of the leading degenerates as mentally diseased; unmasking and stigmatising their imitators as enemies to society; warning the public against the lies of these parasites.

The 'freedom,' the 'modernity,' the 'progress,' and the 'truth' of these madmen and charlatans are not ours. We have nothing in common with them. They wish for self-indulgence; we wish for work. They wish to drown consciousness in the unconscious; we desire to strengthen and enrich the human power of right reasoning. They wish for evasive ideation and babble; we desire the increase of attention, observation and knowledge.

The criterion by means of which the true lovers of progress may be recognized and distinguished from the impostors may be this: Whoever preaches absence of discipline is an enemy of progress; and whoever worships his own self is an enemy of society. Society has for its first premise neighbourly love and the capacity for self-sacrifice; and progress is the effect of an ever more rigorous subjugation of the beast in man; of an ever tenser self-control; an ever keener sense of duty and responsibility. The emancipation for which we are striving is of the judgement, not the appetites.

Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death

FREDERICK W. H. MYERS

THE works of Myers may be divided into two categories, his literary publications and his scientific investigations. As a poet, his best works are St. Paul (1867), The Renewal of Youth (1882), and Fragments of Prose and Poetry, posthumously published. His essays comprise Essays Classical, and Essays Modern (1883), and Science and Future Life (1893). His lifework, however, was the foundation of the Society for Psychical Research, and his scientific observation of alleged occult occurrences. The results of his investigations are recorded in Phantasms of the Living, the joint work of Myers, Podman and Gurney, and in Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death, posthumously published in 1903.

I—THE GREAT QUESTION

THE most momentous question man has to ask himself is whether his personality involves any element which can survive the decease and decay of the body. It is around this problem that man's gravest fears as well as his stimulating hopes have centred. Yet men have never yet sought to apply the scientific method to the problem of human destiny, although they have found that Science has led to so much valid discovery and indisputable truths in other forms of knowledge.

In most civilized countries there has been for the past two thousand years a distinct, tacit belief that human survival has been proved by certain obscure phenomena recorded to have been observed in Palestine. But there has been no serious attempt to correlate that belief with scientific discovery and observation, for men have kept their convictions relative to this subject in a sealed mental compartment consecrated to religion or superstition, but not to experiment.

The object then of this work is to endeavour to break down that artificial wall of demarcation which has thus far excluded from scientific treatment the problems which stand in most

need of all the aids to discovery which such treatment can afford.

Following upon the triumph of Christianity, the Christian Church became for Europe the accredited guardian of all phenomena bearing upon the unseen world. But it was inevitable that the enquiry should become wider and broader, and in the process of broadening witchcraft, Swedenborgianism, Mesmerism, Spiritism all play their part as precursors. The belief in witchcraft passed as human ignorance and folly, though to-day we feel that witchcraft was based upon phenomena that were not understood, phenomena such as hysteria, which when scientifically approached along the lines of psychology, may yield us valuable information.

In the movement headed by Mesmer 'suggestion'—though not under that name—came into prominence, but it was not till our generation that medical science took up the study of hypnotism in which every well-attested fact of witchcraft or of mesmerism finds, if not its explanation, at least its parallel, thus becoming a recognized and advancing method of relieving human ills.

It was to Emmanuel Swedenborg first that the unseen world appeared before all things as a realm of law, a region not of mere emotional vagueness but of definite progress according to definite relations of cause and effect. Founded upon many facts of the supernormal, modern spiritualism or spiritism has erected its edifice, a sectarian cult detracting from what ought to be a branch of scientific enquiry rather than a sectarian creed.

The enquiry, then, with which we are faced, must be an enquiry resting primarily, as all scientific enquiries in the stricter sense must now rest, upon objective facts actually observable upon experiments which we can repeat to-day, and which we may hope to carry farther to-morrow. It must be based on the presupposition that if a spiritual world exists, and if that world has at any epoch been manifest or even discoverable, then it ought to be manifest or discoverable now.

II—DISINTEGRATION OF PERSONALITY

Each man is regarded as at once unitary and also almost infinitely composite. The multiplex organism inherited from earthly ancestors is ruled and unified by a soul or spirit which has originated in a spiritual environment, a spirit which, even while embodied, subsists in that environment and which will still subsist therein after the body's decay.

Man has a consciousness the best line of proof for which probably lies in the memory of past acts, when we arrive at the conclusion that even the hypnotised subject may be conscious.

Now personality may be divided or duplicated, and accordingly we must consider the possibility of any given arrangement or division of the total mass of consciousness which exists within us.

There occur, frequently, changes in the conscious life of individuals, changes which are generally noxious to the physical organism. They seem to be separate from the primary stream of conscious purposive life, and not infrequently are steps on the road to the breaking up of personality and mental overthrow.

The process may begin with something which is to the psychical organism no more than a corn or boil is to the physical. In consequence of some suggestion from without, or of some inherited tendency, a small group of psychical units set up a process of exaggerated growth which shuts them off from free and healthy interchange with the rest of the personality. The result may be an uncontrolled, unmodified group of thoughts or actions developing in various ways. It may become a fixed, insistent idea inducing hysterical convulsions, or it may draw so many psychical elements to its centre that it forms a kind of secondary personality co-existing secretly with the primary one.

Usually, these fixed ideas are at the outset but extravagant fancies—as that one is made of glass or the like—and hardly one of us is wholly free from tendencies to certain types of thoughts or emotions for which we cannot summon any adequate check. Some haunting troubles have their origin in our childhood, but for some we must go even farther back. The fear of darkness, the fear of solitude, the fear of thunderstorms speak of primitive helplessness, and to these and such instinctive feelings a morbid development is easily given.

These fixed ideas may readily pass into hysteria in which a series of phantom copies of real maladies of the nervous system may occur or they may be determined by no physiological mechanism and may then be some form of self-suggestion. What is only a silly fancy seems in some cases to produce an effect which is objective, measurable and capable of causing serious disablement. This may be a restriction of the conscious field wherein, by a fixed distraction, the subject may be incapable of attaching certain sensations to his personality, although no physiological cause can be attributed.

For example, a hysteric may actually lose sensation in one arm, but on being told by a doctor that there is a caterpillar on that arm the reinforcement of attention thus generated may bring back the sensibility. In these and similar cases hysteria is a dissolutive process where the elements of personality are isolated.

Hysteria is undoubtedly a disease, but it is by no means an indication of initial mental weakness, and it would be a great mistake to suppose that all psychical disturbances are due to vanity, to anger, to terror, to sexual passion. Danger lies before us if we fix our conception of human character too low. We must not form the idea that there is nothing before us but a study of decay. It is his steady advance and not his occasional regression which makes the chief concern of man. Martyrs, crusaders, nihilists, enthusiasts of any kind who are swayed by impulses largely below the threshold of ordinary consciousness, these may bring to bear on human affairs a force more concentrated and at higher tension than deliberate reason can generate. They are virtually carrying out self-suggestions which have acquired the permanence of fixed ideas. These fixed ideas, however, are not so isolated as those of true hysterics.

Sometimes a secondary state intervenes, a kind of bewilderment overrunning the whole personality. This state ranges from sleep-wakings of all kinds and includes all stages of alternation of personality, from

brief somnambulism up to permanent and thorough changes of personality.

The study of the phenomena of dreams is perhaps the best starting-point for the study of these secondary states. In many cases our dream contains a conversation in which we await with eagerness and hear with surprise the remarks of our interlocutor who must, of course, all the time represent only another segment of ourselves. This in waking life may dominate a being's mentality to such an extent that he is a changed person where there is marked severance between the new and the old self.

There are many recorded cases of these duplications of personality in which a person may believe himself to be other than he is and actually act the part completely. Cases of alleged 'possession' or 'spirit control' may come under this head. They are really cases of duplicated personality in which suggestion has made its impression upon a hysterical type of mind.

We see now that personality is of complex structure, with separable elements which may be dissected and dissociated. Sometimes hysteria brings to light acquisitions as well as losses of faculty—an integration in place of a disintegration.

III—THE NORMAL AND THE GENIUS

GENIUS may be regarded as a power of utilising a wider range than other men can utilise of faculties in some degree innate in all. The word 'normal' is ordinarily used to imply either conformity to a standard, or a position as an average between two extremes. But there occur instances in the life of every one of us when a maximum of faculty is manifested, when we do what we have never before even supposed ourselves able to do; a man, we say, outdoes himself in a great emergency, as, for example, when he rescues his children from a burning house, exercising a strength and agility which seemed beyond his own. The action is an emergence of hidden faculty taking command of the man and guiding his action at the moment when his being is deeply stirred.

Such an instance may serve as an illustration of a phenomenon which is constantly occurring on a small scale in the inner life of each of us.

Sometimes there is a rush upwards as of a subaqueous spring, an inspiration flashes into the mind for which our conscious effort has not prepared us. This so-called inspiration may in itself be trivial or worthless, but it is the initial stage of a phenomenon to which, when certain rare attributes are also present, the name of genius will be naturally given.

As an illustration of the workings of genius we may consider those cases of 'arithmetical prodigy,' generally a boy of tender years capable of performing 'in his head,' and almost instantaneously, problems for which ordinary workers would require pencil and paper, and a much longer time. Generally this power shows itself in early years and tends to weaken in later years. We may also consider the records left by eminent men as to the element of subconscious mentation which was involved in their best work. For example, one psychologist of repute has declared that he has sometimes understood a geometrical demonstration made to him a year previously without ever having directed his attention to it. The conception implanted in his brain seemed to have ripened spontaneously, bringing about a novel grasp of the proof.

Observation then of many such declarations shows us that a very brief and shallow submergence beneath the conscious level is often enough to infuse fresh vigour into trains of thought. In some cases of deep and fruitful abstraction we see a slight approach to duplication of personality. John Stuart Mill, intent on his Principles of Logic, as he threaded the crowds of Leadenhall Street, recalls certain morbid cases of hysterical distraction—only that with Mill the process was an integrative one and not a dissolutive one—a gain and not a loss of power over the organism. Again, in some of these cases, we see the man of genius achieving spontaneously and unawares much the same result as that which is achieved for the hypnotic subject by deliberate artifice. He is in fact co-ordinating the working and the sleeping phases of his existence.

These slight imperfect instances seem to point in a more useful direction than do some of the facts collected by most anthropologists who hold that genius is a kind of nervous malady, a disturbance of mental balance akin to criminality or even madness. Rather, the man of genius is on the whole the completed type of humanity, and in a man such as Socrates we see the ideal unification of human powers. Perhaps the promptings of the Demon of Socrates are the manifestations of the subliminal self of a man of genius, conveying to that great philosopher precisely the precognitive information which is the privilege of the sensitive man of to-day.

We have, of course, assumed in man a soul which can draw strength and grace from a spiritual universe. That which religions have claimed for their saints—and what is sanctity but the genius of the ethical realm?—psychology must claim for every form of spiritual indrawing, every form of spiritual response. That indrawing is healthy and full of joy and shows us that genius is akin to the child and not to the madman.

Men of genius, then, are no eccentrics nor degenerates; they have made for us the sanest and most fruitful experiment yet made by man; they have endeavoured to exalt the human race in a way in which it can be exalted. They have drawn on forces which exist and on a Soul which answers; they have dwelt on those things 'by dwelling on which it is,' as Plato has it—'that even God is divine.'

IV—SLEEP AND HYPNOTISM

SLEEP is a change of personality which is borne in on everyone's notice, not as a morbid curiosity, but as an essential part of life. It is difficult to define sleep for its definition is recognized as a crux of philosophy. Nor can we be content to deal with it in a purely negative aspect, dwelling upon the mere absence of working faculties. We must treat sleep

positively as far as we can, as a definite phase of our personality, co-ordinate with the working phase.

The break of consciousness in sleep is associated in some way with a powerful physiological change and a few moments of sleep will sometimes bring a renovation which hours of lying down in darkness and silence will not yield. There must be therefore, in sleep, an increased control over organic functions at the foundation of bodily life.

Sometimes, however, we find that sleep is capable of strange developments, night sometimes outdoing the most complex achievements of day. The somnambulist, like the man of genius, brings into play resources which are beyond ordinary reach. Sometimes a dream may be preserved in permanent results as, for example, in cases where a dream has led to 'conversion' or marked religious change, or where it has been the starting-point of an 'insistent idea' or of a fit of actual insanity. M. Taine relates how a gendarme, impressed by an execution at which he had assisted, dreamt that he himself was to be executed and was afterwards so influenced by the dream that he attempted suicide. Thus it would seem that the dreaming self may undergo sensory and emotional experiences apparently more intense than those of vigilance, and may produce thereby lasting effects upon the waking body and mind.

It is also possible, from observed data—such as the solutions of difficult problems in sleep—to conclude that not only memory but power of inference and of argument may be intensified in sleep.

We are also conscious that in sleeping states the sleeping spirit is capable of perception of distant scenes, of telepathic communications with distant persons, or even with spirits unencumbered by the flesh. Here again, then the inference of the phenomena of sleep would point to the fact that the waking personality is adapted to the needs of earthly life; the personality of sleep maintains the fundamental connexions between the organism and the spiritual world by supplying it with spiritual energy during sleep and itself develops by the exercise of its own spiritual faculties.

Closely connected with sleep is the hypnotic trance, which, however, may be roughly characterised as self-suggestion. Such suggestion, as a systematic appeal to the deeper subconscious powers in man, must be fitted on to the whole serious life of man. There must needs be some scheme of self-suggestion—some general theory which can give the individual a basis for his appeal, whether he may regard the appeal as directed to an intelligence outside himself or to his own inherent faculties and informing soul.

Schemes of self-suggestion have been effective in all the superstition and all the religion of man. Each form of supernatural belief has been utilised in securing the blessing of relief from physical pain. Charms, inert objects, meaningless gestures and words have been employed for the cure of disease. We know how long some forms of primitive belief persisted in medicine, as, for example, the cure of some disease by some object bearing some resemblance to its name or symptoms.

Even where persons are well aware of the intrinsic futility of charms these may nevertheless exercise a real, practical influence as a reminder to the subliminal self, or serve to keep some nervous disturbance in check.

All these, and our higher religious appeals are but attempts at a practical realization of the essential truth that it is possible by a right disposition of our own minds to draw energy from an environing world of spiritual life.

V—PHANTASMS OF THE DEAD

From the actions and perceptions of spirits still in the flesh we pass to inquire into the actions of spirits no longer in the flesh, and into the forms of perception with which men still in the flesh respond to that unfamiliar and mysterious agency. In popular language, we are looking out for 'ghosts.'

Now a ghost is not what popular fancy imagines as such, 'a dead person permitted to communicate with the living,' but rather a manifestation of persistent personal energy, an indication that some kind of force is being exercised after death which is in some way connected with a person previously known on earth. Now this definition may seem to imply an assumption we are not warranted in making. Theoretically, at least, it is just possible that this influence which, after a man's death, creates a phantasmal impression of him may indicate no continuing action on his part, but may be some residue of the force or energy which he generated while yet alive.

However, we may say that now, for the first time, we are able to form a conception of ghostly communication which may be presented as in some way a development of facts already experimentally known.

We have already the conception of multiplex personality, the possibility of the co-existence of many states and many memories in the same individual; and we have also the conception of telepathy—the action of mind on mind apart from any bodily organ, forming, as it were messages from men to men still in the flesh.

Wherever, then, there is any form of hallucination, some message is forcing its way upwards from one stratum of personality to another.

In post mortem cases we ought to expect some similar general principles to those of phantasms of the normal, actual life of man, and most conspicuous in this class are actual apparitions.

A phantasm representing a person whose death is recent is specially likely to arouse interest, and the emotional state of a person may be considered a sufficient cause for the hallucination. But there are calm, collected states of mind wherein there are recorded instances of phantasms. For example, take the case of Rev. R. M. Hill, who saw a tall figure rush into his room. He was surprised and alarmed, but it vanished before he had time to recognize it. An uncle, a tall man, died about that moment, and it is remarked that although Mr. Hill knew his uncle to be ill, the anxiety which he may have felt would hardly have given rise to an unrecognized and formidable apparition.

Sometimes the phenomena associated with apparition are dismissed extremely lightly, but all our study of personality shows us that, whatever else a 'ghost' may be, it is one of the most complex phenomena in nature. It is a

function of two unknown variables—the incarnate spirit's sensitivity and the discarnate spirit's capacity of self-manifestation.

There are few recorded cases where actual apparitions give evidence of any continuity in the knowledge possessed by a spirit of friends on earth, though there are cases where a spirit is recorded as appearing repeatedly—in guardian angel fashion—foreseeing and sympathising with certain happenings. Sometimes apparitions do imply a perception of earthly events such as moral crises, marriage, grave quarrels or impending crimes of friends left behind on earth.

Many cases of alleged apparition have been investigated by the Society for Psychical Research, and their findings recorded; findings which stimulate the acutely scientific experimenter to further research.

Of course, in any such inquiry as the present we must often stand intermediate between matters capable and matters incapable of proof. The secure discovery that there is a life in man independent of blood and all material would be a dominating fact of all science and speculation.

Our researches have given hope that science will shortly recognize that the relation between the material and spiritual worlds cannot be an ethical or emotional relation alone. In the spirit world we become conscious of laws at least as persistent and identical from age to age as the known laws of energy and motion.

No longer can belief in the soul's survival after death be supported by tradition alone. It must be more and more tested by experience and inquiry.

In the age of Thales, Greece was given delight by the first dim notion of cosmic unity and law. In the age of Christ, Europe felt the first high authentic message from a world beyond our own. In our own age we reach the perception that such messages may become continuous and progressive, that between seen and unseen there is a channel and fairway which future generations may learn to widen and to clarify.



HEINRICH KARL MARX was born at Trèves, May 5, 1818. After the failure of the revolutionary movement of 1848 in Germany he settled in London, where he died March 14, 1883. In 1867 was published the first volume of Marx's work, Capital, and two further volumes appeared after his death. Marx was a leading exponent of the materialist conception of history; he believed that historical development was based mainly on economic considerations.

Elliott & Fry

SIR FRANCIS GALTON was born near Birmingham, February 16, 1822, a cousin of Charles Darwin. He was educated first at King Edward's School, Birmingham, and studied medicine in Cambridge and London. In 1846 he travelled in the Sudan, and in 1850 explored Damaraland, writing two books on his experiences. He then turned his attention specially to meteorology, and formulated a theory of anti-cyclones which led to his long association with the Meteorological Council. His books on Hereditary Genius and Inquiries into Human Faculty established the principles of what he termed eugenics, in furtherance of which he founded a laboratory in 1904. Galton was knighted in 1909 and died January 17, 1911.



ERNST HEINRICH HAECKEL was born at Potsdam, February 16, 1834. He qualified as a physician but abandoned medicine for natural history and specialised in zoology, becoming director of the zoological institute at Jena in 1862, and, in 1865, professor of zoology at Jena University. He held that chair for 48 years and on retiring in 1909 devoted himself to the establishment of a museum of evolution. A master of zoology and an authority on botany and embryology, Haeckel's industry produced something like half a hundred scientific works. He died at Jena, August 8, 1919.



AUGUSTE FOREL was born at Morges, in the canton of Vaud, Switzerland, September 1, 1848, and studied at the universities of Zurich and Vienna. In 1873 he was appointed assistant medical officer of a hospital for the insane at Munich, and in 1879 became professor of psychiatrics at Zurich and director of the cantonal asylum at Burgholzli. He gave up his professorship in 1897 and settled at Chigny near Morges. Apart from his entomological interests Forel specialised in the anatomy of the brain and the aural system. He became a recognized authority on hypnotism and won an international reputation as a reformer of penological methods.